Policy Response 2: The Role of Science and Activism in Climate Policy

Environmentalism and science are often conflated with one another. The climate space has become crowded with concerned citizens, scientists, celebrities, and politicians, making it both a movement of scientific interest and of pop culture. This duality has led to questions over the role science should play in policymaking and how agnostic scientists ought to remain in the face of climate change. While Steel (2015) provides a summary of the various models for scientific engagement, Ojha et al (2016) highlight the failure of science to consider sociological and cultural concerns. On the other hand, Kusch (2019) argues that not only should science be involved in policymaking, but that it is unavoidably biased and necessarily political. However, Gluckman (2015) contends the limitations of science are precisely why its roll in policy should be limited. Finally, mass-media outlets like the BBC, TED, and Yes! provide insight into how environmentalism manifests in popular culture, from celebrities like Greta Thunberg and Al Gore, to popular movements in Latin America and Ghana. These movements underpin political pressure and can motivate states to form international treaties and IGOs around shared environmental concerns. While McCormick (1999) is fairly critical of such treaties, Susskind (2008) and Koppel & Sprinz (2009) are more optimistic. In short, environmentalism is an artifact of popular culture and scientific intrigue, making it both a highly contested and competitive space.

Analysis

As environmentalism has grown in public salience, science has taken an increasingly prominent role in both public and private sector debate. However, the nature of this role has been largely contested. For example, Steel (2015) writes that the spectrum of involvement includes approaches like normal science, which seeks to advise but not instruct, to logical positivism, which advocates for scientists writing policy on relevant matters (p. xxv). Others, like Ojha et al (2015), question whether technocratic decision making is equipped to address sociological and cultural concerns. Good policy, they argue, cannot be effective without involving the communities most impacted by climate change (p. 418). For instance, they note the Nepalese government’s lack of engagement with the local community on climate policy, even though those communities were disproportionately impacted by glacial runoff and other factors. Nonetheless, Ojha et al conclude that science is a component of the policymaking process, and should be considered equally alongside sociological, political, and economic expertise.

Other dimensions of scientific involvement are still further removed from one-another. Steel (2015) writes that the post-modernists view science as a construct and part of a larger power pyramid. In this framework, the role of science is minimized and not seen as possessing more inherent truth than feeling and personal experience (p. xix). The post-normal view, on the other hand, advocates that the role of science should be institutionalized and integrated into legislative committees, the courts, and policymaking arenas (pp. xxv-xxvi). In a TED Talk, Kusch (2019) goes a step further, arguing that not only should scientists be politically engaged, but that such engagement is necessary (8.00). Finally, others like Gluckman (2018) echo the post-modern sentiment, expressing a desire to remove evidence-based policymaking from our vocabularies (p. 91). Gluckman argues that policymaking often takes place at the boundary of scientific understanding, that science is not the only form of evidence, and that tradition and folklore carry special cultural significance (p. 92). In that, Gluckman expresses the concerns raised by Ojha et al (2015) and suggests that policymakers ought to consider the sociological impact, not simply the ecological outcome, of climate policies.

As the preceding discussion demonstrated, the environmental policy arena contains multiple actors, from scientists and sociologists to legislatures and local communities. Among the largest of these constituencies are the public, among whom celebrities, politicians, and grassroots organizations are part. In fact, scientists can cross into the public domain. For example, Rachel Carson’s widely acclaimed book Silent Spring is credited with launching the modern environmentalist movement, and changing the national attitude toward climate (Stoll, n.d.). However, the impact of individuals and the fickle nature of climate in the public mind, leave open how much influence one person can have. On the one hand, environmental celebrities, like Greta Thunberg, criticize but offer little in the way of solutions (BBC, 2024). On the other hand, politician turned private citizen, Al Gore (2020), is able to speak intelligently on climate issues in a way that connects with the average citizen. The ability to raise awareness, therefore, is at least partly contingent upon the ability to inform and connect.

As mentioned, Rachel Carson’s book is broadly credited with spawning a global movement (Stoll, n.d.). Pragmatic views such as those expressed by Al Gore can similarly introduce environmentalism to the layperson. Nonetheless, even if such issue proliferation gives rise to popular movements like those in Ghana or Latin America (Pousadela, 2020), their impact is uncertain. For instance, deforestation, water, and air pollution are still concerns throughout much of the world. Stoll (n.d.) writes that while every one of the chemicals listed in Carson’s book has been banned or restricted, chemical contamination continues to be a public concern. Similarly, Pousadela (2020) writes that while popular environmental movements have sparked government awareness, their actual impact on policy remains unclear. It’s important therefore, that environmental stewards exist as ambassadors of the climate issue, but simply raising awareness doesn’t constitute structural change.

While activism can pressure policymakers to act, international treaties are another means of bringing about change. Much like raising awareness, however, international agreements and IGOs can be criticized for lacking effectiveness. McCormick (1999), for example, writes that such treaties are often weak, lack enforcement mechanisms, and compete with national priorities (p. 92). Moreover, the lack of a global governing body means states can neither be coerced nor held accountable for not following international law (p. 97). Susskind (2008) echoed this realist view, adding that politician’s commitment to international agreements is often superficial and subordinate to the election cycle. Nonetheless, legally binding agreements can form the basis for both economic prosperity and environmental responsibility.

That said, the two regimes can seem at odds. For example, Bhagwati (1993) notes the inherent tension between economics and environmental politics. One abstains from government regulation, the other invites it (p. 42). In fact, concerns about over-regulation could be supported by Levy (1996) who argued that non-binding agreements are more effective than their legally binding counterparts. While LBAs foster animosity, LNBAs encourage collaboration and willful participation on climate issues (p. 76). Furthermore, Levy’s arguments suggest good environmental policy and economics are not mutually exclusive. In one example, the European Commission, whose primary focus is economics, worked to enforce cross-border emissions restrictions as a means of ensuring both economic synergy and environmental responsibility (p. 108). Similarly, Bhagwati (1993) writes that economic growth does not necessarily correlate to greater environmental harm. For example, Bhagwati cites studies indicating SO2 emissions fall as incomes rise (p. 43). Moreover, policies can impact environmental outcomes. For instance, restrictions on auto imports led the Japanese to export larger, less fuel-efficient SUVs (p. 43). Even if assumptions about GHG emissions and growth are contested, it’s clear that policy, economics, and the environment are intertwined.

To this extent, Bhagwati (1993) argues that private boycotts and lobbying are effective alternatives to environmental regulation (p. 47). While these strategies may be part of the solution, the rise in global emissions suggests that international law still has a role to play. Contrary to the arguments made by Levy (1996), Koppel & Sprinz (2009) contend that legally-binding treaties are the best means of enforcing such laws. More importantly, they write, these agreements must contain mechanisms to enforce terms and peacefully resolve disputes (p. 1863). Among the more compelling solutions offered, Susskind (2008) proposes writing agreements that allow for the sharing of green technology across borders. This technical proliferation could be paired with what Koppel & Sprinz (2009) write is a need for clear and precise laws that are both understandable and enforceable (p. 1866). In short, economic growth and regulation are not mutually exclusive. It’s also clear that economic policies can provide both environmental risks and upside. As Bhagwati (1993) writes, the increased tax revue that comes from economic growth can form the basis for future environmental programs. Nonetheless, whether legally binding or voluntary, some form of international cooperation is required.

