Policy Response 2: The Role of Science and Activism in Climate Policy

Environmentalism and science are often conflated with one another. The climate space has become crowded with concerned citizens, scientists, celebrities, and politicians, making it both a movement of scientific interest and of pop culture. This duality has led to questions over the role science should play in policymaking and how agnostic scientists ought to remain in the face of climate change. While Steel (2015) provides a summary of the various models for scientific engagement, Ojha et al (2016) highlight the failure of science to consider sociological and cultural concerns. On the other hand, Kusch (2019) argues that not only should science be involved in policymaking, but that it is unavoidably biased and necessarily political. However, Gluckman (2015) contends the limitations of science are precisely why its roll in policy should be limited. Finally, mass-media outlets like the BBC, TED, and Yes! provide insight into how environmentalism manifests in popular culture, from celebrities like Greta Thunberg and Al Gore, to popular movements in Latin America and Ghana. These movements underpin political pressure and can motivate states to form international treaties and IGOs around shared environmental concerns. While McCormick (1999) is fairly critical of such treaties, Susskind (2008) and Koppel & Sprinz (2009) are more optimistic. In short, environmentalism is an artifact of popular culture and scientific intrigue, making it both a highly contested and competitive space.

Analysis

As environmentalism has grown in public salience, science has taken an increasingly prominent role in both public and private sector debate. However, the nature of this role has been largely contested. For example, Steel (2015) writes that the spectrum of involvement includes approaches like normal science, which seeks to advise but not instruct, to logical positivism, which advocates for scientists writing policy on relevant matters (p. xxv). Others, like Ojha et al (2015), question whether technocratic decision making is equipped to address sociological and cultural concerns. Good policy, they argue, cannot be effective without involving the communities most impacted by climate change (p. 418). For instance, they note the Nepalese government’s lack of engagement with the local community on climate policy, even though those communities were disproportionately impacted by glacial runoff and other factors. Nonetheless, Ojha et al conclude that science is a component of the policymaking process, and should be considered equally alongside sociological, political, and economic expertise.

Other dimensions of scientific involvement are still further removed from one-another. Steel (2015) writes that the post-modernists view science as a construct and part of a larger power pyramid. In this framework, the role of science is minimized and not seen as possessing more inherent truth than feeling and personal experience (p. xix). The post-normal view, on the other hand, advocates that the role of science should be institutionalized and integrated into legislative committees, the courts, and policymaking arenas (pp. xxv-xxvi). In a TED Talk, Kusch (2019) goes a step further, arguing that not only should scientists be politically engaged, but that such engagement is necessary (8.00). Finally, others like Gluckman (2018) echo the post-modern sentiment, expressing a desire to remove evidence-based policymaking from our vocabularies (p. 91). Gluckman argues that policymaking often takes place at the boundary of scientific understanding, that science is not the only form of evidence, and that tradition and folklore carry special cultural significance (p. 92). In that, Gluckman expresses the concerns raised by Ojha et al (2015) and suggests that policymakers ought to consider the sociological impact, not simply the ecological outcome, of climate policies.

As the preceding discussion demonstrated, the environmental policy arena contains multiple actors, from scientists and sociologists to legislatures and local communities. Among the largest of these constituencies are the public, among whom celebrities, politicians, and grassroots organizations are part. In fact, scientists can cross into the public domain. For example, Rachel Carson’s widely acclaimed book Silent Spring is credited with launching the modern environmentalist movement, and changing the national attitude toward climate (Stoll, n.d.). However, the impact of individuals and the fickle nature of climate in the public mind, leave open how much influence one person can have. On the one hand, environmental celebrities, like Greta Thunberg, criticize but offer little in the way of solutions (BBC, 2024). On the other hand, politician turned private citizen, Al Gore (2020), is able to speak intelligently on climate issues in a way that connects with the average citizen. The ability to raise awareness, therefore, is at least partly contingent upon the ability to inform and connect.

As mentioned, Rachel Carson’s book is broadly credited with spawning a global movement (Stoll, n.d.). Pragmatic views such as those expressed by Al Gore can similarly introduce environmentalism to the layperson. Nonetheless, even if such issue proliferation gives rise to popular movements like those in Ghana or Latin America (Pousadela, 2020), their impact is uncertain. For instance, deforestation, water, and air pollution are still concerns throughout much of the world. Stoll (n.d.) writes that while every one of the chemicals listed in Carson’s book has been banned or restricted, chemical contamination continues to be a public concern. Similarly, Pousadela (2020) writes that while popular environmental movements have sparked government awareness, their actual impact on policy remains unclear. It’s important therefore, that environmental stewards exist as ambassadors of the climate issue, but simply raising awareness doesn’t constitute structural change.

While activism can pressure policymakers to act, international treaties are another means of bringing about change. Much like raising awareness, however, international agreements and IGOs can be criticized for lacking effectiveness. McCormick (1999), for example, writes that such treaties are often weak, lack enforcement mechanisms, and compete with national priorities (p. 92). Moreover, the lack of a global governing body means states can neither be coerced nor held accountable for not following international law (p. 97). Susskind (2008) echoed this realist view, adding that politician’s commitment to international agreements is often superficial and subordinate to the election cycle. Nonetheless, legally binding agreements can form the basis for both economic prosperity and environmental responsibility.

That said, the two regimes can seem at odds. For example, Bhagwati (1993) notes the inherent tension between economics and environmental politics. One abstains from government regulation, the other invites it (p. 42). In fact, concerns about over-regulation could be supported by Levy (1996) who argued that non-binding agreements are more effective than their legally binding counterparts. While LBAs foster animosity, LNBAs encourage collaboration and willful participation on climate issues (p. 76). Furthermore, Levy’s arguments suggest good environmental policy and economics are not mutually exclusive. In one example, the European Commission, whose primary focus is economics, worked to enforce cross-border emissions restrictions as a means of ensuring both economic synergy and environmental responsibility (p. 108). Similarly, Bhagwati (1993) writes that economic growth does not necessarily correlate to greater environmental harm. For example, Bhagwati cites studies indicating SO2 emissions fall as incomes rise (p. 43). Moreover, policies can impact environmental outcomes. For instance, restrictions on auto imports led the Japanese to export larger, less fuel-efficient SUVs (p. 43). Even if assumptions about GHG emissions and growth are contested, it’s clear that policy, economics, and the environment are intertwined.

To this extent, Bhagwati (1993) argues that private boycotts and lobbying are effective alternatives to environmental regulation (p. 47). While these strategies may be part of the solution, the rise in global emissions suggests that international law still has a role to play. Contrary to the arguments made by Levy (1996), Koppel & Sprinz (2009) contend that legally-binding treaties are the best means of enforcing such laws. More importantly, they write, these agreements must contain mechanisms to enforce terms and peacefully resolve disputes (p. 1863). Among the more compelling solutions offered, Susskind (2008) proposes writing agreements that allow for the sharing of green technology across borders. This technical proliferation could be paired with what Koppel & Sprinz (2009) write is a need for clear and precise laws that are both understandable and enforceable (p. 1866). In short, economic growth and regulation are not mutually exclusive. It’s also clear that economic policies can provide both environmental risks and upside. As Bhagwati (1993) writes, the increased tax revue that comes from economic growth can form the basis for future environmental programs. Nonetheless, whether legally binding or voluntary, some form of international cooperation is required.

Outlook

Without a doubt, the criticism levelled at activists like Greta Thunberg, international organizations like the UN, and the myriad of treaties governing global resources is valid. Raising awareness, as Thunberg or other activists do, is the lowest point of entry to involvement in the global climate discussion. It’s much more difficult to imagine an innovative policy approach or to design more efficient solar cells. To this extent, the marginal utility of the UN or other IGOs in doing more than holding meetings is questionable. As Susskind (2008) pointed out, world leaders are worried about the next election cycle and scoring points with their constituents. In this, the realist model of the world clearly holds serve. The best international bodies can do is suggest a course of action. This places the climate agenda firmly in the hands of the private sector, and this is perhaps where efforts to raise awareness have a role to play.

While the status of China and the United States as the world’s leading emitters casts serious doubt on Bhagwati’s (1993) argument that growth lowers emissions, there’s a compelling argument that environmental change lies in the hands of private citizens. For one thing, green growth can reduce our carbon footprint while also benefiting the economy. Furthermore, carbon markets provide both public and private incentive to operate in a more sustainable way. Hein (2018) writes that fewer than half of the countries committed to reducing deforestation had the financial instruments to achieve their goals (p. 8). Carbon markets are one such instrument and represent an opportunity for regulators and private business to work together. Finally, it goes without saying that innovation happens in the private sector, not via UN conferences or activist marches. At some point, the engineering challenges of climate change must be solved by the technical minds focused on those problems. Sharing technology across borders as recommended by Susskind (2008) is one approach, incentives offered in the Inflation Reduction Act are another. Therefore, regardless of the mechanism, the goals of governments ought to be how best to enable the people solving the problems of climate change to do their greatest work.

References

BBC. (2024). Greta Thunberg: Who is the climate activist and what has she achieved. BBC.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49918719

Bhagwati, J.N. (1993). The case for free trade. Scientific American, 269(5), 42-49.

https://www.scientificamerican.com/issue/sa/1993/11-01/

Gluckman, P. (2018). The role of evidence and expertise in policy-making: The politics and

practice of science advice. Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, 151(1), 91-101. https://royalsoc.org.au/images/pdf/journal/151-1-Gluckman.pdf

Gore, A. (2020, June 23). The new urgency of climate change [Video]. TED.

https://www.ted.com/talks/al_gore_the_new_urgency_of_climate_change#t-1987370

Hein, J., Guarin, A., Frommé, E., & Pauw, P. (2018). Deforestation and the Paris climate

agreement: An assessment of REDD+ in the national climate action plans. Forest Policy and Economics, 90, 7-11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2018.01.005

Holst, C. & Christensen, J. (2016). The role of expertise in policymaking. Open Access

Government. https://www.openaccessgovernment.org/role-expertise-policy-making/28592/  

Koppel, M. & Sprinz, D.F. (2019). Do binding beat nonbinding agreements? Regulating

international water quality. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63(8), 1860-1888. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002718822127

Levy, M.A. (1996). European acid rain: The power of tote-board diplomacy. Keohane, R.O. &

Levy M.A. (Eds.). Institutions for Environmental Aid: Pitfalls and Promises. (pp. 37-94). MIT Press. https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262611206/institutions-for-environmental-aid/

McCormick, J. (2010). The role of environmental NGOs in international regimes. Axelrod, R.S.

& Vandeveer, S. (Eds.), The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy (pp. 92-110). CQ Press. https://www.academia.edu/857760/The_role_of_environmental_NGOs_in_international_regimes

Pousadela, I. (2020). Stories from the youth climate movement in the global south. Yes!

https://www.yesmagazine.org/opinion/2020/07/17/youth-climate-leaders-global-south

Ojha, H. R., Ghimire, S., Pain, A., Nightingale, A., Khatri, D. B., & Dhungana, H. (2016). Policy

without politics: technocratic control of climate change adaptation policy making in Nepal. Climate Policy, 16(4), 415–433. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2014.1003775

Steel, B.S. (Ed.). (2015). Science and politics: An A-to-Z guide to issues and controversies. Sage

Publishing. https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/science-and-politics/book239100

Stoll, M. (n.d.). Legacy of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. Environment & Society Portal.

https://www.environmentandsociety.org/exhibitions/rachel-carsons-silent-spring/legacy-rachel-carsons-silent-spring

Susskind, L. (2008). Strengthening the global environmental treaty system. Issues in Science and

Technology, 25(1). https://issues.org/susskind/

TEDx Talks. (2019, December 6). Scientific expertise in the age of post-truth – Martin Kusch –

TEDxVienna [Video]. YouTube. https://youtube.com/watch?v=AHa4QLmu8Dg

Policy Response 1: A Review of Policy Diffusion in the Public and Private Sector

The study of how environmental policies proliferate is an exercise in simplicity and competing complexities. On the one hand, policy diffusion is relatively easy to understand. A state develops emissions controls or sustainable fishing practices, and other countries adopt similar policies. On the other hand, a myriad of factors determines whether an adopting state can facilitate such advancements. This essay examines the challenge of policy diffusion in the arena of environmental politics with a focus on fisheries and emissions controls. Works by Kern et al (2001) provide a detailed overview of how policies proliferate, while Stafford (2019) provides useful background on sustainability concepts, flaws, and limitations. Mainstream media coverage of Chinese fishing practices is also reviewed as are the lobbying efforts of industry special interests. Finally, literature from the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO, 2017) illustrates how policy dissemination doesn’t necessarily result in environmentally favorable outcomes while Chasek (2016) provides an overview of policy arenas, actors, and the various interests that influence international policy. To address these issues, the discussion begins with how the tragedy of the commons applies to overfishing and potential policy approaches to remediating risk. It then examines how states differ in their approach to environmental issues and what factors influence policy diffusion. Finally, we’ll consider how fuel efficiency standards have improved in the United States and why they continue to lag behind their European frontrunners.

