Please Hold: Why Your Call Center Job (mostly) Isn't Going Anywhere

“I alerted three employees who showed complete indifference towards me…so began a yearlong saga of pass the buck, don’t ask me, and ‘I’m sorry sir, your claim can go nowhere.’”

  • United Breaks Guitars, Dave Carroll (2009)

This paper begins 20 years ago, long before the rise of AI, when Myspace hadn’t yet folded to Facebook, and Amazon had only recently become profitable. Here, on the ninth floor of the Starbucks corporate office, I engaged an analyst in a spirited though misguided debate over why people were so loyal to the brand. I’d spent two years in the call center, listening to customers from Los Angeles to New York say the same thing: “If I got this service at McDonalds, I wouldn’t care; but at Starbucks I expect more.” Prior to that, I’d spent another two years in the stores “surprising and delighting” customers in accordance with the company’s mission. I actually believed that we were changing the world one cup of coffee at a time, and my conversations with customers across North America proved as much. Or so I thought. 

“They’re statistically irrelevant,” the analyst said. “All the people you’ve talked to don’t matter.” An awkward silence followed and the conversation soon ended, but it marked the moment that I started to question the nature of my reality. At that time Starbucks served around twenty-five million customers a week, while the number of calls handled by the contact center was somewhere in the low tens of thousands. On a good day there might be a few pleasant conversations, on a bad day it was hard to comprehend how the company stayed in business. The reality, however, was that all of these complaints amounted to less than one-percent of Starbucks’ daily volume. The overwhelming majority of customers were satisfied. The complainers, even those who parroted the customer connection Howard Schultz believed was essential, weren’t representative. People went to Starbucks because it was there. The success of the company wasn’t based on surprising and delighting customers, it was premised on consistency and market saturation. As one VP of store development put it, “If we don’t keep opening stores, someone else will.” The connection to the brand was, to a certain extent, fungible, and with it, the need to personally apologize for failed expectations. And so it was a year later that Starbucks announced it was outsourcing its call center to an outfit in Nevada. From that point forward, if you called customer support, you’d not be talking to the company. 

The cost-cutting target on customer service is nothing new. Call centers had been outsourced for decades prior to Starbucks’ decision. However, the rise of artificial intelligence has presented companies with a new opportunity to replace agents, provide more consistent and available service, and keep headcount flat while continuing to grow. This paper explores the growing tension between reducing costs and providing a human connection. It reviews how companies value their AI investments, the importance of good partners, and whether they should even listen to their customers at all.

Background & literature review

The cloud of hyperbole and fear surrounding artificial intelligence makes discerning fact from fiction extraordinarily difficult. When Amazon announced it was laying off thirty-thousand employees, The Wall Street Journal was quick to attribute the job cuts to AI (Ellis et al 2025). However, CNBC argued that CEOs are under increasing pressure to show gains from artificial intelligence, even if reductions in force aren’t the result of AI. Intelligent automation, they say, provides a convenient excuse for layoffs that would have happened anyway (Morabito, 2025). Furthermore, while Amazon CEO Andy Jassy extolled the potential for artificial intelligence to reshape the customer experience (Coleman, 2023), it’s doubtful the company has figured out how AI should be used, much less deployed a solution at scale. 

Executives may want to implement AI but determining how and where and which vendor to choose is difficult. Furthermore, the market is saturated with AI products that offer little actual value. According to an MIT report on AI adoption, one executive described the bulk of AI products as science projects, adding that of dozens of demos, only one or two were genuinely useful (Challapally et al, 2025, p. 7). Similarly, in a report on the use of artificial intelligence in contact centers, McKinsey found that CEOs are flooded with vendors predicting an AI end to human agents. However McKinsey cautions against such exuberance, citing technical challenges, software compatibility, and the continued need for human escalation as reasons to be skeptical of such predictions (Blackader et al, 2025). Nonetheless, interest in AI adoption is real and driving phenomenal growth in investment, infrastructure, and AI-related services.

Business case

It’s difficult to argue that AI doesn’t present tremendous advantages to contact center operations. Microsoft, for example, announced that AI had saved it over $500 million in call center costs in 2024 alone (Babu, 2025). Payment processor Klarna (2024a) claims their chatbots do the work of 700 agents while achieving satisfaction scores that are on par with humans. The company reported that it had saved over $40 million as a result of AI. And, IBM (n.d.) partnered with Camping World to implement self-help and agent-assisted AI solutions that have improved wait times, decreased dropped call rates, and improved agent efficiency by 33%.

AI has also been used to achieve better customer results by creating better human engagements. For example, McKinsey (McK, n.d.) partnered with Deutsche Telekom to implement an AI coach that analyzes agents’ interactions with customers and provides tailored feedback in real time. Deutsche Telekom reported a 2% decrease in transfers, a 10% increase in first call resolution (FCR) and a 14 point increase in net promoter score as a result. While it’s easy to downplay the softer benefits of AI, they carry real impact to the bottom line. For example, Qualtrics found that 53% of bad experiences resulted in customers cutting spend, while customers were twice as likely to recommend if their issue was resolved on first contact (Zdatny & Brown, 2024). Desmarais (2025) echoes these findings, writing that 93% of customers expect their issue to be resolved on the first call, adding that for every 1% gained in FCR companies reduce their operating costs by 1%.

AI can be used to automate agent tasks and transform call centers into data centers. Google and Deloitte partnered with Canadian insurance company Definity to modernize their contact center operations. According to Google (GOOG, n.d.), GenAI has been used to automatically document calls and reduce total handle time to 3 ½ minutes per call. Prior to AI automation, agents had been spending 3-5 minutes on documentation alone.

That documentation is itself an asset to businesses. Morrell (2025b) writes that companies should start viewing call centers as business intelligence hubs, not cost centers, noting that contact center leadership have consistently polled more favorably toward analytics since 2018. Respondents said contact center data helped them spot opportunities for self-service, process failures, and assist with the customer journey. Moreover, data has helped consultants and business operators alike. Mckinsey (McK, n.d.) used vast amounts of call center data to train AI models, identify trends and set KPIs. Google (GOOG, n.d.) uses its VertexAI to store transcripts, emails, and call records for analysis. The data are made available to agents and analysts in real time. Nicastro (2025) sums up these benefits, writing that Contact Center as a Service has turned call centers into revenue generators. In short, AI coupled with contact center data is a powerful tool for driving business insights and competitive advantage. 

Finally, Amazon argues that customers want the 24/7 service that only AI tools can provide. Human agents, they write, are expensive and not always available. Furthermore, by handling the majority of contacts through AI, human agents are free to focus on more complex and sensitive issues (Merritt, 2021). In a similar vein, Morrell (2025a) writes that customers will choose the method of contact that is most convenient for them, and the one that fully resolves their issue. In that, there isn’t one right way to service customers, except that they are served quickly and with the right information. AI meets this objective by being constantly available at scale. The benefits are not only increased agent efficiency, but reduced costs and better, more available customer service.

Customer voice

The benefits of AI to businesses may be clear, however, adopters must ask whether automation is actually what their customers want and whether there exists too much of a good thing. Morrell (2025a) writes that companies can’t assume that customers will use digital communication simply because it’s there. As Microsoft (Morris, 2016) and Harvard (Dixon & Tomand, 2010) pointed out, customers will choose the solution that’s easiest to use, regardless of the technology behind it. McKinsey data reinforced this point, noting that 94% of Boomers and 71% of GenZ say calling in was still the easiest way to reach customer care (Blackader et al, 2025). 

Further underwriting these preferences may be a broader skepticism of AI. For example, more than half of customers surveyed are concerned that artificial intelligence will replace humans (Zdatny & Brown, 2024). This need for human contact is not new or unique to AI, however. Dichter (2019) argued in Forbes that people’s desire to speak to someone in their own country isn’t nativism, it’s psychological and instantly relatable. In other cases, simply implying a human connection removes psychological barriers. Stewart (2023) summarizes a conversation with Boston University professor Michelle Shell, who says just displaying the option to talk to an agent while interacting with AI puts people at ease. Moreover, the McKinsey data above suggests demographics play a role in shaping our expectations. Morrell (2025a) writes that GenZ generally have less experience with in-person engagements, are more apprehensive about phone interactions, and carry higher expectations of service as a result.

Yet human contact isn’t necessary or even preferred for many interactions. Forrester (Leggett, 2019) found that two-thirds of customers say valuing their time is the most important thing a company can do to provide them good service. Self-service, they argue, meets the customer while they’re engaged, is faster, cheaper, and often comes with higher satisfaction. It’s also worth noting that the nature of the company’s business defines what quality service means. Microsoft (Chang, 2023) writes that B2B customers are more likely to self-help and engage online resources, while as individuals, customers want something closer to white-glove service. In fact, 63% of customers expect service to be personalized, and 80% of customers were more likely to make a purchase if that need was met. Nonetheless, the rise of digital experience, chat, email, and now AI, have allowed companies to radically depart from traditional customer service models. Facebook, for example, famously has no customer service phone number. Reporters for Business Insider noted that the best way to get a human at the company, was to reach out via social media (John and Johnson, 2023). Squarespace (SQSP, 2024) publicly acknowledges its lack of a direct line writing, “we truly believe it wouldn’t be possible to provide the same effective help over the phone.” The company argues that the nature of their product often requires screencaptures, code snips, and other visual representations that are better resolved over email. Online scheduler Acuity (AS, 2025) makes a nearly identical statement, directing customers to its 24/7 chat platform; and Uber (n.d.) says it doesn’t offer a direct line for riders but does for Uber Eats and Business.

The risks of eliminating phone lines will be covered more in the discussion, but there are indications that the approach might not represent customer interests. At the very least, a company’s ability to not provide a direct line is highly dependent on the business it is in. Frontier Airlines for example was among the companies cited by Stewart (2023) who had eliminated their customer service numbers. Two years later, the company has reinstated its 800 line, presumably due to customer pushback. Indeed, the unpredictability of problems and human nature suggest companies should think carefully before eliminating phones. IBM (n.d.) and Amazon (Merritt, 2021) each stressed the importance of maintaining human agents to handle more complex issues. McKinsey (Blackader et al, 2025) went a step further, writing that such complex issues require human empathy and judgement. The higher the mix of complexity and emotion, the more the customer wants a live agent (Morrell, 2025a).

Finally, it’s worth noting that trends in the data support the persistence of phone lines. According to Morrell (2025a), phones still account for 60% of contacts and though that number plateaued in 2022, it hasn’t declined. McKinsey reported similar data, noting that while digital interactions have increased 6% since 2010, phone calls still gained 2% over the same period. In other words, they write, though AI might take a larger share of interactions, the total number of phone calls are likely to increase over time (Blackader et al, 2025). The resilience of human interactions was further supported by Qualtrics data. In the same survey of customers who voiced concern that AI would replace humans, 61% said they preferred a human contact. And 74% preferred humans when the problem was technical (Zdatny and Brown, 2024). 

In summary, customers want fast, easy service that solves their problem. How these needs are met is highly dependent on our age, level of frustration, technical aptitude and relationship to the brand. It’s clear from the literature reviewed here, however, that while some companies have eliminated phone numbers, talking to a live person remains not only the dominant form of contact, but a highly persistent one as well.

Challenges

Getting AI right and deciding whether it should be used at all are two of the biggest challenges facing decisionmakers. Media coverage of AI and the gravitational lensing that comes with it, distorts perceptions and suggests that businesses are adopting AI at rates that match its growth. In fact, the opposite is true. MIT reported that while 60% of surveyed businesses said they’d reviewed enterprise AI solutions, just 20% developed a pilot, and only 5% reached production (Challapally, 2025, p. 3). Lindner (2025) cites better but still paltry statistics indicating that 74% of CRM initiatives fail to meet goals due to inadequate technical integration. These low success rates suggest that companies are either not finding value in AI or are unable to overcome the technical challenges inherent in enterprise-wide initiatives. 

The aforementioned deluge of AI vendors and startups offering unproven products is one challenge reported by Blackader et al (2025). However, identifying a quality vendor is only part of the challenge. Technical and cultural resistance to change are major factors facing new initiatives. For example, Nicastro (2025) writes that lack of trust is a significant hurdle to AI adoption. Call center agents don’t fear AI so much as they fear a bad rollout of the technology. Employees want artificial intelligence to make their jobs easier, not micromanage them. Similarly, Challapally et al (2025) write that users prefer GPT for mundane tasks, but 90% of those surveyed still prefer humans for mission-critical work. These findings suggest that a solution might look good on paper but fail to achieve real value in practice. 

Even if social resistance is mitigated, controlling costs remains a non-trivial concern. Enterprise-wide implementations of AI can run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars and be difficult to forecast. For instance, a Gartner study found that over half of companies surveyed underestimated the initial costs of implementation by 30-40%. Hiring data scientists, ML experts, and training existing staff also carries ongoing costs that are often under-appreciated (Piccolo, 2025). 

Budget concerns aside, determining the right implementation of AI can be difficult. Vendors often don’t understand a client’s approval process or dataflows, and while generic chatbots have high pilot to implementation rates, they’re often brittle, over-engineered, and not aligned with workflows. One executive interviewed by MIT said that if the technology doesn’t integrate with Salesforce, no one’s going to use it (Challapally et al, 2025, pp. 7-15). Similarly business results can be equally elusive. For example, McKinsey (Blackader et al, 2025), found that very few companies were able to achieve meaningful reductions in contact center volume. Those who did, they write, were able to solve the aforementioned data and integration issues. Yet, even relatively simple engagements can be difficult to remediate. For instance, McKinsey found that 50-60% of contact center interactions remain transactional, despite efforts to reduce them (Blackader et al, 2025). The resilience of simple contacts should at minimum serve as a reality check to the limitations of AI. 

Finally, politics and data are concerns for leadership and vendors alike. Dixon and Toman (2010) wrote in the Harvard Business Review that companies often fail to recognize the importance of providing basic service and instead focus on metrics that don’t matter. For example, Harvard’s survey of contact center leadership found that 89% of respondents said exceeding expectations was their primary strategy; yet the authors argue that this approach is flawed, noting that the data show that more satisfied customers are not necessarily more loyal customers. The challenge is no less for vendors tasked with implementing AI initiatives. In their case study of Deutsche Telekom, McKinsey (McK, n.d.) noted that the most challenging aspect of implementation was identifying relevant information. Morrell (2025b) covers this problem from a production perspective, writing that failures in automation often lead to callbacks, but fewer than half of companies said they had sufficient data to identify the root cause. These comments speak to the importance of having quality data, clear goals and understanding what matters. 

In some cases, the difficulties start with articulating value to the CEO. Surveyed executives expressed trouble framing the value of AI outside of sales and marketing, even though backend applications of artificial intelligence often carry higher returns (Challapally et al, 2025, pp. 10, 20). In other cases, risks arise from expectations that don’t match the chosen technology. For example, a lawyer interviewed by MIT said GenAI’s lack of memory and access to prior conversations made it impractical to use. This lack of persistence was cited by researchers as a major reason AI projects fail (pp. 12-14). Yet, MIT data also found that there was near unanimous individual use of AI across the board, indicating that while corporate initiatives might fail, employees are still finding value in AI (p. 8). That said, these results are not necessarily representative of contact centers. For example, Qualtrics cited in-house research that showed only 20% of agents actively use AI (Zdatny & Brown, 2024), a far cry from the unanimous adoption rates cited by MIT. Regardless, these findings suggest that AI has a place in day-to-day workflows, but enterprise solutions often fail to meet the employee where AI is needed most. 

In short, the risks to successful implementation of AI are equal parts social, political, technical, and operational. Simply throwing AI at a problem does not ensure that the problem will be solved or that the project will be completed. Competition between stakeholders and business units also plays a role in project success. Finally, technical challenges, lack of vendor domain knowledge, and process incompatibility all conspire to make forecasting costs difficult. How these challenges can be met will be discussed more in the next section. 

Remediating challenges

Clearly there are challenges facing AI that are not easily resolved. Yet the gains in efficiency and revenue cited by MIcrosoft, Klarna, IBM, and others, show that AI can be done right. AWS provides a list of best-practices that begins with starting small. Amazon recommends focusing on transactional asks like password resets, address updates, and routing to the right person (Merritt, 2021). While McKinsey’s (Blackader et al, 2025) research shows that transactional contacts can be stubbornly persistent, focusing on these simple tasks is low risk while still providing value. Alternatively, IBM (n.d.) took a phased approach to their development of Camping World’s virtual assistant, a strategy that both limited risk and proved essential to the project’s success. And, in their case study of Definity, Google (GOOG, n.d.) focused their initial rollout on documenting calls before taking on other tasks. Definity says it is using the success of this program to pursue enterprise applications of AI. In a nod to MIT’s recommendation that adopters focus on backend systems, Google says the call center’s low risk and high ROI made it an ideal starting point for AI adoption. Their tight focus on streamlining documentation further aided the project’s success.

Though starting small might encourage companies to develop solutions in-house, finding a quality partner remains essential. According to MIT, strategic partnerships between vendors and clients are twice as likely to succeed as internal builds (Challapally et al, 2025, pp 19-23). Indeed each of the case studies above involves a major technical partner, whether Google, IBM, or McKinsey. Vendors can also help solve requirements and technical gaps. For example, in their work with Deutsche Telekom, McKinsey (McK, n.d.) cited their commitment to spending time with agents, understanding workflows and the team’s learning process as central to their approach. This effort helped them identify information overload as a major inhibitor to agent learning. Separately, IBM worked with Camping World to tailor solutions to their various customer segments, and Google’s (GOOG, n.d.) work with Definity addressed specific operational pain points. In all cases vendors took the time to understand the client’s objectives and craft solutions that resolved front-line issues. 

Focusing on making the process easy was also a recurrent theme throughout the literature. In their best practices, Amazon writes that solutions need to communicate who the customer is, what they’re doing, and where they are in the system and pass that information to the agent. The customer, they say, should not have to repeat themselves (Merritt, 2021). Dixon and Toman (2010) make a similar point, arguing that while good service does little to reinforce a brand, bad service can do a lot to undermine it. Therefore, it’s important to make interactions with the company as easy as possible. Finally, Microsoft writes that customers want the fastest solution for the least amount of effort, pointing out that 28% of respondents cited agent ineffectiveness and 25% cited lack of self-help as their top complaints. Solutions, they say, should not only reduce friction but empower employees and customers to solve problems (Morris, 2016).

Finally, it’s important to find the right balance between AI initiatives and organic use. MIT argues that successful implementations do three things: buy not build, select tools that integrate deeply and adapt over time, and empower managers to make decisions instead of adopting a centralized solution (Challapally et al, 2025, p. 23). Microsoft (Chang, 2023) offers slightly different criteria, defining success as keeping solutions lean and consolidating initiatives around a single cloud platform. It’s not clear to what extent the case studies above follow these recommendations. Certainly Definity’s desire to implement enterprise applications of AI suggests centralized planning. However, the high personal use of AI cited by Challapally et al (2025) indicates that decentralized approaches have merit. Nicastro’s (2025) argument that agents don’t fear artificial intelligence but a bad rollout of the technology, alludes to a similar point. In that, a more organic approach to AI might help drive adoption. Klarna (2024b), for example, has embraced a ground up approach, encouraging employees to test applications of AI in their daily work. This decentralized model, the company says, has resulted in a 90% employee adoption rate of artificial intelligence.

In summary, successful initiatives will tailor solutions to customers’ and employees’ needs. They will be decentralized and focus on making interactions with the company as easy as possible. Their success hinges on finding a quality partner, starting small, and overcoming organizational resistance, both to using AI and to how it’s deployed. 

