As British troops set fire to the U.S. capitol building on August 24, 1814, it might have seemed as though the American experiment had met its end. In fact, the War of 1812 was simply the last word in a debate over democracy that had pestered Britain and her parliament for decades. What began in earnest during the French and Indian War, continued through American independence and later the French Revolution. It is with some irony, however, that in sowing the seeds of revolt in America, Britain initiated a democratic revolution of its own. This essay examines the attitudes and perspectives of the British legislature, public, and the crown toward American independence; and while correctly attributed to taxes and representation, the war ought to be more broadly viewed as the middle act of a larger British revolution.
If England’s national debt was the third front of the French and Indian War, Lord Grenville was the general to fight it. While an honest and forthright man, Grenville was not well liked. His abrasive style afforded him few friends and was as much responsible for his rise as his downfall. Nonetheless, Grenville’s penchant for law and finance at a time when England’s national debt had nearly doubled, proved too valuable to dispatch (Clark, 1950). It was in this post war fiscal crisis, that the British government turned to the American colonies for assistance.
The story of taxes and American revolution is deeply rooted in a personal feud between Lord Grenville and King George. In fact, the Stamp and Sugar Acts were a direct manifestation of the power struggle between these two men, and indeed, the slow rolling retreat from monarchial rule that had been proceeding throughout Britain for centuries. Grenville’s ambitions were very much focused on expanding the powers of Parliament at the expense of the King. Raising taxes on the colonies was not only a means to generate revenue, but it diminished the Throne by demonstrating Parliament’s legal authority over the colonies (Clark, 1950, p. 393). Though repealed little more than a year after being ratified, Grenville’s taxes would work to advance democratic progress in both Great Brittan and the American colonies. By 1765, King George had had enough of the problematic minister and dismissed him from office. Yet ironically Lord Grenville’s departure would, itself, spawn a dramatic reduction in the King’s ability to remove public officials. It was Grenville’s last rebuke to the powers of the Throne, that his termination should solidify Parliamentary authority once and for all (p. 391). At the same time, the issues of taxes and representation set in motion by Grenville’s policies would fuel revolution a continent away.
By the time the Americans declared their independence, there was little room for surprise on either side. There was, however, plenty of room for debate and rebuttal, much of which came from two lawyers appointed by the King to respond to the colonists demands. Jeremy Bentham (1776) issued a blistering response to the Declaration that was both emotionally colorful and intellectually provoking. “The opinions of the modern Americans on Government,” he writes, “like those of their good ancestors on witchcraft, would be too ridiculous to deserve any notice” (para 1). And on the notion of self-evident truths he ripostes, “This rarity is a new discovery; now, for the first time, we learn, that a child…has the same quantity of natural power as the parent” (para 3). Bentham reserves little for the notion of unalienable rights as well, suggesting that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are tantamount to the complete disregard for law and order (para 7). Past the fiery retorts, however, Bentham argues the American declaration is undermined by the precedent of historic submission to British rule; both in law and duties paid. He contends that none of the taxes and indeed none of the colonists’ grievances exist outside the bounds of preexisting norms (Bentham 1776). American independence, therefore, had no legal or philosophical grounds on which to stand.
While Bentham was writing his rebuttal of the American declaration, his friend and fellow attorney John Lind articulated a more complete response. As Oxford Professor of law, Herbert Hart writes, in Lind’s view, taxation and representation were inseparable. Hart summarizes Lind’s views as follows:
The idea that [taxes and representation were separate] arose, according to Lind, from a misconception of the nature of property as something that belonged to individuals independently of the law. On the basis of this misconception there had developed the further erroneous idea that when the subject pays taxes he is making a gift of what is his and which, since it is a gift, requires his consent (Hart, 1976, p. 550).
Hart goes on to say that Lind’s position was premised on the idea that the notion of ownership can only exist if supported by law. He quotes Lind himself, quite aptly. “Take away the fence which the law has set around this thing…and where would your right or property be then” (p. 550). The point is well stated but also perfectly embodies the American disagreement. While the colonists held certain rights to be unalienable, they recognized the law needed to be structured in a way that protected these ideas. In a sense, both the British and the Americans were correct in their assessment that without the law, rights are void of meaning. In fact, a century before, English philosopher John Locke argued that such rights as life, liberty and property were God-given. And prior still, the Magna Carta contained similar provisions (Krutz, G., 2021, p. 32). In any event, while Lind’s final views on democracy are lesser known, Bentham would become one of its biggest champions, pressing for Parliamentary reforms and praising the progress of the Americans (Hart, 1976, pp. 557, 560). These views, and indeed the arc of Bentham’s trajectory, were matched by the British public and to a lesser degree, King George himself.
However, while British reforms would follow the American and French revolutions, popular opinion did not start off favoring the colonists. Historian Benjamin Labaree (1970) writes, “As one reads the newspaper commentary [regarding the prospect of war]…he is struck by the extent to which the subject of America evoked an emotional response” (p. 7). By Labaree’s analysis, some 70% of political commentary took a decidedly anti-American stance (p. 7). While it’s not surprising that the common public would have sided with the domestic viewpoint, the range of opinions within that spectrum swung from fear that the Americans would succeed, to conspiracies framing the Americans as both aggressors and victims (pp. 9, 10, 16). The most common view, however, was that the Americans were ungrateful, specifically for the protection provided by British troops who bled colonial ground during the French and Indian War (pp. 17, 18). Indeed, American revolt in that context would be a bitter pill to swallow, but ingratitude, while potent, would have proven transitory next to the economic concerns of trade.
