Policy Response 1: A Review of Policy Diffusion in the Public and Private Sector

The study of how environmental policies proliferate is an exercise in simplicity and competing complexities. On the one hand, policy diffusion is relatively easy to understand. A state develops emissions controls or sustainable fishing practices, and other countries adopt similar policies. On the other hand, a myriad of factors determines whether an adopting state can facilitate such advancements. This essay examines the challenge of policy diffusion in the arena of environmental politics with a focus on fisheries and emissions controls. Works by Kern et al (2001) provide a detailed overview of how policies proliferate, while Stafford (2019) provides useful background on sustainability concepts, flaws, and limitations. Mainstream media coverage of Chinese fishing practices is also reviewed as are the lobbying efforts of industry special interests. Finally, literature from the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO, 2017) illustrates how policy dissemination doesn’t necessarily result in environmentally favorable outcomes while Chasek (2016) provides an overview of policy arenas, actors, and the various interests that influence international policy. To address these issues, the discussion begins with how the tragedy of the commons applies to overfishing and potential policy approaches to remediating risk. It then examines how states differ in their approach to environmental issues and what factors influence policy diffusion. Finally, we’ll consider how fuel efficiency standards have improved in the United States and why they continue to lag behind their European frontrunners.

Analysis

The need for collective international action and good policy is perhaps no more apparent than in the arena of global fisheries, yet as Stafford (2019) writes, the overuse of sustainability has led to confusion about what the word means and ironically, resulted in unsustainable practices. Fishing quotas, he notes, are both poorly defined and difficult to project, yet are considered sustainable (pp. 1-2). Similarly, Kern et al (2001) cite the importance of clear policy and clearer problem statements, writing that the best policy is useless against a poorly understood problem and vice versa (pp. 7-8). Accurate verbiage, therefore, is essential to crafting good policy, particularly with respect to common pool resources like breathable air, clean water, and ocean life. Such resources are vulnerable to socioeconomic theories like the tragedy of the commons, which Stafford (2019) and Chasek (2016) describe as the exploitation of a shared resource to the detriment of the broader community. Overfishing of the sort practiced by China (Urbina, 2020) is one such example and poses significant environmental risks from bycatch and collapsed fisheries to international instability. Furthermore, China’s practices undermine international policy by exposing weaknesses in enforcement. At the same time, China’s population needs food and special interests have an incentive to maintain the status quo. More broadly, global fisheries are thought to provide over 200 million jobs (Chasek, 2016, p. 8), which further complicates the policy picture, all of which contributes to the tragedy of the commons playing out in the world’s oceans.

While concerns over military action garner headlines, a policy of economic and financial coercion would more effectively dissuade Chinese activity. For example, much of the fishing reported by Urbina (2020) has taken place in international waters off the coast of South America. The countries of Argentina, Chile, Brazil and others could utilize MERCOSUR to enact coordinated tariffs on Chinese goods or freeze collaborative projects domestically. Such economic coercion was used by the United States in the 1980s to enact a ban on whaling (Chasek, 2016, p. 16). To that extent, countries affected by China’s aggressive fishing tactics could form tighter bonds with the U.S. and leverage American tariffs to alter Chinese policy. For example, the United States could utilize the USMCA to block Chinese exports attempting to enter via Mexico. The World Bank and IMF could be used to influence smaller players where China is an active lender to seek partnerships with western sources. Another option is to use NGOs (like Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund, and the Sierra Club) to raise public awareness and put pressure on international companies to reduce their investments in China. Finally, it’s worth noting that Chinese veto power makes enacting policy through the UN unlikely. It’s also unclear that such a policy would be enforceable without the aforementioned collaboration. Moreover, Kern et al (2001) note that the budget for the United Nations Environmental Programme is less than that of Greenpeace (p. 10), further calling into question the ability of the UN to act persuasively.