Analysis

The need for collective international action and good policy is perhaps no more apparent than in the arena of global fisheries, yet as Stafford (2019) writes, the overuse of sustainability has led to confusion about what the word means and ironically, resulted in unsustainable practices. Fishing quotas, he notes, are both poorly defined and difficult to project, yet are considered sustainable (pp. 1-2). Similarly, Kern et al (2001) cite the importance of clear policy and clearer problem statements, writing that the best policy is useless against a poorly understood problem and vice versa (pp. 7-8). Accurate verbiage, therefore, is essential to crafting good policy, particularly with respect to common pool resources like breathable air, clean water, and ocean life. Such resources are vulnerable to socioeconomic theories like the tragedy of the commons, which Stafford (2019) and Chasek (2016) describe as the exploitation of a shared resource to the detriment of the broader community. Overfishing of the sort practiced by China (Urbina, 2020) is one such example and poses significant environmental risks from bycatch and collapsed fisheries to international instability. Furthermore, China’s practices undermine international policy by exposing weaknesses in enforcement. At the same time, China’s population needs food and special interests have an incentive to maintain the status quo. More broadly, global fisheries are thought to provide over 200 million jobs (Chasek, 2016, p. 8), which further complicates the policy picture, all of which contributes to the tragedy of the commons playing out in the world’s oceans.

While concerns over military action garner headlines, a policy of economic and financial coercion would more effectively dissuade Chinese activity. For example, much of the fishing reported by Urbina (2020) has taken place in international waters off the coast of South America. The countries of Argentina, Chile, Brazil and others could utilize MERCOSUR to enact coordinated tariffs on Chinese goods or freeze collaborative projects domestically. Such economic coercion was used by the United States in the 1980s to enact a ban on whaling (Chasek, 2016, p. 16). To that extent, countries affected by China’s aggressive fishing tactics could form tighter bonds with the U.S. and leverage American tariffs to alter Chinese policy. For example, the United States could utilize the USMCA to block Chinese exports attempting to enter via Mexico. The World Bank and IMF could be used to influence smaller players where China is an active lender to seek partnerships with western sources. Another option is to use NGOs (like Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund, and the Sierra Club) to raise public awareness and put pressure on international companies to reduce their investments in China. Finally, it’s worth noting that Chinese veto power makes enacting policy through the UN unlikely. It’s also unclear that such a policy would be enforceable without the aforementioned collaboration. Moreover, Kern et al (2001) note that the budget for the United Nations Environmental Programme is less than that of Greenpeace (p. 10), further calling into question the ability of the UN to act persuasively.

The Chinese use case provides a useful entrance into the examination of how state actors differ in their response to environmental issues. As Chasek (2016) writes, a myriad of factors can affect a state’s approach to climate issues, from NGOs to economic concerns and others. Urbina (2020), for example, reported that Chinese long-range fishing began, in part, due to depleted local fisheries. China’s response to this crisis was to expand their fishing footprint, a response that reflects both the economic and social concerns associated with food security. Alternatively, the United States’ opposition to whaling was largely predicated on its declining need for whaling products and mounting pressure from environmental groups, which subsequently produced a radically different policy than that demonstrated by the Chinese. A final example can be found in the United States’ slow adoption of fuel economy standards. In this, strong cultural and institutional biases play a role. As Nivola (2009) writes, the United States has trailed European policymakers in fuel economy largely because Americans won’t support the necessary taxes, a policy that has ensured cheap gas and disincentivized fuel economy. In this way, culture and precedent work together to influence a country’s response to climate concerns, whether long or short-term.

The discussion of international policy owes some attention to how such policies proliferate throughout the global community. The notion of policy diffusion was discussed at length by Kern et al (2001) who identified three primary drivers of policy proliferation. The first of these concerns the technical capabilities of the imitating country and the public demand for action. These require that the adopting nation have the technical knowledge and functional capacity to implement environmental controls in the presence of strong public will. The second stipulation addresses policy frontrunners and disseminating organizations, like the United Nations Environmental Programme. This entails that the frontrunners not only implement policies but that they publish those policies (and their results) internationally through designated organizations. Finally, both the policy and the problem must be thoroughly understood. Good policy is meaningless if applied against a poorly understood problem. Therefore, it is essential that the adopting nation understand both the policy and the problem they are trying to solve (pp. 7-13).

When studying policy diffusion, it’s easy to assume that only good policies proliferate, but this is not always the case. For example, the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO, 2017), found that lobbyists effectively won concessions from Spanish regulators that closely mirrored their Dutch counterparts. In both cases, fishing quotas were increased, and regulatory oversight decreased. It’s also worth acknowledging that good policy is wholly within the eye of the beholder. Spanish fishing interests, for example, were likely satisfied with their lobbyists’ efforts. Nonetheless, policies can proliferate in the presence of opposition. For example, Kern et al, (2001), cite the rise of environmental agencies, ministries, and other national organizations throughout Europe and North America as a prominent instance of policy proliferation (pp. 13-15). The EPA is one such example that has both ardent support and opposition from various political groups within the United States. That said, sometimes good policies fail to proliferate or do so more slowly. Such is the case with fuel economy in the United States. Reducing vehicle emissions is seen as a critical step in reducing global GHGs, yet policymakers have been slow to implement regulations until recently. Nivola (2009) writes that U.S. fuel efficiency standards are half of what they are in Europe, largely because Americans have no tolerance for taxes either publicly or politically. Furthermore, cheap gas has disincentivized innovation and largely kept America behind Europe. Nonetheless, the United States possesses many of the prerequisites for successful policy adoption. America has the technical capability to achieve greater fuel economy, benefits from a clear policy frontrunner to emulate, and enjoys strong public support for GHG reduction. However, they lack institutional and public support for higher taxes. These issues haven’t prevented the diffusion of policy, but they have slowed its progress.

Finally, a great deal of attention has been paid to policy and policymakers, however, private sector innovation can be a major source of environmental change. For example, SeaPact (SP, n.d.) is a collaboration of 11 leading North American seafood companies committed to the sustainable use of international fisheries. While organized by for-profit companies, SeaPact works with a select number of NGOs who act as advisors on resource management and innovation. According to the SeaPact site, the organization’s members have developed better nets, trawling gear, and other technologies to help reduce bycatch and damage to the environment. Beyond SeaPact, industry leaders like Trident Seafoods have a well-published commitment to sustainability. In their most recent ESG report, the company identifies their customers, community, employees, and owners as the beneficiaries of sustainable practices (TRD, 2023). Such commitments reflect broad support, not only from management and ownership, but from the public whose concerns often manifest through NGOs.

Prospective Outlook

The preceding discussion has covered a wide range of issues from overfishing and fuel efficiency to policy diffusion and private sector change. It goes without saying that future solutions to climate change will incorporate all of local, global, and private sector policy proliferation. However, while Kern et al (2001) detail the prerequisites for policy diffusion, they note that adopting nations must tailor such policies to their needs. This point cannot be overstated. The United States’ slow roll toward greater fuel economy is a perfect example. PEW research indicates that two-thirds of Americans think the government should do more to address climate change and a bipartisan majority supports tougher fuel efficiency standards (Tyson & Kennedy, 2020, pp. 1-6), yet our aversion to taxes runs countercurrent to those desires. This implies that a wholesale, blind adoption of European gas taxes would not be the best approach. Instead, tailoring tax policy to the American mindset, for example through hybrid incentives paid for by carbon taxes, could achieve the same ends through a slightly different means. In that, innovative policy must compliment private sector innovation and social norms. Policy proliferation, therefore, is as much about adopting what works as much as it is understanding the cultural and political factors at play.

References

CEO. (2017). Fishing for influence: Press passes give lobbyists EU council building access

during fishing quota talks. Corporate Europe Observatory. https://corporateeurope.org/en/power-lobbies/2017/05/fishing-influence

Chasek, P. S. (2016). Global Environmental Politics (7th ed.). Taylor & Francis.

https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9780813350356

Kern, K., Jorgens, H. & Janicke, M. (2001). The diffusion of environmental policy innovations: A

contribution to the globalisation of environmental policy. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228202810_The_Diffusion_of_Environmental_Policy_Innovations_A_Contribution_to_the_Globalisation_of_Environmental_Policy

Nivola, P.S. (2009). The long and winding road: Automotive fuel economy and American

politics. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0225_cafe_nivola.pdf

Safford, R. (2019). Sustainability: A flawed concept for fisheries management? University of

California Press. https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.346

SP. (n.d.). Our projects. Sea Pact. https://www.seapact.org/

TRD. (2023). Ocean allies: Strengthening our bond with the ocean and each other. Trident

Seafood Corp. https://cdn.bfldr.com/VUHD2VO5/as/2htqnw77xq8nrk4snzxc23j/Trident_Seafood_Corp_ESG_Report

Tyson, A., & Kennedy, B. (2020). Two-Thirds of Americans Think Government Should

Do More on Climate: Bipartisan backing for carbon capture tax credits, extensive tree-planting efforts. Pew Research Center. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep57745

Urbina, I. (2020). How China’s expanding fishing fleet is depleting the world’s oceans. Yale

Environment 360. https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-chinas-expanding-fishing-fleet-is-depleting-worlds-oceans

The Symbiosis of Domestic Issues and Foreign Affairs

For many young American’s, the war in Afghanistan has defined their country’s foreign policy. Yet for much of the last eighty years, intervention and globalization have been the status quo. From the Cold War to the War on Terror, the United States has been a global leader, defending western values and American capitalism. The fall of the Soviet Union, however, was followed by the rise of globalization, cheap labor, and the decline of American manufacturing. Between 2000 and 2010, Ohio alone lost over 600,000 manufacturing jobs to outsourcing and automation (Ahmed, 2018, p. 27), while the rise of the service and technology sectors left many blue-collar communities with little recourse. The subsequent loss of jobs and protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have helped to usher in a renewed focus on domestic priorities, however disentangling national concerns from world affairs is difficult if not impossible. This essay examines the interplay between domestic and foreign policy and argues that each cannot exist without the other.

Policy Analysis & Discussion

In an article published in Polity, David Lumsdaine (1996) examines the fusion of domestic and foreign affairs, noting that the norms of the former often influence the latter. For example, states with strong social welfare programs often have strong foreign aid programs. Similarly, protectionist, free-market, or centrally planned societies generally adopt similar international policies (pp. 301-305). In a market-driven representative democracy, like the United States, such domestic priorities may shift generationally or with each election cycle. During the Cold War, for example, foreign policy reflected anti-communist public sentiment and favored international intervention. In fact, not only did the duopoly of the Cold War drive the West’s security apparatus, but it also drove the rise of western manufacturing as American companies filled the industrial void left by the second world war (Ahmed, 2018).

That said, policymakers don’t always follow public opinion. For example, by the turn of the century, domestic issues were once again a national concern. Nonetheless, policymakers pursued a globalist agenda while framing those policies as promoting American jobs (Ahmed, 2018, pp. 11-13). Ironically, these policies decimated Midwest manufacturing and resulted in the aforementioned job losses. Twenty years later, domestic policies are once again a public priority. According to Gallup data, the number of Americans who say the country should take a major or leading role in world affairs has fallen by 15% (Jones, 2023), while Pew Research found that 51% of adults prefer greater attention be paid to domestic issues than on foreign policy (Silver, 2022). Taken together, these data suggest that Americans want U.S. involvement in world affairs, but not at the expense of domestic concerns.

