In the fall of 1994, two Tlingit Indian teens were banished to a remote set of Alaskan islands as punishment for assaulting a pizza delivery man in Everett, Washington. The sentence which involved traditional native customs ran concurrently with state guidelines for felony assault, and the teens served both tribal and traditional state sentences. The decision to invoke the Tlingit tribal court was not without controversy, however it illustrated an important fact. Federal, state and Indian traditions are not mutually exclusive. In fact, illiberal customs are tolerated throughout American society, ranging from the non-democratic arrangement of some Indian Nations to the religious practices of cults and mainstream denominations alike. This essay argues that, while Federal protection for specific cultural traditions isn’t realistic, it also isn’t necessary. The flexibility provided by liberal governance allows for self-directed preservation of historical norms while existing under traditional western values.
To begin with, cultural trade is unavoidable and arguably desirable. A tradition that no longer evolves is, in a very real sense, already dead. Consider, for example, the tradition of Christmas. The fact that both the exchange of gifts and the date of celebration are likely derived from pagan traditions is irrelevant to observers. Yet such cross-cultural exchange is a vital part of human existence. Without traditions, such as Saturnalia and the winter solstice, our modern notion of Christmas might look very different. Food, language, ceremonies, and ideas flow freely across borders. As Historian Eric Foner writes, although the French offered American Indians citizenship if they adopted Catholicism, it was more often that Frenchmen chose the free life of the Indians (Foner, 2019, p. 44). Likewise, the modern genres of jazz, blues, and R&B are fusions of African and American musical traditions. The Blues were exported by Jimi Hendrix, B.B. King, and Muddy Waters, and reimported by way of Eric Clapton. Surely it is a dark world where such vibrant expressions and interpretations of culture are lost or segregated from one another. Yet it is also true that porous intellectual borders necessitate change and ultimately, loss of cultural artifacts to time.
Determining the obligation, if any, that liberal countries have to protect cultural traditions is crucial. English philosopher, John Locke, recognized that freedom was neither absolute nor cost-free. Ceding a little personal autonomy, he said, was necessary to ensure a well-functioning society (Krotoszynski, 1990, pp. 1398-1399). Indeed, Locke’s comments are not contingent upon western liberal governance. Any society, whether illiberal Indian Nations or French-Canadian Quebecers require that individuals conform to prevailing social norms. This necessarily means that one shed some of their cultural identity. For example, to the extent that western liberal values impose on relative minorities, like Muslim immigrants, such assimilation is necessary, and indeed, would be equally as necessary if western women were to emigrate to Saudi Arabia. Social Science professor, Charles Taylor resists the notion of conformity however (Gutmann, 1994, pp. 48, 53), even while acknowledging that intersectionalist group identities themselves necessitate that one conforms (pp. 55, 58). While Taylor pays minimal attention to this conflict, it underpins the impossibility of legislating specific cultural identities. Liberal societies, therefore, can only provide a legal framework for self-determination and organization, agnostic of specific religious or cultural values.
In fact, this framework tolerates relatively illiberal traditions. For example, Amish communities reject most notions of modern technology and secularism, nor do they generally participate in the political process. Yet like Native Americans, they are considered American citizens and protected by the same civil liberties. Religious liberty allows for numerous organized belief systems, many of which voluntarily restrict personal agency. Amish place restrictions on dress, Jews enforce dietary and labor laws, and even the existence of cults is permitted. Each of these organizations, regardless of how one feels about them, possesses a system of ideas and, in the case of the Jews and the Amish, long standing cultural traditions that the group perpetuates. It is impossible to imagine a federal government legislating the specific values of the Jewish and Amish communities or walling them off on their respective reservations; however, these groups are free to and, in fact do, self-organize along shared values.
Taylor and others do not believe that passive tolerance provides sufficient cultural protection. He argues for a politics of difference, where cultural and individual differences are emphasized over similarities (Gutmann, 1994, p. 38). He argues that cultural preservation must be protected by law, writing, “the goal of [such laws] is not to bring us back to an eventual ‘difference-blind’ social space but…to maintain and cherish distinctness, not just now but forever” (p. 40). This is a remarkably naïve statement given that its implications are without precedent. No human tradition has remained unchanged forever. Even the most well-preserved religious ceremonies are two-dimensional reenactments without the depth of true belief. Furthermore, linguistic, culinary, and secular traditions all carry cultures across borders, making preservation of the type proposed by Taylor unrealistic. Indeed, a world where French remains French and white remains white, is repulsive. The beauty of culture is that it can, and should, be shared. That said, Taylor’s argument raises the valuable question of to what degree liberal societies should accommodate illiberal traditions, and what, if anything, should be done when those traditions violate majority norms.
The short answer is western majorities owe little to intervening when social norms are violated. As the example of the Amish shows, little social harm is done by the existence of those communities. Furthermore, even if certain cultural norms violate personal autonomy, adherence is voluntary. Jews who no longer whish to be Jewish are free to do so, even if they face social and familial backlash. Furthermore, the numerous Indian Nations, with Indian law, and a variety of democratic and undemocratic governments, demonstrates that western liberalism and illiberal practices are not mutually exclusive and, in fact, are often protected by law. Intervention is only required in the case where an individual’s civil liberties are violated against their will. Such a case is currently playing out in a lawsuit filed against the Church of Scientology alleging crimes of child trafficking, forced labor, and imprisonment (Cohen Milstein, 2022). However, by and large, group practices whether religious, secular, or a fusion of the two, ought to be left alone. It is impossible for a legislature to be all things for all cultures as politics of difference suggests. Such a prospect requires, if not encourages, cultural consolidation, not diversity. Therefore, it is essential that communities take it upon themselves to preserve their cultures. As Anthony Appiah put it, “If we create a culture that our descendants will want to hold on to, our culture will survive them” (Gutann, 1994, p. 158). In other words, cultural survival rests in the hands of its members, and the value they place on perpetuating it.
In summary, while critics of western democracy like Taylor advocate for unprecedented social collectivism, liberalism provides a proven, if imperfect, track record of enabling diversity through self-determination. It is through organizations of individuals around shared identities, not Federal management, that cultural traditions will survive.
References
Cohen Milstein (2022). Church of Scientology accused of human trafficking, forced labor.
CohenMilstein. https://www.cohenmilstein.com/update/church-scientology-accused-human-trafficking-forced-labor
Foner, E. (2011). Give me liberty: An American history. W.W. Norton & Company
Gutmann, A. (1994). Multiculturalism. Princeton University Press
Krotoszynski Jr., R.J. (1990). Autonomy, community, and traditions of liberty: The contrast of
British and American privacy law. Duke Law Journal, 1398-1454. https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol39/iss6/6