The Chinese use case provides a useful entrance into the examination of how state actors differ in their response to environmental issues. As Chasek (2016) writes, a myriad of factors can affect a state’s approach to climate issues, from NGOs to economic concerns and others. Urbina (2020), for example, reported that Chinese long-range fishing began, in part, due to depleted local fisheries. China’s response to this crisis was to expand their fishing footprint, a response that reflects both the economic and social concerns associated with food security. Alternatively, the United States’ opposition to whaling was largely predicated on its declining need for whaling products and mounting pressure from environmental groups, which subsequently produced a radically different policy than that demonstrated by the Chinese. A final example can be found in the United States’ slow adoption of fuel economy standards. In this, strong cultural and institutional biases play a role. As Nivola (2009) writes, the United States has trailed European policymakers in fuel economy largely because Americans won’t support the necessary taxes, a policy that has ensured cheap gas and disincentivized fuel economy. In this way, culture and precedent work together to influence a country’s response to climate concerns, whether long or short-term.

The discussion of international policy owes some attention to how such policies proliferate throughout the global community. The notion of policy diffusion was discussed at length by Kern et al (2001) who identified three primary drivers of policy proliferation. The first of these concerns the technical capabilities of the imitating country and the public demand for action. These require that the adopting nation have the technical knowledge and functional capacity to implement environmental controls in the presence of strong public will. The second stipulation addresses policy frontrunners and disseminating organizations, like the United Nations Environmental Programme. This entails that the frontrunners not only implement policies but that they publish those policies (and their results) internationally through designated organizations. Finally, both the policy and the problem must be thoroughly understood. Good policy is meaningless if applied against a poorly understood problem. Therefore, it is essential that the adopting nation understand both the policy and the problem they are trying to solve (pp. 7-13).

When studying policy diffusion, it’s easy to assume that only good policies proliferate, but this is not always the case. For example, the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO, 2017), found that lobbyists effectively won concessions from Spanish regulators that closely mirrored their Dutch counterparts. In both cases, fishing quotas were increased, and regulatory oversight decreased. It’s also worth acknowledging that good policy is wholly within the eye of the beholder. Spanish fishing interests, for example, were likely satisfied with their lobbyists’ efforts. Nonetheless, policies can proliferate in the presence of opposition. For example, Kern et al, (2001), cite the rise of environmental agencies, ministries, and other national organizations throughout Europe and North America as a prominent instance of policy proliferation (pp. 13-15). The EPA is one such example that has both ardent support and opposition from various political groups within the United States. That said, sometimes good policies fail to proliferate or do so more slowly. Such is the case with fuel economy in the United States. Reducing vehicle emissions is seen as a critical step in reducing global GHGs, yet policymakers have been slow to implement regulations until recently. Nivola (2009) writes that U.S. fuel efficiency standards are half of what they are in Europe, largely because Americans have no tolerance for taxes either publicly or politically. Furthermore, cheap gas has disincentivized innovation and largely kept America behind Europe. Nonetheless, the United States possesses many of the prerequisites for successful policy adoption. America has the technical capability to achieve greater fuel economy, benefits from a clear policy frontrunner to emulate, and enjoys strong public support for GHG reduction. However, they lack institutional and public support for higher taxes. These issues haven’t prevented the diffusion of policy, but they have slowed its progress.

Finally, a great deal of attention has been paid to policy and policymakers, however, private sector innovation can be a major source of environmental change. For example, SeaPact (SP, n.d.) is a collaboration of 11 leading North American seafood companies committed to the sustainable use of international fisheries. While organized by for-profit companies, SeaPact works with a select number of NGOs who act as advisors on resource management and innovation. According to the SeaPact site, the organization’s members have developed better nets, trawling gear, and other technologies to help reduce bycatch and damage to the environment. Beyond SeaPact, industry leaders like Trident Seafoods have a well-published commitment to sustainability. In their most recent ESG report, the company identifies their customers, community, employees, and owners as the beneficiaries of sustainable practices (TRD, 2023). Such commitments reflect broad support, not only from management and ownership, but from the public whose concerns often manifest through NGOs.

Prospective Outlook

The preceding discussion has covered a wide range of issues from overfishing and fuel efficiency to policy diffusion and private sector change. It goes without saying that future solutions to climate change will incorporate all of local, global, and private sector policy proliferation. However, while Kern et al (2001) detail the prerequisites for policy diffusion, they note that adopting nations must tailor such policies to their needs. This point cannot be overstated. The United States’ slow roll toward greater fuel economy is a perfect example. PEW research indicates that two-thirds of Americans think the government should do more to address climate change and a bipartisan majority supports tougher fuel efficiency standards (Tyson & Kennedy, 2020, pp. 1-6), yet our aversion to taxes runs countercurrent to those desires. This implies that a wholesale, blind adoption of European gas taxes would not be the best approach. Instead, tailoring tax policy to the American mindset, for example through hybrid incentives paid for by carbon taxes, could achieve the same ends through a slightly different means. In that, innovative policy must compliment private sector innovation and social norms. Policy proliferation, therefore, is as much about adopting what works as much as it is understanding the cultural and political factors at play.