The link between domestic and foreign policy isn’t always so clear, however. For example, Ukraine’s ability to defend its shipping lanes could directly impact national food prices (Berman et al, 2024). European grain exports and U.S. foreign aid, therefore, become domestic issues. America could spend money on Ukraine and prevent a spike in food prices, but it would have less money to spend on national priorities like renewable energy, immigration, crime, and infrastructure. Similarly, protectionist trade policies such as tariffs on Chinese exports also carry unintended consequences. Researchers Selmi et al (2020), studied the fallout of U.S. tariffs, and found that such protectionist policies have largely harmed American companies, noting that the technology, industrial, energy, and consumer sectors were particularly affected (pp. 284, 286, 288). Furthermore, China responded with its own set of tariffs, cutting its reliance on American technology, and favoring domestic suppliers. According to the Wall Street Journal, Cisco, Dell and Hewlett Packard have seen a dramatic reduction in sales, and Adobe, Citrix, and Salesforce have each closed or reduced the scale of their Chinese operations as a result (Lin, 2024). In short, separating international and domestic policy in a globalized economy is difficult. It’s important to consider, therefore, to what degree America can relinquish its status as a global leader and promoter of global trade.

Such concerns are no better illustrated than in the areas of agriculture and manufacturing. According to the EPA, agriculture contributed over $1 trillion to U.S. GPD and employed over 22 million workers in 2019 (EPA, 2023). China is one of the largest importers of American agricultural products, bringing in over $3.2 billion in soybeans alone in 2018. (Selmi et al, 2020, p. 290). At the same time, researchers Burke & Emerick (2016) note that while corn and soybeans are two of America’s most important crops, they are also some of the most vulnerable to climate change. Just one day in excess of corn’s optimal growing temperature can reduce end of year yields by half a percent (p. 108). Furthermore, a majority of American corn and soy is grown in areas benefiting from irrigation subsidies, benefits that Burke & Emerick theorize are unlikely to continue (p. 116). Agriculture, therefore, represents a confluence of domestic, international, and regional policies, bridging both industrial and climate-related interests.

Such interests have begun to impact domestic policy. For instance, while the United States buys roughly 80% of Mexico’s agricultural exports, domestic farmers have not had equal access to the NAFTA market. In response to growing national concerns, certain provisions were added to the USMCA to help American farmers compete in the regional economy (Runde et al, 2021, p. 6). Promoting more multilateral trade between North American countries will help protect American farmers should China go elsewhere for its agricultural needs. Nonetheless, there is no denying the threat to U.S. farmers posed by a trade war with China, decreased globalization, and competition from regional trading partners.

In some ways, the shift toward regional trade perfectly illustrates the tradeoffs between global and local priorities. For instance, since NAFTA was implemented, trade between the U.S. and the rest of North America has tripled. It’s added over $80 billion in GDP and an estimated 14 million jobs to the U.S. economy (Chatzky et al, 2020). Pulling back from China allowed policymakers to invest more regionally and domestically. At the same time, the rise of Chinese and Mexican manufacturing has led to opportunities to reshore some of the labor that was lost over the last twenty years. Institute for National Strategic Studies senior researcher T.X. Hammes (2016) writes that wage gains in Asian and Mexican manufacturing, combined with advancements in robotics, and 3D printing, have made the cost of reshoring more competitive with overseas production. In fact, Hammes believes the 3D printing revolution and the rise of robotics will fuel a proliferation of localized manufacturing (pp. 6-8). Nonetheless, Hammes and others recognize the increase in robotics and elimination of supply chains necessarily means the loss of jobs. While some jobs will undoubtedly be created, how robotics, AI, and advancements like 3D printing effect the labor market are critical policy issues going forward.

On the issue of climate change, regionalization, reshoring, and technological advancements all prove beneficial. As Hammes (2016) points out, shorter supply lines and more efficient production mean fewer greenhouse gas emissions, less waist, and a lower carbon footprint. In this the United States has an opportunity to not only address domestic manufacturing and climate-related concerns, but also emerge as a world leader in the green transition. This begins paradoxically with a reduced focus on world affairs and an increased capacity for domestic spending. The Inflation Reduction Act is one such piece of legislation, providing incentives for a variety of green investments from renewable energy to battery technology; and it’s expected to create over 1.3 million jobs by 2030 (Higgins, 2023). Legislation like the IRA or its predecessor, the Energy Independence Act, not only provides incentives for new technology, but creates opportunities for the manufacturing and fossil fuel economies.

Conclusion

Indeed, a wholly isolationist focus is unrealistic. As this discussion has shown, domestic and foreign priorities come with tradeoffs. Chinese tariffs spurred a renewed focus on regional relationships; aiding Ukraine takes funds away from domestic priorities like immigration and infrastructure; and confronting climate change requires a coordinated global effort, but depends on robust domestic policies. Conversely, increased involvement in European and Middle East affairs necessarily means less money for domestic priorities. In short, there is no domestic policy that is free of global implications. Each must be made with consideration of the other.

References

Ahmed, S. (Ed.). (2018). U.S. foreign policy for the middle class: Perspectives from Ohio. The Ohio

State University & Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/USForeignPolicy_Ohio_final.pdf

Chatzky, A., McBride, J., & Sergie, M.A. (2020). NAFTA and the USMCA: Weighing the impact of

North American trade. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/naftas-economic-impact#chapter-title-0-2

Jones, J.M. (2023). Fewer Americans want U.S. taking major role in world affairs. Gallup.

https://news.gallup.com/poll/471350/fewer-americans-taking-major-role-world-affairs.aspx

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Norway’s Push for a Renewable Future

A little over 120 kilometers off the west coast of Norway sits the world’s largest aquatic windfarm. The project dubbed Hywind Tampen, is part of the country’s aggressive push into offshore wind and other renewable energy sources. According to the International Trade Administration (a U.S. agency), the Norwegians expect to have 1,500 turbines in operation, producing upwards of 30 GW in renewable energy by 2040 (ITA, 2024). Yet at the same time, a significant percentage of Norway’s GDP comes from fossil fuel extraction. Just 400 kilometers south of the Hywind Tampen project, some of the world’s largest oil and gas platforms occupy the North Sea. While Norway relies primarily on renewable energy at home, they are a major player in the international fossil fuel market. For example, Norwegian natural gas exports cover roughly 3% of global and 25% of European demand (NP, 2023). All told, fossil fuel extraction accounted for nearly a quarter of Norway’s GDP in 2023 (CNBC, 2024). This dependence on fossil fuels and Norway’s status as a green leader make the country an intriguing case study. More importantly, their success at widespread EV adoption, use of renewable energy, and reliance on fossil fuels to pay for it all, provide a template for the green transitions of other western economies.

Policy and Literature Review

Along with rich natural gas deposits, Norway has some of the world’s most well-suited geography for producing renewable energy. For example, 98% of Norway’s electricity is provided by renewables with the overwhelming majority of that coming from hydroelectric dams (Ritchie et al, 2024). Interestingly, while electricity production in terms of TWH has increased steadily since 1970, green energy on a per capita basis has remained relatively flat over the same period (secs. 1-2). This is due in large part to the legacy of Norway’s reliance on hydroelectric power. While much of the world invested in coal and gas-powered plants, Norway built dams. Nonetheless, Norway’s overall GHG emissions have climbed steadily since 1970, peaking around 2004 before gradually declining over the last 20 years (EC, 2023). While this constitutes a surprise, it illustrates that a green economy is much larger than the electric grid and moratoriums on gas powered cars.

Figure 1 Norway's total GHG emissions by sector (EC, 2023).

For example, according to the European Commission (EC, 2023), the majority of Norway’s GHG emissions are from fossil fuel extraction. While global GHG emissions have doubled since 1970, Norway’s emissions related to the production of oil and gas have expanded by a factor of 30.

It's also worth contextualizing Norway’s performance against the United States. Surprisingly, America’s total GHG emissions on a per capita basis have remained relatively flat since 1970 (EC, 2023). CO2 emissions peaked between 2004 and 2007 before declining for much of the next 15 years. By the same measure, Norway’s CO2 emissions peaked around 2010 and have declined only modestly since. This is likely due to a much smaller population and a continued policy of maximizing fossil fuel exports.

Figure 2 Norway's total CO2 emissions by sector (EC, 2023).

Finally, while Norway’s specific policies will be discussed more in the next section, it’s helpful to review international trends in green policy adoption. Ohio State University dean of law, Lincoln Davies (2018) writes that green policies generally follow a three-phase arc, beginning with policy proliferation (at the federal and local level), then by a period of iteration and improvement, and finally a widespread redistribution of successful policies across other green initiatives (p. 315). Furthermore, Davies notes that policymakers are shifting toward market-based solutions rather than feed-in-tariffs and taxes. Such moves are a sign of a maturing green economy (pp. 316-317) and evident in Norway’s transition to a low emission society.

Policy Actions and Recommendations

Norway’s modern relationship with environmental policy began in 1991 when they became one of the first nations to adopt a carbon tax. Today, 85% of the country’s GHG emissions are covered either by EU or domestic CO2 policies (IEA, 2022, p. 10). Norway has been an active participant in the Paris Climate Agreement as well, adopting so-called NDCs or National Determined Contributions to reduce emissions to half of their 1990 levels by 2030. The NDC targets were given legal backing in 2017 by the Climate Change Act, and in 2021, the country introduced the Climate Action Plan, which sets emissions targets on all areas not covered by NDC or EU regulations (p. 10). Norway has also taken aggressive steps to push EV adoption, including setting goals to eliminate all new gas-powered car sales by 2025, waving EV VAT taxes, instituting exemptions on tolls, ferry passes, and parking, and offering free public charging for EV owners. (CNBC, 2024). These policies and the proliferation of electric vehicle manufacturers have resulted in a dramatic increase in EV adoption. For example, according to CNBC reporting, 82% of Norway’s new car sales were electric in 2023 (CNBC, 2024). The rise of EV’s has resulted in an almost 16% reduction in transportation-related CO2 emissions since 2014 (EC, 2023) and a 20% improvement in Oslo’s air quality, according to Sture Portvik, the city’s manager of electromobility (CNBC, 2024, 3.15).

Yet Norway’s electrification has carried unintended consequences and challenges. For example, increased EV adoption has resulted in a dramatic reduction in CO2 tax revenue. At the same time, an increase in EVs has led to increased traffic, wear and tear on the city’s infrastructure and less tax revenue to pay for repairs. In a nod to the policy arc outlined by Davies (2018), policymakers have begun phasing out EV incentives and redistributing the public tax burden more evenly across EV owners (CNBC, 2024). Nonetheless, for all of Norway’s efforts, their GHG emissions remain relatively high. Future policies must work to wean Norway’s economy off fossil fuel production. For example, CNBC (2024) reported that Norway intends to double its electricity output through wind power alone by 2040 (18.30). At the same time, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance has proposed implementing a resource rent on onshore wind power and reinvesting those funds in green technology (NMF, 2024). Another option is to gradually wind down fossil fuel exploration by limiting new permits. Under this model, Norway would exit the fossil fuel industry by 2050 (Statistics Norway, 2020). Such policies could be further paired with subsidies to help ease the industry’s transition to green energy.

Using policies to spur innovation, particularly in battery technology and agriculture is another option. Freyer Battery CEO Bergen Steen cites the American Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) as an example European policymakers could follow (CNBC, 2024, 11.00). The IRA has resulted in hundreds of billions of dollars in green tech investment from battery alternatives to better steel (Worland, 2023). Green technologies could also be applied to agriculture alongside taxes on corporate farms or moratoriums on industrial fertilizers.  In short, it is essential that future policies work to transition existing carbon-heavy industries to low emission technologies, while reducing the footprint of those systems through better batteries and more sustainable practices.