Discussion and outlook

I am admittedly biased in my view of contact centers. On the one hand, I’m sympathetic to the nature of the role and the ownership one takes over issues they had no part in creating. It’s drudgerous, yes, but important, I believe, to own your mistakes, not outsource them to someone else. The notion of deflecting responsibility to third parties or a fleet of robots, offends my sense of accountability and certainly wouldn’t fly in my career leading enterprise initiatives. On the other hand, all of those contacts are very likely statistically irrelevant. In a free market, real risk comes from over-emphasizing what doesn’t matter, and so companies are incentivized to make decisions that benefit the business, not a fractional subset of individuals. Yet this remains an abrasive somewhat cynical pill to swallow, regardless of how true it may be. And so, perhaps it’s foolish to say, but surely there exists a reasonable middleground, where cake can be had and eaten too.

To begin with, no one wants to feel as though they don’t matter, whether that’s customers or contact center representatives. The expectations of personalized white-glove service stated by Chang (2023) and the cross-generational preference for human contact covered by Blackader et al (2025) are indicators of that fact. That said, one could be forgiven for believing that if every company could do away with direct lines, as Facebook, Squarespace, and Uber have done, that they would. After all, a 2018 survey by the National Association of Call Centers, suggests that a non-trivial percentage of organizations are biased in that direction. According to Dichter (2019), 45% of companies were either totally or mostly cost-driven, viewing the primary purpose of the contact center being to benefit the company, not the customer.

It’s no surprise, therefore, that reduced costs is one of the most consistent benefits cited throughout the literature. Amazon, IBM, and McKinsey all pushed cost-savings as a principal benefit of AI (Merritt, 2021; IBM, n.d.; McK, n.d.). In an interview with Vox, Harvard professor Ryan Buell said companies recognize that these costs exist on a sliding scale. Humans are the most expensive, robots are the cheapest (Stewart, 2023). Yet there exists a second sliding scale between costs and customer expectations that prevents companies from abdicating all responsibility to meet customers in person. The preference for human interaction across multiple surveys, including Qualtrics (Zdatny and Brown, 2024) and McKinsey (Blackader et al, 2025) are indicators of this need. However, there are more pervasive factors that won’t be remediated simply by the passage of time. Dichter (2019) writes that the rise of smart phones and social media have allowed customers to reach millions of viewers the minute their expectations aren’t met. The implication being a PR disaster for companies who prioritize cost saving over quality service. United Airlines famously suffered this fate after refusing to reimburse musician Dave Carroll (n.d.) for damaging one of his guitars. The artist responded by writing a song that went viral and gained traction in the mainstream media. 

Nonetheless, it’s foolish to expect companies to avoid finding ways to lower costs. AI uniquely applies to call centers in ways that it may not to other business units. It’s also true that very few agents will complain if artificial intelligence means seeing fewer calls in queue. However, this doesn’t mean that companies want to broadly eliminate all humans from the contact center. In fact, Dichter (2019) writes that the rise of offshoring that came about in the 1990s has since shown signs of reversing. For example, there are over 600 call centers, employing over a quarter million people in Texas alone; and Senator Gallego (2025) of Arizona recently introduced legislation to keep call centers in America. Furthermore, IBM (n.d.) acknowledged that while Watson reduces the need for human contact, it doesn’t replace it. And McKinsey (Blackader et al, 2025) says retaining quality human agents will become a competitive advantage over the coming years. In that, Facebook, Squarespace, and Uber are outliers that are allowed to forgo human contact because the nature of their business allows them to do so. Perhaps this is the slice of cake my inner idealist desires. The sentiments above and their permutations cited throughout this paper, suggest, if nothing else, a desire to keep humans involved. I believe, however, that human involvement is far more obligatory than that statement suggests, particularly in the age of social media. Ironically, however, its value may not be fully appreciated until it's nowhere to be found. 

Outlook

Hanging over the human argument is the very fact that AI might be giving people exactly what they want. After all, Microsoft (Morris, 2016) and Amazon (Merritt, 2021) argued that customers want service that is fast, easy, and available. Not necessarily a human to talk to every time they need help. Admittedly it is tempting to apply these perspectives unilaterally across the spectrum of contacts. But as was shown in the literature review, context, age, technical aptitude, and frustration level all play a role in determining whether a human conversation is required. All else being equal, however, simply offering a path to humans is often enough (Stewart, 2023). These competing vectors present a compelling conversation for exactly what the future holds and to what degree AI will take over customer service. 

To start, call centers are one of the departments most likely to be impacted by artificial intelligence. MIT, for example, concluded that AI was already driving 5-20% reductions in force across the industry (Challapally et al, 2025, p. 21). While it’s easy to view this impact as a much broader harbinger of things to come, that’s likely not the case. The surveillance required to gain sufficient data to inform intent, tone, and mood are beyond what most of us are willing to concede. Contact centers have no such barriers, however. Conversations are recorded, screens monitored, chats logged, feedback taken, and to a certain extent, shared across industries, in ways the salaried worker would vociferously resist. In the call center, however, this is standard practice. Even bathroom breaks are monitored. The environment, therefore, is uniquely positioned to deploy AI in ways that are difficult to replicate elsewhere. In that, they may be a laboratory for the AI apocalypse. Or it may simply be overblown. After all, 57% of customer care leaders told McKinsey they expected call volumes to continue increasing over the next several years, and the same study noted that while AI has helped remediate transactional calls, volumes have continued increasing due to new and different needs (Blackader et al, 2025). Morrell (2025a) echoes these findings in his article titled The Great Contact Center Standoff, noting the paradox between the rising use of AI assisted service and customers’ increased preference for phone interaction. Gartner (2025) argues that not only will no fortune 500 company have fully eliminated humans from customer service, but that to do so would be highly undesirable. While the company capped these predictions at 2028, the persistence of phone calls, the fact that a strong majority of GenZ still prefer human conversation, and the evolving nature of new and different reasons to call support, all suggest that agents will be answering phones for years to come. 

This points to a future where AI dominates the low hanging fruit while organic intelligence handles the more sensitive issues. Moreover, the persistence of human agents in a field primed for AI takeover, bodes well for the resilience of human labor in other roles. If we can survive in contact centers, we should be able to find a toehold in engineering. More importantly, this evolution suggests a fundamental shift in what the role demands. Nearly every source cited here referenced the importance of maintaining a human connection particularly for complex scenarios. This suggests that agents of the future will need to possess high emotional maturity, sound judgement, and empathetic self-awareness. It’s also possible that AI might alleviate our need to call contact centers in the first place. McKinsey (Blackader et al, 2025) hypothesizes that AI assistants will call companies, make dinner reservations, and square our utility bills on our behalf. Indeed, such interactions are already taking place in limited fashion. OpenTable, for example, is already using AI to help customers with their dinner plans. The budding rise of AI assistants even garnered attention from the New York Times (Guay, 2025) who ironically concluded that the best assistants had the least amount of AI.

That said, predicting the future amidst all the hyperbole and fear surrounding AI is next to impossible. However, a few general landmarks can be established. First, AI isn’t going away. Its impact on contact center jobs is real and potentially substantial. Second, AI has a use case, in part, because it provides the fast, easy service consumers want. Lastly, humans aren’t going anywhere. Despite all of our intelligent automation, devices, and need for instant gratification, sometimes what we need most is simply another human to talk to.

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Why Your AI Can't Fire You (Yet): The Irreducible Human Core of Project Management

“Once men turned their thinking over to machines in the hope that this would set them free. But that only permitted other men with machines to enslave them.”

  • Frank Herbert, Dune, 1965, p. 17

It’s no surprise that the speed of AI development has outpaced research on its impact to skilled labor. In fact, a great deal of consternation has arisen over the last five years due in large part to the unknown it represents. Amidst the hysteria, however, is the fact that AI is quickly becoming indispensable while fusing fear and utility in a tapestry that is not easily undone. However, rather than tackle the broad impacts of artificial intelligence here, this paper focuses on the field of project management. It is, for one, a career in which this author has a great deal of experience, but also one that exists at the intersection of social and technical expertise. It both benefits from the efficiencies AI brings to the table while simultaneously being threatened by its effects. Perhaps most critically, project management invokes the traits AI has yet to master: intuition, influence, perception, and others. Its mathematical, coding, and powers of deduction may be super-human, but AI fails to quantify nostalgia or regret and the power they can have over a person’s decision-making. As will be discussed, the path forward is far from certain except that AI’s spread is creeping down the halls of corporate America, swallowing some roles while nibbling around the edges of others. Project management, however, remains at the periphery, a nod to the fact that its purpose is still largely based on human factors. Nonetheless, the productivity AI creates also threatens to drive project management into extinction. As this paper argues, however, the demise of the project manager is greatly exaggerated. As long as people remain, there will remain a need to manage them.

Background

Project management is a broad field with arguably more similarities between industries than within a single industry. Program managers, product managers, and project managers are all part of the project management family even while carrying distinctly different responsibilities. Within one company there may be dozens of similarly titled roles drawing on various specialties, whether in software development, marketing, or HR. Regardless, the project manager is responsible for ensuring that an objective is met. They answer to whether other people have done their jobs and interact with the bureaucracy on behalf of the team. Douglas (2023b) writes that project management is a skillset that is gained through both training and experience, (p. 94), noting that it is often misunderstood by leadership as an intuition that any skilled worker possesses (p. 102). Angara et al (2020) write that devops is a socioeconomic system that solves social issues more than technical issues. Project management, they argue, is a complex phenomenon that requires high maturity, real time communication, and self-driven teams capable of making rapid adjustments (pp. 81, 86). While a certain amount of automation can expedite process, these observations speak to the interdependence of sociology and technical execution. Ruiz et al (2020) arrive at a similar conclusion, writing that project outcomes will always depend on human factors and may be difficult to predict or resolve even for experienced managers (p. 55). Though this statement was made advocating for the use of AI, it acknowledges the inherent unknowns that come with human involvement. 

In fact, human involvement drives the need for project managers. A startup with only a handful of engineers has no need for project management, but an organization with several dozen teams will experience divergence, competing priorities, agendas, and politics, all of which a project manager needs to mitigate to ensure a project stays on schedule. Growth can also reduce the effectiveness of leadership. Douglas (2023a) writes that executive support for projects is often inadequate and uniformed. The project manager, he writes, compensates for this by using a complicated array of tactics to offset ineffective leadership (p. 34). Threats to project success can also come from within the team. Bahi et al (2024) note that agile teams often encounter various complex and context-specific challenges that lack clear or easy solutions (p. 56). It is the role of the project manager to facilitate a solution and shield management from the chaos of execution. Similarly, Angara et al (2020) write that project success is inhibited by overlapping functions between teams, rapidly changing priorities, and customer expectations (p. 80). The project manager is expected to confront and coordinate solutions to all of these challenges. 

It should be clear from the preceding discussion that the bulk of the PM role is driven by bureaucratic factors and human behavior. That said, there are technical aspects of the job that may involve hard sciences, data analysis, python scripting, and so on. In the literature reviewed here, a great deal of emphasis was placed on the advantages of AI as a means for assisting with these tasks. However, it is important to distinguish between tasks and asks as they pertain to project management. The former is something a PM might do, the latter is a dependency on another team (i.e. data science, finance, etc). While business trends are not discussed here, it is worth noting that consolidation of roles does occur, where project managers are expected to perform engineering or analyst responsibilities. In the observation of this author, however, the bulk of project management roles focus on enablement, not task completion. Finally, a great many studies focused on the impact of AI to construction project management while others make broad statements about its benefits to healthcare, software development, and manufacturing. It’s also worth reemphasizing that for the sake of simplicity, this paper uses “project manager” to refer to project, program, and product management, even though they involve different responsibilities. In any event, it’s important to keep in mind the potential for divergence in the scope, context, and definition of project management throughout this discussion. 

Literature review

Overview

There is little doubt AI offers substantial benefits to overall project delivery. From data analysis and research, to customer satisfaction and quarterly planning, the upside of AI seems clear. For example, Janat et al (2024) cite cross-industry surveys reporting a 20% increase in task efficiency, a 10% increase in time saved, and a similar reduction in error rates as a result of AI implementations (p. 1817). Similarly, Shoushtari et al (2025) write that AI assisted tools reduced construction timelines by 20%, costs by 15%, and improved overall team engagement (pp. 50-57).  Case studies examining a variety of industries have returned similar results. For example, automated scheduling and predictive analysis reduced construction delays by 20%. Healthcare professionals cited significant improvements in cross-team communication, noting that natural language processing made it easier to share and comprehend data in real time. This corresponded to a 30% increase in efficiency. AI helped with market analysis, segmentation, and reporting, boosting ad campaign performance by 30%. And in software development, machine learning was used to automate resource allocation and quarterly planning, contributing to a 25% increase in on-time delivery (Hossain et al, 2024, pp. 7-11). 

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the vast majority of project managers have responded favorably to the inclusion of AI in their dependent workflows (Janat et al, 2024). Similarly, Hossain et al (2024) write that in a survey of 150 project managers, improved efficiency, decision-making, and productivity were among the top advantages. Respondents said that automating tasks such as scheduling and reporting allowed them to focus on more strategic issues (pp. 7-8). 

Business case

The benefits of AI are discussed in the following sections, however they can be summarized as increased velocity, immediate access to higher quality data, reduced risk, and competitive advantage through better analysis (Bahi et al, 2024; Vergara et al, 2025;  Hashfi et al, 2024). Outdated processes and increasing complexity were also cited as drivers of AI adoption. For example, Janat et al (2024) argue that traditional project management has relied on manual, labor-intensive, error-prone processes that introduce risk (p. 1811). Ruiz et al (2020) write that current project management methodologies are “largely insufficient” and leave the project manager to make decisions based on prior experience and intuition (p.54). Shoushtari et al (2025) similarly argue that current methodologies are challenged by the size, scope and complexity of today’s projects (p. 49). Douglas (2023) adds that this complexity leads to an over emphasis on timelines and budgets, and concludes that a more dynamic style of project management is required (p. 44). Finally, Hossain et al (2024) write that antiquated project management methodologies are rigid and fail to adapt to changes and uncertainties during delivery (p. 1). Researchers argue that AI can lubricate delivery and compensate for inefficient and outdated processes. 

That said, there are compelling acknowledgements, if not counter-arguments made throughout the literature. For example, Hashfi and Raharjo (2024) write that many of the challenges inherent to other methodologies can be overcome by agile (p. 368).  Others, like Douglas (2023b) counter that while agile does present advantages, it can be difficult to implement across multiple teams and suffers when communication breaks down (p. 46). Still, the potential risks are outweighed by the rewards. As Bahi et al (2024) point out, AI can greatly enhance agile delivery by streamlining tasks such as development, testing, and documentation. However, they acknowledge that agile remains susceptible to large changes in priorities (pp. 54-56). Lastly, Angara et al (2020) note that project success is still largely driven by developer competency, seniority, and cross-team dependencies. Failures occur, they write, when communication, collaboration, and team cohesion break down (pp. 80, 81).

In summary, most researchers believe projects are becoming too complicated for humans alone to manage. They see increased automation as a means to mitigate risk and improve efficiency. The dependence on human factors remains strong, however, demonstrating that automation alone doesn’t ensure success.

Data analysis

AI has perhaps no greater impact than in the world of big data. Researchers cited better outcomes and more efficient use of time as the primary benefits. For example, Janat et al (2024) write that automating data science and analysis allowed the project manager to shift their focus to strategic initiatives (p. 1812). Hossain et al (2024) make a similar point, arguing that by automating mundane tasks such as analysis and reporting, the project manager was free to focus on more important issues (pp. 7-8). At a macro scale, AI is broadly seen as a risk reducer. Shoushtari et al (2025) write that AI has been used to find patterns and risks that analysts failed to see (pp. 51-52). Vergara et al (2025) make similar high-level observations, citing not only better analysis, but increased speed and quality as outcomes of intelligent automation (pp. 8, 9). Bahi et al (2024) write that agile teams benefit from data-driven decision making, risk assessment, and increased velocity as a result of AI (p. 54). In short, artificial intelligence improves the speed at which work is done. However, the project manager benefits primarily from the automation of this work, not the automation of their role. 

AI & Communication

Project communication was another benefactor of AI involvement. Ruiz et al (2020) noted the potential for chatbot integrations with MS Project and Oracle Primavera to automate scheduling, reduce risks and conflicts, and improve messaging (p. 55). AI powered bots were also shown to improve cross-team communication through chat, messaging, and automatic report generation. In a survey of construction projects, AI reduced communication delays by 10% and improved team engagement by 25% (Shoushtari et al, 2025, pp. 51-52, 57). Similar benefits were realized in software development where GPT has been used to automate client communications, maintain dashboards, and provide instant access to information (Vergara et al, 2025, pp. 9-10). Other researchers go a step further, arguing that AI not only improves communication but enhances stakeholder engagement. It promotes a culture of data-driven decision making that allows project managers to benefit from profound data insights (Hossain et al, 2024, pp. 3, 4; Janat et al, 2024, p. 1812). In short, the benefits of AI are both inward and outwardly facing, enabling faster communication to both clients and stakeholders.

Resource allocation and planning

Significant benefits were also realized in capacity planning and resource allocation. In fact, the advantages of AI go beyond counting available hours. Shoushtari et al, (2025) write that AI models not only consider the team’s schedule but their individual expertise as well. Scheduling and delivery, they note, can be automatically updated as employee availability changes (pp. 51-52).  Bahi et al (2024) echo these findings, writing that AI can analyze historical data and team performance to more effectively allocate resources. Real time monitoring can be used to address team performance and make agile teams more responsive (pp. 54, 58). Furthermore, IT and software development surveys found that the use of machine learning during planning improved resource allocation by 37% (Hossain et al, 2024, p. 11). It should be noted, however, that contradictions in the research exist. For example, Angara et al (2020), argue that storypointing requires a mindset that is intuitive, rational, and agreeable and is one that invokes real time, groundlevel effort (p. 81). In other words, it can only be done by humans. This same argument could be applied to the process of estimating developer weeks or expertise during quarterly planning. Similarly, Hossain et al (2024) argue on behalf of AI, citing the pitfalls of using historical data and experience to estimate effort. However, it’s worth considering that AI would use the same historical data and would be partly (if not equally) prone to the same error.

Creativity

Creativity has long been considered one of the hallmarks of human thinking, however, AI is increasingly capable of inspiring creative thought, if not synthesizing new ideas all its own. For example, audits of the construction industry found that only 8% of projects were categorized as highly imaginative, while 92% were rated low or moderately imaginative (Kineber et al, 2024, p. 2). This has, in part, been addressed through AI. For example, GPT has been used to improve urban planning and derive building layouts (Vergara, 2025, p. 10). Bahi et al (2024) write that GenAI can facilitate brainstorming, generate novel ideas, and help teams overcome creative hurdles (p. 58). On the other hand, Manyika (2022) argues that getting AI to develop truly novel ideas from math and science remains a challenge (p. 12). Hashfi and Raharjo (2024) make a similar argument noting that while data science and analysis can be automated, the human is still needed to draw conclusions. (p. 367). They acknowledge, however, that the line between artificial and human is constantly moving. Noting that the future of AI will likely synthesize STEM and human-centric or human-like behavior (p. 367). 

Excessive optimism

Other benefits were more hopeful than actual. For example, Hashfi and Raharjo (2024) write that AI has the potential to predict bottlenecks in construction or identify KPIs, assign story points and plan sprints in software development (p. 368). As noted above, however, the nature of high fidelity tasks like storypointing and sprint planning are often contingent upon real time factors that AI won’t have access to (Angara et al, 2020). Still other suggestions are further fetched or unrealistic. For example, Shoushtari et al (2025) theorize that AI could use sentiment analysis to manage stakeholder engagement (p.55). However, the potential risks and unintended consequences of bad messaging are real, and particularly acute when dealing with executives. Nonetheless, Hashfi and Raharjo (2024) write that AI has the capability to replace human cognition, decision making, and problem solving, citing progress made in data analysis, risk assessment, performance monitoring, and optimization as signs of its progress (p. 372). Such predictions ignore the human aspects of project management discussed earlier. This is less an issue with compute power and more one of sufficient data to make an informed calculation. Angara et al (2020) attempt to address this gap, noting that tone is a leading indicator of project success or failure. They suggest that AI be used to monitor tone across the field of project communication, writing that organizations should attempt to capture “every possible communication” (p. 89) between project stakeholders, customers, senior management, and the project team. They include recording scrums, team meetings, slack messages and emails and storing them as text files for analysis (pp. 80, 89). 