References

CEO. (2017). Fishing for influence: Press passes give lobbyists EU council building access

during fishing quota talks. Corporate Europe Observatory. https://corporateeurope.org/en/power-lobbies/2017/05/fishing-influence

Chasek, P. S. (2016). Global Environmental Politics (7th ed.). Taylor & Francis.

https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9780813350356

Kern, K., Jorgens, H. & Janicke, M. (2001). The diffusion of environmental policy innovations: A

contribution to the globalisation of environmental policy. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228202810_The_Diffusion_of_Environmental_Policy_Innovations_A_Contribution_to_the_Globalisation_of_Environmental_Policy

Nivola, P.S. (2009). The long and winding road: Automotive fuel economy and American

politics. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0225_cafe_nivola.pdf

Safford, R. (2019). Sustainability: A flawed concept for fisheries management? University of

California Press. https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.346

SP. (n.d.). Our projects. Sea Pact. https://www.seapact.org/

TRD. (2023). Ocean allies: Strengthening our bond with the ocean and each other. Trident

Seafood Corp. https://cdn.bfldr.com/VUHD2VO5/as/2htqnw77xq8nrk4snzxc23j/Trident_Seafood_Corp_ESG_Report

Tyson, A., & Kennedy, B. (2020). Two-Thirds of Americans Think Government Should

Do More on Climate: Bipartisan backing for carbon capture tax credits, extensive tree-planting efforts. Pew Research Center. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep57745

Urbina, I. (2020). How China’s expanding fishing fleet is depleting the world’s oceans. Yale

Environment 360. https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-chinas-expanding-fishing-fleet-is-depleting-worlds-oceans

Norway’s Push for a Renewable Future

A little over 120 kilometers off the west coast of Norway sits the world’s largest aquatic windfarm. The project dubbed Hywind Tampen, is part of the country’s aggressive push into offshore wind and other renewable energy sources. According to the International Trade Administration (a U.S. agency), the Norwegians expect to have 1,500 turbines in operation, producing upwards of 30 GW in renewable energy by 2040 (ITA, 2024). Yet at the same time, a significant percentage of Norway’s GDP comes from fossil fuel extraction. Just 400 kilometers south of the Hywind Tampen project, some of the world’s largest oil and gas platforms occupy the North Sea. While Norway relies primarily on renewable energy at home, they are a major player in the international fossil fuel market. For example, Norwegian natural gas exports cover roughly 3% of global and 25% of European demand (NP, 2023). All told, fossil fuel extraction accounted for nearly a quarter of Norway’s GDP in 2023 (CNBC, 2024). This dependence on fossil fuels and Norway’s status as a green leader make the country an intriguing case study. More importantly, their success at widespread EV adoption, use of renewable energy, and reliance on fossil fuels to pay for it all, provide a template for the green transitions of other western economies.

Policy and Literature Review

Along with rich natural gas deposits, Norway has some of the world’s most well-suited geography for producing renewable energy. For example, 98% of Norway’s electricity is provided by renewables with the overwhelming majority of that coming from hydroelectric dams (Ritchie et al, 2024). Interestingly, while electricity production in terms of TWH has increased steadily since 1970, green energy on a per capita basis has remained relatively flat over the same period (secs. 1-2). This is due in large part to the legacy of Norway’s reliance on hydroelectric power. While much of the world invested in coal and gas-powered plants, Norway built dams. Nonetheless, Norway’s overall GHG emissions have climbed steadily since 1970, peaking around 2004 before gradually declining over the last 20 years (EC, 2023). While this constitutes a surprise, it illustrates that a green economy is much larger than the electric grid and moratoriums on gas powered cars.

Figure 1 Norway's total GHG emissions by sector (EC, 2023).

For example, according to the European Commission (EC, 2023), the majority of Norway’s GHG emissions are from fossil fuel extraction. While global GHG emissions have doubled since 1970, Norway’s emissions related to the production of oil and gas have expanded by a factor of 30.