Outlook

Without a doubt, the criticism levelled at activists like Greta Thunberg, international organizations like the UN, and the myriad of treaties governing global resources is valid. Raising awareness, as Thunberg or other activists do, is the lowest point of entry to involvement in the global climate discussion. It’s much more difficult to imagine an innovative policy approach or to design more efficient solar cells. To this extent, the marginal utility of the UN or other IGOs in doing more than holding meetings is questionable. As Susskind (2008) pointed out, world leaders are worried about the next election cycle and scoring points with their constituents. In this, the realist model of the world clearly holds serve. The best international bodies can do is suggest a course of action. This places the climate agenda firmly in the hands of the private sector, and this is perhaps where efforts to raise awareness have a role to play.

While the status of China and the United States as the world’s leading emitters casts serious doubt on Bhagwati’s (1993) argument that growth lowers emissions, there’s a compelling argument that environmental change lies in the hands of private citizens. For one thing, green growth can reduce our carbon footprint while also benefiting the economy. Furthermore, carbon markets provide both public and private incentive to operate in a more sustainable way. Hein (2018) writes that fewer than half of the countries committed to reducing deforestation had the financial instruments to achieve their goals (p. 8). Carbon markets are one such instrument and represent an opportunity for regulators and private business to work together. Finally, it goes without saying that innovation happens in the private sector, not via UN conferences or activist marches. At some point, the engineering challenges of climate change must be solved by the technical minds focused on those problems. Sharing technology across borders as recommended by Susskind (2008) is one approach, incentives offered in the Inflation Reduction Act are another. Therefore, regardless of the mechanism, the goals of governments ought to be how best to enable the people solving the problems of climate change to do their greatest work.

References

BBC. (2024). Greta Thunberg: Who is the climate activist and what has she achieved. BBC.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49918719

Bhagwati, J.N. (1993). The case for free trade. Scientific American, 269(5), 42-49.

https://www.scientificamerican.com/issue/sa/1993/11-01/

Gluckman, P. (2018). The role of evidence and expertise in policy-making: The politics and

practice of science advice. Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, 151(1), 91-101. https://royalsoc.org.au/images/pdf/journal/151-1-Gluckman.pdf

Gore, A. (2020, June 23). The new urgency of climate change [Video]. TED.

https://www.ted.com/talks/al_gore_the_new_urgency_of_climate_change#t-1987370

Hein, J., Guarin, A., Frommé, E., & Pauw, P. (2018). Deforestation and the Paris climate

agreement: An assessment of REDD+ in the national climate action plans. Forest Policy and Economics, 90, 7-11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2018.01.005

Holst, C. & Christensen, J. (2016). The role of expertise in policymaking. Open Access

Government. https://www.openaccessgovernment.org/role-expertise-policy-making/28592/  

Koppel, M. & Sprinz, D.F. (2019). Do binding beat nonbinding agreements? Regulating

international water quality. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63(8), 1860-1888. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002718822127

Levy, M.A. (1996). European acid rain: The power of tote-board diplomacy. Keohane, R.O. &

Levy M.A. (Eds.). Institutions for Environmental Aid: Pitfalls and Promises. (pp. 37-94). MIT Press. https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262611206/institutions-for-environmental-aid/

McCormick, J. (2010). The role of environmental NGOs in international regimes. Axelrod, R.S.

& Vandeveer, S. (Eds.), The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy (pp. 92-110). CQ Press. https://www.academia.edu/857760/The_role_of_environmental_NGOs_in_international_regimes

Pousadela, I. (2020). Stories from the youth climate movement in the global south. Yes!

https://www.yesmagazine.org/opinion/2020/07/17/youth-climate-leaders-global-south

Ojha, H. R., Ghimire, S., Pain, A., Nightingale, A., Khatri, D. B., & Dhungana, H. (2016). Policy

without politics: technocratic control of climate change adaptation policy making in Nepal. Climate Policy, 16(4), 415–433. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2014.1003775

Steel, B.S. (Ed.). (2015). Science and politics: An A-to-Z guide to issues and controversies. Sage

Publishing. https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/science-and-politics/book239100

Stoll, M. (n.d.). Legacy of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. Environment & Society Portal.

https://www.environmentandsociety.org/exhibitions/rachel-carsons-silent-spring/legacy-rachel-carsons-silent-spring

Susskind, L. (2008). Strengthening the global environmental treaty system. Issues in Science and

Technology, 25(1). https://issues.org/susskind/

TEDx Talks. (2019, December 6). Scientific expertise in the age of post-truth – Martin Kusch –

TEDxVienna [Video]. YouTube. https://youtube.com/watch?v=AHa4QLmu8Dg

Policy Response 1: A Review of Policy Diffusion in the Public and Private Sector

The study of how environmental policies proliferate is an exercise in simplicity and competing complexities. On the one hand, policy diffusion is relatively easy to understand. A state develops emissions controls or sustainable fishing practices, and other countries adopt similar policies. On the other hand, a myriad of factors determines whether an adopting state can facilitate such advancements. This essay examines the challenge of policy diffusion in the arena of environmental politics with a focus on fisheries and emissions controls. Works by Kern et al (2001) provide a detailed overview of how policies proliferate, while Stafford (2019) provides useful background on sustainability concepts, flaws, and limitations. Mainstream media coverage of Chinese fishing practices is also reviewed as are the lobbying efforts of industry special interests. Finally, literature from the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO, 2017) illustrates how policy dissemination doesn’t necessarily result in environmentally favorable outcomes while Chasek (2016) provides an overview of policy arenas, actors, and the various interests that influence international policy. To address these issues, the discussion begins with how the tragedy of the commons applies to overfishing and potential policy approaches to remediating risk. It then examines how states differ in their approach to environmental issues and what factors influence policy diffusion. Finally, we’ll consider how fuel efficiency standards have improved in the United States and why they continue to lag behind their European frontrunners.

Analysis

The need for collective international action and good policy is perhaps no more apparent than in the arena of global fisheries, yet as Stafford (2019) writes, the overuse of sustainability has led to confusion about what the word means and ironically, resulted in unsustainable practices. Fishing quotas, he notes, are both poorly defined and difficult to project, yet are considered sustainable (pp. 1-2). Similarly, Kern et al (2001) cite the importance of clear policy and clearer problem statements, writing that the best policy is useless against a poorly understood problem and vice versa (pp. 7-8). Accurate verbiage, therefore, is essential to crafting good policy, particularly with respect to common pool resources like breathable air, clean water, and ocean life. Such resources are vulnerable to socioeconomic theories like the tragedy of the commons, which Stafford (2019) and Chasek (2016) describe as the exploitation of a shared resource to the detriment of the broader community. Overfishing of the sort practiced by China (Urbina, 2020) is one such example and poses significant environmental risks from bycatch and collapsed fisheries to international instability. Furthermore, China’s practices undermine international policy by exposing weaknesses in enforcement. At the same time, China’s population needs food and special interests have an incentive to maintain the status quo. More broadly, global fisheries are thought to provide over 200 million jobs (Chasek, 2016, p. 8), which further complicates the policy picture, all of which contributes to the tragedy of the commons playing out in the world’s oceans.

While concerns over military action garner headlines, a policy of economic and financial coercion would more effectively dissuade Chinese activity. For example, much of the fishing reported by Urbina (2020) has taken place in international waters off the coast of South America. The countries of Argentina, Chile, Brazil and others could utilize MERCOSUR to enact coordinated tariffs on Chinese goods or freeze collaborative projects domestically. Such economic coercion was used by the United States in the 1980s to enact a ban on whaling (Chasek, 2016, p. 16). To that extent, countries affected by China’s aggressive fishing tactics could form tighter bonds with the U.S. and leverage American tariffs to alter Chinese policy. For example, the United States could utilize the USMCA to block Chinese exports attempting to enter via Mexico. The World Bank and IMF could be used to influence smaller players where China is an active lender to seek partnerships with western sources. Another option is to use NGOs (like Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund, and the Sierra Club) to raise public awareness and put pressure on international companies to reduce their investments in China. Finally, it’s worth noting that Chinese veto power makes enacting policy through the UN unlikely. It’s also unclear that such a policy would be enforceable without the aforementioned collaboration. Moreover, Kern et al (2001) note that the budget for the United Nations Environmental Programme is less than that of Greenpeace (p. 10), further calling into question the ability of the UN to act persuasively.