Conclusion

Limiting GHG emissions matters as the impact of pollutants carries global consequences. Norway’s example, even if local, provides at least one possible approach to limiting emissions. That said, it’s important to discuss why some countries fail to address climate concerns. One reason already covered here is geography. Few countries have Norway’s rivers or coastline and therefore don’t have access to hydro or wind alternatives. Another reason is a lack of national wealth. Green tech, while cheapening, is still costly. The infrastructure alone is not conducive to geopolitical instability, nor do developing nations have the resources to invest in such technologies. Domestic concerns play a role as well, from special interests in the oil and gas industries, to a lack of affordability. The rivers of the Pacific Northwest are a terrific source of renewable energy but garner resistance from environmental groups and the EPA. The diverse landscape of the United States similarly prohibits the widespread adoption of solar or wind. Finally, political will makes environmental change difficult. In Norway, there is a culture of shared utility around the use of public funds, and a track record of using that money for the public good. The United States, on the other hand, has no comprehensive energy policy (Kraft & Furlong, 2019), nor does such national trust exist. None of these reasons preclude the adoption of green technology, but they illustrate the complications associated with going green.

In summary, Norway is leading the world’s transition to a green, low emission society, but that transition is predicated on a continued reliance on fossil fuels. While this might seem hypocritical, it illustrates the complexities of going green in an advanced economy. More importantly, the Norwegian model illustrates that fossil fuels are part of the green solution, whether by funding green industries, or transitioning themselves to new technologies.

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Afghanistan: A Microfinancing Opportunity

A quick internet search of 1960s Afghanistan reveals a society that is unrecognizable today. Sixty years ago, Afghanistan was flourishing. Women and men intermingled, and girls attended coeducation schools. Then, following a series of coups, the Soviet invasion and the American-backed Taliban, Afghanistan fell under strict Islamic rule. A dramatic reduction in personal freedoms, access to education, food, and healthcare followed, while extreme poverty and religious rule have resulted in broad social exclusion, hunger, and a lack of basic needs. These issues are difficult to solve, and Afghanistan lacks much of the necessary infrastructure to deliver services at scale, however marginal improvements in living conditions are possible. This essay examines various local approaches to relieving poverty while remaining clear of systemic challenges such as infrastructure and governance.

Background

Landlocked and sharing long borders with Pakistan and Iran, Afghanistan sits in Central Asia, about 200 miles from the Arabian Sea. The region contains modest reserves of petroleum, natural gas, and mineral deposits. Traditional exports include low volume production of textiles, food products, and a variety of goods from furniture to shoes (CIA, 2023). The most widely publicized export under the Taliban’s first ascent to power was opium, however the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported that as of 2023, poppy production (as measured by land under cultivation) had declined by 95%, primarily due to a self-imposed ban on poppy farming (UNODC, 2023).

Poverty continues to define the Afghan way of life, however. According to the Multi-dimensional Poverty Index, Afghanistan’s 55% poverty rate in 2016 was the highest in the world (UNDP, 2023, p. 6). The country’s HDI score was similarly grim, ranking Afghanistan 180th out of 191 (UNDP, 2021, p. 274). Furthermore, according to the UN’s news agency, 95% of Afghans aren’t getting enough to eat (United Nations, 2022). In other words, there aren’t a diversity of options for Afghans facing extreme poverty and starvation.

Poor governance has plagued the country as well, with allegations of corruption widely reported during the West’s occupation of Afghanistan, and equally well documented oppression under the current Taliban regime. Further complicating matters is the Taliban’s isolation from the global community. This isolation, rampant poverty, and the freezing of over $7 billion in national assets by the United States, has left acting prime minister Mohammad Hassan Akhund with little to govern.

Despite its economic challenges, however, Afghanistan remains a fascinating case study. Consider that in just the last sixty years, the country has seen monarchial, theocratic, and democratic rule. It has twice been occupied by superpowers, endured decades of war, and though bordered by much stronger neighbors, it has continued to exist. The fact that a people can endure so much hardship and persist, is cause for optimism that a better future is possible.

Development Issues

Poverty is the single biggest development issues facing Afghanistan today. The effects of such conditions are varied, from hunger and bad health to hopelessness and lawlessness. More importantly, however, is the exclusion that comes with it. Academics Janet Gornick & Natascia Boeri define social exclusion as the absence of opportunity to make the most of one’s life (Gornick & Boeri, 2016). While this has several applications in Afghanistan, it is most visible in the Taliban’s treatment of women, who are forbidden from travelling, going to school, and holding most jobs. This constitutes a remarkable sequestration of the country’s productive population. Yet the restrictions on Afghan women are more than economic. As Gornick & Boeri write, social exclusion is both material and social (pp. 223, 224). Women are not only prevented from working, but they are also almost entirely cut off from society. This has a compounding effect on the economic mobility of families, whose working age women may be willing but not allowed to contribute.

One cannot talk about Afghanistan without talking about religion. The concepts of social exclusion and religious rule may seem academic; however, they help contextualize the relationship between development issues and their consequences. For example, religion impacts local government’s ability to treat the symptoms of poverty, such as hunger and disease. As research consultant Rick James writes, faith can be both a powerful and flammable agent for change (James, 2011, p. 110). Mixing religious views with the Taliban may be more risk than any Faith-based Organization (FBO) wishes to take on, for example. The resulting lack of aid compounds the short and long-term effects of hunger including lower IQs, impaired health, and malnourished children (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, p. 31). Furthermore, hunger and poverty exist in a negatively symbiotic relationship, where each feeds the other. Malnourished children are less productive, less intelligent adults, who are less capable of lifting their country out of poverty.

Policy Options

While mixing religion and relief carries risks, engaging with Muslim faith-based organizations to provide relief is nonetheless an intriguing approach. As Erica Bornstein (2002) of Berkely writes, people of faith have a long history of providing agricultural, education, and self-help assistance in places state-sponsored actors were unwilling to go (p. 5). Rick James (2011) adds that the communities that are the most in need are often communities of faith themselves, as is the case in Afghanistan. In other words, there’s a sense of common ground between recipient and giver.

As mentioned, conflicts over religious points of view may compound the effects of poverty. However, the risks aren’t all due to the Taliban. For example, the religious values associated with FBOs can interfere with the delivery of relief, as was demonstrated during the early days of the HIV epidemic (Clarke et al, 2011, p. 6). In another example, Erica Bornstein writes that World Vision sees economic transformation, morality, and redemption as intertwined (Bornstein, 2002, p. 9). Such a conflation of relief, faith, and morality offers all sorts of risks if the local community accepts the aid but rejects the faith. Nonetheless, FBOs whether Afghani or other, working locally with individual communities is worth exploring.

Promoting better healthcare locally is another option that should not radically compromise Taliban principles, nor should it require complex investment and infrastructure planning. For example, Banerjee & Duflo (2011) talk extensively about the effectiveness of mosquito nets at reducing rates of malaria, or a few drops of chlorine at preventing water-borne illnesses. Another benefit to prioritizing better healthcare is that it can be done through partnership with faith-based organizations. Essentially, an FBO who is permitted to operate inside Afghanistan for one purpose could deliver medical supplies as well. Finally, as an example of what basic disease prevention can do, research cited by Banerjee & Duflo indicates that children who grew up malaria free, earned up to 50% more throughout their adult lives than children who got the disease (p. 45). In other words, for the cost of a mosquito net or a few drops of chlorine, developing nations like Afghanistan can have more productive and better off adults.

Finally, microfinance is the most intriguing option Afghanistan could pursue. While poverty might seem counterintuitive to the notion of lending, microfinance is specifically designed to work in impoverished communities. For example, it has helped hundreds of locals start or grow businesses in places like India and Southeast Asia (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). Furthermore, loans do not have to constitute thousands of dollars. Grameen Bank, a microfinancier based in Bangladesh, for example, offers annual $450 maximum lines of credit for first time borrowers (Grameen Bank, 2023).

That said, while it’s easy to overplay the snowball effect of microfinance, there are limits to its ability to lift communities out of poverty. First, recipients of microfinancing are overwhelmingly poor and remain poor after having paid back their loans (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). Second, ensuring repayment is difficult and requires dedication on the part of the lender (p. 167). These are not reasons to avoid microfinance, however the commitment to the borrower and the limits of microfinance must be recognized.

Policy Recommendation

Afghanistan presents a number of challenges that could be addressed through better policy and governance. However, it’s important to keep in mind the likelihood that any such policy would be considered. Poverty is presumably something the Taliban government care about but lack the infrastructure to address. An alternative to massive development projects, however, is to lean on wealthier Afghans (perhaps government officials themselves), to act as lenders and financiers of microcredit.

The benefit of microfinance is that it provides individual families with opportunities to start small businesses that generate modest profits. Those profits can be used to buy other essentials, like food, medicine, clothing, or another loan. While other solutions like FBO assistance or medical aid are needed, microfinance provides the potential to meet those needs by cultivating micro-economic activity. In other words, generate incomes at an extremely local level that can be used to afford basic needs. That said, the scale of these operations should not be overexaggerated. One of the microfinance success stories cited by Banerjee & Duflo (2011), for example, was that of an Indian woman who began collecting and sorting trash by hand, then by cart, and eventually buying garbage from her neighbors. While a worthy success story, the results were still very local and should not be conflated with the outcomes of venture capital. The woman in the story remained poor and continued sorting garbage by hand. Credit allowed the woman to lift her family out of extreme poverty into a less dire, but still poor circumstance. It did not afford her a middleclass lifestyle.

Probably the more intriguing benefit of microfinance is that it could be administered by the Taliban, on a village-by-village basis. As discussed in the policy options section, servicing loans is a significant source of overhead for microfinanciers, however the Taliban’s near-ubiquitous control of government and civil services, as well as being one of the few sources of money in the country, make them a curious option. Furthermore, Pashtunwali which promotes a code of honor and shame (Glatzer, 2002), is widely understood by most Afghans, and could be a platform to establish trust that borrowed money will be repaid. Said differently, there is a cultural basis by which accountability can be presumed and enforced as a form of social insurance.

Finally, implementing microfinance is not without risks. First, sourcing the money to lend is a challenge. In the examples cited by Banerjee & Duflo (2011), the host countries where microfinance was taking place all had existing economies, whether in India or Southeast Asia. Afghanistan has virtually no economy by comparison. This challenge is not easily surmounted except through wealthy Afghans deciding to lend. Second, the wealthiest Afghans may be Taliban officials. As mentioned, the Taliban may be well positioned to operate microfinance schemes, however, their reputation for fear and brutality might preclude anyone from borrowing. This could be mitigated however by lending to Afghans in more conservative parts of the country. Upon establishing trust, they could branch out into more urban, comparatively liberal parts of Afghanistan. Finally, microfinance has limited upside, however, Afghanistan’s aforementioned 55% poverty rate suggests that even small increases in income can make a worthwhile difference.

Conclusion

Afghanistan is a troubled but formidable country. Its people face widespread poverty, starvation, and an oppressive religious regime. Yet there is opportunity for small scale, local efforts to produce meaningful change in the lives of individual families through microfinance. Unlike other policy approaches, microfinance enables entrepreneurial expression, generates income for families, and allows those who find success to buy food, medicine and other essential supplies. Most importantly, microfinance begins to break down the barriers of social exclusion by focusing on enablement through lending.

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Eritrea: The Unrealized Potential of one of Africa’s Poorest Nations

In 1993 a relatively tiny sliver of land bordering the Red Sea, won its independence from Ethiopia. By many measures the modest country of Eritrea, should be one of Africa’s richest nations. Its strategic position on one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, abundant natural resources, and central access to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the U.A.E. suggest that with moderately successful governance, this coastal state could be one of the region’s most prominent success stories. Instead, a combination of poor management, lack of fiscal transparency, stagnating growth and ongoing emigration have left Eritrea behind many of their developing peers. This paper examines the challenges facing Eritrea’s development, and argues that while a focus on FDI, economic diversification, and emigration are critical to its success, true reform begins with increased transparency.