Still other researchers suggest that risks associated with resource allocation and team performance might be mitigated by using AI to screen candidates. Ruiz et al (2020) write that AI has been used to estimate prospective employees’ emotional intelligence and predict performance using data from social networks (pp. 59, 60). Privacy concerns aside, the accuracy of judgements based on such limited, self-selected, and highly curated data (i.e. what we post about and how we interact with social media, etc) must be called into question. In assessing the competency of AI to make judgements of any kind, Manyika (2022, p. 19) asks “as compared to what?” Similarly, gauging an employee’s emotional intelligence should be followed by the same question. 

Risks

Finally, the use of AI is not without risks whether actual or theoretical. In fact, in the literature reviewed here, risk assessment was one of the greatest areas of overlap and consistency across researchers. Data privacy, the ubiquitous access to employee and customer communications, and data availability were cited by Janat et al (2024), Shoushtari et al (2025), and Hashfi, et al (2024). Job loss, resistance to change, budget, and lack of technical understanding were near unanimous points of concern as well. Perhaps most critically, only Vergara et al (2025) mentioned the potential for over-reliance on automation (p. 14). Indeed the quantifiable wins and perception of super-intelligence associated with AI, will present a compelling case for leadership to take results at face value. The aforementioned unintended consequences of sending grammatically correct but poorly timed communications to executives is one such example. Similarly, only Bahi et al (2024) cite the potential for lack of accountability associated with AI (p. 57). The potential for teams to generate AI-assisted data without review and for executives to take such data at face value are equally pernicious. Observations by Douglas (2023a) noting the importance of accountability and the disconnect between leadership and project management further the point. These topics will be discussed further in the next section, but it’s worth noting that today’s leaders may suffer from too much information, and that a reduction in communication might be more appropriate. 

Discussion & Outlook

Tension between technocratic thinking and philosophy is nothing new. Plato was one of civilization’s earliest technocrats and believed morality could be quantified as plainly as mathematics. More recently, rational choice theory attempted to model social behavior and politics in the way physics models quantum mechanics (Cohn, 1999). Today’s conversation surrounding AI embodies a similar dynamic. In fact, the preceding discussion displays an unabashed bias for technical applications of AI and high level measures of efficiency. Nothing of substance was offered regarding mitigating company politics, disagreements, or divergence between teams. AI’s most ardent supporters are quick to boast that computers will soon manage human relationships or prevent politics through data and automation, while trivializing the ambiguity of human decisions and how often emotion overrides rationality. This says nothing of the draconian measures required to access such data and whether that is a world in which anyone would want to live. In that, the project manager should derive comfort knowing that as long as people remain, there will be a need to manage them.

Nonetheless, the potential for over-reliance on AI as mentioned by Vergara et al (2025) is real but not automatic. Data will always be a refuge from ambiguity even if truth lies in the undefined. Leadership, for example, have always been biased toward quantifiable pedigree: degrees, certifications, work history, etc. However, an MBA says nothing of a project manager’s ability to mediate a disagreement between two type-A engineers. A fortune 500 resume may struggle to perform in the chaotic environment of a startup. A credentialed PM might have no feel for when they need to step on toes or play within the rules. Yet a person’s adaptability or ability to gain the respect of an engineering team is arguably more important than their understanding of system diagrams. 

The preference for data will, nonetheless, persist. And that’s expected. Inherent in this preference, however, is the assumption that what lies in the data constitutes everything that needs to be known. The answers AI provide are necessarily a subset of all potential answers, much in the way this paper represents a summary of the reviewed literature, and that literature reflects what this author thinks is relevant. In that, AI platforms are no different. For example, the most frequently cited domains vary by company. Wikipedia is GPT’s top source while Perplexity and Google favor Reddit. Though the top sources account for fewer than ten percent of total citations, they reflect bias in the system. For example, GPT’s tendency toward Wikipedia indicates a preference for encyclopedic sources, while Perplexity prioritizes community discussion (Lafferty, 2025). During a conversation addressing the potential impacts of AI to the music industry, producer Rick Beato (2025) took a more critical position, noting that true expertise remains in the minds of the experts and is unavailable to AI. Artificial intelligence, he argued, can’t access what hasn’t been written down.

Gaps aside, AI will select for the most common points of view, but not necessarily the most relevant points of view. For example, in research conducted on the cocoa industry, this author found that 2024 versions of GPT failed to highlight the risks posed by aging trees and farmers (Vedvick, 2025). It instead biased toward the growing cocoa trade and emphasized what a great idea he had. A year later, Anthropic’s Sonnet 4.5 did a better, but still incomplete job of surfacing these risks. As Hashfi & Raharjo (2024) rightly pointed out, AI might be able to surface insights, but only humans can decide if those insights are relevant or even insightful at all. Taken together, the limitations of AI suggest a tool that is better used internally, where complete datasets are available, but one that should be treated with a degree of skepticism when applied externally. 

Nonetheless, data-driven decisions have value and should be pursued. Their upsides were highlighted by Bahi et al (2024) and Hossain et al (2024) and reflect a growing desire for such traits in project managers. Meta (n.d.) recently posted a Program Manager role specifically focused on driving decisions through data. Decades prior, Starbucks embarked on a mission to push its development managers toward centralized planning,  and quantified measures of site suitability. These efforts clashed with the relationship focused nature of store development but were central to closing dozens of under-performing stores during the Great Recession. 

None of this means that AI is the right tool for the job, however. Researchers cited the risks of AI but did not consider the appropriateness of its application, particularly as it stacks up against existing solutions. For instance, did AI uplevel a mature quarterly planning process, or was the existing state devoid of organization? If the later, then the presence of structure, whether AI-driven or not, is likely to improve execution. Hossain et al (2024) and Bahi et al (2024) nonetheless argued for the benefits of AI-assisted capacity planning. And, while it’s true that calculating engineering capacity is well within the capability of AI, it’s also well within the capabilities of Excel. Furthermore, the assumption that priorities are universally understood and followed across an organization is true only in the laboratory. The politics and competition between security, technical debt, and new product development will not be remediated simply because AI says it’s so. Finally, the level of effort required to update a plan of record, adjust a backlog, and notify stakeholders is relatively trivial. While AI could be used to automatically plan quarters, it’s arguable whether it should. The notion that human priorities will subvert to an intelligent machine is naive and ignorant of how people behave in a collective. As Angara et al (2020) mentioned earlier, the estimation process is full of real time contingencies that intelligent automation won’t have access to. It’s worth considering, therefore, whether fixing bad planning is more costly than doing it through traditional methods.

Perhaps more importantly, automation of the sort discussed above risks undermining accountability (Bahi et al, 2024). In some respects this is as much an individual trait as it is an outcome of culture. A product development cycle that exists agnostic of quarterly planning can, for example, foster a culture of kicking it over the wall. Product writes the epics and it’s engineering’s responsibility to do the work. On the other hand, quarterly planning itself can result in a similar exchange where program management assigns work to a product backlog and walks away. In this there is a lesson for the data-driven orgs, like Meta and others. Automation cannot undermine accountability.

Outlook

When it comes to AI, the toothpaste is out of the tube. And the technology represents undeniable potential to revolutionize how work gets done. However, while there is a tendency to believe that we’ll all soon be replaced by thinking machines, that end is not as near or as certain as the doomsdayers might have us believe. It is true that efficiency breeds a reduction in force and that reduction carries less need for project managers. However, it bears mentioning that none of the authors above cited reductions in force amidst all the gains in efficiency and other benefits. Job losses were only noted as a potential risk, not a realized event. Furthermore, the Wall Street Journal reported that while AI has generated a flood of investment activity, it hasn’t made the average worker more productive. Instead, AI’s impact is more sector and role specific. For example, entry level developers. Furthermore the percentage of jobs exposed to AI automation has remained relatively constant since 2022, suggesting that AI’s impact on the labor market isn’t accelerating (Lahart, 2025).

This hasn’t slowed AI investment, however. For example, global spending on AI is expected to surpass $500 billion by 2026, and the cost of maintaining that infrastructure will exceed $2 trillion by 2030. For context, that is more than the annual revenues of Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, Meta, Nvidia, and Alphabet combined  (Morabito, 2025). This is a tremendous amount of capacity but it doesn’t necessarily spell the end of white collar work. For instance, Deloitte found that as of June 2025, 53% of consumers had either experimented with GenAI or were using it regularly, up from 38% in 2024. Regular users also doubled to 20% year-over-year and of those, 42% said AI had a very positive effect on their lives (Fineberg et al, 2025). In other words, AI may be much more of a consumer device than a piece of corporate infrastructure. If artificial intelligence becomes the way in which we shop, search, and explore, that bodes much more positively for job creation and security. 

Nonetheless, worries of broad job losses are not totally unfounded. Vibe coding for example enables fullstack app creation with virtually no knowledge of computer science. At minimum, advanced AI will enable organizations to remain flatter for longer, avoiding the types of problems that come with bureaucracy and the need for project managers. We’re already at a point where the distance between creativity and creation is nearly zero. This author, for example, created a fullstack budget app through AI-assisted coding and basic technical aptitude. Certainly others have created far more sophisticated programs with the same tools. Therefore, the future will likely select for the most competitive mix of technical and social skills. Whether these represent the new face of engineering or the future of project management is yet to be determined.

All of that said, visions of a world enslaved by AI are hyperbolic. Even super intelligence without access to data is limited. The randomness of a mundane day at work is still beyond our willingness to cede privacy for better data. And so, until then, humans will still be required to manage the cascading wave of chaos that ensues when a customer’s email lands on the CEO’s desk.

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Brief: Chocolate and the Global Demand for Cocoa

In August 2025, JP Morgan published an article asking why cocoa prices were falling.[1] In fact, prices remain three times higher than their prior decade norms.[2] And, while retailers absorbed much of this initial increase, consumer prices have been on the rise. For example, in July 2025, Hershey announced price increases of 13-20% for retailers,[3] who in turn passed on 11% increases to consumers.[4] The Wall Street Journal[5] expects cocoa prices to remain elevated for the remainder of 2025, while JP Morgan suggests high prices may be the new normal.[6] In fact, significant structural threats from climate change to aging farmers present substantial risks to long-term supply. Therefore, it is in the best interests of private and public entities to secure a sustainable supply of cocoa through investment, education, and market liberalization. 

Background

Cocoa is one of the world’s most widely traded commodities, with global production increasing nearly six fold from 1 million tonnes in 1961 to 5.6 million in 2023.[7] Over the same period, global imports of cocoa beans rose from 1.2 million tonnes to 11.3 million tonnes annually[8] demonstrating robust demand for chocolate and other cocoa products. Consumer preference for fine chocolate is also globally distributed, with Western Europe being the world’s largest consumer of chocolate followed by Asia and the United States.[9] Likewise, Brazil is a net cocoa importer[10] and one of the world’s top ten consumers of finished chocolate products.[11]

Cocoa demand is in part driven by income and status. The International Institute for Sustainable Development cited growth in Asia’s upper middle class and youth income as fueling demand for chocolate products,[12] suggesting a link between development, prosperity, and chocolate consumption. Similarly, researchers at the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that rising incomes accompanied changing food preferences and consumption that outpace population growth.[13] 

Economic development is not limited to the United States. Brazil’s appetite for chocolate, for example, is indicative of a developing market but one that is not strictly western, European, or American. Likewise, consumers’ growing appetite for chocolate is fueling demand across the board. The U.S. market for finished chocolate products is expected to reach $189 million by 2026, while the global market for cocoa beans is expected to surpass $16 billion.[14] Per capita data suggest a similar trend. For example, annual cocoa consumption per person has roughly doubled in Australia from 1.5kg in 1961 to over 3kg in 2022. In Japan demand has increased eightfold for the same period from 0.18kg to 1.5kg.[15] In fact, per capita data understate total demand. In the United States, for instance, cocoa consumption per person increased by a factor of 1.5,[16] while cocoa imports increased by a factor of 2.7.[17] Population growth, income, and prosperity are therefore important considerations when forecasting future demand. 

Risks

Climate change

About three quarters of the world’s cocoa is produced by just two countries: Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. Agriculturally, this presents multiple risks. First, cocoa is not native to either region and successful cultivation requires substantial soil amendments. Second, both countries exist in a transition zone between savanna and rain forest and are prone to climate related weather extremes. Third, cocoa trees are vulnerable to slight variations in temperature, drought, and excessive rainfall.[18] To put this in perspective, cocoa’s ideal growing temperature exists in a narrow range of 22 - 25C. Just three consecutive months of fewer than 100mm of rainfall can damage plants and affect yields[19] while, annual rainfall in excess of 2500mm makes plants susceptible to disease, fungus, and other ailments.[20] Furthermore, according to predictions by the general circulation climate model, rising temperatures are expected to accompany decreasing rainfall across the region, putting downward pressure on cocoa yields. Finally, prior year rainfall is a predictor of the current harvest, making weather related cause and effect a multi-year cycle.[21] In summary, about three quarters of the world’s cocoa is farmed in an artificially produced ecosystem in a region that is at risk for extreme weather events. This may cause some farms to collapse or abandon cocoa production altogether. 

Aging trees and farmers

If climate related challenges are the most intuitive risk facing production, aging trees and farmers are the silent killer. Cocoa trees reach peak production at 18 years,[22] yet in many of the world’s major cocoa producing regions, trees are decades past their primes. Cameroon, Ghana, Indonesia and Columbia are all plagued by aging trees. In Nigeria the problem is particularly acute where the average cocoa plant is around 40 years old.[23] Aging trees are also less productive and more labor intensive. For example, worldwide production averages just 0.4 tonnes of cocoa per hectare despite theoretical output of 3 - 5 tonnes predicted under fertile trees and well-maintained growing conditions.[24] 

The demographics of cocoa farming are similarly worrisome. The average age of the Ghanan farmer is over 50. In Nigeria it’s 50 - 60 and in Cameroon 63 - 70. The children of cocoa farmers are either not entering the cocoa business, or are choosing to plant other more profitable crops (rubber, wheat, and maize).[25] Climate considerations aside, it is reasonable to wonder who will farm the land in 20 years.

Small farms

As mentioned, west Africa produces about three quarters of the world’s cocoa. However, the overwhelming majority of that production is from small farms. In fact, about 90% of the world’s cocoa production comes from just 5-6 million family run operations between 1 - 10 hectares. The farms small size makes them more susceptible to economic, political, and climate related pressure. Farmers receive just 6% of finished product sales, while farm gate prices (prices paid to the farmer) are often set by government-run wholesalers and do not cover the cost of operations.[26] The farm's small size reduces leverage and makes negotiation difficult. It’s also worth noting that where state-run buyers are compulsory, the farmer is locked out of the international market and therefore cannot benefit from high cocoa prices. Furthermore, family run farms also struggle with access to credit and insurance, with a lack of trust denominating both sides of the transaction.[27] 

Finally, poor farming practices that range from limited agricultural knowledge, pest disease control and prevention, soil management, limited or no irrigation infrastructure, and poor pollination are common issues on small farms.[28] The combination of these factors are major drivers of low yields and failing crops. 

Outlook

As JP Morgan pointed out, cocoa prices are expected to fall as short-term demand softens, but long-term, prices will likely remain well above their historic norms. The multi-year tail of climate cause and effect coupled with extreme weather events, suggest that supply will be subject to the whims of annual weather patterns. And, indeed, recent price volatility reflects the onset of drought and a renewed rainy season.[29] In short, annual supply is variable and not necessarily reflective of long-term risks.

Climate and agriculture

The aging farmer, tree, and lack of a replacement generation are significant, and in this opinion, underappreciated by short-term markets. That said, climate suitability is expected to persist in the world’s primary growing regions for the next 40 years, providing farmers and governments time to adjust.[30] Collapse, therefore, is not imminent or certain. Furthermore, demand for chocolate has tripled since 1960, growing in excess of 90% over the last two decades with more growth expected.[31] Nonetheless, agricultural sustainability is a chief concern. The average productivity of cocoa farms is only 30% higher now than it was 50 years ago and diminishing production is expected to persist as plants age and poor farming practices continue.[32] 

The effects of climate and disease related challenges might be addressed through breeding drought and disease resistant varieties and distributing plants to farmers.[33] Ecuador, for example, has increased the production of high yield, disease resistant clones as part of a national program sponsored by the government.[34] Similarly, hand pollinating has been shown to result in up to a 160% increase in yield.[35] Still, without financing and economic incentives, the future of cocoa production is in doubt. 

Public sector

To that end, public policy is shaping the future of cocoa production and agriculture around the world. For example, Cameroon fully liberalized their cocoa market, allowing farmers to charge market prices for their beans. Indonesia levied a 10% export tax on cocoa, incentivizing downstream processing and turning the country into a net cocoa importer.[36] Mozambique held auctions for US aid, which helped stimulate domestic refinement and marketing industries.[37] In Ecuador, the government’s High Quality Aromatic Cocoa Reactivation Project has helped position the country as one of the world’s top producers of fine flavored cocoa.[38]

That said, government initiatives don’t always favor special interests. For example programs like Feed the Future (an Obama administration initiative) failed to gain traction because farmers were incentivized by their governments to focus on food security (maize, rice, wheat).[39] Similarly, wholesalers and government run aggregators that buy at fixed prices, can indirectly incentivize farmers to switch to more profitable crops such as rubber or palm oil.[40] Access to land, lack of ROI, and finances continue to be the biggest hurdles to new cocoa development and generational engagement.[41] Yet all of these challenges can be at least partially addressed by policy. Either through subsidies, R&D, or by market liberalization.

Private sector

Finally, the importance of private sector involvement cannot be overstated. The Nestlé Cocoa Plan, for example, seeks to instill better farming practices, produce better, more sustainable cocoa, and improve the lives of farmers by increasing income and equality. As of 2025, the company claims to have engaged around 180,000 farmers under this program while establishing partnerships with the Rainforest Alliance, the International Cocoa Initiative, and others.[42]

The company also operates the Nestle Income Accelerator program which promotes (and rewards) sustainable farming practices by paying premiums for Rainforest Certified cocoa, offering cash incentives for adopting the accelerator program (including school enrollment, good agricultural practices, diversified incomes, etc), and encouraging farmers to develop secondary incomes.[43]

Similarly, Mars launched pilot programs in 2022 to provide sustainable incomes to small farmers throughout Côte d’Ivoire. The company says it plans on using lessons learned from these beta programs to inform strategies for tackling similar challenges throughout the global supply chain. Mars said it is committed to improving farmers' livelihoods by removing obstacles to finance and sustainable farming practices. Mars also highlighted the need for diversified incomes as a means of insulating farmers from market volatility. The company has partnered with a variety of organizations including Fairtrade and has established the Farmer Income Lab as an industry thinktank tasked with researching and advising the industry on best practices. Mars operates country-specific initiatives as well, aimed at promoting living wages in those regions, including LEAP in Côte and d’Ivoire, and ACTIVE in Indonesia.[44]

Smaller operators like Maeve Chocolate source directly from the farmer (when possible) and return 10% of their net profits to the farm. The company has also helped fund new wells, new trees, and enrolled farmers in savings and loan programs.[45] In short, private sector involvement is essential to the long term success of the cocoa industry, whether funding global change initiatives as Mars seeks to do, or establishing fresh water supplies as Maeve has recently done, for-profit enterprises have a stake in maintaining a healthy cocoa supply. 