The Chinese use case provides a useful entrance into the examination of how state actors differ in their response to environmental issues. As Chasek (2016) writes, a myriad of factors can affect a state’s approach to climate issues, from NGOs to economic concerns and others. Urbina (2020), for example, reported that Chinese long-range fishing began, in part, due to depleted local fisheries. China’s response to this crisis was to expand their fishing footprint, a response that reflects both the economic and social concerns associated with food security. Alternatively, the United States’ opposition to whaling was largely predicated on its declining need for whaling products and mounting pressure from environmental groups, which subsequently produced a radically different policy than that demonstrated by the Chinese. A final example can be found in the United States’ slow adoption of fuel economy standards. In this, strong cultural and institutional biases play a role. As Nivola (2009) writes, the United States has trailed European policymakers in fuel economy largely because Americans won’t support the necessary taxes, a policy that has ensured cheap gas and disincentivized fuel economy. In this way, culture and precedent work together to influence a country’s response to climate concerns, whether long or short-term.

The discussion of international policy owes some attention to how such policies proliferate throughout the global community. The notion of policy diffusion was discussed at length by Kern et al (2001) who identified three primary drivers of policy proliferation. The first of these concerns the technical capabilities of the imitating country and the public demand for action. These require that the adopting nation have the technical knowledge and functional capacity to implement environmental controls in the presence of strong public will. The second stipulation addresses policy frontrunners and disseminating organizations, like the United Nations Environmental Programme. This entails that the frontrunners not only implement policies but that they publish those policies (and their results) internationally through designated organizations. Finally, both the policy and the problem must be thoroughly understood. Good policy is meaningless if applied against a poorly understood problem. Therefore, it is essential that the adopting nation understand both the policy and the problem they are trying to solve (pp. 7-13).

When studying policy diffusion, it’s easy to assume that only good policies proliferate, but this is not always the case. For example, the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO, 2017), found that lobbyists effectively won concessions from Spanish regulators that closely mirrored their Dutch counterparts. In both cases, fishing quotas were increased, and regulatory oversight decreased. It’s also worth acknowledging that good policy is wholly within the eye of the beholder. Spanish fishing interests, for example, were likely satisfied with their lobbyists’ efforts. Nonetheless, policies can proliferate in the presence of opposition. For example, Kern et al, (2001), cite the rise of environmental agencies, ministries, and other national organizations throughout Europe and North America as a prominent instance of policy proliferation (pp. 13-15). The EPA is one such example that has both ardent support and opposition from various political groups within the United States. That said, sometimes good policies fail to proliferate or do so more slowly. Such is the case with fuel economy in the United States. Reducing vehicle emissions is seen as a critical step in reducing global GHGs, yet policymakers have been slow to implement regulations until recently. Nivola (2009) writes that U.S. fuel efficiency standards are half of what they are in Europe, largely because Americans have no tolerance for taxes either publicly or politically. Furthermore, cheap gas has disincentivized innovation and largely kept America behind Europe. Nonetheless, the United States possesses many of the prerequisites for successful policy adoption. America has the technical capability to achieve greater fuel economy, benefits from a clear policy frontrunner to emulate, and enjoys strong public support for GHG reduction. However, they lack institutional and public support for higher taxes. These issues haven’t prevented the diffusion of policy, but they have slowed its progress.

Finally, a great deal of attention has been paid to policy and policymakers, however, private sector innovation can be a major source of environmental change. For example, SeaPact (SP, n.d.) is a collaboration of 11 leading North American seafood companies committed to the sustainable use of international fisheries. While organized by for-profit companies, SeaPact works with a select number of NGOs who act as advisors on resource management and innovation. According to the SeaPact site, the organization’s members have developed better nets, trawling gear, and other technologies to help reduce bycatch and damage to the environment. Beyond SeaPact, industry leaders like Trident Seafoods have a well-published commitment to sustainability. In their most recent ESG report, the company identifies their customers, community, employees, and owners as the beneficiaries of sustainable practices (TRD, 2023). Such commitments reflect broad support, not only from management and ownership, but from the public whose concerns often manifest through NGOs.

Prospective Outlook

The preceding discussion has covered a wide range of issues from overfishing and fuel efficiency to policy diffusion and private sector change. It goes without saying that future solutions to climate change will incorporate all of local, global, and private sector policy proliferation. However, while Kern et al (2001) detail the prerequisites for policy diffusion, they note that adopting nations must tailor such policies to their needs. This point cannot be overstated. The United States’ slow roll toward greater fuel economy is a perfect example. PEW research indicates that two-thirds of Americans think the government should do more to address climate change and a bipartisan majority supports tougher fuel efficiency standards (Tyson & Kennedy, 2020, pp. 1-6), yet our aversion to taxes runs countercurrent to those desires. This implies that a wholesale, blind adoption of European gas taxes would not be the best approach. Instead, tailoring tax policy to the American mindset, for example through hybrid incentives paid for by carbon taxes, could achieve the same ends through a slightly different means. In that, innovative policy must compliment private sector innovation and social norms. Policy proliferation, therefore, is as much about adopting what works as much as it is understanding the cultural and political factors at play.

References

CEO. (2017). Fishing for influence: Press passes give lobbyists EU council building access

during fishing quota talks. Corporate Europe Observatory. https://corporateeurope.org/en/power-lobbies/2017/05/fishing-influence

Chasek, P. S. (2016). Global Environmental Politics (7th ed.). Taylor & Francis.

https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9780813350356

Kern, K., Jorgens, H. & Janicke, M. (2001). The diffusion of environmental policy innovations: A

contribution to the globalisation of environmental policy. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228202810_The_Diffusion_of_Environmental_Policy_Innovations_A_Contribution_to_the_Globalisation_of_Environmental_Policy

Nivola, P.S. (2009). The long and winding road: Automotive fuel economy and American

politics. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0225_cafe_nivola.pdf

Safford, R. (2019). Sustainability: A flawed concept for fisheries management? University of

California Press. https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.346

SP. (n.d.). Our projects. Sea Pact. https://www.seapact.org/

TRD. (2023). Ocean allies: Strengthening our bond with the ocean and each other. Trident

Seafood Corp. https://cdn.bfldr.com/VUHD2VO5/as/2htqnw77xq8nrk4snzxc23j/Trident_Seafood_Corp_ESG_Report

Tyson, A., & Kennedy, B. (2020). Two-Thirds of Americans Think Government Should

Do More on Climate: Bipartisan backing for carbon capture tax credits, extensive tree-planting efforts. Pew Research Center. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep57745

Urbina, I. (2020). How China’s expanding fishing fleet is depleting the world’s oceans. Yale

Environment 360. https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-chinas-expanding-fishing-fleet-is-depleting-worlds-oceans

Policy Brief: Green Hydrogen and a Renewable Future

Nearly two decades of incentives and energy policies have spawned a remarkable duality in renewable energy. Solar accounts for just 3.9% of total U.S. electricity, yet California produced so much solar energy, the state essentially threw it away. This has prompted lawmakers to cut back on incentives and delay installations, but nationally there are few signs of solar abating (Osaka, 2024). In February of 2023, for example, the EIA estimated that over half of new U.S. electricity generating capacity would come from solar, compared to just 11% from wind and 14% from natural gas (Fasching & Ray, 2023). If solar proliferation continues, even modestly, this presents both infrastructure and policymaking challenges. Furthermore, the United States’ commitment to 100% carbon-free electricity by 2035 (WH, 2021), necessitates a massive investment in renewable energy. This is further supported by the IRA, IIJA, and FERC order 2222 which not only encourages distributed energy resources like rooftop solar, but requires utilities to integrate DER into the grid. Yet, as the California case shows, the intermittent nature of renewables lends such energy sources to extreme cycles of boom, bust, and waste.