Background

Eritrea is located on the horn of Africa, bordered by the Red Sea to the north, Sudan to the west, and Ethiopia and Djibouti to the south. The country is mineral-rich, with large reserves of copper, zinc, silver and gold. Its long coastline boasts a powerful fishery, and its strategic location provides ready access to the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. Yet for all these innate advantages, Eritrea remains not only among the world’s poorest nations, but near the bottom of their peer group (Kaplan, 2016). This combination of factors, their tremendous potential coupled with an inability to get out of their own way, makes Eritrea an intriguing case study.

The 2018 human development index ranked Eritrea 179th out of 189 countries in terms of total development, a fact representative of the country’s poor governance, lack of social spending, and non-existent participation in the global economy (United Nations Development Programme, 2018). However, this is only the best estimate based on the available data. Eritrea’s absence from both the MPI and Gini indexes, for example, illustrate a much broader issue with transparency and disclosure.

Though their lack of transparency and low HDI scores are powerful indicators of poor governance, Eritrea’s history has notable bright spots. To begin with, their separation from Ethiopia was both peaceful and democratic. Though a border dispute and twenty years of war would later follow, a stable peace was reached in 2018 and the two countries appear to be regional allies. On the other hand, Eritrea’s democratic aspirations seemed to have died at nearly the moment they were born. Their president, Isaias Afwerki has held office since 1993 and the country has yet to hold a single democratic presidential election.

Development Issues

While Eritrea supposedly has democratic intentions, it has failed to demonstrate liberal reform. Seth Kaplan, of Johns Hopkins University, writes that the anti-business ideology of government officials has resulted in an underdeveloped private sector, a lack of skilled labor, and a weak judicial system (Kaplan, 2016, p. 13). These are all broad symptoms of what economists like Paul Collier (2007) refer to as the bad governance development trap. Furthermore, Eritrea remains self-reliant and protectionist. These policies have resulted in stagnant growth and economic isolation. In 2014, for example, FDI per capita was among the lowest in Africa while imports were far from where they should be (Kaplan, 2016,pp. 7, 10). Strict, isolationist policies limit growth and discourage investment, while other opportunities, such as economic diversification, are lost.

These economic challenges are further complicated by Eritrea’s resource-rich geography. Collier calls this the natural resource curse and writes that developing nations with large natural resource booms often end up poorer than when they started (Collier, 2007, p. 23). Deakin University professor Damien Kingsbury echoes this sentiment, writing that income from natural resources should provide capital for investment and development, however it more often leads to corruption and violence (Kingsbury, 2019 p. 97). While it’s not fair to say that Eritrea has fallen victim to the natural resource curse, its preference to open mineral extraction to FDI, as it did with the Bisha Mine in lieu of other opportunities (Kaplan, 2016), bears watching. In other words, if Eritrea’s poor governance continues to preference natural resource development, the historical odds are not conducive to a prosperous long-term future. While the concepts of traps might seem academic and theoretical, they provide real value. Not only do they help frame the country’s economic and political landscape, but they also help define problems and frame solutions.

Policy Options

Despite its economic and social development concerns, Eritrea has options. The first of these is to increase financial transparency. While this should be technically straightforward, rooting out corruption is not so simple. It is impossible for foreign agencies to ensure zero corruption without internal cooperation. The simple case of identifying dishonesty was illustrated by Kingsbury (2019), who cited examples of Indonesian officials who questioned how agencies would know when one hundred miles of road were asked for, but only twenty were needed (p. 88). Transparency requires local action, either on the part of public officials or the public themselves. Collier (2007) cites an example in Uganda where one banking official decided to alert local media every time the central government released public education funding. The resulting public scrutiny incentivized officials to address corruption, and as a result, the amount of money reaching schools increased from 20% to 90% of allocation (p. 67). Transparency carries obvious risks, however. Death threats, political unrest, public shame, and removal from office are a few. That said, transparency followed by immediate action, such as the sustained delivery of funding to schools or hospitals, should mitigate the risk.

Given the amount of emigration that has occurred over the past two decades, Eritrea would likely need to revisit their position on staunch self-reliance and accept foreign technical assistance. International aid could also be used to build out infrastructure, roads, the electrical grid, and schools. Aid could also help existing infrastructure. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has allocated over $6 million in technical assistance to help fight African Swine Fever in Latin America (U.S. Department of State, 2023). It’s difficult to imagine a developing country with poor education having the intellectual capacity, much less the budget to protect their existing infrastructure from such risks.

Eritrea could also consider increasing imports, particularly those that support existing businesses or develop infrastructure. Free trade carries risks, however, as was demonstrated in Cameroon where cheap onion imports devastated local farmers. However, non-competitive imports or flexible tariffs are options the government could consider (Achtnich, 2018). Ultimately, engaging with the world economy and protecting local interests are not mutually exclusive, but do require careful planning.

Alternatively, Eritrea could take steps to encourage more foreign direct investment by improving transparency and disclosure. That said, there are no silver bullets. As Kingsbury (2019) writes, FDI often involves a foreign company extracting resources and amassing offshore profits that provide little benefit to the local economy (p. 71). FDI is also subject to market conditions and competition from more attractive opportunities abroad. The IMF reported, for example, that recent trends in FDI show a clear preference for geopolitical alignment and reduced risks (Ahn et al., 2023). The recent pullback from China and Taiwan are examples of how quickly FDI can change directions. That said, these risks don’t preclude FDI but they are important policy considerations.

Finally, economic diversification is another area of opportunity. Kingsbury (2019) cites the explosive growth of China, Japan, India, and Brazil as examples of countries who became factories for the West, though he cautions that such approaches don’t always work and carry unintended consequences (p. 66). Another risk of service diversification is that services are inherently dependent upon the health of one’s customers. Much of the Middle East and Africa’s futures, for example, lie in their ability to diversify away from fossil fuels. Regardless, similar opportunities exist for Eritrea to serve its wealthier regional neighbors, just as Brazil and India served the West.

Policy Recommendations

Long-term success for Eritrea can be summarized in three objectives: encourage foreign direct investment, stop the flow of emigration, and incentivize the diaspora to return home. These goals contribute to the sustained success of Eritrea by diversifying the economy, growing GDP, increasing tax revenue, and retaining Eritrea’s human intellect; however, none of these objectives can be met without first increasing transparency.

Transparency might be a footnote in other developing countries, however in Eritrea, a lack of disclosure is a fundamental and well recognized problem. This is evident in such basic terms as its absence from the MPI and Gini indexes, as well as its poor international perception (Kaplan, 2016). In fact, Eritrea’s reputation and lack of access earned it a near last place finish on the World Bank’s assessment of government effectiveness (p. 13). It’s difficult to argue for increased foreign investment, international aid, and economic diversification, when the country’s government can’t be trusted.

Transparency carries both international and domestic goals. For example, domestic transparency includes publishing government finances in local papers. It may also include a degree of freedom of the press to print such data without narrative. Conversely, recipients should publish what they received versus what the government supposedly allocated. Third party regional audits would be another option. As the Uganda case cited by Collier (2007) showed, such disclosure not only reduces corruption, but it increases public trust. Furthermore, transparency helps effectively distribute aid by directing it to where it’s needed most.

Internationally, transparency can make the difference between development and remaining in the bottom billion. Kingsbury (2019) points to Botswana as a country that has greatly improved its anti-corruption controls particularly around natural resource extraction (p. 77). Such controls encourage foreign investment and aid by reducing ambiguity and risk. Open contracts and bidding are one example of such transparency. More importantly, the financial incentives that come with disclosure result in increased tax revenue. This is money the government can use to reinvest in infrastructure, education, economic development, and to pay the salaries of employees.

Certainly, transparency carries risks, particularly for the government officials charged with reforming. However, public outrage, unrest, death threats and violence can be mitigated by open public dialogue and immediate transparent action. If Eritrean officials are skeptical of these reforms, the increased national wealth and personal prestige that come with a healthy and diversified economy ought to provide reasonable motivation.   

Conclusion

Eritrea’s natural resources and geography place it in a strong position to succeed, however, its insular self-reliance and economic isolation have resulted in a stagnant economy, lack of opportunity, and rampant emigration. These issues are exacerbated by a lack of transparency that discourages foreign investment and international aid. These factors make it highly unlikely that Eritrea will be able to self-arrest and climb out poverty without decisive reform. It is critical therefore that Eritrea commit to a policy of transparency, at home and abroad. From these reforms can flow increased economic prosperity, social spending, and national wealth.

References

Achtnich, T. [DW Documentary]. (2018, June 6). The deceptive promise of free trade. [Video].

YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DnW9ZQtI1_E

Ahn, J., Habib, A., Malacrino, D., & Presbitero, A.F. (2023). Fragmenting foreign direct investment

hits emerging economies hardest. The International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/04/05/fragmenting-foreign-direct-investment-hits-emerging-economies-hardest

Collier, P. (2007). The Bottom Billion: Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about

it. Oxford University Press Academic US. https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9780199740949

Kaplan, S. (2016). Eritrea’s economy. Atlantic Council. http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep03690.7

Kingsbury, D. (2019). Politics in Developing Countries. Taylor & Francis.

https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781351583145

U.S. Department of State. (2023). Foreign Assistance. https://www.foreignassistance.gov

Globalization: A Lasting Change

Globalization has been a buzzword for much of the last thirty years. It’s been used to describe the present state of economics and future state of everything. It’s been, if not said explicitly, then generally understood that the world will only become more globalized. In reality, globalization is as much a variable condition as it is multifaceted and poorly defined. Globalization is both a condition of economic interdependence and the effect it has on the human condition. Taken together these aspects define globalization and provide the incentive to maintain international cooperation. Globalization, therefore, is not only here but will never go away.

Foreign Policy writer Pankaj Ghemawat (2009) argues that the locally sourced nature of everything from finance to how we interact with the internet undermines the notion of globalization, however this view is a bit narrow. Consider that one could travel to nearly any country in the world and see the familiar sight of power poles and power lines. One could likely buy a cigarette in most of these places as well. Even if locally provided are not the global availability of electricity and tobacco indicative of a globalized world? Noam Chomsky (2015) seems to think so when he argues that one of the great benefits of globalization is that he could phone a friend virtually anywhere in the world. This interconnectivity, he says, is the very definition of globalization. Whether people choose to connect with others is irrelevant. The important fact is that the integration exists to do so.

Even with the nearly ubiquitous availability of electricity, tobacco, and companies like Starlink bringing internet to the world, globalists contend that more integration is required. As economics writer Martin Wolf (2004) puts it, “The failure of the world is not that there is too much globalization, but that there is too little” (p. 4). Harvard economics professor Jeffrey Frankel quantifies this sentiment by pointing out that, “globalization would have to increase another sixfold…before it would literally be true that Americans did business as easily across the globe as across the country” (Frankel, 2000, Judging by the Globalization 2000 Standard of Perfect International Integration section, para 2). These sentiments should not be taken to mean that globalization doesn’t exist. As mentioned earlier, globalization is a macro-economic condition that changes over time. Mr. Frankel (2000) points out that the first half the twentieth century saw both a boom in global growth and a return to protectionist policies. A similar give and take has existed with regional trade. The World Trade Organization (2021) cited three instances of regionalization originating in the 1950s, 1980s, and the present day (p. 26). It’s notable that globalization as it’s been thought about, has existed between the second and third periods of regionalization, suggesting a cyclical relationship. Even if analysts like former Foreign Policy writer Moises Naim (2009) contend that today’s globalization is fundamentally different from prior eras, the progression toward globalization is undeniable. The relationship between regional and global policies may be cyclical but it’s not terminal for either.

The narrative around global finance tells a similar tale. In his arguments suggesting the world is less globalized than people think, Mr. Ghemawat (2009) points out that:

[T]he total amount of the world’s capital formation that is generated from foreign direct investment (FDI) has been less than 10 percent for the last three years for which data are available (2003–05). In other words, more than 90 percent of the fixed investment around the world is still domestic (The 10% presumption section, para. 2).