Conclusion

Clearly demand for chocolate remains strong and, as developing nations become more affluent, that demand is likely to increase. Though cocoa supplies are likely secure for the coming decades, the threats to long-term supply are real. It is imperative that governments and private organizations take steps to protect the cocoa industry by investing in their farmers, paying living wages, and incentivizing a new generation of farmers to take up their family’s work. Educating farmers on sustainable practices, revitalizing aging farms with younger trees, and liberalizing markets so that farmers have access to global prices are all positive steps that can be taken to ensure stable, long-term supply. 

Notes

1. Tracey Allen, “Cocoa prices are finally falling. Why?” J.P.Morgan, August 5, 2025, https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/commodities/cocoa-prices.

2. “Cocoa,” Trading Economics. Accessed October 2, 2025. https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/cocoa.

3. Owen Tucker-Smith and Jesse Newman, “Hershey lifts candy prices, citing high cocoa costs,” Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2025. https://www.wsj.com/business/retail/hershey-lifts-candy-prices-citing-high-cocoa-costs-7aec150b

4. Jenni Reid, “Chocolate lovers, brace yourselves: Prices are rising, but not forever,” CNBC, August 22, 2025. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/08/22/chocolate-set-to-get-more-expensive-but-2026-outlook-looks-sweeter.html 

5. Tucker-Smith and Newman, “Hershey lifts candy prices.”

6. Allen, “Cocoa prices are falling.”

7. “Cocoa bean production by region, 1961 to 2023,” Our World in Data. Accessed October 2, 2025. https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cocoa-beans-production-by-region.

8. “Imports of cocoa beans, 1961 to 2022,” Our World in Data. Accessed October 2, 2025. https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/global-food?tab=line&country=~OWID_WRL&Food=Cocoa+beans&Metric=Imports 

9. Vivek Voora, Steffany Verudez and Cristina Larrea. “Global Market Report: Cocoa,” International Institute for Sustainable Development, (January 1, 2019). https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22025

10. “Cocoa Beans in Brazil,” Observatory of Economic Complexity. Accessed October 2, 2025. https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/cocoa-beans/reporter/bra.

11. Marta Kozicka et al. “Forecasting Cocoa Yields for 2050,” Alliance biodiversity & CIAT, (2018). Forecasting cocoa yields for 2050 | Alliance Bioversity International - CIAT.

12. Voora, Verudez and Larrea, “Global Market Report.”

13. Julie Howard and Emmy Simmons. “Agriculture Under Pressure: Implications for Agricultural Development in U.S. Foreign Assistance,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, (August 1, 2020). https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26061 

14. Voora, Verudez and Larrea, “Global Market Report.”

15. “Cocoa bean consumption per person, 1961-2022,” Our World in Data. Accessed 10/2/2025. https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/chocolate-consumption-per-person?tab=line.

16. “Cocoa bean consumption per person,” Our World in Data.

17. “Imports of Cocoa Beans,” Our World in Data.

18. John Eden Kongor, Margaret Owusu and Charlotte Oduro-Yeboah. “Cocoa production in the 2020s: challenges and solutions,” CABI Agriculture and Bioscience 5, no. 102 (October 31, 2024), doi: https://doi.org/10.1186/s43170-024-00310-6.

19. “Growing Cocoa,” International Cocoa Organization. Accessed 10/2/2025. https://www.icco.org/growing-cocoa/

20. Kongor, Owusu and Oduro-Yeboah. “Cocoa production in the 2020s.”

21. Kozicka et al. “Forecasting Cocoa Yields for 2050.”

22. Kongor, Owusu and Oduro-Yeboah. “Cocoa production in the 2020s.”

23. Kozicka et al. “Forecasting Cocoa Yields for 2050.”

24. Kozicka et al. “Forecasting Cocoa Yields for 2050.”

25. Kozicka et al. “Forecasting Cocoa Yields for 2050.”

26. Kongor, Owusu and Oduro-Yeboah. “Cocoa production in the 2020s.”

27. Kozicka et al. “Forecasting Cocoa Yields for 2050.”

28. Kongor, Owusu and Oduro-Yeboah. “Cocoa production in the 2020s.”

29. Allen, “Cocoa prices are falling.”

30. Kozicka et al. “Forecasting Cocoa Yields for 2050.”

31. Francesco Recanati, Davide Marveggio and Giovanni Dotelli. “From beans to bar: A life cycle assessment towards sustainable chocolate supply chain,” Science of the Total Environment 613-614, (February 2018): 1013-1023, doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2017.09.187

32. Kozicka et al. “Forecasting Cocoa Yields for 2050.”

33. Kongor, Owusu and Oduro-Yeboah. “Cocoa production in the 2020s.”

34. Kozicka et al. “Forecasting Cocoa Yields for 2050.”

35. Kongor, Owusu and Oduro-Yeboah. “Cocoa production in the 2020s.”

36. Kozicka et al. “Forecasting Cocoa Yields for 2050.”

37. Howard and Simmons. “Agriculture under pressure.”

38. Kozicka et al. “Forecasting Cocoa Yields for 2050.”

39. Howard and Simmons. “Agriculture under pressure.”

40. Kozicka et al. “Forecasting Cocoa Yields for 2050.”

41. Kongor, Owusu and Oduro-Yeboah. “Cocoa production in the 2020s.”

42. “Nestle Cocoa Plan,” Nestle. Accessed 10/2/2025. https://www.nestlecocoaplan.com/our-approach/nestle-cocoa-plan.

43. “The Income Accelerator Program: How it works,” Nestle, (January 2022). https://kitkat20.factory.kitkat.com/sites/default/files/2024-10/nestle-income-accelerator-how-it-works.pdf

44. “Mars, Incorporated supports 14,000 cocoa farmers on a path to a sustainable…,” Mars, (April 20, 2022). https://www.mars.com/news-and-stories/press-releases-statements/mars-supports-cocoa-farmers-sustainable-living-income.

45. “You + Us? Major Impact,” Maeve Chocolate. Accessed 10/2/2025. https://maevechocolate.com/pages/people

Policy Response 1: A Review of Policy Diffusion in the Public and Private Sector

The study of how environmental policies proliferate is an exercise in simplicity and competing complexities. On the one hand, policy diffusion is relatively easy to understand. A state develops emissions controls or sustainable fishing practices, and other countries adopt similar policies. On the other hand, a myriad of factors determines whether an adopting state can facilitate such advancements. This essay examines the challenge of policy diffusion in the arena of environmental politics with a focus on fisheries and emissions controls. Works by Kern et al (2001) provide a detailed overview of how policies proliferate, while Stafford (2019) provides useful background on sustainability concepts, flaws, and limitations. Mainstream media coverage of Chinese fishing practices is also reviewed as are the lobbying efforts of industry special interests. Finally, literature from the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO, 2017) illustrates how policy dissemination doesn’t necessarily result in environmentally favorable outcomes while Chasek (2016) provides an overview of policy arenas, actors, and the various interests that influence international policy. To address these issues, the discussion begins with how the tragedy of the commons applies to overfishing and potential policy approaches to remediating risk. It then examines how states differ in their approach to environmental issues and what factors influence policy diffusion. Finally, we’ll consider how fuel efficiency standards have improved in the United States and why they continue to lag behind their European frontrunners.

Analysis

The need for collective international action and good policy is perhaps no more apparent than in the arena of global fisheries, yet as Stafford (2019) writes, the overuse of sustainability has led to confusion about what the word means and ironically, resulted in unsustainable practices. Fishing quotas, he notes, are both poorly defined and difficult to project, yet are considered sustainable (pp. 1-2). Similarly, Kern et al (2001) cite the importance of clear policy and clearer problem statements, writing that the best policy is useless against a poorly understood problem and vice versa (pp. 7-8). Accurate verbiage, therefore, is essential to crafting good policy, particularly with respect to common pool resources like breathable air, clean water, and ocean life. Such resources are vulnerable to socioeconomic theories like the tragedy of the commons, which Stafford (2019) and Chasek (2016) describe as the exploitation of a shared resource to the detriment of the broader community. Overfishing of the sort practiced by China (Urbina, 2020) is one such example and poses significant environmental risks from bycatch and collapsed fisheries to international instability. Furthermore, China’s practices undermine international policy by exposing weaknesses in enforcement. At the same time, China’s population needs food and special interests have an incentive to maintain the status quo. More broadly, global fisheries are thought to provide over 200 million jobs (Chasek, 2016, p. 8), which further complicates the policy picture, all of which contributes to the tragedy of the commons playing out in the world’s oceans.

While concerns over military action garner headlines, a policy of economic and financial coercion would more effectively dissuade Chinese activity. For example, much of the fishing reported by Urbina (2020) has taken place in international waters off the coast of South America. The countries of Argentina, Chile, Brazil and others could utilize MERCOSUR to enact coordinated tariffs on Chinese goods or freeze collaborative projects domestically. Such economic coercion was used by the United States in the 1980s to enact a ban on whaling (Chasek, 2016, p. 16). To that extent, countries affected by China’s aggressive fishing tactics could form tighter bonds with the U.S. and leverage American tariffs to alter Chinese policy. For example, the United States could utilize the USMCA to block Chinese exports attempting to enter via Mexico. The World Bank and IMF could be used to influence smaller players where China is an active lender to seek partnerships with western sources. Another option is to use NGOs (like Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund, and the Sierra Club) to raise public awareness and put pressure on international companies to reduce their investments in China. Finally, it’s worth noting that Chinese veto power makes enacting policy through the UN unlikely. It’s also unclear that such a policy would be enforceable without the aforementioned collaboration. Moreover, Kern et al (2001) note that the budget for the United Nations Environmental Programme is less than that of Greenpeace (p. 10), further calling into question the ability of the UN to act persuasively.

The Chinese use case provides a useful entrance into the examination of how state actors differ in their response to environmental issues. As Chasek (2016) writes, a myriad of factors can affect a state’s approach to climate issues, from NGOs to economic concerns and others. Urbina (2020), for example, reported that Chinese long-range fishing began, in part, due to depleted local fisheries. China’s response to this crisis was to expand their fishing footprint, a response that reflects both the economic and social concerns associated with food security. Alternatively, the United States’ opposition to whaling was largely predicated on its declining need for whaling products and mounting pressure from environmental groups, which subsequently produced a radically different policy than that demonstrated by the Chinese. A final example can be found in the United States’ slow adoption of fuel economy standards. In this, strong cultural and institutional biases play a role. As Nivola (2009) writes, the United States has trailed European policymakers in fuel economy largely because Americans won’t support the necessary taxes, a policy that has ensured cheap gas and disincentivized fuel economy. In this way, culture and precedent work together to influence a country’s response to climate concerns, whether long or short-term.

The discussion of international policy owes some attention to how such policies proliferate throughout the global community. The notion of policy diffusion was discussed at length by Kern et al (2001) who identified three primary drivers of policy proliferation. The first of these concerns the technical capabilities of the imitating country and the public demand for action. These require that the adopting nation have the technical knowledge and functional capacity to implement environmental controls in the presence of strong public will. The second stipulation addresses policy frontrunners and disseminating organizations, like the United Nations Environmental Programme. This entails that the frontrunners not only implement policies but that they publish those policies (and their results) internationally through designated organizations. Finally, both the policy and the problem must be thoroughly understood. Good policy is meaningless if applied against a poorly understood problem. Therefore, it is essential that the adopting nation understand both the policy and the problem they are trying to solve (pp. 7-13).

When studying policy diffusion, it’s easy to assume that only good policies proliferate, but this is not always the case. For example, the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO, 2017), found that lobbyists effectively won concessions from Spanish regulators that closely mirrored their Dutch counterparts. In both cases, fishing quotas were increased, and regulatory oversight decreased. It’s also worth acknowledging that good policy is wholly within the eye of the beholder. Spanish fishing interests, for example, were likely satisfied with their lobbyists’ efforts. Nonetheless, policies can proliferate in the presence of opposition. For example, Kern et al, (2001), cite the rise of environmental agencies, ministries, and other national organizations throughout Europe and North America as a prominent instance of policy proliferation (pp. 13-15). The EPA is one such example that has both ardent support and opposition from various political groups within the United States. That said, sometimes good policies fail to proliferate or do so more slowly. Such is the case with fuel economy in the United States. Reducing vehicle emissions is seen as a critical step in reducing global GHGs, yet policymakers have been slow to implement regulations until recently. Nivola (2009) writes that U.S. fuel efficiency standards are half of what they are in Europe, largely because Americans have no tolerance for taxes either publicly or politically. Furthermore, cheap gas has disincentivized innovation and largely kept America behind Europe. Nonetheless, the United States possesses many of the prerequisites for successful policy adoption. America has the technical capability to achieve greater fuel economy, benefits from a clear policy frontrunner to emulate, and enjoys strong public support for GHG reduction. However, they lack institutional and public support for higher taxes. These issues haven’t prevented the diffusion of policy, but they have slowed its progress.

Finally, a great deal of attention has been paid to policy and policymakers, however, private sector innovation can be a major source of environmental change. For example, SeaPact (SP, n.d.) is a collaboration of 11 leading North American seafood companies committed to the sustainable use of international fisheries. While organized by for-profit companies, SeaPact works with a select number of NGOs who act as advisors on resource management and innovation. According to the SeaPact site, the organization’s members have developed better nets, trawling gear, and other technologies to help reduce bycatch and damage to the environment. Beyond SeaPact, industry leaders like Trident Seafoods have a well-published commitment to sustainability. In their most recent ESG report, the company identifies their customers, community, employees, and owners as the beneficiaries of sustainable practices (TRD, 2023). Such commitments reflect broad support, not only from management and ownership, but from the public whose concerns often manifest through NGOs.

Prospective Outlook

The preceding discussion has covered a wide range of issues from overfishing and fuel efficiency to policy diffusion and private sector change. It goes without saying that future solutions to climate change will incorporate all of local, global, and private sector policy proliferation. However, while Kern et al (2001) detail the prerequisites for policy diffusion, they note that adopting nations must tailor such policies to their needs. This point cannot be overstated. The United States’ slow roll toward greater fuel economy is a perfect example. PEW research indicates that two-thirds of Americans think the government should do more to address climate change and a bipartisan majority supports tougher fuel efficiency standards (Tyson & Kennedy, 2020, pp. 1-6), yet our aversion to taxes runs countercurrent to those desires. This implies that a wholesale, blind adoption of European gas taxes would not be the best approach. Instead, tailoring tax policy to the American mindset, for example through hybrid incentives paid for by carbon taxes, could achieve the same ends through a slightly different means. In that, innovative policy must compliment private sector innovation and social norms. Policy proliferation, therefore, is as much about adopting what works as much as it is understanding the cultural and political factors at play.

References

CEO. (2017). Fishing for influence: Press passes give lobbyists EU council building access

during fishing quota talks. Corporate Europe Observatory. https://corporateeurope.org/en/power-lobbies/2017/05/fishing-influence

Chasek, P. S. (2016). Global Environmental Politics (7th ed.). Taylor & Francis.

https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9780813350356

Kern, K., Jorgens, H. & Janicke, M. (2001). The diffusion of environmental policy innovations: A

contribution to the globalisation of environmental policy. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228202810_The_Diffusion_of_Environmental_Policy_Innovations_A_Contribution_to_the_Globalisation_of_Environmental_Policy

Nivola, P.S. (2009). The long and winding road: Automotive fuel economy and American

politics. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0225_cafe_nivola.pdf

Safford, R. (2019). Sustainability: A flawed concept for fisheries management? University of

California Press. https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.346

SP. (n.d.). Our projects. Sea Pact. https://www.seapact.org/

TRD. (2023). Ocean allies: Strengthening our bond with the ocean and each other. Trident

Seafood Corp. https://cdn.bfldr.com/VUHD2VO5/as/2htqnw77xq8nrk4snzxc23j/Trident_Seafood_Corp_ESG_Report

Tyson, A., & Kennedy, B. (2020). Two-Thirds of Americans Think Government Should

Do More on Climate: Bipartisan backing for carbon capture tax credits, extensive tree-planting efforts. Pew Research Center. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep57745

Urbina, I. (2020). How China’s expanding fishing fleet is depleting the world’s oceans. Yale

Environment 360. https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-chinas-expanding-fishing-fleet-is-depleting-worlds-oceans

Brief: Green Hydrogen and a Renewable Future

Nearly two decades of incentives and energy policies have spawned a remarkable duality in renewable energy. Solar accounts for just 3.9% of total U.S. electricity, yet California produced so much solar energy, the state essentially threw it away. This has prompted lawmakers to cut back on incentives and delay installations, but nationally there are few signs of solar abating (Osaka, 2024). In February of 2023, for example, the EIA estimated that over half of new U.S. electricity generating capacity would come from solar, compared to just 11% from wind and 14% from natural gas (Fasching & Ray, 2023). If solar proliferation continues, even modestly, this presents both infrastructure and policymaking challenges. Furthermore, the United States’ commitment to 100% carbon-free electricity by 2035 (WH, 2021), necessitates a massive investment in renewable energy. This is further supported by the IRA, IIJA, and FERC order 2222 which not only encourages distributed energy resources like rooftop solar, but requires utilities to integrate DER into the grid. Yet, as the California case shows, the intermittent nature of renewables lends such energy sources to extreme cycles of boom, bust, and waste.

The seasonal characteristics of renewables have made storage a critical component of the green ecosystem. In fact, while the storage conversation centers around lithium-ion solutions, the concept of batteries is broad and often far removed from chemical processes. Pumped hydro and thermal storage are two examples, however, as this paper argues, hydrogen presents an intriguing alternative that can be both green and renewable at scale. Moreover, hydrogen compliments the ancillary, short-term application of traditional batteries by providing robust seasonal energy for those months where little solar is available. In this, hydrogen does not compete with battery storage but instead fills a gap that would otherwise be covered by fossil fuels.

This paper explores the policies that advance hydrogen’s use as a grid-scale energy source in three capacities: a seasonal supplement to intermittent renewable energy, a store for excess renewable energy, and onsite industrial energy supply. The benefits of such applications are threefold. First, committing excess renewable energy to hydrogen production avoids waste as is currently happening in California. Second, as the mix of renewables grows, the impact of intermittent supply will become more apparent. Stored hydrogen provides both cheap and reliable energy to a wide range of customers and helps FERC meet its obligations in those areas. It also helps smooth supply dips, reduces risks to infrastructure and helps RTOs and ISOs ensure adequate, affordable supply to their regions. Finally, stored hydrogen, particularly in industrial capacities, helps reduce congestion by alleviating transmission loads during peak usage periods.

Background & Literature Review

The use of hydrogen is nothing new. In fact, heavy industries around the world produce large quantities of hydrogen for use in everything from fertilizers to steel. It is not, however, widely used as a source of electricity, and its application in this domain remains largely theoretical. That said, hydrogen possesses intriguing potential as a long-term supplement to intermittent renewables. Similarly, it has potential as an alternative power source to energy intensive industries like manufacturing and computing, and as a capacity management system that reduces congestion through DER.

To begin with, however, it’s important to acknowledge the limitations of hydrogen as an energy source. For example, Both Lambert (2007) and McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) write that hydrogen is not as energy efficient nor as cheap as traditional batteries. This is, in part, because traditional lithium-ion batteries store electricity while hydrogen fuel cells manufacture it. This process produces electricity, heat, and water instead of simply releasing electricity (DOE, n.d.). For this reason, hydrogen energy systems are not an ideal solution for intra-day applications. However, both Lambert (2007) and McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) believe it is cost-effective and environmentally favorable when deployed at scale over several months (for example, during winter). Energy efficiency also declines through the process of manufacturing and storage. Flux power (Flux, 2021) writes that hydrogen produced by electrolysis is only 30-40% efficient, while Bloom Energy (Bloom, 2023) was more optimistic, citing efficiencies as high as 60% in certain applications. Regardless, energy loss is a consideration. Furthermore, Edwards et al (2007) cite the “significant energy penalty” (p. 1050) associated with hydrogen storage, not to mention further losses incurred if the gas is used to make steam. Therefore, good policy must consider how hydrogen is to be used, its strengths, weaknesses, and appropriate applications.