The seasonal characteristics of renewables have made storage a critical component of the green ecosystem. In fact, while the storage conversation centers around lithium-ion solutions, the concept of batteries is broad and often far removed from chemical processes. Pumped hydro and thermal storage are two examples, however, as this paper argues, hydrogen presents an intriguing alternative that can be both green and renewable at scale. Moreover, hydrogen compliments the ancillary, short-term application of traditional batteries by providing robust seasonal energy for those months where little solar is available. In this, hydrogen does not compete with battery storage but instead fills a gap that would otherwise be covered by fossil fuels.

This paper explores the policies that advance hydrogen’s use as a grid-scale energy source in three capacities: a seasonal supplement to intermittent renewable energy, a store for excess renewable energy, and onsite industrial energy supply. The benefits of such applications are threefold. First, committing excess renewable energy to hydrogen production avoids waste as is currently happening in California. Second, as the mix of renewables grows, the impact of intermittent supply will become more apparent. Stored hydrogen provides both cheap and reliable energy to a wide range of customers and helps FERC meet its obligations in those areas. It also helps smooth supply dips, reduces risks to infrastructure and helps RTOs and ISOs ensure adequate, affordable supply to their regions. Finally, stored hydrogen, particularly in industrial capacities, helps reduce congestion by alleviating transmission loads during peak usage periods.

Background & Literature Review

The use of hydrogen is nothing new. In fact, heavy industries around the world produce large quantities of hydrogen for use in everything from fertilizers to steel. It is not, however, widely used as a source of electricity, and its application in this domain remains largely theoretical. That said, hydrogen possesses intriguing potential as a long-term supplement to intermittent renewables. Similarly, it has potential as an alternative power source to energy intensive industries like manufacturing and computing, and as a capacity management system that reduces congestion through DER.

To begin with, however, it’s important to acknowledge the limitations of hydrogen as an energy source. For example, Both Lambert (2007) and McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) write that hydrogen is not as energy efficient nor as cheap as traditional batteries. This is, in part, because traditional lithium-ion batteries store electricity while hydrogen fuel cells manufacture it. This process produces electricity, heat, and water instead of simply releasing electricity (DOE, n.d.). For this reason, hydrogen energy systems are not an ideal solution for intra-day applications. However, both Lambert (2007) and McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) believe it is cost-effective and environmentally favorable when deployed at scale over several months (for example, during winter). Energy efficiency also declines through the process of manufacturing and storage. Flux power (Flux, 2021) writes that hydrogen produced by electrolysis is only 30-40% efficient, while Bloom Energy (Bloom, 2023) was more optimistic, citing efficiencies as high as 60% in certain applications. Regardless, energy loss is a consideration. Furthermore, Edwards et al (2007) cite the “significant energy penalty” (p. 1050) associated with hydrogen storage, not to mention further losses incurred if the gas is used to make steam. Therefore, good policy must consider how hydrogen is to be used, its strengths, weaknesses, and appropriate applications.

Nonetheless, long-term storage is perhaps the most obvious grid-scale application of green hydrogen. Lambert (2020) and McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) each note the potential for hydrogen to be used as a seasonal load balancer, during periods when renewable sources aren’t as plentiful. This seasonal use compliments ancillary systems, like batteries and spinning reserves, by assuming a long-term, base-load role. Moreover, unlike lithium-ion batteries, hydrogen fuel cells do not need to be recharged so long as the supply of fuel remains constant (DOE, n.d.). Moving hydrogen, however, presents both incentives and disincentives for grid-scale applications. On the one hand, Edwards et al (2007) write that the current transportation system cannot be easily converted to carry hydrogen. Moreover, moving hydrogen at scale, they write, will require significant research and development. Lambert (2020), however, cites studies suggesting the existing natural gas infrastructure is indeed capable of handling pure hydrogen. Either way, it’s fair to assume that infrastructure investment will be required to bring hydrogen power to market in large quantities.

Alternatively, these risks can be mitigated by producing hydrogen onsite. In fact, onsite electricity production presents an intriguing opportunity for industry, regulators, and policymakers alike. For example, while residential customers number over 154 million, there are just 900,000 industrial consumers. Yet those customers draw over 25% of domestic electricity, the majority of which is bought from suppliers (Shively & Ferrare, 2019). In fact, according to the EIA (2023), just 15% of industrial electricity is produced onsite, with most of that coming by way of combined heat and power (CHP) generation. In that, there is an opportunity for green hydrogen. Edwards et al (2007) write that hydrogen-based CHP is up to 85% energy efficient, making it an intriguing replacement to natural gas. Such energy efficient solutions take on increased importance as the EIA expects total energy needs to more than double by 2050, with a majority of that being supplied by intermittent renewables (AEO, 2023).

The issue then becomes one of supplying power cheaply enough to economically manufacture hydrogen on-site. This could entail entering into exclusive power purchase agreements or standing up dedicated transmission lines to meet those needs. As with all aspects of the hydrogen solution, transmission is not without complications. Shively & Ferrare (2019) and Robertson & Palmer (2023) both express the difficulty in setting up new transmission lines, and RTOs face significant challenges bringing energy to customers when lines cross multiple jurisdictions. Nonetheless, onsite hydrogen production avoids transportation challenges while also absorbing excess energy from the grid. Perhaps most importantly, locally produced electricity reduces congestion by feeding it directly to the load.

Finally, it’s necessary to discuss some of the existing policies, their challenges and unintended consequences as they relate to hydrogen. To begin with, hydrogen production has many applications outside of electricity that compete for attention. For example, McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) note the challenge for policymakers lies in knowing where hydrogen fits in the green economy. Its power producing capabilities are one potential use, but it possesses a wide range of industrial applications that make knowing how it should be used more difficult.

Perhaps more crucial is green hydrogen’s dependence on cheap energy. Edwards et al (2007) write that though commercial hydrogen is 75% energy efficient, the cost of electrolysis is still several times higher than hydrocarbon-derived production (p. 1047). Over ten years later, the Department of Energy continues to cite the cost of electricity as the single biggest prohibitor to hydrogen production (Peterson et al, 2020 p. 13). Therefore, the success of hydrogen is directly coupled to policies that promote cheap energy. In that, the discussion has come full circle, returning to the dilemma faced by California lawmakers who have curtailed solar incentives due to an overabundance of supply. Rogers & Wisland (2014) summed up this problem rather succinctly, writing that DER integration is not a technical challenge, it is largely one of economics. Specifically, who pays for the cost of transmission when the flow of electricity is reversed (p. 4), or as was the case in California, when prices go negative.

On that note, federal policies have produced both benefits and drawbacks to DER, and by extension, green hydrogen. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act directs federal funds toward the research and development of clean hydrogen energy systems. It also directs research toward more efficient electrolysis and establishes clean hydrogen hubs for developing and promoting new technologies (Christensen et al, 2021). These policies along with a trend of energy decentralization, suggest that renewable energy will be cheaply available to green hydrogen producers over the long-term. On the other hand, serious concerns exist over supply chains and ongoing trade disputes with China, Southeast Asia, India, and others. Nikos et al (2021) write that tariffs put in place under the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 have increased the price of Chinese PV cells by upwards of 60%. The increased costs are one reason solar prices are higher in the United States than in most of the rest of the world (p. 16). Runde & Ramanujam (2020) similarly argue that the pandemic highlighted the United States’ overreliance on foreign supply chains, and suggest a need to reshore American manufacturing. In summary, federal and state policies aimed at the proliferation of DER necessitate supply chains capable of meeting that demand. Consequently, achieving grid-scale green hydrogen as mentioned by the IIJA, is likewise dependent upon international supply chains and trade policy.