However, Noam Chomsky (2015) argues that it’s specifically the growth of foreign capital that proved detrimental to developing economies. To sort this out, a more recent look at the data is required. According to McKinsey & Company (Lund et al., 2017), “From January 2007 to December 2016, banks divested at least $2 trillion of [foreign] assets…more than half of the total by European banks” (p. 4). This could be correctly read as a pullback from international markets, but McKinsey analysts suggest that banks were cleaning up unprofitable assets which has resulted in healthier balance sheets (pp. 3, 4, 13). Over the same period, FDI and equity as a percent of total cross-border capital flows increased from 36% to 69% (p. 9). McKinsey doesn’t break down the percentage of FDI vs domestic funding, however they do mention that 27% of equities and 31% of bonds are owned by foreign investors (p. 6). Clearly, we see a significant international presence in financial markets and a substantial increase since Mr. Ghemawat’s article ran in Foreign Policy. These findings also lend support to Mr. Chomsky’s base assumptions that foreign investment has grown dramatically with globalization. Regardless of the conclusions, the growth in global finance would be difficult to unwind completely and is therefore likely to persist at some level even if regional trade continues to grow.

The human cost of globalization is certainly open for debate, and these conclusions may sound like value judgements that have little to do with the binary assessment of whether globalization will continue; however, positive human outcomes form a basis for popular support. It is essential as Harvard University professor of international political economy Dani Rodrik puts it, that government and market economies work together to ensure a broadly beneficial outcome for their citizens (Pearlstein, 2011). Mr. Wolf (2004) echoes this sentiment, writing, “We need more global markets, not fewer, if we want to raise the living standards of the poor of the world” (p. 4, para. 2). Perhaps most conclusively, in research done by Gapminder, Hans Rosling (2007) demonstrates a linear relationship between child mortality and the overall wealth of a nation. He notes that as nations invest in the health of their people, wealth increases in tandem. In other words, a healthy population is a more productive population.

It's important to point out that the human cost of globalization is not all upside. Mr. Naim (2009) cites the rising levels of international crime and terrorism as one drawback of increased interconnectivity, while Mr. Chomsky (2015) alleges that “for most of the [Mexican] population [NAFTA] was awful” (6.42). Furthermore, the Center for Global Development (Clemens, 2015) concluded that the wage disparity between Mexican and American workers has grown since NAFTA’s implementation, not diminished. The rise of global crime is tough to argue, however the economics of trade offer a more optimistic outlook. According to the Council on Foreign Relations (Chatzky et al., 2020), since NAFTA’s implementation, Mexico’s farm imports to the United States have tripled while hundreds of thousands of auto-manufacturing jobs have been created. Finally, Rosling (2007) argues that world health and wealth are generally levelling off. That is, globally we are becoming wealthier and living longer across every region. Certainly, increased jobs and life expectancy are great incentives for the nations of the world to share in economic prosperity, while the proliferation of international crime is an ongoing area of opportunity for all states.

In summary, globalization is a macro-economic event that, while subject to periods of decline and expansion, is unlikely to ever have an end. Moreover, while global finance has continued to grow, the increasing health and wealth of the world’s population provides strong incentives for countries to maintain global ties. It is therefore unlikely that countries could or would want to unwind from the global system. In short, the world is too interconnected to ever deglobalize.

References

Chatzky, A., McBride, J., & Sergie, M.A. (2020). NAFTA and the USMCA: Weighing the impact of

North American trade. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/naftas-economic-impact

Chomsky, N. [Chomsky's Philosophy]. (2015, July 20). Noam Chomsky – Globalization [Video].

YouTube.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4RxHzQTHhKk&t=12s

Clemens, M. (2015, March 17). The US-Mexico Wage Gap Has Grown, Not Shrunk, under

NAFTA. Awkward. Center for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/us-mexico-wage-gap-has-grown-not-shrunk-under-nafta-awkward

Frankel, J.A. (2000, August 1). Globalization of the economy. National Bureau of Economic Research.

https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w7858/w7858.pdf

Ghemawat, P. (2009). Why the world isn’t flat. Foreign Policy.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/14/why-the-world-isnt-flat/

Lund, S., Windhagen, E., Manyika, J., Harle, P., Woetzel, J., & Goldshtein, D. (2017). The new

dynamics of financial globalization. McKinsey & Company. https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/industries/financial%20services/our%20insights/the%20new%20dynamics%20of%20financial%20globalization/mgi-financial-globalization-executive-summary-aug-2017.pdf

Naim, M. (2009, September 30). Think again: Globalization. Moises Naim.

https://www.moisesnaim.com/my-columns/2020/6/10/think-again-globalization

Pearlstein, S. (2011). Dani Rodrik's "The globalization paradox". The Washington Post.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/11/AR2011031106730.html

Rosling, H. [TED]. (2007, January 16). The best stats you've ever seen | Hans Rosling [Video].

YouTube.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hVimVzgtD6w

Wolf, M. (2004). Why globalization works. Yale University Press.

World Trade Organization. (2021). Global value chain development report 2021: Beyond

production.https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/04_gvc_ch1_dev_report_2021_e.pdf

America: A British Revolution

As British troops set fire to the U.S. capitol building on August 24, 1814, it might have seemed as though the American experiment had met its end. In fact, the War of 1812 was simply the last word in a debate over democracy that had pestered Britain and her parliament for decades. What began in earnest during the French and Indian War, continued through American independence and later the French Revolution. It is with some irony, however, that in sowing the seeds of revolt in America, Britain initiated a democratic revolution of its own. This essay examines the attitudes and perspectives of the British legislature, public, and the crown toward American independence; and while correctly attributed to taxes and representation, the war ought to be more broadly viewed as the middle act of a larger British revolution.

If England’s national debt was the third front of the French and Indian War, Lord Grenville was the general to fight it. While an honest and forthright man, Grenville was not well liked. His abrasive style afforded him few friends and was as much responsible for his rise as his downfall. Nonetheless, Grenville’s penchant for law and finance at a time when England’s national debt had nearly doubled, proved too valuable to dispatch (Clark, 1950). It was in this post war fiscal crisis, that the British government turned to the American colonies for assistance.

The story of taxes and American revolution is deeply rooted in a personal feud between Lord Grenville and King George. In fact, the Stamp and Sugar Acts were a direct manifestation of the power struggle between these two men, and indeed, the slow rolling retreat from monarchial rule that had been proceeding throughout Britain for centuries. Grenville’s ambitions were very much focused on expanding the powers of Parliament at the expense of the King. Raising taxes on the colonies was not only a means to generate revenue, but it diminished the Throne by demonstrating Parliament’s legal authority over the colonies (Clark, 1950, p. 393). Though repealed little more than a year after being ratified, Grenville’s taxes would work to advance democratic progress in both Great Brittan and the American colonies. By 1765, King George had had enough of the problematic minister and dismissed him from office. Yet ironically Lord Grenville’s departure would, itself, spawn a dramatic reduction in the King’s ability to remove public officials. It was Grenville’s last rebuke to the powers of the Throne, that his termination should solidify Parliamentary authority once and for all (p. 391). At the same time, the issues of taxes and representation set in motion by Grenville’s policies would fuel revolution a continent away.

By the time the Americans declared their independence, there was little room for surprise on either side. There was, however, plenty of room for debate and rebuttal, much of which came from two lawyers appointed by the King to respond to the colonists demands. Jeremy Bentham (1776) issued a blistering response to the Declaration that was both emotionally colorful and intellectually provoking. “The opinions of the modern Americans on Government,” he writes, “like those of their good ancestors on witchcraft, would be too ridiculous to deserve any notice” (para 1). And on the notion of self-evident truths he ripostes, “This rarity is a new discovery; now, for the first time, we learn, that a child…has the same quantity of natural power as the parent” (para 3). Bentham reserves little for the notion of unalienable rights as well, suggesting that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are tantamount to the complete disregard for law and order (para 7). Past the fiery retorts, however, Bentham argues the American declaration is undermined by the precedent of historic submission to British rule; both in law and duties paid. He contends that none of the taxes and indeed none of the colonists’ grievances exist outside the bounds of preexisting norms (Bentham 1776). American independence, therefore, had no legal or philosophical grounds on which to stand.

While Bentham was writing his rebuttal of the American declaration, his friend and fellow attorney John Lind articulated a more complete response. As Oxford Professor of law, Herbert Hart writes, in Lind’s view, taxation and representation were inseparable. Hart summarizes Lind’s views as follows:

The idea that [taxes and representation were separate] arose, according to Lind, from a misconception of the nature of property as something that belonged to individuals independently of the law. On the basis of this misconception there had developed the further erroneous idea that when the subject pays taxes he is making a gift of what is his and which, since it is a gift, requires his consent (Hart, 1976, p. 550).

Hart goes on to say that Lind’s position was premised on the idea that the notion of ownership can only exist if supported by law. He quotes Lind himself, quite aptly. “Take away the fence which the law has set around this thing…and where would your right or property be then” (p. 550). The point is well stated but also perfectly embodies the American disagreement. While the colonists held certain rights to be unalienable, they recognized the law needed to be structured in a way that protected these ideas. In a sense, both the British and the Americans were correct in their assessment that without the law, rights are void of meaning. In fact, a century before, English philosopher John Locke argued that such rights as life, liberty and property were God-given. And prior still, the Magna Carta contained similar provisions (Krutz, G., 2021, p. 32). In any event, while Lind’s final views on democracy are lesser known, Bentham would become one of its biggest champions, pressing for Parliamentary reforms and praising the progress of the Americans (Hart, 1976, pp. 557, 560). These views, and indeed the arc of Bentham’s trajectory, were matched by the British public and to a lesser degree, King George himself.

However, while British reforms would follow the American and French revolutions, popular opinion did not start off favoring the colonists. Historian Benjamin Labaree (1970) writes, “As one reads the newspaper commentary [regarding the prospect of war]…he is struck by the extent to which the subject of America evoked an emotional response” (p. 7). By Labaree’s analysis, some 70% of political commentary took a decidedly anti-American stance (p. 7). While it’s not surprising that the common public would have sided with the domestic viewpoint, the range of opinions within that spectrum swung from fear that the Americans would succeed, to conspiracies framing the Americans as both aggressors and victims (pp. 9, 10, 16). The most common view, however, was that the Americans were ungrateful, specifically for the protection provided by British troops who bled colonial ground during the French and Indian War (pp. 17, 18). Indeed, American revolt in that context would be a bitter pill to swallow, but ingratitude, while potent, would have proven transitory next to the economic concerns of trade.

The British public was not alone in harboring these concerns. King George considered the loss of the colonies to be a mortal blow not only to Britan’s finances but its status on the world stage (Bullion, 1994). However, despite these concerns, the King was remarkably sympathetic to the notion that citizens might grow disillusioned with opportunities at home. He writes,

It was thoroughly known that from every Country there always exists an active emigration of unsettled, discontented, or unfortunate People, who failing in their endeavours to live at home, hope to succeed better where there is more employment suitable to their poverty (p. 306).

This conciliatory view is particularly surprising from a monarch who would have viewed American revolution as betrayal, but it was not out of line with revolutionary observers like Michele-Guillaume Jean de Crèvoceur who wrote, “Alas, two thirds of [Americans] have no country. Can a wretch who wanders about, who works and starves…call England or any other kingdom his country?” (Crèvoceur, 1782, p. 4). On matters of trade and diplomacy, the King was no less gentil, writing,

This comparative view of our former territories in America is not stated with any idea of lessening the consequence of a future friendship and connection with them; on the contrary it is to be hoped we shall reap more advantages from their trade as friends than ever we could derive from them as Colonies (Bullion, 1994, p. 307).

While it is tempting to declare King George an American apologist, Historian John Bullion cautions against this conclusion, writing that the King was susceptible to whomever had his ear. After American independence had been finalized, the King was “noticeably lukewarm toward efforts to improve commercial relations with the United States” (p. 310). Regardless, King George’s views were not decidedly anti-American. Even if one were to consider the King’s most favorable sentiments to stem from economic enrichment versus democratic endorsement, that an eighteenth-century monarch could hold such a favorable view is no less remarkable.