It's also worth contextualizing Norway’s performance against the United States. Surprisingly, America’s total GHG emissions on a per capita basis have remained relatively flat since 1970 (EC, 2023). CO2 emissions peaked between 2004 and 2007 before declining for much of the next 15 years. By the same measure, Norway’s CO2 emissions peaked around 2010 and have declined only modestly since. This is likely due to a much smaller population and a continued policy of maximizing fossil fuel exports.

Figure 2 Norway's total CO2 emissions by sector (EC, 2023).

Finally, while Norway’s specific policies will be discussed more in the next section, it’s helpful to review international trends in green policy adoption. Ohio State University dean of law, Lincoln Davies (2018) writes that green policies generally follow a three-phase arc, beginning with policy proliferation (at the federal and local level), then by a period of iteration and improvement, and finally a widespread redistribution of successful policies across other green initiatives (p. 315). Furthermore, Davies notes that policymakers are shifting toward market-based solutions rather than feed-in-tariffs and taxes. Such moves are a sign of a maturing green economy (pp. 316-317) and evident in Norway’s transition to a low emission society.

Policy Actions and Recommendations

Norway’s modern relationship with environmental policy began in 1991 when they became one of the first nations to adopt a carbon tax. Today, 85% of the country’s GHG emissions are covered either by EU or domestic CO2 policies (IEA, 2022, p. 10). Norway has been an active participant in the Paris Climate Agreement as well, adopting so-called NDCs or National Determined Contributions to reduce emissions to half of their 1990 levels by 2030. The NDC targets were given legal backing in 2017 by the Climate Change Act, and in 2021, the country introduced the Climate Action Plan, which sets emissions targets on all areas not covered by NDC or EU regulations (p. 10). Norway has also taken aggressive steps to push EV adoption, including setting goals to eliminate all new gas-powered car sales by 2025, waving EV VAT taxes, instituting exemptions on tolls, ferry passes, and parking, and offering free public charging for EV owners. (CNBC, 2024). These policies and the proliferation of electric vehicle manufacturers have resulted in a dramatic increase in EV adoption. For example, according to CNBC reporting, 82% of Norway’s new car sales were electric in 2023 (CNBC, 2024). The rise of EV’s has resulted in an almost 16% reduction in transportation-related CO2 emissions since 2014 (EC, 2023) and a 20% improvement in Oslo’s air quality, according to Sture Portvik, the city’s manager of electromobility (CNBC, 2024, 3.15).

Yet Norway’s electrification has carried unintended consequences and challenges. For example, increased EV adoption has resulted in a dramatic reduction in CO2 tax revenue. At the same time, an increase in EVs has led to increased traffic, wear and tear on the city’s infrastructure and less tax revenue to pay for repairs. In a nod to the policy arc outlined by Davies (2018), policymakers have begun phasing out EV incentives and redistributing the public tax burden more evenly across EV owners (CNBC, 2024). Nonetheless, for all of Norway’s efforts, their GHG emissions remain relatively high. Future policies must work to wean Norway’s economy off fossil fuel production. For example, CNBC (2024) reported that Norway intends to double its electricity output through wind power alone by 2040 (18.30). At the same time, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance has proposed implementing a resource rent on onshore wind power and reinvesting those funds in green technology (NMF, 2024). Another option is to gradually wind down fossil fuel exploration by limiting new permits. Under this model, Norway would exit the fossil fuel industry by 2050 (Statistics Norway, 2020). Such policies could be further paired with subsidies to help ease the industry’s transition to green energy.

Using policies to spur innovation, particularly in battery technology and agriculture is another option. Freyer Battery CEO Bergen Steen cites the American Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) as an example European policymakers could follow (CNBC, 2024, 11.00). The IRA has resulted in hundreds of billions of dollars in green tech investment from battery alternatives to better steel (Worland, 2023). Green technologies could also be applied to agriculture alongside taxes on corporate farms or moratoriums on industrial fertilizers.  In short, it is essential that future policies work to transition existing carbon-heavy industries to low emission technologies, while reducing the footprint of those systems through better batteries and more sustainable practices.