Policy Options

As the preceding discussion has shown, green hydrogen offers a compelling solution to seasonal inconsistencies in renewable energy. It is, however, predicated on an abundance of cheap, renewable energy, making it directly dependent on DER and susceptible to international trade policies. Fortunately, it’s not necessary for policymakers to solve a grid-scale problem in one initiative. Much in the way today’s DER initiatives are predicated on over forty years of prior policy, hydrogen adoption can, and arguably should, be done incrementally.

As a starting point, policymakers can target specific industries. For example, Ohio might partner with heavy manufacturers while Arizona and Texas might choose to work with industrial computing. The goal of such programs would be to reduce congestion and enable growth by promoting onsite power production. Under such a program, industry partners could receive abatements, carbon credits, or property tax adjustments based on the percentage of power they generate onsite. Two roughly parallel models exist for this approach: PURPA’s avoided cost stipulation (Shively & Ferrare, 2019) and property tax breaks for homeowners who install DER (Rogers & Wisland, 2014). Such policies are effective in 45 states and carry broad public support. In either case, adapting these policies to industrial customers could incentivize onsite energy production and help meet EIA growth projections while reducing congestion.

It’s important to note that onsite power production doesn’t necessarily require grid-ready fuel cell technology. As was reported by the EIA (2023), most onsite power production comes from CHP processes. The extent to which hydrogen could replace natural gas is a critical point for R&D, however, hydrogen and natural gas blends are an alternative that could work with existing infrastructure. For example, tests have proven blends containing 5-10% hydrogen were compatible with existing technology, and Europe is testing concentrations as high as 20% (Lambert, 2020). Therefore, regulators could stipulate a hydrogen transition that mirrors ethanol additives in fuel, rewarding companies who produce or use green hydrogen in lieu of natural gas.

More importantly, excess energy must be both affordable and accessible. Congestion is one of the biggest risks to supply and often necessitates establishing new lines. Given the difficulties in building new transmission cited by Shively & Ferrare (2019) and Robertson & Palmer (2020), it’s important for RTOs to begin the planning process early. One policy approach could be to build on FERC order 2222 and require utilities to provide hydrogen producers with direct access to excess energy, provided that excess is derived from renewables and used to produce green hydrogen. In that, RTOs and utilities are compelled to build new transmission lines, while industrial consumers are rewarded for investing in green hydrogen DER. Furthermore, Villarreal (2020) advocates for adopting policies that compel utilities to invest in DER, noting that their multi-year planning processes benefit from the flexibility DER provides. Taking industrial demand off the grid reduces both technical and bureaucratic risk.

Finally, ensuring abundant, cheap energy is essential to the success of clean hydrogen, however, as California has demonstrated, incentives lose effectiveness when excessive energy is produced. Nonetheless, for states lacking California’s solar boom, there are effective policies available. For example, Rogers & Wisland (2014) write that net metering and property tax breaks still hold value in most areas. Others, like Ünel & Zerbe (2022) argue that net metering fails to compensate DER owners for the full value of their investment. In that, homeowners should be paid for both the utility and environmental avoided costs (pp. 5-6). Alternatively, requiring utilities to invest in clean energy is another option. For example, as part of their renewable portfolio standard, New Jersey requires 35% of energy sold in state to come from renewables (NJ, n.d.). A final approach, not discussed in any of the literature reviewed here is to require solar on all new construction. This could reasonably be limited to areas conducive to solar generation, and is more appropriate for markets like California where incentives are no longer effective. As with all of these solutions, however, supply concerns exist for such large-scale production initiatives.

Policy Recommendation

Any policy must contain clear scope and success criteria. Therefore, the recommendation in this paper is to create abundant, cheap electricity through DER and provide that energy to industrial partners for the purpose of creating clean hydrogen. McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) advocate for a similar approach, noting the unpredictability of the residential market, appliance compatibility, and a host of other technical complications as reasons to avoid consumer-based solutions. Alternatively, industrial customers often exist in clusters with dedicated infrastructure, some of which is hydrogen compatible, or capable of supplying the power required to manufacture it onsite (pp. 5, 10, 20). Industrial customers are fewer but also have the most to gain from self-managed DER. Provided overhead is sufficiently reduced, supplementing their energy consumption with clean hydrogen may prove cost advantageous, particularly in those periods where renewables are unavailable. Achieving partial grid separation would also help insulate them from extreme price spikes that occur on an intra-day basis.

McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) write that finding an industrial partner willing to share some of the risk is essential to the technology’s success. In this, regulators have an opportunity to incentivize industrial cooperation by providing tax breaks, carbon credits, and direct access to cheap (or free) renewable energy. If opportunities do not already exist for the private sector to partner with the DOE, policymakers should consider expanding the IIJA to include such programs. Local governments could work with specific companies to install, upgrade, or test existing infrastructure for use with hydrogen CHP. The DOE’s EV-focused Workplace Charging Challenge is a good example of what such a policy could look like. The important point is that such policies produce real world infrastructure from which data can be collected.

Finally, amending FERC order 2222 to require RTOs to provide excess green energy directly to industrial customers is a great long-term strategy. There is unfortunately, likely no way around the difficulties of building new transmission lines, though to the extent possible, regulators can work to streamline the process. This policy provides transmission operators with a destination for their excess energy while also incentivizing industry to invest in DER. It’s worth noting that residential incentives are not recommended due to the uncertainty of green hydrogen’s compatibility. In that, it is important that policymakers limit scope as described and work with a handful of participants, perhaps by holding a lottery, where government agrees to share the capital costs associated with green hydrogen infrastructure. On a longer-term basis, regulators need to establish real targets, like those stated around emissions reductions. For example, converting 50% of onsite energy production to green hydrogen by 2050 is one goal. Having all industrial customers fully independent, sustainable, and renewable by 2060 is another objective. Either way, real world infrastructure and measurable definitions of success are critical.

Conclusion

Clean hydrogen presents a terrific opportunity to provide seasonal energy when solar and wind are not available. The risks of hydrogen, including infrastructure compatibility, DER dependence, and international policies, make its viability far from certain. Therefore, policymakers must consider options that are both targeted and carry well-defined measures of success. To that degree, a focus on industrial customers, infrastructure support, including direct access to cheap energy, and active federal partnerships are essential to the success of clean hydrogen.

References

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https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/

Bloom. (2023). Hydrogen power generation and the significance of efficiency. Bloom Energy.

https://www.bloomenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/hydrogen-power-generation-whitepaper.pdf

Ünel, B., & Zerbe, A. (2022). The Role of Information in Distributed Energy Resource

Deployment and Policy. Institute for Policy Integrity. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep45826

Christensen, E.L., Auslander, J.M., & Pilchen, Z.B. (2021). The bipartisan infrastructure

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EIA. (2023). Use of energy explained: Energy use in industry. U.S. Energy Information

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Edwards, P. P., Kuznetsov, V. L., & David, W. I. F. (2007). Hydrogen Energy. Philosophical

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Fasching, E. & Ray, S. (2023). More than half of new U.S. electric-generating capacity in 2023

will be solar. U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=55419

Flux. (2021). Hydrogen fuel cell efficiency. How does it compare to lithium-ion? Flux Power.

https://www.fluxpower.com/blog/hydrogen-fuel-cell-efficiency-how-does-it-compare-to-lithium-ion#:

Lambert, M. (2020). Hydrogen and decarbonisation of gas: false dawn or silver bullet? Oxford

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McWilliams, B., & Zachmann, G. (2021). Navigating through hydrogen. Bruegel.