By the time 1809 came around, Jeremy Bentham had completed a full about-face, advocating for Parliamentary reforms and universal voting rights. It was a remarkable turn of events for a man who only two decades before had declared the French revolution to be “nonsense on stilts” (Armitage, 2004, p. 63). Furthermore, the eventual adoption of full representation by the British Parliament speaks to broad public support for American ideals. King George, as Bullion pointed out, was at worst lukewarm while at best, quite optimistic. Certainly, these sentiments cast the subsequent war of 1812 in a more interesting, if not puzzling light. One might read the American grievance of impressment as a young upstart nation wanting to challenge the aging empire for supremacy. And this could be quite right. In fact, this global challenge would take centuries to play out, as American scholar Robert Kagan, writes,

When it came to dealing with the European giants, [the United States] claimed to abjure power and assailed as atavistic the power politics of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century European empires (Kagan, 2002, p. 6).

It would not be until the close of the second World War that America emerged as economically and militarily superior to its European fathers. Indeed, the bi-directional tension between Britain, Europe, and North America that gave rise to revolution has never fully abated. As Kagan points out, the freedom enjoyed by much of the European continent is paid for by American hegemony. In this aspect, he writes, the wall cannot pass through the gate (p. 25). In other words, the luxuries afforded Europe by American power can never be fully enjoyed by Americans. This centuries-old tension is likely to persist as America’s foreign policy continues to shift and global trade becomes more regionally focused. As throughout history, however, America and Britain will maintain their long-standing, if at times, strained relationship as societies of similar stripes.  

In summary, the British view of American independence was almost universally one of contempt and ingratitude. Yet few Brits likely saw the broader strokes of their own budding independence. In a very real sense, America showed the British that rights and representative government were possible, and, provided Englishmen with the inspiration to finish their own revolution.

References

Armitage, D., (2004, April). The declaration of independence in world context. OAH Magazine of

History, 18(3), 61-66. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25163686

Bentham, J., (1776). A short review of the declaration. University of Wisconsin Pressbooks.

https://wisc.pb.unizin.org/ps601/chapter/jeremy-bentham-a-short-review-of-the-declaration/

Bullion, J.L., (1994, April). George III on empire, 1783. The William and Mary Quarterly, 51(2),

305-310. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2946866

Clark, D. M., (1950). George Grenville as first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer,

1763-1765. Huntington Library Quarterly, 13(4), 383-397. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3816164

Crèvecoeur, M.G. J. (1782). “What is an American?” Letter III of letters from an American farmer.

https://americainclass.org/sources/makingrevolution/independence/text6/crevecoeuramerican.pdf

Hart, H.L.A., (1976, October). Bentham and the United States of America. The Journal of Law &

Economics, 19(3), 547-567. https://www.jstor.org/stable/725081

Kagan, R., (June & July, 2002). Power and Weakness. Policy Review.

Krutz, G. (2021). American government (3rd ed.). Rice University.

https://openstax.org/details/books/american-government-3e

Labaree, B.W., (1970). The idea of American independence. Proceedings of the Massachusetts

Historical Society, 1970, Third Series, 82(1970), 3-20. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25080688

Economic Global Order

In 2001 noted Political Scientist and Professor John Mearsheimer published his third book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.  Mearsheimer pays particular attention to states and their motivations in chapter 3, in which he defines the world as inherently anarchial, competitive, and one dominated by power, fear, and a quest for survival. This trinity of motivations manifests principally as military strength, aggression, and underhanded behavior which can only be offset by geographical factors or opposing strength (Mearsheimer, 2001). This essay examines a few of Mearsheimer’s positions and argues that contrary to a perpetual state of fear and threat of war, the world today is driven much more by economic motivations, interconnectivity, and mutual prosperity.

The decade following the end of World War II laid the groundwork for two markedly divergent paths of global order. In one was the rise of the Soviet Union, nuclear proliferation, and an omnipresent threat of atomic catastrophe. In the other, the late forties and fifties marked the beginning of globalization, openness, and increased economic freedom between countries. As Princeton Professor of Politics and International Affairs John Ikenberry (1996, pp. 79 - 80) points out, it was institutions like the United Nations and global trade agreements like GATT that, while widely used to enforce Soviet containment, provided the basic stability for Western States and democracies to engage in more free and open trade. It is, as Ikenberry says (p. 79), telling that while the Soviet Union collapsed more than thirty years ago, these Western agreements and trade are still flourishing today.

Mearsheimer (2001, pp. 63-64, 66) would argue that institutions like the UN, NATO, and trade agreements like GATT or the USMCA (formerly NAFTA) are at their root driven by competition and motivated by fear and a need for ever greater security. But why? Mearsheimer (p. 54) clearly states that his first assumption is that world order is anarchic. This to mean, as he puts it, there is no government of governments, no global authority presiding over world affairs. It is this anarchial environment that inspires competition and leads states to exist in perpetual fear.

On its face at the highest level, the world is anarchic. There is no government of governments and save for the goodwill of a Great Power, smaller states have little recourse. However, there are Great Powers and those Great Powers do come to the aid of weaker states. Currently we see this playing out in great force in the Ukraine war. More distantly, in the first Gulf War, the United States came to the aid of Kuwait. America also infamously backed the Taliban against the Soviets during their Afghan war. Great Power involvement in the affairs of weaker states is discretional to be sure but it’s not non-trivial. Furthermore, trade deals like the USMCA or the USJTA (United States Japan Trade Agreement) provide the structure and necessary rules that govern commerce between countries that both parties agree to. In short, whether a Great Power, an international trade deal, or non-governmental organizations like the IMF or the IAEA, there are resources available to weaker states. The world does not exist in a vacuum of authority as perhaps Mearsheimer suggests nor is it a free for all. Trade agreements and cooperatives between States like the UN provide a semblance of international law and order, not anarchy.

Mearsheimer (2001) concludes that survival is the core drive of every state and indeed it is hard to argue that any state would choose to not exist. However, Mearsheimer over-indexes on the prominence of survival in the policies of foreign affairs. For example, he writes, “[…] the only assumption in dealing with a specific motive that is common to all states says their principal objective is to survive” (p. 55).  He furthers this point by proposing that American military might is the only reason Canada and Mexico do not attack their North American neighbor and that the Atlantic Ocean is the only thing keeping the Americans out of Europe (pp. 56, 60). These arguments ignore the mutually beneficial trade agreements between the U.S., Mexico, and Canada, as strong motivators for peace; and they ignore the fact that the United States has twice crossed the Atlantic to fight World Wars; and, after occupying large swaths of the European continent, decided to give it back. To be clear, survival can absolutely play a dominant role in foreign policy. The spread of Communism was a key motivator in America’s decision to get involved in Vietnam, for example (Office of the Historian, 1964). The Cold War and the resulting arms race were also direct manifestations of all the things Mearsheimer identifies in his arguments. The critique is that the motivators of fear and survival are highly selective to specific situations between actors. The foreign policy of Ukraine, for example, is no doubt highly indexed by fear and a struggle for survival, but this does not mean that a similar relationship exists between the countries of Canada, Mexico, and the United States.

Finally, if fear, survival and the threat of war govern foreign policy, we should see an increase in inter-state conflict, but in fact we see a long-term decline in wars between countries. According to the Peace Research Institute (2016), rates of war between countries have dramatically declined since the 1940s. In fact, not only have rates of inter-state conflicts decreased, they’re not a major contributor to overall world conflict:

(Gates et al., 2016, p. 2)

Over this same period, the world has become increasingly globalized and economically dependent. As American University professor Joshua Goldstein (2011) points out:

Not only is China a very long way from being able to go toe-to-toe with the United States [militarily]; it’s not clear why it would want to. A military conflict (particularly with its biggest customer and debtor) would impede China’s global trading posture and endanger its prosperity. (Wars will get worse in the future section, para. 4)

The same logic applies to the relationships codified in NAFTA and later the USMCA. In today’s world, economic prosperity motivates Great Powers while existential survival is the exception, not a constant.  Consider, for example, that from the end of World War II until the early 1970s, world GDP and trade grew by 4.9% and 7% respectively per year. The fortunes of growth were universally felt from Europe to Asia, and of course, North America (WTO, 2014, p.48). It’s hard to imagine such a change in global prosperity not impacting priorities between states; and indeed, the decline in inter-state conflicts suggests this is the case.

In summary, the world does not exist in a state of total anarchy. Great Powers serve their best interests, but today those interests are principally governed by maintaining good economic ties with the rest of the world. An increase in trade, a decrease in inter-state conflicts, and the proliferation of international cooperatives all reflect a shift toward global interdependence. The more skin states have in the economic game, the more they have to lose through war. Survival is therefore less driven by an anarchial model of power and fear, and more incentivized through economic prosperity while playing within the rules.

References

Gates, S., Nygard, H.M., Strand, H. & Urdal, H. (2016). Trends in armed conflict, 1946-2014.

Peace Research institute Oslo. https://files.prio.org/publication_files/prio/Gates,%20Nyg%C3%A5rd,%20Strand,%20Urdal%20-%20Trends%20in%20Armed%20Conflict,%20Conflict%20Trends%201-2016.pdf

Goldstein, J. (2011, August 15). Think again: war. Foreign policy.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/15/think-again-war/

Ikenberry, J. (1996). The myth of post Cold-War chaos. Foreign Affairs, 75(3), 79-91.

Mearsheimer, J. (2001). Anarchy and the struggle for power. The tragedy of great power politics. (pp.

54-72). W.W. Norton & Company

Office of the Historian. (1964, March 16). 84. Memorandum from the secretary of defense

(McNamara) to the president. Office of the historian. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d84

World Trade Organization. (2014). World trade report 2014.

https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/world_trade_report14_e.pdf

Confronting the Challenge of Suicide Terrorism

In August of 2021 as the last American flight left Kabul, video of victorious Taliban fighters spread around the world. For the better part of two decades, the Taliban had employed suicide attacks and IEDs to harass a better equipped, more advanced force; and now that force was leaving. The story of the Taliban’s success has many threads, and while there is plenty of room to debate what went wrong, there is little doubt the Taliban won. Though their tactics were not the only contributing factor to their victory, it is impossible to separate the outcome from the methods. Furthermore, America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan is, in part, an endorsement of the tactics. More importantly, the Taliban’s success makes it difficult to dissuade terrorist groups from deploying suicide attacks in the future. In fact, the globalized nature of terrorism, the permanent record immortalized on the internet, and the success of suicide attacks makes total dissuasion impossible. Instead, the powers of the world should focus on mitigation through clear objectives, negotiation, diplomacy, and military force to achieve the best possible outcome.  

To begin with, it’s important to understand the full scope of the problem suicide terrorism represents. It is not a one-sided issue, as University of Chicago professor Robert Pape (2003) points out, nor one led by mindless irrational actors. Terrorism, and specifically suicide attacks, are used because they’re effective and often carry popular domestic support (p. 349). Furthermore, target countries contribute to popular support by engaging in socially disruptive policies like regime change, democratization, and religious confrontation. While America and its allies have an unofficial policy of refusing to negotiate with terrorists, the United States has shown throughout its history that it is willing to work with imperfect regimes and international groups that do not share its values (Augusto Pinochet in Chile, the Afghan mujahedeen, and modern relations with Saudi Arabia, to name a few). Therefore, the absence of western principles should not prohibit engaging with any group, terrorist or otherwise. Instead, target countries should understand who they’re working with and the objectives of the organization. This requires that western countries acknowledge certain aspects of terrorist groups that cut across preferred narratives. For example, terrorist groups often have quantifiable goals and deploy suicide attacks in pursuit of those goals.

[S]uicide terrorism is strategic. The vast majority of suicide terrorist attacks are not isolated or random acts by individual fanatics but, rather, occur in clusters as part of a larger campaign by an organized group to achieve a specific political goal (Pape, 2003 p. 344).

In other words, terrorist organizations are rational actors with objectives that have quantifiable definitions of success (p. 344). By comparison, an irrational actor commits actions without any broader objective in mind. School shootings are an example of an irrational act where violence serves its own end, and the shooter is not part of a larger organization with political aims. Recognizing terror groups as rational actors is critical to understanding their objectives and forming a response. That said, while the hardline approach is not reliable, as Afghanistan showed, accepting that terrorist have rational goals does not preclude an aggressive posture.