Nonetheless, long-term storage is perhaps the most obvious grid-scale application of green hydrogen. Lambert (2020) and McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) each note the potential for hydrogen to be used as a seasonal load balancer, during periods when renewable sources aren’t as plentiful. This seasonal use compliments ancillary systems, like batteries and spinning reserves, by assuming a long-term, base-load role. Moreover, unlike lithium-ion batteries, hydrogen fuel cells do not need to be recharged so long as the supply of fuel remains constant (DOE, n.d.). Moving hydrogen, however, presents both incentives and disincentives for grid-scale applications. On the one hand, Edwards et al (2007) write that the current transportation system cannot be easily converted to carry hydrogen. Moreover, moving hydrogen at scale, they write, will require significant research and development. Lambert (2020), however, cites studies suggesting the existing natural gas infrastructure is indeed capable of handling pure hydrogen. Either way, it’s fair to assume that infrastructure investment will be required to bring hydrogen power to market in large quantities.

Alternatively, these risks can be mitigated by producing hydrogen onsite. In fact, onsite electricity production presents an intriguing opportunity for industry, regulators, and policymakers alike. For example, while residential customers number over 154 million, there are just 900,000 industrial consumers. Yet those customers draw over 25% of domestic electricity, the majority of which is bought from suppliers (Shively & Ferrare, 2019). In fact, according to the EIA (2023), just 15% of industrial electricity is produced onsite, with most of that coming by way of combined heat and power (CHP) generation. In that, there is an opportunity for green hydrogen. Edwards et al (2007) write that hydrogen-based CHP is up to 85% energy efficient, making it an intriguing replacement to natural gas. Such energy efficient solutions take on increased importance as the EIA expects total energy needs to more than double by 2050, with a majority of that being supplied by intermittent renewables (AEO, 2023).

The issue then becomes one of supplying power cheaply enough to economically manufacture hydrogen on-site. This could entail entering into exclusive power purchase agreements or standing up dedicated transmission lines to meet those needs. As with all aspects of the hydrogen solution, transmission is not without complications. Shively & Ferrare (2019) and Robertson & Palmer (2023) both express the difficulty in setting up new transmission lines, and RTOs face significant challenges bringing energy to customers when lines cross multiple jurisdictions. Nonetheless, onsite hydrogen production avoids transportation challenges while also absorbing excess energy from the grid. Perhaps most importantly, locally produced electricity reduces congestion by feeding it directly to the load.

Finally, it’s necessary to discuss some of the existing policies, their challenges and unintended consequences as they relate to hydrogen. To begin with, hydrogen production has many applications outside of electricity that compete for attention. For example, McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) note the challenge for policymakers lies in knowing where hydrogen fits in the green economy. Its power producing capabilities are one potential use, but it possesses a wide range of industrial applications that make knowing how it should be used more difficult.

Perhaps more crucial is green hydrogen’s dependence on cheap energy. Edwards et al (2007) write that though commercial hydrogen is 75% energy efficient, the cost of electrolysis is still several times higher than hydrocarbon-derived production (p. 1047). Over ten years later, the Department of Energy continues to cite the cost of electricity as the single biggest prohibitor to hydrogen production (Peterson et al, 2020 p. 13). Therefore, the success of hydrogen is directly coupled to policies that promote cheap energy. In that, the discussion has come full circle, returning to the dilemma faced by California lawmakers who have curtailed solar incentives due to an overabundance of supply. Rogers & Wisland (2014) summed up this problem rather succinctly, writing that DER integration is not a technical challenge, it is largely one of economics. Specifically, who pays for the cost of transmission when the flow of electricity is reversed (p. 4), or as was the case in California, when prices go negative.

On that note, federal policies have produced both benefits and drawbacks to DER, and by extension, green hydrogen. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act directs federal funds toward the research and development of clean hydrogen energy systems. It also directs research toward more efficient electrolysis and establishes clean hydrogen hubs for developing and promoting new technologies (Christensen et al, 2021). These policies along with a trend of energy decentralization, suggest that renewable energy will be cheaply available to green hydrogen producers over the long-term. On the other hand, serious concerns exist over supply chains and ongoing trade disputes with China, Southeast Asia, India, and others. Nikos et al (2021) write that tariffs put in place under the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 have increased the price of Chinese PV cells by upwards of 60%. The increased costs are one reason solar prices are higher in the United States than in most of the rest of the world (p. 16). Runde & Ramanujam (2020) similarly argue that the pandemic highlighted the United States’ overreliance on foreign supply chains, and suggest a need to reshore American manufacturing. In summary, federal and state policies aimed at the proliferation of DER necessitate supply chains capable of meeting that demand. Consequently, achieving grid-scale green hydrogen as mentioned by the IIJA, is likewise dependent upon international supply chains and trade policy.

Policy Options

As the preceding discussion has shown, green hydrogen offers a compelling solution to seasonal inconsistencies in renewable energy. It is, however, predicated on an abundance of cheap, renewable energy, making it directly dependent on DER and susceptible to international trade policies. Fortunately, it’s not necessary for policymakers to solve a grid-scale problem in one initiative. Much in the way today’s DER initiatives are predicated on over forty years of prior policy, hydrogen adoption can, and arguably should, be done incrementally.

As a starting point, policymakers can target specific industries. For example, Ohio might partner with heavy manufacturers while Arizona and Texas might choose to work with industrial computing. The goal of such programs would be to reduce congestion and enable growth by promoting onsite power production. Under such a program, industry partners could receive abatements, carbon credits, or property tax adjustments based on the percentage of power they generate onsite. Two roughly parallel models exist for this approach: PURPA’s avoided cost stipulation (Shively & Ferrare, 2019) and property tax breaks for homeowners who install DER (Rogers & Wisland, 2014). Such policies are effective in 45 states and carry broad public support. In either case, adapting these policies to industrial customers could incentivize onsite energy production and help meet EIA growth projections while reducing congestion.

It’s important to note that onsite power production doesn’t necessarily require grid-ready fuel cell technology. As was reported by the EIA (2023), most onsite power production comes from CHP processes. The extent to which hydrogen could replace natural gas is a critical point for R&D, however, hydrogen and natural gas blends are an alternative that could work with existing infrastructure. For example, tests have proven blends containing 5-10% hydrogen were compatible with existing technology, and Europe is testing concentrations as high as 20% (Lambert, 2020). Therefore, regulators could stipulate a hydrogen transition that mirrors ethanol additives in fuel, rewarding companies who produce or use green hydrogen in lieu of natural gas.

More importantly, excess energy must be both affordable and accessible. Congestion is one of the biggest risks to supply and often necessitates establishing new lines. Given the difficulties in building new transmission cited by Shively & Ferrare (2019) and Robertson & Palmer (2020), it’s important for RTOs to begin the planning process early. One policy approach could be to build on FERC order 2222 and require utilities to provide hydrogen producers with direct access to excess energy, provided that excess is derived from renewables and used to produce green hydrogen. In that, RTOs and utilities are compelled to build new transmission lines, while industrial consumers are rewarded for investing in green hydrogen DER. Furthermore, Villarreal (2020) advocates for adopting policies that compel utilities to invest in DER, noting that their multi-year planning processes benefit from the flexibility DER provides. Taking industrial demand off the grid reduces both technical and bureaucratic risk.

Finally, ensuring abundant, cheap energy is essential to the success of clean hydrogen, however, as California has demonstrated, incentives lose effectiveness when excessive energy is produced. Nonetheless, for states lacking California’s solar boom, there are effective policies available. For example, Rogers & Wisland (2014) write that net metering and property tax breaks still hold value in most areas. Others, like Ünel & Zerbe (2022) argue that net metering fails to compensate DER owners for the full value of their investment. In that, homeowners should be paid for both the utility and environmental avoided costs (pp. 5-6). Alternatively, requiring utilities to invest in clean energy is another option. For example, as part of their renewable portfolio standard, New Jersey requires 35% of energy sold in state to come from renewables (NJ, n.d.). A final approach, not discussed in any of the literature reviewed here is to require solar on all new construction. This could reasonably be limited to areas conducive to solar generation, and is more appropriate for markets like California where incentives are no longer effective. As with all of these solutions, however, supply concerns exist for such large-scale production initiatives.

Policy Recommendation

Any policy must contain clear scope and success criteria. Therefore, the recommendation in this paper is to create abundant, cheap electricity through DER and provide that energy to industrial partners for the purpose of creating clean hydrogen. McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) advocate for a similar approach, noting the unpredictability of the residential market, appliance compatibility, and a host of other technical complications as reasons to avoid consumer-based solutions. Alternatively, industrial customers often exist in clusters with dedicated infrastructure, some of which is hydrogen compatible, or capable of supplying the power required to manufacture it onsite (pp. 5, 10, 20). Industrial customers are fewer but also have the most to gain from self-managed DER. Provided overhead is sufficiently reduced, supplementing their energy consumption with clean hydrogen may prove cost advantageous, particularly in those periods where renewables are unavailable. Achieving partial grid separation would also help insulate them from extreme price spikes that occur on an intra-day basis.

McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) write that finding an industrial partner willing to share some of the risk is essential to the technology’s success. In this, regulators have an opportunity to incentivize industrial cooperation by providing tax breaks, carbon credits, and direct access to cheap (or free) renewable energy. If opportunities do not already exist for the private sector to partner with the DOE, policymakers should consider expanding the IIJA to include such programs. Local governments could work with specific companies to install, upgrade, or test existing infrastructure for use with hydrogen CHP. The DOE’s EV-focused Workplace Charging Challenge is a good example of what such a policy could look like. The important point is that such policies produce real world infrastructure from which data can be collected.

Finally, amending FERC order 2222 to require RTOs to provide excess green energy directly to industrial customers is a great long-term strategy. There is unfortunately, likely no way around the difficulties of building new transmission lines, though to the extent possible, regulators can work to streamline the process. This policy provides transmission operators with a destination for their excess energy while also incentivizing industry to invest in DER. It’s worth noting that residential incentives are not recommended due to the uncertainty of green hydrogen’s compatibility. In that, it is important that policymakers limit scope as described and work with a handful of participants, perhaps by holding a lottery, where government agrees to share the capital costs associated with green hydrogen infrastructure. On a longer-term basis, regulators need to establish real targets, like those stated around emissions reductions. For example, converting 50% of onsite energy production to green hydrogen by 2050 is one goal. Having all industrial customers fully independent, sustainable, and renewable by 2060 is another objective. Either way, real world infrastructure and measurable definitions of success are critical.

Conclusion

Clean hydrogen presents a terrific opportunity to provide seasonal energy when solar and wind are not available. The risks of hydrogen, including infrastructure compatibility, DER dependence, and international policies, make its viability far from certain. Therefore, policymakers must consider options that are both targeted and carry well-defined measures of success. To that degree, a focus on industrial customers, infrastructure support, including direct access to cheap energy, and active federal partnerships are essential to the success of clean hydrogen.

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The Ethics of Performance Enhancing Drug Use in Baseball

In late September 1998, Mark McGwire hit his 70th homerun of the season. It was four more than rival Sammy Sosa and nine more than the prior record of 61 that had stood for nearly forty years. A little more than a decade later, however, McGwire would admit to using steroids enroute to his record-setting season, offering apologies to fans, baseball commissioner Bud Selig, and the family of prior record holder, Roger Maris (Weisbaum, 2010). Though McGwire and a handful of other players would become the face of baseball’s steroid era, responsibility for one of the league’s most prominent scandals falls equally to the Players Association, the league office, and the owners. Morally, however, baseball’s decision to not regulate performance enhancing drug use, amounts to a breach of contract between the fan and the game. Though the league has never admitted to using steroids to rejuvenate baseball following the 1994 strike, it wasn’t until steroid use became public and attendance numbers had recovered, that the league instituted a formal testing policy. This essay, therefore, explores the ethical theories and implications of baseball’s involvement in the steroid scandal, its outcomes, and how future circumstances could be handled differently.

Background and Ethical Dilemma

The decline in attendance following the players strike in 1994 is widely viewed as a pivotal moment in the league’s handling of steroids, however, the fact is, performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) were not a new concern for baseball. In fact, the steroid era is widely viewed as originating in the 1980s, and baseball’s attempts to limit illegal drug use, though weak, date back to the 1970s. The strike brought doping into focus, however, as owners faced twin crises of declining attendance and accelerating PED use. Moreover, the anabolic steroids that typified PEDs during that time, were a controlled substance and subject to federal regulation (Mitchell, 2007). In other words, unauthorized distribution and possession of these drugs was illegal, regardless of baseball’s position on the matter. Therefore, the league had an incentive to moderate performance enhancing drugs if for no other reason than player safety and rule of law. Furthermore, the strike presented an opportunity for both sides to negotiate a solution to PEDs before they became a problem.

At the same time, baseball appeared to be benefiting from enhanced player performance. Attendance and revenue had climbed steadily throughout the steroid era and by 1993, over 70 million people had attended a game compared to fewer than 30 million twenty years prior (BBR, n.d.). Team payrolls had topped $900 million for the first time in league history (BBR, n.d.), and baseball was quickly becoming the domain of rich players and wealthier owners. It’s somewhat unsurprising, therefore, that as the players and owners began negotiating a new labor agreement, the two sides prioritized money over a comprehensive drug policy (Mitchell, 2007). Nonetheless, the negotiations failed to reach an agreement and in August of 1994, the players went on strike.

Major League Baseball now had two competing problems. When play resumed in 1995, attendance, which had climbed steadily for decades, fell by over 30% (Pantuosco, 2011). Consequently, the league faced a dramatic reduction in revenue. The second problem was the proliferation of illegal performance enhancing drugs. On the one hand, the league could maintain the hands-off approach to PEDs that had accompanied baseball’s rise over the prior two decades, and trust that enhanced performance would renew interest; or they could abide by federal law and implement new drug policies that would expose steroid use and further risk the fans’ relationship with the game. Such a dilemma pits aspects of utilitarianism, relativism, and Kantian ethics against one another. However, as will be discussed, the players’ preference for financial priorities and baseball’s recovered attendance figures, suggest that no clear-cut lines of moral superiority exist in baseball’s steroid scandal.  

Solutions Implemented

In the early months of 1994, then commissioner, Bud Selig, proposed adding steroids to the league’s list of banned substances, and instituting a formal testing program for players suspected of doping. This was intended to augment an earlier, informal agreement that had been reached in 1984 under which players could be tested if suspected of illegal drug use, however, neither proposal defined what constituted reasonable cause, making each subjective and difficult to enforce. The league had also made numerous attempts to institute random drug testing over the preceding decades, however these policies had focused primarily on recreational drugs not performance enhancing substances. Regardless, all, including the 1994 proposal, were rejected by the players (Mitchell, 2007).

That said, though the owners appeared to support drug policies, their commitment to enforcing them was weak and easily displaced. For example, future commissioner Rob Manfred, who was baseball’s chief labor negotiator at the time, admitted that after players rejected the 1994 proposal, determining how revenue would be divided between the players and owners was more important than setting drug policy. These priorities would remain in place until the next labor contract was negotiated in the early 2000s (Mitchell, 2007, pp. SR-11, 25, 43-44). Therefore, baseball’s initial solution to the attendance and steroid issue was to maintain the status quo and prioritize money over doping policy.

It wasn’t until 2001, after rumors of steroid use had been picked up by the media, that baseball began a pilot program, testing players in the minor leagues. That program was ratified by major league players in 2002 and formally enforced in 2004. By 2005 baseball’s drug policy had been updated a final time. The first positive test was punishable with a 50 game suspension; a second failed test carried a 100 game ban; and a third infraction resulted in a permanent suspension. In all cases, the player’s name would be released publicly (Michell, 2007). On April 3, 2005, twenty years after the start of the steroid era, Alex Sanchez became the first player to receive a suspension under baseball’s new PED policy (BA, n.d.).

Results

It wasn’t until 1998, a year after the new labor agreement was signed, that rumors first began circulating that St. Louis Cardinals slugger Mark McGwire was taking steroids. At the time, McGwire and fellow slugger Sammy Sosa were pursuing baseball’s single season homerun total. One of the game’s most prestigious records. Indeed, the drama of the homerun chase sparked renewed interest in the game. Pantuosco (2011) writes that the competition between McGwire and Sosa provided the injection of interest that baseball’s owners desired. League-wide attendance numbers further support that assessment. By 1998, over 70 million fans attended games, a number not seen since 1993 (BBR, n.d.). Furthermore, the rise in attendance was accompanied by a “dramatic increase” in offensive output throughout the league in 1996 (Mitchell, 2007, p. SR-14). Renewed interest and offensive output, therefore, positively reinforced baseball’s decision to not control doping and instead, prioritize money and performance.

There were negative consequences as well, however. For example, numerous incidents of steroids, packaging, and syringes being found by team personnel, law enforcement, and others culminated with a federal investigation into an illegal PED distribution center, which had alleged connections to high profile stars including Barry Bonds and Jason Giambi (Mitchell, 2007, p. SR-17). The BALCO investigation, as it was known, ultimately spawned congressional hearings and an independent investigation led by Senator George Mitchell (2007), marking the culmination of baseball’s worst scandal.

Certainly, baseball’s approach to steroids had far reaching implications. On the one hand, it resulted in an era of historical offensive output and rejuvenated fan interest. Additionally, some of baseball’s biggest stars made millions in endorsements as a result of their performances (Pantuosco, 2011, p. 60). On the other hand, baseball traded a PR problem for a moral dilemma. Mitchell (2007) writes, “[t]he problem of performance enhancing substance use in baseball has shaken the faith of many baseball fans in the integrity and fairness of…the records that have been achieve during what has come to be known as baseball’s ‘steroids era’” (p. 12). It has also resulted in players of that era being kept out of the hall of fame. Nearly 20 years after baseball instituted its formal drug testing policies, no player linked to performance enhancing drugs has been inducted into the hall of fame (Uberti, 2016). It must be stated, however, that since baseball instituted its new policy, incidents of steroid use have declined dramatically, though this may simply be due to players opting for newer, non-detectable substances (Mitchell, 2007).

Analysis

 It’s easy to criticize baseball’s handling of steroids following the 1994 strike, but as discussed above, the short-term results were exactly what the owners wanted. Mitchell (2007) writes that the league’s initial response to steroids was slow and ineffective, however this is only the case if the outcome is judged through a reduction in steroid use. Both the players and the owners made clear through their negotiations that their chief concern was money, not drug policy. More importantly, both sides chose to prioritize money over player health and integrity of the game. These realities provide important insight into baseball’s decision-making process and whether their decisions were appropriate.

Under the best interpretation of the owner’s intensions, a utilitarian argument could apply. Baber (n.d.) summarizes utilitarianism as preferencing those actions that produce the best overall consequence and least amount of pain. Baber continues, writing that modern, rule-based utilitarianism instructs societies to adopt only those rules that produce the greatest good for all. Hindsight certainly allows one to judge baseball’s decisions over an ever-lengthening period of time. However, leading up to the strike of 1994, it was clear that the players, by voting down various drug policies, preferred the benefits of enhanced performance over the health risks of PEDs. The boost in offensive output and endorsements are aspects of such benefits. Furthermore, such enhanced performance provided a beneficial version of the game to millions of fans, and indeed, baseball’s attendance toward the end of the 1990s supports this conclusion. It’s also true that baseball’s attendance figures did not dramatically decline following the steroid scandal and have held steady for much of the last 20 years. Importantly, over that same period, league payroll has climbed to over $4.6 billion (BBR, n.d.). It’s difficult to argue, therefore, that from a utilitarian perspective the greater good wasn’t served. Player health would constitute a minor stake in the overall good brought to fans, players, owners, and advertisers. And to the extent that baseball’s laissez-faire approach to steroids damaged the integrity of the game, it hasn’t resulted in decreased attendance. Therefore, on these grounds, baseball’s decision to defer testing was appropriate.