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NJ. (n.d.). Energy policy in New Jersey. Department of Environmental Protection.

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Shively & Ferrare. (2019). Understanding today’s electricity business. Enerdynamics.

Osaka, S. (2024). Rooftop solar panels are flooding California’s grid. That’s a problem. The

Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2024/04/22/california-solar-duck-curve-rooftop/

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Robertson, M. & Palmer, K. (2023). Transmission 102: Building new transmission lines.

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Rogers, J., & Wisland, L. (2014). Solar Power on the Rise: The Technologies and Policies

behind a Booming Energy Sector. Union of Concerned Scientists. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep00012

Runde, D. F., & Ramanujam, S. R. (2020). Recovery with Resilience: Diversifying Supply

Chains to Reduce Risk in the Global Economy. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26011

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Internal Combustion Engines Role in the Climate Agenda

In 2012 a Connecticut-based startup, LiquidPiston, made waves when it announced plans to create an internal combustion engine with 50% efficiency. While the company intends their design for sub-100 horsepower applications (Wojdyla, 2012), LiquidPiston’s efforts are part of a much broader push to revolutionize ICE technology. These efforts in the face of environmental pressure and a surge in EV production, speak to the durability of the ICE. For example, The Wall Street Journal reports that while ICEs continue to dominate the US market, consumer demand for electric vehicles is stalling and sales of hybrids and high-efficiency ICEs are climbing (Ziegler, 2024). Yet questions over the efficacy of more efficient combustion engines remain, from carbon leakage and the rebound effect to those based on ideological principle. This essay examines the politics and media coverage surrounding fuel economy and the argument that better fuel efficiency is a valid means of reducing GHG emissions.

Regulating fuel economy is nothing new, though for people over the age of forty, the Clean Air Act of 1970 may seem like recent history. To begin with, the CAA mandated a 90% reduction in new vehicle emissions by 1975 (EPA, 2023). Then, following the oil embargo of the next few years, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, which required automakers to incrementally increase fuel efficiency over the coming decade (Nivola, 2009, p. 2). Throughout the 1980s and 90s, the EPA imposed regulation seeking to further limit the amount of carbon and nitrogen-based emissions. Yet despite these efforts, emissions and fuel economy per vehicle improved only modestly and, in fact, declined in the first decade of this century. This regression was largely due to poorly written policy that failed to foresee the rise of light-duty trucks and SUVs, both of which were excluded under existing efficiency regulations (pp. 2, 3). It wasn’t until the Obama administration that policy began to move the needle on fuel economy, aiming to double efficiency by 2025 (UCS, 2016). Nonetheless, the notion of addressing climate change through more efficient use of fossil fuels is seen by climate advocates as a temporary solution if not outright dismissed.

Admittedly, it’s easy to view EV resistance as the product of special interests and the status quo. However, a closer look at the issue suggests efficiency may have a role to play in environmental policy. To begin with the global economy is overwhelmingly reliant on fossil fuel energy. Even advanced economies, like Norway, with strong bases of renewable energy are dependent on fossil fuel exports as a major source of GDP. Furthermore, Santos et al (2021) write that over 60% of global electricity comes from burning fossil fuels and that EV emissions are simply transferred to the source (p. 4). Such carbon leakage has been noted by experts on either side of the efficiency discussion. For example, Karplus et al (2015) write that reduced fuel consumption resulting from greater fuel economy leads to lower prices which makes those fuels more attractive to other industries (p. 520). Gasoline that might have been burned in cars, for instance, is simply burned elsewhere.

Efficiency is not necessarily the panacea that proponents of greater fuel economy might suggest, however. Parry & Pizer (2007) write that increasing miles per gallon can actually increase fuel consumption by encouraging owners to drive more (p. 85). This so-called rebound effect was noted by Karplus et al (2015) and others as a drawback of ICE economy standards. Other scientific bodies such as the Union of Concerned Scientists take a much more optimistic stance, writing that if all the scheduled regulations are implemented, the United States could reduce its oil usage by 2.4 million barrels per day (UCS, 2016). Nonetheless, the propensity of hybrid owners to drive more is a significant argument against greater fuel economy. Finally, hybrids may not be as efficient as consumers believe. The Wall Street Journal ran an article overviewing the costs and advantages of owning a hybrid. They were quick to note that hybrid efficiency is greatest during short commutes or city driving but declines on the open highway (Ziegler, 2024). While this may not affect the majority of drivers, it is the inverse of what consumers have come to expect from traditional ICEs.

As might be expected, the issue of hybrids has drawn media and special interest attention. The Wall Street Journal article (Ziegler, 2024), for instance, was relatively apolitical in its evaluation of the hybrid solution, noting consumer familiarity and a lack of range anxiety as its advantages. On the other hand, CNN (2024) was somewhat critical of Toyota’s resistance to full EVs and continued reliance on hybrid technology. Karplus et al (2015) and Nivola (2009) were pragmatic while Santos et al (2021) were clearly partial to the fossil fuel industry. While it’s difficult to say whether special interests played a role in biasing the aforementioned media coverage, they certainly have a seat at the table. The EPA, for example, is America’s primary regulator of emissions and chiefly responsible for setting efficiency standards. The Union of Concerned Scientists, cited here, advises regulators and industry officials on potential outcomes of policy, while finally, prominent industry leaders Toyota (CNN, 2024), Nissan (Perkins, 2021), and Stellantis (Stafford, 2023) are embracing hybrid innovation. To the extent that oil industry concerns are present, they are secondary to economic and manufacturing efficiency. GM of Toyota North America, David Christ (CNN, 2024) sums up the argument by pointing out that for every EV battery that’s produced, the company could make six plug-in hybrids and ninety standard hybrids (1.45). Christ goes on to argue that green adoption should not be measured in terms of EVs sold, but in carbon remediated.

It's clear from the preceding discussion that promoting greater fuel economy is not without its disadvantages, however good policy begins with acknowledging the risks of rebounding and carbon leakage. The former can be addressed through carbon taxes and cap and trade programs as outlined by Parry & Pizer (2007) while the latter could be dissuaded through carbon border adjustments (carbon tariffs) as advocated by Kardish et al (2022). Most importantly, consumer preference will drive both market and policy decisions. A 2020 PEW survey (Tyson & Kennedy, 2020) found that a bipartisan majority of Americans believe the government should do more on climate and that over 70% favored tougher fuel economy standards. Researchers note that while partisan divides exist on the issues of carbon emissions, carbon taxes, and fuel economy, at least half of republicans favored environmentally-conscious policy in each case (p. 6). Such strong bipartisan support suggests a path forward for policymakers.

In summary, greater fuel economy has a part to play in the global effort to remediate carbon emissions, but it must be supported by policy that limits leakage and transference. It’s clear from the literature reviewed here that the issue of fuel efficiency is salient in the news, scholarly articles, and public opinion. Such broad interest provides an opportunity for policymakers to enforce regulations that benefit both consumers and the climate.