The British public was not alone in harboring these concerns. King George considered the loss of the colonies to be a mortal blow not only to Britan’s finances but its status on the world stage (Bullion, 1994). However, despite these concerns, the King was remarkably sympathetic to the notion that citizens might grow disillusioned with opportunities at home. He writes,
It was thoroughly known that from every Country there always exists an active emigration of unsettled, discontented, or unfortunate People, who failing in their endeavours to live at home, hope to succeed better where there is more employment suitable to their poverty (p. 306).
This conciliatory view is particularly surprising from a monarch who would have viewed American revolution as betrayal, but it was not out of line with revolutionary observers like Michele-Guillaume Jean de Crèvoceur who wrote, “Alas, two thirds of [Americans] have no country. Can a wretch who wanders about, who works and starves…call England or any other kingdom his country?” (Crèvoceur, 1782, p. 4). On matters of trade and diplomacy, the King was no less gentil, writing,
This comparative view of our former territories in America is not stated with any idea of lessening the consequence of a future friendship and connection with them; on the contrary it is to be hoped we shall reap more advantages from their trade as friends than ever we could derive from them as Colonies (Bullion, 1994, p. 307).
While it is tempting to declare King George an American apologist, Historian John Bullion cautions against this conclusion, writing that the King was susceptible to whomever had his ear. After American independence had been finalized, the King was “noticeably lukewarm toward efforts to improve commercial relations with the United States” (p. 310). Regardless, King George’s views were not decidedly anti-American. Even if one were to consider the King’s most favorable sentiments to stem from economic enrichment versus democratic endorsement, that an eighteenth-century monarch could hold such a favorable view is no less remarkable.
By the time 1809 came around, Jeremy Bentham had completed a full about-face, advocating for Parliamentary reforms and universal voting rights. It was a remarkable turn of events for a man who only two decades before had declared the French revolution to be “nonsense on stilts” (Armitage, 2004, p. 63). Furthermore, the eventual adoption of full representation by the British Parliament speaks to broad public support for American ideals. King George, as Bullion pointed out, was at worst lukewarm while at best, quite optimistic. Certainly, these sentiments cast the subsequent war of 1812 in a more interesting, if not puzzling light. One might read the American grievance of impressment as a young upstart nation wanting to challenge the aging empire for supremacy. And this could be quite right. In fact, this global challenge would take centuries to play out, as American scholar Robert Kagan, writes,
When it came to dealing with the European giants, [the United States] claimed to abjure power and assailed as atavistic the power politics of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century European empires (Kagan, 2002, p. 6).
It would not be until the close of the second World War that America emerged as economically and militarily superior to its European fathers. Indeed, the bi-directional tension between Britain, Europe, and North America that gave rise to revolution has never fully abated. As Kagan points out, the freedom enjoyed by much of the European continent is paid for by American hegemony. In this aspect, he writes, the wall cannot pass through the gate (p. 25). In other words, the luxuries afforded Europe by American power can never be fully enjoyed by Americans. This centuries-old tension is likely to persist as America’s foreign policy continues to shift and global trade becomes more regionally focused. As throughout history, however, America and Britain will maintain their long-standing, if at times, strained relationship as societies of similar stripes.
In summary, the British view of American independence was almost universally one of contempt and ingratitude. Yet few Brits likely saw the broader strokes of their own budding independence. In a very real sense, America showed the British that rights and representative government were possible, and, provided Englishmen with the inspiration to finish their own revolution.
References
Armitage, D., (2004, April). The declaration of independence in world context. OAH Magazine of
History, 18(3), 61-66. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25163686
Bentham, J., (1776). A short review of the declaration. University of Wisconsin Pressbooks.
https://wisc.pb.unizin.org/ps601/chapter/jeremy-bentham-a-short-review-of-the-declaration/
Bullion, J.L., (1994, April). George III on empire, 1783. The William and Mary Quarterly, 51(2),
305-310. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2946866
Clark, D. M., (1950). George Grenville as first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer,
1763-1765. Huntington Library Quarterly, 13(4), 383-397. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3816164
Crèvecoeur, M.G. J. (1782). “What is an American?” Letter III of letters from an American farmer.
https://americainclass.org/sources/makingrevolution/independence/text6/crevecoeuramerican.pdf
Hart, H.L.A., (1976, October). Bentham and the United States of America. The Journal of Law &
Economics, 19(3), 547-567. https://www.jstor.org/stable/725081
Kagan, R., (June & July, 2002). Power and Weakness. Policy Review.
Krutz, G. (2021). American government (3rd ed.). Rice University.
https://openstax.org/details/books/american-government-3e
Labaree, B.W., (1970). The idea of American independence. Proceedings of the Massachusetts
Historical Society, 1970, Third Series, 82(1970), 3-20. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25080688