Conclusion

Limiting GHG emissions matters as the impact of pollutants carries global consequences. Norway’s example, even if local, provides at least one possible approach to limiting emissions. That said, it’s important to discuss why some countries fail to address climate concerns. One reason already covered here is geography. Few countries have Norway’s rivers or coastline and therefore don’t have access to hydro or wind alternatives. Another reason is a lack of national wealth. Green tech, while cheapening, is still costly. The infrastructure alone is not conducive to geopolitical instability, nor do developing nations have the resources to invest in such technologies. Domestic concerns play a role as well, from special interests in the oil and gas industries, to a lack of affordability. The rivers of the Pacific Northwest are a terrific source of renewable energy but garner resistance from environmental groups and the EPA. The diverse landscape of the United States similarly prohibits the widespread adoption of solar or wind. Finally, political will makes environmental change difficult. In Norway, there is a culture of shared utility around the use of public funds, and a track record of using that money for the public good. The United States, on the other hand, has no comprehensive energy policy (Kraft & Furlong, 2019), nor does such national trust exist. None of these reasons preclude the adoption of green technology, but they illustrate the complications associated with going green.

In summary, Norway is leading the world’s transition to a green, low emission society, but that transition is predicated on a continued reliance on fossil fuels. While this might seem hypocritical, it illustrates the complexities of going green in an advanced economy. More importantly, the Norwegian model illustrates that fossil fuels are part of the green solution, whether by funding green industries, or transitioning themselves to new technologies.

References

CNBC. (2024, February 17). How Norway built an EV utopia while the U.S. Is struggling to go electric

| CNBC documentary [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5DbRyeZNRk

Davies, L.L. (2018). Eulogizing renewable energy policy. Journal of Land & Environmental Law,

33(2), 309-330. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26895805

EC. (2023). EDGAR – Emissions database for global atmospheric research. European Commission.

https://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/country_profile/NOR

IEA. (2022). Norway 2022: Energy policy review. International Energy Agency.

https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/de28c6a6-8240-41d9-9082-a5dd65d9f3eb/NORWAY2022.pdf

ITA. (2024). Norway country commercial guide. International Trade Administration.

https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/norway-offshore-energy-oil-gas-and-renewables

Kraft, M. E., & Furlong, S. R. (2019). Public Policy: Politics, Analysis, and Alternatives

(7th ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc. (US). https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781544374598

NMF. (2024). Proposition to the storting 2 LS: Resource rent tax on onshore wind power. Norwegian

Ministry of Finance. https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/38eb2ed69eb44ef4b5f25f6a0638c036/en-gb/pdfs/prp202320240002000engpdfs.pdf

NP. (2023). Exports of oil and gas. Norwegian Petroleum.

https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/production-and-exports/exports-of-oil-and-gas/

Ritchie, H., Roser, M., & Rosado, P. (2024). Renewable energy: Renewable energy sources are growing

quickly and will play a vital role in tackling climate change. Our World in Data. https://ourworldindata.org/renewable-energy  

Statistics Norway. (2020). Consequences of reduced petroleum activities. Statistics Norway. ht

tps://www.ssb.no/nasjonalregnskap-og-konjunkturer/artikler-og-publikasjoner/konsekvenser-av-redusert-petroleumsvirksomhet

Worland, J. (2023). How the inflation reduction act has reshaped the U.S. – and the world. Time.

https://time.com/6304143/inflation-reduction-act-us-global-impact/

America: A British Revolution

As British troops set fire to the U.S. capitol building on August 24, 1814, it might have seemed as though the American experiment had met its end. In fact, the War of 1812 was simply the last word in a debate over democracy that had pestered Britain and her parliament for decades. What began in earnest during the French and Indian War, continued through American independence and later the French Revolution. It is with some irony, however, that in sowing the seeds of revolt in America, Britain initiated a democratic revolution of its own. This essay examines the attitudes and perspectives of the British legislature, public, and the crown toward American independence; and while correctly attributed to taxes and representation, the war ought to be more broadly viewed as the middle act of a larger British revolution.

If England’s national debt was the third front of the French and Indian War, Lord Grenville was the general to fight it. While an honest and forthright man, Grenville was not well liked. His abrasive style afforded him few friends and was as much responsible for his rise as his downfall. Nonetheless, Grenville’s penchant for law and finance at a time when England’s national debt had nearly doubled, proved too valuable to dispatch (Clark, 1950). It was in this post war fiscal crisis, that the British government turned to the American colonies for assistance.