References

CNN. (2024). Toyota sells only two electric vehicles. Executive insists they’re not

holding back. CNN Business. https://www.cnn.com/videos/business/2024/04/11/toyota-executive-electric-vehicles-hybrids-cprog-gr-orig.cnn

EPA. (2023). Timeline of major accomplishments in transportation, air pollution, and

climate change. United States Environmental Protection Agency. https://www.epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-and-climate-change/timeline-major-accomplishments-transportation-air

Kardish, C., Ye, J., Keohane, N. (2022). Carbon border adjustments: Considerations for

policymakers. Center for Clkmate and Energy Solutions. https://www.c2es.org/document/carbon-border-adjustments-considerations-for-policymakers/

Karplus, V., Kishimoto, P.N., & Paltsev, S. (2015). The global energy, CO2 emissions,

and economic impact of vehicle economy standards. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 49(4), 517-538. https://www.jstor.org/stable/jtranseconpoli.49.4.0517

Nivola, P.S. (2009). The long and winding road: Automotive fuel economy and American

politics. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0225_cafe_nivola.pdf

Parry, I.W.H. & Pizer, W.A. (2007). Emissions trading versus C02 taxes versus

standards. Resources for the future. https://www.rff.org/publications/issue-briefs/emissions-trading-versus-co2-taxes-versus-standards/

Perkins, C. (2021). Nissan says it’s working on an engine with 50-percent thermal

efficiency. Road and Track. https://www.roadandtrack.com/news/a35646974/nissan-50-percent-thermal-efficiency/

Santos, N.D.S.A., Roso, V.R., Malaquias, A.C.T., & Baêta, J.G.C. (2021). Internal

combustion engines and biofuels: Examining why this robust combination should not be ignored for future sustainable transportation. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 148, 147-148. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2021.111292

Stafford, E. (2023). 2025 Ram 1500 Ramcharger avoids the range anxiety of EV trucks.

Car and Driver. https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a45734742/2025-ram-1500-ramcharger-revealed/

Tyson, A., & Kennedy, B. (2020). Two-Thirds of Americans Think Government Should

Do More on Climate: Bipartisan backing for carbon capture tax credits, extensive tree-planting efforts. Pew Research Center. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep57745

UCS. (2016). Fuel Economy and Emissions Standards for

Cars and Trucks, Model Years 2017 to 2025: A critical step to reducing oil use and global warming emissions. Union of Concerned Scientists. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17278

Wojdyla, B. (2012). LiquidPiston’s hyper-efficient engine: Turning the rotary inside out.

Popular Mechanics. https://www.popularmechanics.com/cars/a8174/liquidpistons-hyper-efficient-engine-turning-the-rotary-inside-out-13817971/

Ziegler, B. (2024). Should you buy a hybrid car? Here’s what you need to know. The

Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/lifestyle/cars/hybrid-car-is-it-worth-it-69adc329?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1

The Ethics of Performance Enhancing Drug Use in Baseball

In late September 1998, Mark McGwire hit his 70th homerun of the season. It was four more than rival Sammy Sosa and nine more than the prior record of 61 that had stood for nearly forty years. A little more than a decade later, however, McGwire would admit to using steroids enroute to his record-setting season, offering apologies to fans, baseball commissioner Bud Selig, and the family of prior record holder, Roger Maris (Weisbaum, 2010). Though McGwire and a handful of other players would become the face of baseball’s steroid era, responsibility for one of the league’s most prominent scandals falls equally to the Players Association, the league office, and the owners. Morally, however, baseball’s decision to not regulate performance enhancing drug use, amounts to a breach of contract between the fan and the game. Though the league has never admitted to using steroids to rejuvenate baseball following the 1994 strike, it wasn’t until steroid use became public and attendance numbers had recovered, that the league instituted a formal testing policy. This essay, therefore, explores the ethical theories and implications of baseball’s involvement in the steroid scandal, its outcomes, and how future circumstances could be handled differently.

Background and Ethical Dilemma

The decline in attendance following the players strike in 1994 is widely viewed as a pivotal moment in the league’s handling of steroids, however, the fact is, performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) were not a new concern for baseball. In fact, the steroid era is widely viewed as originating in the 1980s, and baseball’s attempts to limit illegal drug use, though weak, date back to the 1970s. The strike brought doping into focus, however, as owners faced twin crises of declining attendance and accelerating PED use. Moreover, the anabolic steroids that typified PEDs during that time, were a controlled substance and subject to federal regulation (Mitchell, 2007). In other words, unauthorized distribution and possession of these drugs was illegal, regardless of baseball’s position on the matter. Therefore, the league had an incentive to moderate performance enhancing drugs if for no other reason than player safety and rule of law. Furthermore, the strike presented an opportunity for both sides to negotiate a solution to PEDs before they became a problem.

At the same time, baseball appeared to be benefiting from enhanced player performance. Attendance and revenue had climbed steadily throughout the steroid era and by 1993, over 70 million people had attended a game compared to fewer than 30 million twenty years prior (BBR, n.d.). Team payrolls had topped $900 million for the first time in league history (BBR, n.d.), and baseball was quickly becoming the domain of rich players and wealthier owners. It’s somewhat unsurprising, therefore, that as the players and owners began negotiating a new labor agreement, the two sides prioritized money over a comprehensive drug policy (Mitchell, 2007). Nonetheless, the negotiations failed to reach an agreement and in August of 1994, the players went on strike.

Major League Baseball now had two competing problems. When play resumed in 1995, attendance, which had climbed steadily for decades, fell by over 30% (Pantuosco, 2011). Consequently, the league faced a dramatic reduction in revenue. The second problem was the proliferation of illegal performance enhancing drugs. On the one hand, the league could maintain the hands-off approach to PEDs that had accompanied baseball’s rise over the prior two decades, and trust that enhanced performance would renew interest; or they could abide by federal law and implement new drug policies that would expose steroid use and further risk the fans’ relationship with the game. Such a dilemma pits aspects of utilitarianism, relativism, and Kantian ethics against one another. However, as will be discussed, the players’ preference for financial priorities and baseball’s recovered attendance figures, suggest that no clear-cut lines of moral superiority exist in baseball’s steroid scandal.  

Solutions Implemented

In the early months of 1994, then commissioner, Bud Selig, proposed adding steroids to the league’s list of banned substances, and instituting a formal testing program for players suspected of doping. This was intended to augment an earlier, informal agreement that had been reached in 1984 under which players could be tested if suspected of illegal drug use, however, neither proposal defined what constituted reasonable cause, making each subjective and difficult to enforce. The league had also made numerous attempts to institute random drug testing over the preceding decades, however these policies had focused primarily on recreational drugs not performance enhancing substances. Regardless, all, including the 1994 proposal, were rejected by the players (Mitchell, 2007).

That said, though the owners appeared to support drug policies, their commitment to enforcing them was weak and easily displaced. For example, future commissioner Rob Manfred, who was baseball’s chief labor negotiator at the time, admitted that after players rejected the 1994 proposal, determining how revenue would be divided between the players and owners was more important than setting drug policy. These priorities would remain in place until the next labor contract was negotiated in the early 2000s (Mitchell, 2007, pp. SR-11, 25, 43-44). Therefore, baseball’s initial solution to the attendance and steroid issue was to maintain the status quo and prioritize money over doping policy.

It wasn’t until 2001, after rumors of steroid use had been picked up by the media, that baseball began a pilot program, testing players in the minor leagues. That program was ratified by major league players in 2002 and formally enforced in 2004. By 2005 baseball’s drug policy had been updated a final time. The first positive test was punishable with a 50 game suspension; a second failed test carried a 100 game ban; and a third infraction resulted in a permanent suspension. In all cases, the player’s name would be released publicly (Michell, 2007). On April 3, 2005, twenty years after the start of the steroid era, Alex Sanchez became the first player to receive a suspension under baseball’s new PED policy (BA, n.d.).

