Acts of espionage present curious ethical dilemmas. In the case of Edward Snowden, he acted because he believed his actions served the greater good, both to civil liberties and to the existence of the country. On the one hand, utilitarian morals certainly apply. Civil liberties form the foundation of this country and broadly benefit the lives of most Americans. On the other hand, Snowden makes subtle appeals to idealistic American values that appear to be deeply personal and subjective. His desire to help Iraqis escape tyranny and his disillusionment with American foreign policy (Winig, 2014, p. 3) capture this sentiment. However, it's not clear to what extent moral frameworks are equipped to judge actions when taken in defense of ideas. Morality is often talked about as it applies to our interactions with one-another, but seldom do we consider how the value of ideas and individuals stack up against each other. For example, do the ideas of civil liberties and unalienable rights hold value apart from their impact on people’s lives? At first, it seems as though they don’t. After all, Kant, Mill, and others attempted to project definitions of morality that imply universal truths, agnostic of cultural context, and they all fail on these same grounds. And yet, people are willing to die for their countries and the ideas that define them.
Such perspective casts Snowden’s actions and the national conversation that followed in a new light. At root was a conversation about the type of society we want to have and how willing we are to defend those values. However, it’s not obvious that this is a moral conversation. The fact that the NSA failed to disclose the true nature of the Patriot Act to congress (and by extension, the American public) suggests an ethically dubious footing (Winig, 2014, p. 1). And Obama’s subtle conflation of transparent policy with disclosing specific anti-terrorist activities is at best, intellectually dishonest (p. 9). Certainly, the members of the state establishment would defend their secrecy (or lie) on utilitarian grounds. Defending the country is, after all, defending the greater good. When defending that greater good transgresses into a personal quest for power, however, is not clear. And so, for this reason, bringing the public into the conversation is to check the power of an overly-intrusive government.
Yet for this to be a conversation about morals, we must agree that civil liberties and the qualities that make America what it is, hold value. Baber (n.d.) writes that morality is a system for determining right from wrong and ethics is the study of that system. I would propose, however, that ethics describe specific actions and morals govern the context of those actions. In that, the government’s failure to disclose their domestic surveillance program was unethical, even if its existence was morally justifiable. The NSA’s defense, therefore, could invoke utilitarian principles even while acknowledging a Kantian obligation to tell the truth. Snowden, on the other hand, would likely argue that not only was the failure to disclose unethical, but the program itself was immoral. Without civil liberties, there is no America. Therefore, actions that violate those norms cannot be done in service to the greater good.
Clearly, these conclusions rest in large part on the value one places on the premise of America. Snowden, for example, makes numerous references to liberties, turnkey tyranny, and the general good of the American people in his communications both before and after his disclosure (Winig., 2014), suggesting a strong belief in America. This moral subjectivism, or right and wrong as determined by the individual, rejects formal premises of morality (Baber, n.d.). Alternatively, Snowden could mount a utilitarian defense, however, his inability to know the outcome of his decisions prevents him from accurately honoring the greater good. His decisions, as was argued by General Dempsey, might have caused far more harm than benefit (Winig, 2014, p. 11) in which case he could only base his actions on subjectivism, even if he believed he was invoking utilitarian principles. Nonetheless, with all of this being said, Snowden’s decisions have proven beneficial in deeply subtle and important ways.
The moral worth of civil liberties may not be obvious but that does not mean they lack value. It may be that, like all moral frameworks, they have value simply because we say they do. Therefore, the why behind our sense of moral value isn’t so important. It’s whether we broadly agree that these ideas hold value that matters. In that, Snowden’s decision put the idea of America up for public vote. It provided Americans an opportunity to reaffirm that the legal and philosophical basis for western governance still hold moral worth. Moreover, the fact that as of 2016, over 56% of Americans aged 18-34 viewed Snowden favorably (Winig, 2016) suggests many young people hold similar values. More importantly, this shared acceptance of value allows us to draw firmer moral evaluations. Because Americans value our civil liberties, they must be considered in our evaluation of the greater good. The government’s failure to disclose the NSA’s spying program, therefore, jeopardized the idea of America and the value Americans place in it. Not only do the NSA’s actions fail on Kantian grounds, but they fail on utilitarian principles as well. Though Snowden couldn’t have known the utilitarian implications of his actions with certainty, we can still say he acted morally, even if from a subjective point of view.
In summary, the national conversation that followed the Snowden leaks was not simply about the legality of his actions, it put the idea of America up for debate. It also helped to establish the moral worth of the laws and civil liberties that govern society. In that, moral clarity can be established that finds while Snowden may have invoked subjective forms of right and wrong, he ultimately acted with morality.
References
Baber, H.E. (n.d.). The nature of morality and moral theories. University of San Diego.
http://home.sandiego.edu/~baber/gender/MoralTheories.html
Winig, L. (2014). Hero or traitor? Edward Snowden and the NSA spying program. Harvard
University. https://case.hks.harvard.edu/hero-or-traitor-edward-snowden-and-the-nsa-spying-program/
Winig, L. (2016). Hero or traitor? Edward Snowden and the NSA spying program (sequel).
Harvard University. https://case.hks.harvard.edu/hero-or-traitor-edward-snowden-and-the-nsa-spying-program-sequel/