For policy makers who believe terrorists can be convinced that suicide attacks don’t work, consider that America’s defeat and many, if not all, of the suicide attacks that led to that defeat are immortalized on the internet. The idea that the Taliban victory will fade with time is foolish. Terrorism has globalized both in presence and in tactics. American University professor Audrey Kurth Cronin speaks to this point in an issue of International Security:

The al-Qaida movement has successfully used the tools of globalization to enable it to communicate with multiple audiences, including potential new members, new recruits, active supporters, passive sympathizers, neutral observers, enemy governments, and potential victims (Cronin, 2006 p. 38).

Cronin adds that the internet has allowed terrorism to decentralize and spread globally in a way that wasn’t possible in its earliest iterations (p. 12). For example, in 2020, fifty-four percent of global suicide attacks occurred in Africa, while the second most occurred a continent away in Asia (Mendelboim et al, 2022 para 3). That said, the number of suicide attacks worldwide has decreased dramatically from 470 in 2016 to 74 in 2021 (para 3). Yet the impact of globalization on terrorism remains uncertain. On the one hand, the de-globalization of U.S. forces from the middle east contributed strongly to the decline in suicide attacks (para 1). On the other hand, Sociology professor Donald Black points out that globalization will only continue to force divergent people and cultures together. While this can increase violence in the near term, he says, the very act of globalization can reduce differences between people and therefore terrorism itself (Black, 2004 p. 24). Clearly, globalization has helped terror networks decentralize and spread throughout the world, but it may also be a mechanism to prevent radicalization through long term integration.   

Terror groups perceive a lack of commitment from the west as a weakness, however, democracy is not necessarily a prohibitor to success in combating terrorism. Issues arise for any government when objectives are not properly defined or inhibited by mission-creep. It’s easy to forget that before the United States became bogged down in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union experienced a similar fate. Difficulties are not strictly ideological. Instead, underestimating the opponent and conflating mission objectives are far more lethal to mission success then democracy itself. As Cronin puts it, counterterrorism and political change operate on completely different timelines. Consider that, “[ninety percent] of terrorist organizations have a lifespan of less than one year; and of those that make it to a year, more than half disappear in a decade (Cronin, 2006 p. 13).” Now consider that it took over a century for the United States to pacify the North American continent, and much longer if we were to consider the entirety of the colonial period. The goals of democratizing Afghanistan, defeating Al-Qaida, and toppling the Taliban operated on different timelines, involved different tactics, and had different success criteria. In short, western countries can contain terrorist activities, but it is essential that they do not conflate those efforts with the much more difficult task of nation building.

Successfully confronting terrorism and suicide attacks begins with understanding the opponent and their motivations. Second, military force and negotiations are not mutually exclusive. Pape recognized this twenty years ago when he said, “The current policy debate is misguided. Offensive military action or concessions alone rarely work for long” (Pape, 2003 p. 356). This played out in the Afghan war where simply the threat of a U.S. invasion following 9/11 had the Taliban ready to negotiate. Yet even after the Americans had toppled them from power, the United States made no effort to integrate the Taliban into the political process (Whitlock 2021). Had America utilized the opportunity provided by military force, they might have prevented twenty years of war. Finally, negotiation itself can be used as an offensive tactic. As Cronin says, splintered terrorist groups like Al-Qaida present opportunities to negotiate with individual cells and break them away from the global collective (Cronin, 2006). Furthermore, while Pape (2003) says a decreased U.S. presence in the middle east can help reduce suicide attacks (p. 357), total avoidance isn’t a viable solution. Western countries should continue to foster economic development in third world countries as a long-term counterterrorism strategy.

In summary, suicide attacks will never disappear entirely, but they can be mitigated through a combination of military, diplomatic, and economic means. Therefore, success begins with a mindset change and strictly limiting our ambitions. While these tactics operate on extended timelines, this does not preclude western democracies from using them, so long as scope and objectives are clearly defined.

References

Black, D. (2004). The geometry of terrorism. Theories of Terrorism: A Symposium, 22(1), 14-25.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/3648956

Cronin, A. K. (2006). How Al-Qaida ends: The decline and demise of terrorist groups. International

Security, 31(1), 7-48. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137538

Mendelboim, A., Schweitzer, Y., & Raz, I.G. (2022). Suicide attacks worldwide in 2021: The

downward trend continues. The Institute for National Security Studies. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/suicide-attacks-2021/

Pape, R. (2003). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. American Political Science Review, 97(3),

343-361. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3117613

Whitlock, C. (2021). The Afghanistan papers: A secret history of the war. Simon & Schuster

Do No Harm: Mitigating the Consequences of Humanitarian Aid

Two years before the United States accused Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe of weaponizing food shipments for votes, severe drought devastated the country’s agricultural sector. The resulting humanitarian crisis, coupled with hyper-inflation and high unemployment, prompted the international community to respond. Yet, Zimbabwe, as professors Michael Barnett and Jack Snyder point out, is a shining example of humanitarian aid gone wrong (Barnett & Snyder, 2012, p. 148). By June 2008, stories began circulating that Mr. Mugabe’s government was withholding food relief from voters registered to the opposing party (Pleming, 2008, para. 3). At the same time, the government froze the relief efforts of all international aid groups after accusing some of them of supporting the opposition (para. 8). Zimbabwe is, in many ways, an example of how well-intended foreign aid can have unintended negative consequences. The relief effort also illustrates the peril of conflating aid with a political agenda. Humanitarian aid provides a critical lifeline to people in need, but it is essential that providers be cognizant of unintended consequences. This essay argues that an apolitical, do no harm approach with strong local support is essential to delivering effective humanitarian relief.

Twenty-five years ago, Kofi Annan (1998) passionately argued the merits of nation building and intervention as a means of mitigating humanitarian disasters and avoiding another Rwanda. This was, in some ways, a response to broad recognition that simply providing aid wasn’t good enough, and often resulted in more harm than good. Getting involved militarily and spreading democracy around the world seemed the logical, if not formattable task ahead for developed nations. No one could imagine that only three years later, the events of September 11th would bog the United States down in a failed attempt at nation building; and, while the Afghan war wasn’t strictly based on relief, the humanitarian crisis under the Taliban, the rights of women, and general violence were strong interventionalist incentives. As Afghanistan has shown, however, nation building is difficult.

That said, even if political transition had a functional track record, expecting an NGO to take on that responsibility is naïve. As Drs. Barrett and Snyder point out, “peace builders lack the knowledge to transform crisis-prone countries into stable, liberal, free-market societies” (Barnett & Snyder, 2012, p. 152). Further still, even if NGOs possessed the expertise to engage in nation building, they most certainly lack the resources. Consider that of the nearly $13.5 billion of federal aid to Afghanistan in 2011, only $180 million was classified as humanitarian, while over $12 billion went to governance, and most of that to conflict, peace and security (U.S. Department of State, 2023). These numbers say nothing of the private funds from individuals and NGOs, nor of the costs of military operations in that country. Furthermore, the presence of war offers little qualification as violence almost always accompanies humanitarian disasters, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, or Somalia. In any event, for an NGO to cover the costs of just the U.S. federal government’s aid to Afghanistan, the humanitarian budget would need to increase by a factor of seventy-five. This provides some mathematical context to the task being suggested by peace building advocates.

While expecting NGOs and state-sponsored humanitarian efforts to take on the effort of nation building is foolish, remaining apolitical as do no harm suggests, is not so simple. Johns Hopkins University professor, Soren Jessen-Petersen (2011) speaks to this in a paper published by the U.S. Institute of Peace.

This kind of response, throwing humanitarian personnel right into the middle of conflicts, has tested the security of staff and the agencies’ understanding of politically sensitive involvement, courage, and stamina. It has also severely exposed the difficulties in combining such action with the fundamental principles of impartiality and neutrality. How do you maintain your neutrality and impartiality when a forceful Sri Lanka military embarks on a final onslaught…[and] indiscriminately targets the civilian population whom you are trying to protect? (p. 6)

While Jessen-Petersen argues against the aforementioned peace building efforts, he highlights the difficulty in maintaining neutrality. Yet maintaining neutrality is precisely what must be done. As Zimbabwe showed, partiality puts humanitarian aid at risk. To reduce the possibility of a misunderstanding, Jessen-Petersen proposes that engaging locals in the relief effort would help mitigate bad perceptions. For example, more direct Afghani involvement would have helped dispel the notion that aid organizations were dominated by western interests (p. 10).

At first, sourcing aid from the region where the humanitarian crisis is occurring seems far-fetched, but allowing the communities most impacted by aid to drive how it’s used is, in fact, the best application of do no harm humanitarianism. George Washington professor of Political Science Alexander Downes speaks to a ground up approach when he says, “regime change is highly destabilizing and outcomes depend less on the good intentions or strategy of the intervener and more on the conditions in the target country that are out of the intervener’s control” (Art et al., 2023, pp. 515-521). Columbia professor of Political Science Séverine Autesserre (2017) also wrote extensively on this topic in an issue of International Studies Review. In it, she says the actions of locals within their communities often plays a larger role in peace than those taken by international organizations. She goes on to say that foreigners often lack the knowledge or skills to interact with the population, much less build peace. For example, “Out of 140 diplomats working in the U.K. embassy in Kabul…only three [spoke the language]” (p. 125). Furthermore, international intervention can be poorly received by local communities as was the case in Congo. Auteserre writes, “Congolese youth activists emphasize that they would prefer outsiders to leave, because international peace builders get in the way of local people trying to hold their government accountable” (p. 124). Even regime change, as Downes writes, is best left to domestic forces, as was the case in Serbia. International involvement, he says, “should be limited to diplomatic pressure in support of legitimate domestic demands” (Art et al., 2023, pp. 515-521). In short, engaging locals in the humanitarian process is the surest way to direct international resources in the most needed direction, while limiting unintended consequences.

While do no harm is the most reasonable approach to delivering relief, it is not a perfect approach to humanitarian aid. As humanitarian writer Fiona Terry said, all aid has negative consequences. The best organizations can hope for is to mitigate unintended consequences as much as possible (Barnett & Snyder, 2012, p. 149). That said, there is a balance to be found between doing no harm and comprehensive peace building that will best position providers to succeed against tomorrow’s challenges. This approach begins with defining the limits of humanitarianism. Providing relief cannot be conflated with nation building nor can aid be tied to foreign policy. As Afghanistan showed, state’s interests abroad can change rapidly with little concern for the humanitarian consequences. More importantly, aid organizations should engage apolitically with local communities, and allow the citizenry to define the aid they need. While not perfect, this approach will provide the best possible outcome through the intelligent application of aid. Most of all, this approach scales with the unknown challenges of the future.

There is no foolproof solution to humanitarian relief. In fact, there is no decision one could make that does not carry some consequence. Yet attempting to control for every variable or expanding the scope of relief to include nation building, only results in the conditions that cause humanitarian disasters. Therefore, it is essential that states and NGOs involved in humanitarian initiatives, accept the limits of what aid can do and attempt to limit unintended consequences as much as possible.

References

Annan, K. (1998). Secretary-General reflects on ‘intervention’ in thirty-fifth annual

Ditchley foundation lecture. United Nations. https://press.un.org/en/1998/19980626.sgsm6613.html

Autesserre, S. (2017). International peacebuilding and local success: Assumptions and

effectiveness. International Studies Review, 19(1), 114-132. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26407939  

Barnett, M. & Snyder, J. (2012). Humanitarianism in question. Cornell University Press.

Art, R.J., Crawford, T.W., & Jervis, R. (Eds.). (2023). International Politics. Rowman &

Littlefield.

Jessen-Petersen, S. (2011). Humanitarianism in crisis. U.S. Institute of Peace.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12279

Pleming, S. (2008). U.S. says Zimbabwe uses food aid as weapon. Reuters.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-usa/u-s-says-zimbabwe-uses-food-aid-as-weapon-idUSWAT00961420080606

U.S. Department of State. (2023). U.S. foreign assistance by country.

https://www.foreignassistance.gov/