In many respects, baseball’s steroid policy is a collaboration between players and owners. Their initial decision to act (or not act) was mutually agreed upon and largely driven by financial concerns. By the time the steroid scandal broke, and the BALCO federal investigation had begun, the two sides had mutual incentive to formulate a comprehensive drug policy, both for legal and PR reasons. Therefore, the cooperation between players and owners was equitable and presents a strong Kantian argument that their decisions were moral. In the early years of steroid use, the players and owners knew the risks of PEDs, and both chose money over doping controls. As the steroid scandal gained momentum, a comprehensive doping policy became both legally and financially prudent. Therefore, neither side used the other as mere means. On the other hand, while the relationship between the players and owners might have followed Kantian and utilitarian principles, certain moral and ethical deficiencies arise when considering the league’s obligation to the fans.

To begin with, there’s a legitimate Kantian argument to be made that steroid use constitutes a lie. Gendreau (2015) writes that an athlete’s physical performance is central to their public persona. Moreover, their public persona is shared, interpreted, and written in part by the fans. In this way, the fans share in who the player is (p. 516). By using PEDs, the player has deceived the fan about the nature of their physical performance and violated their Kantian obligation to always tell the truth. Moreover, as Rachels (2022) write, Kant placed particular emphasis on the intentions behind one’s actions. By failing to disclose illegal drug use, the owners intentionally misled fans in pursuit of renewed profits. The fans’ participation in the player’s narrative and the fact that financial transactions are central to that participation, imply an obligation on ownership to conduct business in an honest, transparent manner. By failing to disclose PEDs, ownership breached this contract while using the fans as mere means. In this way, the relationship between the league and the public was inequitable.  

While Kantian principles provide a strong basis for both criticizing and defending baseball’s decisions, cultural relativism provides an alternative defense. Consider, for example, that players have estimated that anywhere from 20 – 50% of their peers used PEDs (Mitchell, 2007). Though this number is unverifiable, it suggests a culture of drug use amongst MLB players that goes beyond official estimates. Strulik (2012) argues that not only does such a culture compel athletes to dope, but it produces two fundamentally different moral frameworks. One for the fans and another for the players (pp. 541-542). In that, few parallels exist in public life for the competitive pressure players face. To fans, baseball is a reprieve from daily life. To players, it’s their livelihood. Not only can doping represent a cultural norm within sports, but it’s necessary to remain employed. Such cultural relativism stands in stark contrast to the moral framework of fans who view sports as a diversion, and players as elite athletic performers. Indeed, relativism is a compelling argument if not for the fact that the league (and players) profit from a dishonest representation of themselves. Therefore, while the players and owners acted ethically with respect to each other, both failed in their moral obligation to the fans, upon whom they depend.

Finally, to the extent that fans may want to claim a moral higher ground, such a position is difficult to support. If voting with their feet is any indication of their morality, the 1994 strike proved more salient than performance enhancing drug use. As mentioned, baseball’s attendance numbers recovered and barely dipped when the steroid scandal was at its height. If anything, fans’ continued patronage brings the Kantian inequity of the steroid era into balance. Regardless, though baseball may claim this argument vindicates their handling of PEDs, it nonetheless constitutes a breach of contract. Their decisions were dishonest whether the fans were broadly outraged by them or not. That said, baseball took an enormous risk in not curtailing steroid use before it became a scandal. There was no reason to think fans wouldn’t react badly to player drug use given how poorly they’d reacted to the 1994 strike. It’s also not clear to what extent broken trust lingers or might surface should baseball encounter a new controversy. For these reasons, the preferable policy would be one of prompt and aggressive anti-doping regulations.

Furthermore, if baseball viewed offense as a means of reinvigorating the sport, they might have considered changing the game itself. For example, baseball’s recent implementation of bigger bases, pitch clocks, bans on certain defensive alignments, and other rule changes have all proven beneficial to the game. It’s worth noting, however, that today’s changes do not entirely fit the historical context of baseball thirty years ago. Nonetheless, there were aspects of the game itself that could have been changed and agreed to by the players without violating their obligation to the fans. In this way, the league would have avoided the ethical dilemma it created by neither disclosing nor curtailing steroid use.

In summary, while baseball’s decision to defer a comprehensive drug policy did not violate codes of ethics between players and owners, it did violate their Kantian obligation to the fans. By not disclosing steroid use, the league misrepresented the game to the public upon whom they depend. Furthermore, though hindsight suggests that this was the correct decision, baseball couldn’t have known this was the case at the time. Therefore, while the outcomes of the league’s decisions can be fully justified on utilitarian principles, the correct course of action would have been to proactively establish a comprehensive drug policy and avoid the risks of a PED scandal.

References

BA. (n.d.). Steroid suspensions in Major League Baseball. Baseball Almanac.

https://www.baseball-almanac.com/legendary/steroids_baseball.shtml

Baber, H. (n.d.). The nature of morality and moral theories. University of San Diego.

https://home.sandiego.edu/~baber/gender/MoralTheories.html

BBR. (n.d.). Major league miscellaneous year-by-year averages and totals. Baseball Reference.

https://www.baseball-reference.com/leagues/majors/misc.shtml

Gendreau, M. S. (2015). Who? Moral Condemnation, PEDs, and Violating the Constraints of

Public Narrative. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 18(3), 515–528. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24478637

Michell, G. J. (2007). Report to the commissioner of baseball of an independent investigation

into the illegal use of steroids and other performance enhancing substances by players in Major League Baseball. Major League Baseball. https://files.mlb.com/mitchrpt.pdf 

Pantuosco, L. J. (2011). Does it pay to be unethical? The case of performance enhancing drugs in

MLB. The American Economist, 56(2), 58–68. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23240392

Strulik, H. (2012). Riding High: Success in Sports and the Rise of Doping Cultures. The

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 114(2), 539–574. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41679520

Rachels, J.R. S. (2022). The Elements of Moral Philosophy (10th ed.). McGraw-Hill Higher

Education (US). https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781264998692

Uberti, D. (2016). Baseball writers face moral dilemma in hall of fame vote. Columbia

Journalism Review. https://www.cjr.org/analysis/baseball_writers_annual_ritual_of.php

Weisbaum, W. (2010). McGwire apologizes to La Russa, Selig. ESPN.

https://www.espn.com/mlb/news/story?id=4816607

Norway’s Push for a Renewable Future

A little over 120 kilometers off the west coast of Norway sits the world’s largest aquatic windfarm. The project dubbed Hywind Tampen, is part of the country’s aggressive push into offshore wind and other renewable energy sources. According to the International Trade Administration (a U.S. agency), the Norwegians expect to have 1,500 turbines in operation, producing upwards of 30 GW in renewable energy by 2040 (ITA, 2024). Yet at the same time, a significant percentage of Norway’s GDP comes from fossil fuel extraction. Just 400 kilometers south of the Hywind Tampen project, some of the world’s largest oil and gas platforms occupy the North Sea. While Norway relies primarily on renewable energy at home, they are a major player in the international fossil fuel market. For example, Norwegian natural gas exports cover roughly 3% of global and 25% of European demand (NP, 2023). All told, fossil fuel extraction accounted for nearly a quarter of Norway’s GDP in 2023 (CNBC, 2024). This dependence on fossil fuels and Norway’s status as a green leader make the country an intriguing case study. More importantly, their success at widespread EV adoption, use of renewable energy, and reliance on fossil fuels to pay for it all, provide a template for the green transitions of other western economies.

Policy and Literature Review

Along with rich natural gas deposits, Norway has some of the world’s most well-suited geography for producing renewable energy. For example, 98% of Norway’s electricity is provided by renewables with the overwhelming majority of that coming from hydroelectric dams (Ritchie et al, 2024). Interestingly, while electricity production in terms of TWH has increased steadily since 1970, green energy on a per capita basis has remained relatively flat over the same period (secs. 1-2). This is due in large part to the legacy of Norway’s reliance on hydroelectric power. While much of the world invested in coal and gas-powered plants, Norway built dams. Nonetheless, Norway’s overall GHG emissions have climbed steadily since 1970, peaking around 2004 before gradually declining over the last 20 years (EC, 2023). While this constitutes a surprise, it illustrates that a green economy is much larger than the electric grid and moratoriums on gas powered cars.

Figure 1 Norway's total GHG emissions by sector (EC, 2023).

For example, according to the European Commission (EC, 2023), the majority of Norway’s GHG emissions are from fossil fuel extraction. While global GHG emissions have doubled since 1970, Norway’s emissions related to the production of oil and gas have expanded by a factor of 30.

It's also worth contextualizing Norway’s performance against the United States. Surprisingly, America’s total GHG emissions on a per capita basis have remained relatively flat since 1970 (EC, 2023). CO2 emissions peaked between 2004 and 2007 before declining for much of the next 15 years. By the same measure, Norway’s CO2 emissions peaked around 2010 and have declined only modestly since. This is likely due to a much smaller population and a continued policy of maximizing fossil fuel exports.

Figure 2 Norway's total CO2 emissions by sector (EC, 2023).

Finally, while Norway’s specific policies will be discussed more in the next section, it’s helpful to review international trends in green policy adoption. Ohio State University dean of law, Lincoln Davies (2018) writes that green policies generally follow a three-phase arc, beginning with policy proliferation (at the federal and local level), then by a period of iteration and improvement, and finally a widespread redistribution of successful policies across other green initiatives (p. 315). Furthermore, Davies notes that policymakers are shifting toward market-based solutions rather than feed-in-tariffs and taxes. Such moves are a sign of a maturing green economy (pp. 316-317) and evident in Norway’s transition to a low emission society.

Policy Actions and Recommendations

Norway’s modern relationship with environmental policy began in 1991 when they became one of the first nations to adopt a carbon tax. Today, 85% of the country’s GHG emissions are covered either by EU or domestic CO2 policies (IEA, 2022, p. 10). Norway has been an active participant in the Paris Climate Agreement as well, adopting so-called NDCs or National Determined Contributions to reduce emissions to half of their 1990 levels by 2030. The NDC targets were given legal backing in 2017 by the Climate Change Act, and in 2021, the country introduced the Climate Action Plan, which sets emissions targets on all areas not covered by NDC or EU regulations (p. 10). Norway has also taken aggressive steps to push EV adoption, including setting goals to eliminate all new gas-powered car sales by 2025, waving EV VAT taxes, instituting exemptions on tolls, ferry passes, and parking, and offering free public charging for EV owners. (CNBC, 2024). These policies and the proliferation of electric vehicle manufacturers have resulted in a dramatic increase in EV adoption. For example, according to CNBC reporting, 82% of Norway’s new car sales were electric in 2023 (CNBC, 2024). The rise of EV’s has resulted in an almost 16% reduction in transportation-related CO2 emissions since 2014 (EC, 2023) and a 20% improvement in Oslo’s air quality, according to Sture Portvik, the city’s manager of electromobility (CNBC, 2024, 3.15).

Yet Norway’s electrification has carried unintended consequences and challenges. For example, increased EV adoption has resulted in a dramatic reduction in CO2 tax revenue. At the same time, an increase in EVs has led to increased traffic, wear and tear on the city’s infrastructure and less tax revenue to pay for repairs. In a nod to the policy arc outlined by Davies (2018), policymakers have begun phasing out EV incentives and redistributing the public tax burden more evenly across EV owners (CNBC, 2024). Nonetheless, for all of Norway’s efforts, their GHG emissions remain relatively high. Future policies must work to wean Norway’s economy off fossil fuel production. For example, CNBC (2024) reported that Norway intends to double its electricity output through wind power alone by 2040 (18.30). At the same time, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance has proposed implementing a resource rent on onshore wind power and reinvesting those funds in green technology (NMF, 2024). Another option is to gradually wind down fossil fuel exploration by limiting new permits. Under this model, Norway would exit the fossil fuel industry by 2050 (Statistics Norway, 2020). Such policies could be further paired with subsidies to help ease the industry’s transition to green energy.

Using policies to spur innovation, particularly in battery technology and agriculture is another option. Freyer Battery CEO Bergen Steen cites the American Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) as an example European policymakers could follow (CNBC, 2024, 11.00). The IRA has resulted in hundreds of billions of dollars in green tech investment from battery alternatives to better steel (Worland, 2023). Green technologies could also be applied to agriculture alongside taxes on corporate farms or moratoriums on industrial fertilizers.  In short, it is essential that future policies work to transition existing carbon-heavy industries to low emission technologies, while reducing the footprint of those systems through better batteries and more sustainable practices.

Conclusion

Limiting GHG emissions matters as the impact of pollutants carries global consequences. Norway’s example, even if local, provides at least one possible approach to limiting emissions. That said, it’s important to discuss why some countries fail to address climate concerns. One reason already covered here is geography. Few countries have Norway’s rivers or coastline and therefore don’t have access to hydro or wind alternatives. Another reason is a lack of national wealth. Green tech, while cheapening, is still costly. The infrastructure alone is not conducive to geopolitical instability, nor do developing nations have the resources to invest in such technologies. Domestic concerns play a role as well, from special interests in the oil and gas industries, to a lack of affordability. The rivers of the Pacific Northwest are a terrific source of renewable energy but garner resistance from environmental groups and the EPA. The diverse landscape of the United States similarly prohibits the widespread adoption of solar or wind. Finally, political will makes environmental change difficult. In Norway, there is a culture of shared utility around the use of public funds, and a track record of using that money for the public good. The United States, on the other hand, has no comprehensive energy policy (Kraft & Furlong, 2019), nor does such national trust exist. None of these reasons preclude the adoption of green technology, but they illustrate the complications associated with going green.

In summary, Norway is leading the world’s transition to a green, low emission society, but that transition is predicated on a continued reliance on fossil fuels. While this might seem hypocritical, it illustrates the complexities of going green in an advanced economy. More importantly, the Norwegian model illustrates that fossil fuels are part of the green solution, whether by funding green industries, or transitioning themselves to new technologies.

References

CNBC. (2024, February 17). How Norway built an EV utopia while the U.S. Is struggling to go electric

| CNBC documentary [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5DbRyeZNRk

Davies, L.L. (2018). Eulogizing renewable energy policy. Journal of Land & Environmental Law,

33(2), 309-330. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26895805

EC. (2023). EDGAR – Emissions database for global atmospheric research. European Commission.

https://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/country_profile/NOR

IEA. (2022). Norway 2022: Energy policy review. International Energy Agency.

https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/de28c6a6-8240-41d9-9082-a5dd65d9f3eb/NORWAY2022.pdf

ITA. (2024). Norway country commercial guide. International Trade Administration.

https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/norway-offshore-energy-oil-gas-and-renewables

Kraft, M. E., & Furlong, S. R. (2019). Public Policy: Politics, Analysis, and Alternatives

(7th ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc. (US). https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781544374598

NMF. (2024). Proposition to the storting 2 LS: Resource rent tax on onshore wind power. Norwegian

Ministry of Finance. https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/38eb2ed69eb44ef4b5f25f6a0638c036/en-gb/pdfs/prp202320240002000engpdfs.pdf

NP. (2023). Exports of oil and gas. Norwegian Petroleum.

https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/production-and-exports/exports-of-oil-and-gas/

Ritchie, H., Roser, M., & Rosado, P. (2024). Renewable energy: Renewable energy sources are growing

quickly and will play a vital role in tackling climate change. Our World in Data. https://ourworldindata.org/renewable-energy  

Statistics Norway. (2020). Consequences of reduced petroleum activities. Statistics Norway. ht

tps://www.ssb.no/nasjonalregnskap-og-konjunkturer/artikler-og-publikasjoner/konsekvenser-av-redusert-petroleumsvirksomhet

Worland, J. (2023). How the inflation reduction act has reshaped the U.S. – and the world. Time.

https://time.com/6304143/inflation-reduction-act-us-global-impact/

The Sun Still Orbits the Earth in Utopia

Evening sun passed through the Parthenon, casting a two-dimensional lattice upon which Plato walked. The philosopher muttered quietly to himself, gesticulating in moments of thought that coalesced around the notion of an idyllic city state. His mentor and friend Socrates, was long dead, executed at the hands of a democratic mob, and it was now against his memory that Plato formed his ideas. The state was not simply a governing body, it was the cultivator of citizens, a parent, a mentor, and guardian. A state did not a great people make. A great state with great institutions made the citizenry. It was therefore with some irony that Plato extolled the higher virtues of human intellect and deplored anything that might pollute the mind. The people, it seemed, were agents of great intellectual potential, but could not be trusted with self-governance (Crawford, 2007). It’s unlikely that Plato included himself amongst those requiring a parental guardian, however. He, after all, was the author of the idea. If only everyone possessed his capacity for intellectual reflection, society might well enter the utopian bliss he sought to create. This inherent selfishness would be mirrored thousands of years later by Marxist revolutionaries like Stalin and Castro, who used such utopian ideas to propel themselves into positions of elite power. Indeed, neither Stalin nor Castro had any intention of condemning themselves to a life of dreary factory work. The revolution and utopia itself were about them. The legions of proletariat were simply useful idiots in a personal quest for power. This essay examines utopian concepts in politics, society, and social media, and explores the thesis that utopian thinking is inherently, perhaps unavoidably, self-serving, and narcissistic.

Much like its Marxist incarnation, utopias are dramatic asymmetries in power masked by curtains of egalitarianism. The Marxist manages to hide this fact in plain sight, notably excluding the elite in their blistering ripostes of capitalism and instead focusing their ire on the bourgeois. Plato was similarly partial to authoritarian governance. As Yves Charbit notes, “[T]he statement that Plato was concerned with ‘equality’ is debatable, and at the very least, should not be understood in the sense of democratic equality. For him, Sparta, not Athenian democracy, represented the most accomplished political model” (Charbit & Virmani, 2002, p. 211). Plato’s guardians, an elite cadre of intellectuals, skilled in logic and unpersuaded by passion were the center of an exclusive upper tier of society. Guardians were imagined to possess the virtues sought in an idyllic citizenry, most notably wisdom and reason. Only warriors were similarly esteemed, and both were privileged in the community (p. 223).  While Plato never explicitly identifies himself as a guardian or a warrior, these ideas are products of his inner dialogue and suggest that his ideal state reflects his self-image. Plato’s utopia, therefore, is his utopia. It not only reflects his values but demonstrates the requisite arrogance to presuppose his values on others. Plato presumes to know what is in everyone’s best interests and withholds the ability for citizens to make such decisions for themselves. In fact, such presuppositions are demonstrated in today’s politics, social movements, and popular culture. They manifest in populism, communism, and identity politics. At the center of these dynamics, however, whether group-based or individual, is an inherently self-centered motivation.

Utopia, exclusivity, power, and revolution are inseparable. Utopian concepts also employ universally simplistic thinking. Sadeq et al (2011) write that utopian thinkers portray the idyllic state as a living reality, enjoyed by all citizens. The end-state is so obvious, they write, that it is taken for granted and with little thought about how it would be implemented or maintained (pp. 131-132). In other words, utopia simply works and almost magically so. More’s vision of a feudal labor system where everyone works the fields (p. 138) captures this quite well. In More’s idyllic state, however, he fails to question the basic assumption that trade work holds equal value – or any value – to all people. Such a society might be quite dystopian for large numbers of people, yet this possibility doesn’t enter into More’s thinking. Therefore, much like Plato’s managed society, one must ask whose utopia More is describing. Has he based his imaginings on empirical research and collective study or is he simply articulating what would make him happy.