The story of taxes and American revolution is deeply rooted in a personal feud between Lord Grenville and King George. In fact, the Stamp and Sugar Acts were a direct manifestation of the power struggle between these two men, and indeed, the slow rolling retreat from monarchial rule that had been proceeding throughout Britain for centuries. Grenville’s ambitions were very much focused on expanding the powers of Parliament at the expense of the King. Raising taxes on the colonies was not only a means to generate revenue, but it diminished the Throne by demonstrating Parliament’s legal authority over the colonies (Clark, 1950, p. 393). Though repealed little more than a year after being ratified, Grenville’s taxes would work to advance democratic progress in both Great Brittan and the American colonies. By 1765, King George had had enough of the problematic minister and dismissed him from office. Yet ironically Lord Grenville’s departure would, itself, spawn a dramatic reduction in the King’s ability to remove public officials. It was Grenville’s last rebuke to the powers of the Throne, that his termination should solidify Parliamentary authority once and for all (p. 391). At the same time, the issues of taxes and representation set in motion by Grenville’s policies would fuel revolution a continent away.

By the time the Americans declared their independence, there was little room for surprise on either side. There was, however, plenty of room for debate and rebuttal, much of which came from two lawyers appointed by the King to respond to the colonists demands. Jeremy Bentham (1776) issued a blistering response to the Declaration that was both emotionally colorful and intellectually provoking. “The opinions of the modern Americans on Government,” he writes, “like those of their good ancestors on witchcraft, would be too ridiculous to deserve any notice” (para 1). And on the notion of self-evident truths he ripostes, “This rarity is a new discovery; now, for the first time, we learn, that a child…has the same quantity of natural power as the parent” (para 3). Bentham reserves little for the notion of unalienable rights as well, suggesting that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are tantamount to the complete disregard for law and order (para 7). Past the fiery retorts, however, Bentham argues the American declaration is undermined by the precedent of historic submission to British rule; both in law and duties paid. He contends that none of the taxes and indeed none of the colonists’ grievances exist outside the bounds of preexisting norms (Bentham 1776). American independence, therefore, had no legal or philosophical grounds on which to stand.

While Bentham was writing his rebuttal of the American declaration, his friend and fellow attorney John Lind articulated a more complete response. As Oxford Professor of law, Herbert Hart writes, in Lind’s view, taxation and representation were inseparable. Hart summarizes Lind’s views as follows:

The idea that [taxes and representation were separate] arose, according to Lind, from a misconception of the nature of property as something that belonged to individuals independently of the law. On the basis of this misconception there had developed the further erroneous idea that when the subject pays taxes he is making a gift of what is his and which, since it is a gift, requires his consent (Hart, 1976, p. 550).

Hart goes on to say that Lind’s position was premised on the idea that the notion of ownership can only exist if supported by law. He quotes Lind himself, quite aptly. “Take away the fence which the law has set around this thing…and where would your right or property be then” (p. 550). The point is well stated but also perfectly embodies the American disagreement. While the colonists held certain rights to be unalienable, they recognized the law needed to be structured in a way that protected these ideas. In a sense, both the British and the Americans were correct in their assessment that without the law, rights are void of meaning. In fact, a century before, English philosopher John Locke argued that such rights as life, liberty and property were God-given. And prior still, the Magna Carta contained similar provisions (Krutz, G., 2021, p. 32). In any event, while Lind’s final views on democracy are lesser known, Bentham would become one of its biggest champions, pressing for Parliamentary reforms and praising the progress of the Americans (Hart, 1976, pp. 557, 560). These views, and indeed the arc of Bentham’s trajectory, were matched by the British public and to a lesser degree, King George himself.

However, while British reforms would follow the American and French revolutions, popular opinion did not start off favoring the colonists. Historian Benjamin Labaree (1970) writes, “As one reads the newspaper commentary [regarding the prospect of war]…he is struck by the extent to which the subject of America evoked an emotional response” (p. 7). By Labaree’s analysis, some 70% of political commentary took a decidedly anti-American stance (p. 7). While it’s not surprising that the common public would have sided with the domestic viewpoint, the range of opinions within that spectrum swung from fear that the Americans would succeed, to conspiracies framing the Americans as both aggressors and victims (pp. 9, 10, 16). The most common view, however, was that the Americans were ungrateful, specifically for the protection provided by British troops who bled colonial ground during the French and Indian War (pp. 17, 18). Indeed, American revolt in that context would be a bitter pill to swallow, but ingratitude, while potent, would have proven transitory next to the economic concerns of trade.