Similarly flawed thinking manifests in utopian concepts of power and hierarchy. For example, in a study of narcissism in right-wing populist movements, researchers Golec de Zavala & Keenan (2021) write that members of populist movements see themselves as exceptional and entitled to privileged treatment. They view themselves self-righteously as the only true representatives of national interests. Narcissistic populism, they write, is not about social justice and equality but rather, entitlement and privilege (pp. 2-3). This collective narcissism blends with individual perceptions of self, and personal status is often the underlying motivation for broader nationalist concerns (p. 2-4). In this way, the left and right wings share common ground. For example, Betty Glad (2002) writes that Stalin and Hitler both displayed grandiose yet insecure perceptions of self. Describing both as malignant narcissists, possessing superegos with insatiable appetites for personal glory. Stalin portrayed himself as the creator of a communist world order while Hitler envisioned himself the founder of a pure Germanic utopia, often comparing himself to Jesus (pp. 2, 5, 20). While each of Stalin, Hitler, Plato, and More sought to advance their vision of an ideal state, Hitler and Stalin wrapped their personal motivations in national political movements. It’s important, therefore, to consider whether individual narcissistic behavior manifests at the group level and how each might influence the other.

To begin with, utopias are collectives of sameness. This uniformity was captured quite well in the 2014 film The Giver (Noyce, 2014), which depicts a utopian society of egalitarian equality, surveillance, and tightly controlled social norms. Society is governed by a single matriarchal authoritarian (Meryl Streep), whose knowledge of life before utopia is debatable, but whose singular authority is not. In their paper on narcissism and political affiliation, Hatemi & Fazekas (2018) summarize such political narcissism, writing that political ideologies and attitudes are not just about how one should live, but demanding that all others live the same way. This arises from a definition of narcissism that is not simply being concerned with oneself but is an agglomeration of self, views of others, modes of thinking, and motivations that guide behavior and become part of individual identity (pp. 873-875). Golec de Zavala & Keenan (2021) arrived at a similar bidirectional conclusion, noting that collective narcissism merges group and personal identity, often compensating undermined self-importance with group affiliation (p. 4). In other words, narcissistic behavior not only manifests at the group and individual levels, but each interacts with the other.

Such interactions are evident in today’s social media landscape. Consider the microblogging site Tumblr, for instance. Andre Cavalcante (2019) likens the site to a “queer utopia” and users describe it as a “queer bubble” where one can lose themselves and fall into a black hole (pp. 1715-1716). Tumblr, like all utopian concepts, represents a type of safe space. One where conformity and lack of dissenting opinion are expected. For utopians, safe spaces are synonymous with ‘people like me’ which mirrors the uniformity of sameness expected in utopia. For example, Cavalcante writes that Tumblr is a vortex of similar thought and is nearly devoid of dissenting opinions (pp. 1727-1729). This sameness extends to the use of language as well. For example, users of Tumblr note that there is no need to defend concepts or words and that the site’s queer voice drowns out non-conforming views (p. 1727). This conformity and the loss of self suggests a merging of group and personal identity through common language, experience, and thought as summarized by Hatemi & Fazekas (2018).

Like spatial utopias, digital utopias possess revolutionary ideation. Cavalcante (2019) for instance, reviews prior research indicating that users of digital utopias are not merely content with behavioral and political change, but seek to bring about social revision as well (p. 1723). They carry an expectation of group accommodation. As one user put it, “people [on Tumblr] get it. And if they can, everyone else should” (p. 1725). This collective self-consciousness closely parallels the collective narcissism observed in right-wing populist movements by Golec de Zavala & Keenan (2021), noting that collective narcissists are driven by a belief that their group is unique, exceptional, entitled to privileged treatment, and insufficiently recognized by others (pp. 2-4). Furthermore, Hatemi & Fazekas (2018) write that with respect to identity politics, the demands for attention, benefits, and implied superiority arguably reflect the exhibitionist dimension of narcissism, that is, the expectation that greater attention be paid to one’s wishes, needs, opinions and values (pp. 874-875). Finally, the proclivity of some members to speak on behalf of the group, prefacing statements with ‘As a…’ followed by their identifiers, further suggests narcissistic self-importance (p. 876). More critically, such statements position the speaker at the center of the group and at the head of an impromptu hierarchy, drawing attention to themselves and away from the issue. The utopian thinking embodied in identity politics, therefore, represents the narcissistic traits observed in both Marxist and populist visions of the ideal.

The self-centered nature of utopian thinking can lead to xenophobic tendencies. For example, although Plato’s utopia allowed for contact with the outside world, he expressly sought to limit external interactions (Charbit & Virmani, 2002, p. 209). The sequestration of utopia, however, is common in spatial, cultural, and religious conceptions of society. Travis DeCook (2022) writes that the nature of utopia necessitates not only a separatist purity but an expulsion of all that threatens its order (p. 213). This intolerance is captured by today’s safe spaces, echo chambers, and xenophobic policies on both the right and left, from modern border policy in the United States to legislating cultural difference in Quebec as advocated by Charles Taylor (Gutmann, 1994). It’s represented in popular culture through films like Elysium (Blomkamp, 2013), where utopia is visible from Earth but separated by the vacuum of space. It’s captured in religious concepts where Heaven is separated from humanity both physically and temporally.

More interesting is what these attempts at utopia say about us. Charles Taylor’s essay on politics of difference offers one perspective. Writing on the notion of legislating difference through law, he says, “the goal of [such laws] is not to bring us back to an eventual ‘difference-blind’ social space but…to maintain and cherish distinctness, not just now but forever” (Gutmann, 1994, p. 40). Just as the literature cited by Cavalcante (2019) suggests, utopians are not satisfied with equal recognition and tolerance. There seems a clear desire for advanced social status and an equally clear disinterest in equal treatment. Taylor’s appeals to distinctness are actually a summons to group identity and sameness. In this respect, he seeks to elevate the in-group (French Quebeckers) over the out-group, non-French speaking Canadians.

It’s not surprising that an inherently self-centered paradigm would produce broadly corrosive pressure on society. Stalin and Hitler illustrate the far ends of such extremes, however utopian thinking fails such tests on theoretical grounds as well. As DeCook (2022) writes, More’s utopia utterly fails in its mission to form a better citizenry through state institutions by not only creating worse utopians, but also worse non-utopians. It is a fundamental contradiction, he says, that utopians claim to abhor the dimensions of money, violence, and greed, yet depend on those vices in others for their very survival (pp. 210-215). In this vein, it is debatable whether the utopias of Marxism, populist nationalism, or identity politics, have created better citizens. Certainly, the aspects of intolerance, cancel culture and doxing, are authoritarian and unbecoming of a morally higher ground. Charles Taylor’s (Gutmann, 1994) desire to preserve the French-Canadian culture through law bears similar reflection. It is undoubtedly the version of Quebec that he remembers, not that of someone else or of another time that defines his ideal state. In summary, it’s clear in the examples reviewed here that utopians are not simply satisfied with equal recognition under law and social norms, they are interested in the self-centered acquisition of status and power both for themselves and for their group.

Any closing discussion must acknowledge certain limitations. To begin with, utopian thinking is not necessarily a group attribute. For example, Golec de Zavala & Keenan (2021) note that narcissism predicts nationalism, but nationalism does not predict narcissism (p. 4). A populist might simply agree with a political alignment but not for narcissistic reasons. Similarly, a Tumblr user is not a narcissistic utopian simply for engaging in an online community. In fact, many users cited by Cavalcante (2019) acknowledge the lack of diverse views on Tumblr as a problem. Cavalcante himself calls the limited range of opinion and the potential to inhabit an echo chamber the biggest risks to the Tumblr community (pp. 1727-1729). Finally, it bears special notice that observing narcissistic characteristics is not tantamount to making a clinical diagnosis of narcissism. The thesis of this paper is that utopian thinking is inherently narcissistic and self-serving, not that all utopians are narcissists. In that, the evidence seems strongly aligned with the hypothesis. The deeper question, however, is whether utopian thinking is unavoidably narcissistic and whether that’s all bad. South African scholar Sabelo J Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018) argues that the Cartesian subject (Descartes’ I think therefore I am) replaced God with self and positioned man at the center of the universe (p. 85). While Ndlovu-Gatsheni intended this birth of narcissistic thinking in the context of racism and identity politics, it can be extrapolated further as a universal point of reference for technocratic and atheistic utopian forms, like Marxism. In the absence of a higher power, the self becomes paramount. While this doesn’t wholly describe the paths to narcissistic utopias, after all, many western religions position humanity as the object of God’s attention, it offers some intriguing food for thought. Finally, it must be asked whether utopian thinking has any value or whether it represents a grave threat to society. Certainly, the losers in Stalin’s revolution would argue the latter. Indeed, collective narcissism can represent real dangers to democracy. On the other hand, majority rule can be slow if not impossible to change. Bringing about social revolutions like gay marriage, women’s and civil rights arguably require the hard leadership that only narcissists provide. Therefore, the presence of narcissistic traits in utopian thinking is likely both a feature and a bug. Not all thinkers are narcissists, yet to suppose our ideal state is the perfect state for all requires narcissistic qualities.

In summary, narcissism appears to play a strong role in utopian thinking. This manifests as a need for recognition at both the group and individual levels and persists across political affiliation. Narcissistic qualities are observable in the utopian concepts of Plato and Charles Taylor and in the digital and physical spaces. Finally, while being affiliated with a utopian community or movement does not make one a narcissist, it is clear that the sun still orbits the earth in utopia.

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Social Networking: A new species of media or a public health concern

In 1927 Philo Farnsworth demonstrated the first working version of the television. This device would revolutionize information in ways few could imagine. Media was no longer simply a newspaper, radio, or photograph. It was a talking box that magically combined all three domains into a visual and auditory experience. Certainly, television was transformative, and it would reign supreme for nearly 80 years until the advent of Facebook and social networking. Indeed, the rise of social media has dominated the information landscape in ways that dwarf the impact of television. The ubiquity of the internet and its constant presence in our lives represents something fundamentally different from all previous forms of media. It travels with us in ways that television and radio can’t approach. Its utility is embedded into everything from healthcare to navigation. Yet growing concerns exist about the consequences of social media, its role in our lives, and the potential for physical and psychological harm. This essay explores the case for social media addiction and whether today’s media represent not just the next evolution of communication, but a public health and safety concern.

The idea of media addiction is nothing new. In fact, scientists have been studying the effects of television on behavior since 1964 (Kubey & Csikszentmihalyi, 2004). And much like the conclusions of researchers studying TV, there is general agreement that social media addiction exists, but its definition, prevalence, and even its relationship to our behavior is less clear. For example, researchers at the University of Bergen note that the recency of social media and the lack of uniform data, make determining pervasiveness difficult if not impossible (Andreassen, 2015, pp. 175-176). Similar conclusions were drawn by Kuss & Griffiths (2017) and Reed & Reay (2015). In fact, in the literature reviewed here, there was broad agreement for both the presence of addiction and the need for further study. Concerns over data quality, self-selection, and biasing were also raised by Reed & Reay (2015), Lee (2015), and Tang et al (2017). The data aren’t wholly bad, however. Andreassen (2015) notes that while statistical support for pervasiveness is hard to come by, data suggesting that certain people are predisposed to social networking (social media) addiction do exist. Furthermore, data showing parallels between social media and chemical addiction were cited by Andreassen (p. 176) and Kuss & Griffiths (2017). The latter notes the growing body of evidence that social networking addiction causes symptoms typically associated with substance abuse, such as, mood modification, tolerance, withdrawal, relapse, and conflict (pp. 2, 6). Scientific American draws similar parallels between social media addiction and compulsive gambling, noting that both groups try and fail to stop, and become defensive about the behavior when questioned or prohibited from engaging in the activity (Kardaras, 2016, p. 67). Addiction, therefore, is broadly understood as prioritizing social networking to the detriment of other social activities, relationships, and one’s psychological health and well-being (Andreassen, 2015, p. 175). In other words, addicts display a continued preference for social media, even if such preferences are detrimental.

Nonetheless, defining specific boundaries remains difficult. How much social media does one need to consume before they’re considered an addict. Many social media users engage in normal overuse while maintaining healthy relationships in the real world (Andreassen, 2015, p. 176). Researchers Kuss & Griffiths (2017) generalize this observation more broadly, suggesting that heavy social network engagement might constitute a new normal (p. 5), and may not be problematic. One might imagine a similar observation being made of America’s crowded taverns during the industrial revolution. Were the bars and speakeasies of the 1920s and 30s breeding grounds for alcoholics or a new normal in industrialized America. Such anecdotal observations suggest that addiction, in general, may be difficult to pin down. Researchers may agree that problem behavior exists, but specifically when behavior becomes a problem is less clear.

The previous section has demonstrated that social media addiction has captured researcher’s attention. At the least there seems to be a broad suspicion that social media addiction is real, even if its cause and extent are not understood. In this it is important that the issue be taken seriously as addiction represents a conversion from the digital into the literal. The virtual in the physical. Though it may be unclear when normal use becomes an addiction, research indicates a strong connection between depression, anxiety, guilt, and other psychological issues with social media overuse. For example, Andreassen (2015) writes, social networking sites are used to replace feelings of guilt, anxiety, restlessness, helplessness, and to forget about personal problems (p. 176). Such coping behaviors can affect behavior in the real world. For example, neuroticism, defined as a tendency to experience anxiety, fear, and depression was positively related to private social networking use during working hours (p. 178). Furthermore, social network addicts were unable to separate from social media despite realizing its negative effects. The usage resulted in social withdrawal, insomnia, and other health problems (pp. 178-179). Marshall University researcher Keith Beard (2011) notes the common causes of internet addiction as depression, anxiety, social awkwardness, and a means of escape from domestic issues (p. 103). In fact, studies suggest that the relationship between our psychological state of mind and social media is bidirectional. That is, it can create and worsen pre-existing conditions (p. 102). The negative looping of social media is known to researchers as the Facebook effect. The more friends a person has on the platform, the higher the likelihood they’ll be depressed, and the more time a person spends on social networking, the more likely they are to become addicted (Kardaras, 2016, p. 69). These findings illustrate the complex relationship between social networking and mental health. A relationship exists but in which direction and to what degree remains unclear.

The consequences of social media addiction can manifest in other ways as well. For example, Scientific American cited research showing a link between compulsive texting and poor performance in school (Kardaras, 2016, pp. 67-68). Research conducted by Reed & Reay (2015), suggested that higher levels of internet use were negatively related to self-motivation, study habits, goal orientation, and control over learning. The authors are quick to note that their findings extend the conclusions of prior research, suggesting that excessive internet and social media use negatively impacts grades (pp. 719-720). A separate, non-representative study of African American students found the opposite, however. While 57% strongly agreed that social media and texting were a distraction during lecture, their GPA was not affected (Lee, 2015, pp. 54-55). Amongst the literature reviewed here, however, the aforementioned research was an outlier.

Beyond school, addiction to social networking impacts work and career. Several studies cited by Andreassen (2015) corroborated these findings, concluding that the use of social networks during working hours negatively impacted performance, and in some cases, resulted in termination (p. 180). More generally, researchers find that multitasking is strongly correlated with excessive smartphone and Facebook use (Lee, 2015, p. 54), suggesting that the urge to engage online regularly diverts attention away from the real world. Nonetheless, while addiction to social media can result in negative outcomes, the long-term consequences may take years to play out. Poor academic performance, for example, might lead to declining job or graduate school opportunities. Poor performance at work, particularly if it leads to termination, can result in increased stress, anxiety, and depression, as well as stunted professional growth. Therefore, it’s important to understand the contributing factors of addiction, who’s at risk, and what, if any trends can be determined.

While the limitations of existing research have been noted, many academics recognize the importance of standardizing scales, definitions, and conducting cross-cultural studies. One such study was conducted by Tang et al (2017) which looked at social media addiction amongst young adults in China, Singapore, and the United States. The numbers were eye-catching. For example, 43% of students reported at least one internet-related addiction. Females were significantly more likely to cite social networking addiction and males more likely to cite gaming addiction as problems (p. 676). It’s worth noting however, that gender biases were far less conclusive in other, U.S. based studies. Tang et al add that cultural factors are a significant contributor to addiction. For example, U.S. rates of self-identified social networking addiction amongst males and females were identical, 26.2%. And online gaming addiction was almost wholly an American phenomenon (pp. 676-677). The increased likelihood of female addiction to social media is likely skewed by Chinese data, where, researchers theorize, China’s one child policy and academic pressure lead Chinese children to seek connections through social media that are unavailable at home (pp. 679-680). Like other studies, Tang et al found that depressive symptoms are a leading indicator of addiction; however, they add that being an only child increases the risk of being depressed. It is not surprising, therefore, that Chinese students spent roughly 10 hours per week on social networking compared to about 6.5 for Americans (pp. 678-679). These data further suggest a connection between anxiety, depression, and addiction but point to cultural factors as a potential driver of behavior.

Further studies suggest similar trends amongst adolescents and college-aged adults. For example, Reed & Reay (2015) found that problematic internet usage was much higher in college students than in the general population (p. 720). Nonetheless, these data were acknowledged as exploratory by researchers. Equally in question are the causes of addiction. As discussed, psychological factors such as anxiety and depression may lead to and result from addiction. However, whether addictive tendencies are the product of our environment or biology is contested. Dingel et al (2015) researched the coverage of addiction in academic literature. While the study found consistent interest in environmental factors (such as cultural norms, parenting, and domestic violence), biological drivers dominated the conversation (p. 475). They note that the notion of an addiction gene crowded out alternative theories and treatments (p. 476). Still, researchers including Dingel et al, recognize that environmental and biological factors are not mutually exclusive, and may in fact be complementary (p. 475). Therefore, based on the literature reviewed here, it is likely that some combination of environmental, pre-existing, and biological factors is at play. For example, researchers acknowledge that social media addicts may have other addictions (Andreassen, 2015, p. 178). Scientific American cited studies indicating that 20% of teens, who were engaged in hyper-texting, were twice as likely to have tried alcohol and 41% more likely to have tried illegal drugs. While not synonymous with addiction, researchers note that such tendencies could indicate compulsive behavior (Kardaras, 2016, p. 68).

Finally, the role of technology and the object of addiction are equally contested. For example, is a social media addict addicted to their phone, the applications, or the psychological reward of social approval. In a 1994 Playboy interview, Marshall McLuhan (1994) argued that the delivery method mattered more than the content of the message, commenting that “most people…are blissfully ignorant of what the media do to them; unaware that because of their pervasive effects on man, it is the medium itself that is the message, not the content” (para. 10). McLuhan’s comments strike a different tone when we consider that 90% of Americans have a smartphone (Bortin, 2023), and over 3 billion people worldwide have a Facebook account (Dixon, 2024). In fact, so attached are we to our mobile phones that researchers developed the term nomophobia to describe the fear of being without one’s device (Kuss & Griffiths, 2017, pp. 8-9). The notion of smartphone addiction, nonetheless, remains contested. For example, Kuss & Griffiths argue that the object of addiction isn’t the technology but other people’s confirmation (pp. 6-9). In this way, social media hijacks our need for novelty, or neophilia, while producing interactions that are less satisfying than real world encounters (Kardaras, 2016, pp. 67-68). In reality, our relationship with social media is not exclusively defined by the device or how we use it. Instead, it is both the omnipresence of our mobile phones and the continuous access to social media that differentiates the internet age from all others.

As demonstrated, the idea that social media addiction exists is broadly suspected, however, much remains undefined. For example, anxiety and depression are surely connected, but to what degree and in which direction is under discussion. Furthermore, are we sure that what we’re observing is addictive behavior and not a new social norm. The research shows, after all, that hyper use is predominant among today’s college-aged students, not their parents’ generation. Yet, at the same time, research also suggests that social media invokes biological desires for human connection and confirmation, even if failing to deliver those basic needs. Furthermore, the near ubiquitous presence of mobile phones coupled with the expanding footprint of social networks like Facebook and increasingly, TikTok, make social media available in ways early television producers could never imagine. Indeed, the era of being able to leave the news at home has long since passed. In this regard, social media, mobile phones, social networks, and the internet are fundamentally different than all previous forms of media. In an essay for Harvard International Journal, Neil Postman (2004) wrote that in solving the problem of information scarcity, we’ve created a new problem of information saturation (p. 4). In fact, we may have created a public health crisis. According to the World Health Organization, more people are reporting mental health issues today than in the 1980s and depression is now the leading global cause of disability (Kardaras, 2016, p. 66). The Chinese have recently declared social media addiction a public health risk (Tang et al., 2017, p. 678) while similar concerns are an active point of research at the National Institute of Health. Such actions lend support to the notion that social media are not simply the next evolution of media. They are fundamentally different, having fused biological and psychological factors with unprecedented accessibility to create a new form of media. Yet the lack of empirical data, uniform scales of measure, and most importantly, pervasiveness, fall short of the requirements to support a public health crisis. Therefore, while it is true that social media are fundamentally different from all prior forms of media, declaring their overuse a public health issue is not supported by the research. Better data are required.

In summary, there is general consensus that social media addiction exists, but its pervasiveness and drivers are not fully understood. However, the ongoing evolution of addiction research should not dissuade policymakers from recognizing the risks of social media overuse, and it does not change the assessment that today’s media represents something distinctly different from all prior media. Nonetheless, until better data are made available, it is too early to declare social media addiction a public health concern.

References:

Andreassen, C.S. (2015). Online social network site addiction: A comprehensive review. Current

Addiction Reports 2, 175–184. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40429-015-0056-9

Beard, K.W. (2011). Internet addiction in children and adolescents. In H.O. Price (Ed.), Internet

addiction. (pp. 95-111). Nova Science Publishers Inc.

Bortin, J. (2023). Cell phone statistics 2024. Consumer Affairs.

https://www.consumeraffairs.com/cell_phones/cell-phone-statistics.html

Dingel, M. J., Ostergren, J., McCormick, J. B., Hammer, R., & Koenig, B. A. (2015). The media

and behavioral genetics: Alternatives coexisting with addiction genetics. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 40(4), 459–486. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43671270

Dixon, S.J. (2024). Number of monthly active Facebook user worldwide as of 4th quarter 2023.

Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/

Kardaras, N. (2016). Generation Z: Online and at risk? Scientific American Mind, 27(5), 64–69.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/24945499

Kuss DJ, Griffiths MD. (2017). Social networking sites and addiction: Ten lessons learned.

International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 14(3), 311-328. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28304359/

Lee, E. B. (2015). Too much information: Heavy smartphone and Facebook utilization by

African American young adults. Journal of Black Studies, 46(1), 44–61. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24572928

McLuhan, M. (1994). The Playboy interview: Marshall McLuhan. Playboy.

https://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/classes/188/spring07/mcluhan.pdf

Postman, N. (2004). The information age: A blessing or a curse. The Harvard International

Journal of Press/Politics, 9(3), 3-10. https://journals.sagepub.com/toc/hija/9/2

Reed, P., & Reay, E. (2015). Relationship between levels of problematic internet usage and

motivation to study in university students. Higher Education, 70(4), 711–723. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43648900

Tang C.S-K., Koh Y.W., Gan Y. (2017). Addiction to internet use, online gaming, and online

social networking among young adults in China, Singapore, and the United States. Asia Pacific Journal of Public Health, 29(8), 673-682. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1010539517739558

America: A British Revolution

As British troops set fire to the U.S. capitol building on August 24, 1814, it might have seemed as though the American experiment had met its end. In fact, the War of 1812 was simply the last word in a debate over democracy that had pestered Britain and her parliament for decades. What began in earnest during the French and Indian War, continued through American independence and later the French Revolution. It is with some irony, however, that in sowing the seeds of revolt in America, Britain initiated a democratic revolution of its own. This essay examines the attitudes and perspectives of the British legislature, public, and the crown toward American independence; and while correctly attributed to taxes and representation, the war ought to be more broadly viewed as the middle act of a larger British revolution.

If England’s national debt was the third front of the French and Indian War, Lord Grenville was the general to fight it. While an honest and forthright man, Grenville was not well liked. His abrasive style afforded him few friends and was as much responsible for his rise as his downfall. Nonetheless, Grenville’s penchant for law and finance at a time when England’s national debt had nearly doubled, proved too valuable to dispatch (Clark, 1950). It was in this post war fiscal crisis, that the British government turned to the American colonies for assistance.

The story of taxes and American revolution is deeply rooted in a personal feud between Lord Grenville and King George. In fact, the Stamp and Sugar Acts were a direct manifestation of the power struggle between these two men, and indeed, the slow rolling retreat from monarchial rule that had been proceeding throughout Britain for centuries. Grenville’s ambitions were very much focused on expanding the powers of Parliament at the expense of the King. Raising taxes on the colonies was not only a means to generate revenue, but it diminished the Throne by demonstrating Parliament’s legal authority over the colonies (Clark, 1950, p. 393). Though repealed little more than a year after being ratified, Grenville’s taxes would work to advance democratic progress in both Great Brittan and the American colonies. By 1765, King George had had enough of the problematic minister and dismissed him from office. Yet ironically Lord Grenville’s departure would, itself, spawn a dramatic reduction in the King’s ability to remove public officials. It was Grenville’s last rebuke to the powers of the Throne, that his termination should solidify Parliamentary authority once and for all (p. 391). At the same time, the issues of taxes and representation set in motion by Grenville’s policies would fuel revolution a continent away.

By the time the Americans declared their independence, there was little room for surprise on either side. There was, however, plenty of room for debate and rebuttal, much of which came from two lawyers appointed by the King to respond to the colonists demands. Jeremy Bentham (1776) issued a blistering response to the Declaration that was both emotionally colorful and intellectually provoking. “The opinions of the modern Americans on Government,” he writes, “like those of their good ancestors on witchcraft, would be too ridiculous to deserve any notice” (para 1). And on the notion of self-evident truths he ripostes, “This rarity is a new discovery; now, for the first time, we learn, that a child…has the same quantity of natural power as the parent” (para 3). Bentham reserves little for the notion of unalienable rights as well, suggesting that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are tantamount to the complete disregard for law and order (para 7). Past the fiery retorts, however, Bentham argues the American declaration is undermined by the precedent of historic submission to British rule; both in law and duties paid. He contends that none of the taxes and indeed none of the colonists’ grievances exist outside the bounds of preexisting norms (Bentham 1776). American independence, therefore, had no legal or philosophical grounds on which to stand.

While Bentham was writing his rebuttal of the American declaration, his friend and fellow attorney John Lind articulated a more complete response. As Oxford Professor of law, Herbert Hart writes, in Lind’s view, taxation and representation were inseparable. Hart summarizes Lind’s views as follows:

The idea that [taxes and representation were separate] arose, according to Lind, from a misconception of the nature of property as something that belonged to individuals independently of the law. On the basis of this misconception there had developed the further erroneous idea that when the subject pays taxes he is making a gift of what is his and which, since it is a gift, requires his consent (Hart, 1976, p. 550).

Hart goes on to say that Lind’s position was premised on the idea that the notion of ownership can only exist if supported by law. He quotes Lind himself, quite aptly. “Take away the fence which the law has set around this thing…and where would your right or property be then” (p. 550). The point is well stated but also perfectly embodies the American disagreement. While the colonists held certain rights to be unalienable, they recognized the law needed to be structured in a way that protected these ideas. In a sense, both the British and the Americans were correct in their assessment that without the law, rights are void of meaning. In fact, a century before, English philosopher John Locke argued that such rights as life, liberty and property were God-given. And prior still, the Magna Carta contained similar provisions (Krutz, G., 2021, p. 32). In any event, while Lind’s final views on democracy are lesser known, Bentham would become one of its biggest champions, pressing for Parliamentary reforms and praising the progress of the Americans (Hart, 1976, pp. 557, 560). These views, and indeed the arc of Bentham’s trajectory, were matched by the British public and to a lesser degree, King George himself.

However, while British reforms would follow the American and French revolutions, popular opinion did not start off favoring the colonists. Historian Benjamin Labaree (1970) writes, “As one reads the newspaper commentary [regarding the prospect of war]…he is struck by the extent to which the subject of America evoked an emotional response” (p. 7). By Labaree’s analysis, some 70% of political commentary took a decidedly anti-American stance (p. 7). While it’s not surprising that the common public would have sided with the domestic viewpoint, the range of opinions within that spectrum swung from fear that the Americans would succeed, to conspiracies framing the Americans as both aggressors and victims (pp. 9, 10, 16). The most common view, however, was that the Americans were ungrateful, specifically for the protection provided by British troops who bled colonial ground during the French and Indian War (pp. 17, 18). Indeed, American revolt in that context would be a bitter pill to swallow, but ingratitude, while potent, would have proven transitory next to the economic concerns of trade.

The British public was not alone in harboring these concerns. King George considered the loss of the colonies to be a mortal blow not only to Britan’s finances but its status on the world stage (Bullion, 1994). However, despite these concerns, the King was remarkably sympathetic to the notion that citizens might grow disillusioned with opportunities at home. He writes,

It was thoroughly known that from every Country there always exists an active emigration of unsettled, discontented, or unfortunate People, who failing in their endeavours to live at home, hope to succeed better where there is more employment suitable to their poverty (p. 306).

This conciliatory view is particularly surprising from a monarch who would have viewed American revolution as betrayal, but it was not out of line with revolutionary observers like Michele-Guillaume Jean de Crèvoceur who wrote, “Alas, two thirds of [Americans] have no country. Can a wretch who wanders about, who works and starves…call England or any other kingdom his country?” (Crèvoceur, 1782, p. 4). On matters of trade and diplomacy, the King was no less gentil, writing,

This comparative view of our former territories in America is not stated with any idea of lessening the consequence of a future friendship and connection with them; on the contrary it is to be hoped we shall reap more advantages from their trade as friends than ever we could derive from them as Colonies (Bullion, 1994, p. 307).

While it is tempting to declare King George an American apologist, Historian John Bullion cautions against this conclusion, writing that the King was susceptible to whomever had his ear. After American independence had been finalized, the King was “noticeably lukewarm toward efforts to improve commercial relations with the United States” (p. 310). Regardless, King George’s views were not decidedly anti-American. Even if one were to consider the King’s most favorable sentiments to stem from economic enrichment versus democratic endorsement, that an eighteenth-century monarch could hold such a favorable view is no less remarkable.

By the time 1809 came around, Jeremy Bentham had completed a full about-face, advocating for Parliamentary reforms and universal voting rights. It was a remarkable turn of events for a man who only two decades before had declared the French revolution to be “nonsense on stilts” (Armitage, 2004, p. 63). Furthermore, the eventual adoption of full representation by the British Parliament speaks to broad public support for American ideals. King George, as Bullion pointed out, was at worst lukewarm while at best, quite optimistic. Certainly, these sentiments cast the subsequent war of 1812 in a more interesting, if not puzzling light. One might read the American grievance of impressment as a young upstart nation wanting to challenge the aging empire for supremacy. And this could be quite right. In fact, this global challenge would take centuries to play out, as American scholar Robert Kagan, writes,

When it came to dealing with the European giants, [the United States] claimed to abjure power and assailed as atavistic the power politics of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century European empires (Kagan, 2002, p. 6).

It would not be until the close of the second World War that America emerged as economically and militarily superior to its European fathers. Indeed, the bi-directional tension between Britain, Europe, and North America that gave rise to revolution has never fully abated. As Kagan points out, the freedom enjoyed by much of the European continent is paid for by American hegemony. In this aspect, he writes, the wall cannot pass through the gate (p. 25). In other words, the luxuries afforded Europe by American power can never be fully enjoyed by Americans. This centuries-old tension is likely to persist as America’s foreign policy continues to shift and global trade becomes more regionally focused. As throughout history, however, America and Britain will maintain their long-standing, if at times, strained relationship as societies of similar stripes.  

In summary, the British view of American independence was almost universally one of contempt and ingratitude. Yet few Brits likely saw the broader strokes of their own budding independence. In a very real sense, America showed the British that rights and representative government were possible, and, provided Englishmen with the inspiration to finish their own revolution.

References

Armitage, D., (2004, April). The declaration of independence in world context. OAH Magazine of

History, 18(3), 61-66. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25163686

Bentham, J., (1776). A short review of the declaration. University of Wisconsin Pressbooks.

https://wisc.pb.unizin.org/ps601/chapter/jeremy-bentham-a-short-review-of-the-declaration/

Bullion, J.L., (1994, April). George III on empire, 1783. The William and Mary Quarterly, 51(2),

305-310. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2946866

Clark, D. M., (1950). George Grenville as first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer,

1763-1765. Huntington Library Quarterly, 13(4), 383-397. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3816164

Crèvecoeur, M.G. J. (1782). “What is an American?” Letter III of letters from an American farmer.

https://americainclass.org/sources/makingrevolution/independence/text6/crevecoeuramerican.pdf

Hart, H.L.A., (1976, October). Bentham and the United States of America. The Journal of Law &

Economics, 19(3), 547-567. https://www.jstor.org/stable/725081

Kagan, R., (June & July, 2002). Power and Weakness. Policy Review.

Krutz, G. (2021). American government (3rd ed.). Rice University.

https://openstax.org/details/books/american-government-3e

Labaree, B.W., (1970). The idea of American independence. Proceedings of the Massachusetts

Historical Society, 1970, Third Series, 82(1970), 3-20. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25080688

Western Democracy: Of Plato and Dahl

Sometime after the year 400 B.C., as Plato finished the last of his great dialogues, he had no idea that some twenty-three centuries later a western liberal democrat named Robert Dahl would challenge his ideas. It may have struck him as ironic that scholars would declare his philosophy the basis on which modern democratic principles were formed, but if Plato were alive to listen to these arguments, he might have heard an echo of his own voice. This essay contends that while Robert Dahl’s worldview is fundamental to the existence of western democracy, Plato’s principles of guardianship are not without merit. Dahl may have been more correct in valuing individual liberty, but as Plato understood, unchecked liberty is dangerous, anarchial, and should be closely guarded.

In his book Democracy and its Critics Political Science professor Robert Dahl confronts several common challenges to democratic principles. It is, in many respects, a defense of democracy and a qualified counterargument to Plato’s views. But it’s not all disagreement. In fact, to declare a winner in this debate would be somewhat foolish. The ideas of liberty and guardianship are not mutually exclusive. They are in many ways interdependent. The Supreme Court, for example, is precisely a manifestation of Plato’s guardian state. Dahl (1989) brushes over this fact but consider that America’s founders devoted one third of governing power to a judiciary that is neither elected nor can be removed. Furthermore, the essence of a representative democracy distances the people from the political process. Representatives, while elected, do not run every decision by the voting public. They are entrusted, to a degree, to make decisions on behalf of the people who elected them. In short, Plato didn’t have it all wrong, and to separate guardianship from democracy is to remove the rule of law and fundamentally alter western political process.

The shared ground between Plato and Dahl goes further than the arrangement of American democracy. One could argue that their philosophies arise from a common understanding of morality and diverge when each decides what to do about it. Regardless, this common origin directly influenced the ideas of both men, the ideas of western democracy, and indeed the structure of our democratic systems. It is, as Dahl writes, the very justification of democracy to, “live under laws of one’s own choosing, and thus to participate in choosing those laws [that] facilitate the personal development of citizens as moral and social beings” (Dahl, 1989 p. 91). He continues more poignantly,

I believe the reasons for respecting moral autonomy sift down to one’s belief that it is a quality without which human beings cease to be fully human and in the total absence of which they would not be human at all (p. 91).

Dahl contends that it is democracy itself that teaches self-reliance, self-worth, and independence (p. 92). At first pass, these positions might seem at odds with Plato’s view of guardianship, but in fact they’re highly complementary. Like Dahl, Plato recognized that moral autonomy exists. He questions whether life would be worth living if the aspects of our intellect that benefit from justice are corrupted, going so far as to declare our sense of justice to be “[f]ar more honored [than the body]” (Crawford, 2007 p. 27). Furthermore, the very essence of Crito is our inner debate over whether to obey the law. It is the ambiguity of this debate, and the potential for unchecked liberty, that necessitates a legal guardrail.

Admittedly, it’s difficult as citizens of western democracy to be wholly impartial when evaluating the virtues of the democratic system. Certainly self-reliance, liberty, and the freedom to pursue self-interests are fundamental to the American way of life, and it’s difficult to argue that Dahl didn’t have it right in his description of western liberalism. However, here again, he and Plato converge at the limits of liberty and self-direction. To better understand this convergence, consider that many of the core ideals that Dahl identifies as uniquely democratic: self-reliance, self-determination, and independence, are all fundamental aspects of anarchial autonomy. The anarchist as Dahl points out, is compelled by moral obligation to evaluate the laws he follows and obey those he chooses but never the ones he rejects. Personal responsibility to the anarchist, he writes, cannot be forfeited (Dahl, 1989 p. 43).

The common ground between anarchy and democracy may have been what worried Plato. After all, the lines between direct democracy, mob rule, and anarchy are quite blurred. It’s not hard to imagine the chaos that would ensue if every citizen were free to exercise their moral autonomy to whatever degree they saw fit. Certainly, the perpetrators of the worst atrocities in human history all felt morally justified. So, while the importance Dahl places on liberty and self-determination is correct and fundamental to democracy, its furthest extremes lie in chaos. Plato surely understood this as the basis for the law but also the reason to protect the law from despotic forces.

Such circumstances may seem theoretical, but they’ve played out in recent American history. In 1957, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown vs The Board of Education, which desegregated public schools, mobs of southern whites backed by the Arkansas national guard took to the streets in protest. In response, President Eisenhower sent in the Army and later addressed the nation:

The very basis of our individual rights and freedoms rests upon the certainty that the President and the Executive Branch of Government will support and insure the carrying out of the decisions of the Federal Courts, even, when necessary with all the means at the President’s command…The interest of the nation in the proper fulfillment of the law’s requirements cannot yield to opposition and demonstrations by some few persons. Mob rule cannot be allowed to override the decisions of our courts (Eisenhower, 1957).

By his own admission, Dahl declares moral judgements to be necessarily ambiguous. To assert that such truths exist in the same sense as mathematical proofs or the laws of physics, he writes, is patently false (Dahl, 1989 pp. 66-67). This admission which Dahl meant as a blow to guardianship is actually an endorsement of Plato’s reliance on the law. Surely southern whites felt morally justified in their actions and, in an anarchial sense, evaluated which laws were worth disregarding before mobilizing. There were certainly many more Americans who exercised the same moral autonomy and arrived at a different conclusion. However, it is specifically because moral judgements are subjective that a set of common laws are required. As this example shows, the sterile rulings of the Supreme Court necessarily need to be insulated from the fervor and passion of mob rule. In a very real sense, some form of legal guardianship is necessary to protect civil society from the very people who inhabit it.

For their similarities, Plato and Dahl diverge radically in their conclusions on the nature of man and the role of government. And clearly the debate between Plato and Dahl cannot be easily settled. However, western democracies like the United States could not exist without the precepts of liberty and individualism. In these aspects, Dahl had it right and, given the undeniable success of democracy in producing the world’s greatest empire, it’s hard to argue that a superior system exists. That said, Plato understood that unchecked liberty leads to chaos and destruction, and therefore, an impartial legal system, a guardian, was critical to protect against mob rule.


References

Crawford, T. (Ed). (2007). Six great dialogues. Dover Publications, Inc.

Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and its critics. Yale University Press.

Eisenhower, D. D. (1957). Radio and television address on the situation in Little Rock. Dwight D.

Eisenhower presidential library. https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/media/3883