The British public was not alone in harboring these concerns. King George considered the loss of the colonies to be a mortal blow not only to Britan’s finances but its status on the world stage (Bullion, 1994). However, despite these concerns, the King was remarkably sympathetic to the notion that citizens might grow disillusioned with opportunities at home. He writes,

It was thoroughly known that from every Country there always exists an active emigration of unsettled, discontented, or unfortunate People, who failing in their endeavours to live at home, hope to succeed better where there is more employment suitable to their poverty (p. 306).

This conciliatory view is particularly surprising from a monarch who would have viewed American revolution as betrayal, but it was not out of line with revolutionary observers like Michele-Guillaume Jean de Crèvoceur who wrote, “Alas, two thirds of [Americans] have no country. Can a wretch who wanders about, who works and starves…call England or any other kingdom his country?” (Crèvoceur, 1782, p. 4). On matters of trade and diplomacy, the King was no less gentil, writing,

This comparative view of our former territories in America is not stated with any idea of lessening the consequence of a future friendship and connection with them; on the contrary it is to be hoped we shall reap more advantages from their trade as friends than ever we could derive from them as Colonies (Bullion, 1994, p. 307).

While it is tempting to declare King George an American apologist, Historian John Bullion cautions against this conclusion, writing that the King was susceptible to whomever had his ear. After American independence had been finalized, the King was “noticeably lukewarm toward efforts to improve commercial relations with the United States” (p. 310). Regardless, King George’s views were not decidedly anti-American. Even if one were to consider the King’s most favorable sentiments to stem from economic enrichment versus democratic endorsement, that an eighteenth-century monarch could hold such a favorable view is no less remarkable.

By the time 1809 came around, Jeremy Bentham had completed a full about-face, advocating for Parliamentary reforms and universal voting rights. It was a remarkable turn of events for a man who only two decades before had declared the French revolution to be “nonsense on stilts” (Armitage, 2004, p. 63). Furthermore, the eventual adoption of full representation by the British Parliament speaks to broad public support for American ideals. King George, as Bullion pointed out, was at worst lukewarm while at best, quite optimistic. Certainly, these sentiments cast the subsequent war of 1812 in a more interesting, if not puzzling light. One might read the American grievance of impressment as a young upstart nation wanting to challenge the aging empire for supremacy. And this could be quite right. In fact, this global challenge would take centuries to play out, as American scholar Robert Kagan, writes,

When it came to dealing with the European giants, [the United States] claimed to abjure power and assailed as atavistic the power politics of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century European empires (Kagan, 2002, p. 6).

It would not be until the close of the second World War that America emerged as economically and militarily superior to its European fathers. Indeed, the bi-directional tension between Britain, Europe, and North America that gave rise to revolution has never fully abated. As Kagan points out, the freedom enjoyed by much of the European continent is paid for by American hegemony. In this aspect, he writes, the wall cannot pass through the gate (p. 25). In other words, the luxuries afforded Europe by American power can never be fully enjoyed by Americans. This centuries-old tension is likely to persist as America’s foreign policy continues to shift and global trade becomes more regionally focused. As throughout history, however, America and Britain will maintain their long-standing, if at times, strained relationship as societies of similar stripes.  

In summary, the British view of American independence was almost universally one of contempt and ingratitude. Yet few Brits likely saw the broader strokes of their own budding independence. In a very real sense, America showed the British that rights and representative government were possible, and, provided Englishmen with the inspiration to finish their own revolution.

References

Armitage, D., (2004, April). The declaration of independence in world context. OAH Magazine of

History, 18(3), 61-66. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25163686

Bentham, J., (1776). A short review of the declaration. University of Wisconsin Pressbooks.

https://wisc.pb.unizin.org/ps601/chapter/jeremy-bentham-a-short-review-of-the-declaration/

Bullion, J.L., (1994, April). George III on empire, 1783. The William and Mary Quarterly, 51(2),

305-310. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2946866

Clark, D. M., (1950). George Grenville as first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer,

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