Results

It wasn’t until 1998, a year after the new labor agreement was signed, that rumors first began circulating that St. Louis Cardinals slugger Mark McGwire was taking steroids. At the time, McGwire and fellow slugger Sammy Sosa were pursuing baseball’s single season homerun total. One of the game’s most prestigious records. Indeed, the drama of the homerun chase sparked renewed interest in the game. Pantuosco (2011) writes that the competition between McGwire and Sosa provided the injection of interest that baseball’s owners desired. League-wide attendance numbers further support that assessment. By 1998, over 70 million fans attended games, a number not seen since 1993 (BBR, n.d.). Furthermore, the rise in attendance was accompanied by a “dramatic increase” in offensive output throughout the league in 1996 (Mitchell, 2007, p. SR-14). Renewed interest and offensive output, therefore, positively reinforced baseball’s decision to not control doping and instead, prioritize money and performance.

There were negative consequences as well, however. For example, numerous incidents of steroids, packaging, and syringes being found by team personnel, law enforcement, and others culminated with a federal investigation into an illegal PED distribution center, which had alleged connections to high profile stars including Barry Bonds and Jason Giambi (Mitchell, 2007, p. SR-17). The BALCO investigation, as it was known, ultimately spawned congressional hearings and an independent investigation led by Senator George Mitchell (2007), marking the culmination of baseball’s worst scandal.

Certainly, baseball’s approach to steroids had far reaching implications. On the one hand, it resulted in an era of historical offensive output and rejuvenated fan interest. Additionally, some of baseball’s biggest stars made millions in endorsements as a result of their performances (Pantuosco, 2011, p. 60). On the other hand, baseball traded a PR problem for a moral dilemma. Mitchell (2007) writes, “[t]he problem of performance enhancing substance use in baseball has shaken the faith of many baseball fans in the integrity and fairness of…the records that have been achieve during what has come to be known as baseball’s ‘steroids era’” (p. 12). It has also resulted in players of that era being kept out of the hall of fame. Nearly 20 years after baseball instituted its formal drug testing policies, no player linked to performance enhancing drugs has been inducted into the hall of fame (Uberti, 2016). It must be stated, however, that since baseball instituted its new policy, incidents of steroid use have declined dramatically, though this may simply be due to players opting for newer, non-detectable substances (Mitchell, 2007).

Analysis

 It’s easy to criticize baseball’s handling of steroids following the 1994 strike, but as discussed above, the short-term results were exactly what the owners wanted. Mitchell (2007) writes that the league’s initial response to steroids was slow and ineffective, however this is only the case if the outcome is judged through a reduction in steroid use. Both the players and the owners made clear through their negotiations that their chief concern was money, not drug policy. More importantly, both sides chose to prioritize money over player health and integrity of the game. These realities provide important insight into baseball’s decision-making process and whether their decisions were appropriate.

Under the best interpretation of the owner’s intensions, a utilitarian argument could apply. Baber (n.d.) summarizes utilitarianism as preferencing those actions that produce the best overall consequence and least amount of pain. Baber continues, writing that modern, rule-based utilitarianism instructs societies to adopt only those rules that produce the greatest good for all. Hindsight certainly allows one to judge baseball’s decisions over an ever-lengthening period of time. However, leading up to the strike of 1994, it was clear that the players, by voting down various drug policies, preferred the benefits of enhanced performance over the health risks of PEDs. The boost in offensive output and endorsements are aspects of such benefits. Furthermore, such enhanced performance provided a beneficial version of the game to millions of fans, and indeed, baseball’s attendance toward the end of the 1990s supports this conclusion. It’s also true that baseball’s attendance figures did not dramatically decline following the steroid scandal and have held steady for much of the last 20 years. Importantly, over that same period, league payroll has climbed to over $4.6 billion (BBR, n.d.). It’s difficult to argue, therefore, that from a utilitarian perspective the greater good wasn’t served. Player health would constitute a minor stake in the overall good brought to fans, players, owners, and advertisers. And to the extent that baseball’s laissez-faire approach to steroids damaged the integrity of the game, it hasn’t resulted in decreased attendance. Therefore, on these grounds, baseball’s decision to defer testing was appropriate.

In many respects, baseball’s steroid policy is a collaboration between players and owners. Their initial decision to act (or not act) was mutually agreed upon and largely driven by financial concerns. By the time the steroid scandal broke, and the BALCO federal investigation had begun, the two sides had mutual incentive to formulate a comprehensive drug policy, both for legal and PR reasons. Therefore, the cooperation between players and owners was equitable and presents a strong Kantian argument that their decisions were moral. In the early years of steroid use, the players and owners knew the risks of PEDs, and both chose money over doping controls. As the steroid scandal gained momentum, a comprehensive doping policy became both legally and financially prudent. Therefore, neither side used the other as mere means. On the other hand, while the relationship between the players and owners might have followed Kantian and utilitarian principles, certain moral and ethical deficiencies arise when considering the league’s obligation to the fans.

To begin with, there’s a legitimate Kantian argument to be made that steroid use constitutes a lie. Gendreau (2015) writes that an athlete’s physical performance is central to their public persona. Moreover, their public persona is shared, interpreted, and written in part by the fans. In this way, the fans share in who the player is (p. 516). By using PEDs, the player has deceived the fan about the nature of their physical performance and violated their Kantian obligation to always tell the truth. Moreover, as Rachels (2022) write, Kant placed particular emphasis on the intentions behind one’s actions. By failing to disclose illegal drug use, the owners intentionally misled fans in pursuit of renewed profits. The fans’ participation in the player’s narrative and the fact that financial transactions are central to that participation, imply an obligation on ownership to conduct business in an honest, transparent manner. By failing to disclose PEDs, ownership breached this contract while using the fans as mere means. In this way, the relationship between the league and the public was inequitable.  

While Kantian principles provide a strong basis for both criticizing and defending baseball’s decisions, cultural relativism provides an alternative defense. Consider, for example, that players have estimated that anywhere from 20 – 50% of their peers used PEDs (Mitchell, 2007). Though this number is unverifiable, it suggests a culture of drug use amongst MLB players that goes beyond official estimates. Strulik (2012) argues that not only does such a culture compel athletes to dope, but it produces two fundamentally different moral frameworks. One for the fans and another for the players (pp. 541-542). In that, few parallels exist in public life for the competitive pressure players face. To fans, baseball is a reprieve from daily life. To players, it’s their livelihood. Not only can doping represent a cultural norm within sports, but it’s necessary to remain employed. Such cultural relativism stands in stark contrast to the moral framework of fans who view sports as a diversion, and players as elite athletic performers. Indeed, relativism is a compelling argument if not for the fact that the league (and players) profit from a dishonest representation of themselves. Therefore, while the players and owners acted ethically with respect to each other, both failed in their moral obligation to the fans, upon whom they depend.

Finally, to the extent that fans may want to claim a moral higher ground, such a position is difficult to support. If voting with their feet is any indication of their morality, the 1994 strike proved more salient than performance enhancing drug use. As mentioned, baseball’s attendance numbers recovered and barely dipped when the steroid scandal was at its height. If anything, fans’ continued patronage brings the Kantian inequity of the steroid era into balance. Regardless, though baseball may claim this argument vindicates their handling of PEDs, it nonetheless constitutes a breach of contract. Their decisions were dishonest whether the fans were broadly outraged by them or not. That said, baseball took an enormous risk in not curtailing steroid use before it became a scandal. There was no reason to think fans wouldn’t react badly to player drug use given how poorly they’d reacted to the 1994 strike. It’s also not clear to what extent broken trust lingers or might surface should baseball encounter a new controversy. For these reasons, the preferable policy would be one of prompt and aggressive anti-doping regulations.

Furthermore, if baseball viewed offense as a means of reinvigorating the sport, they might have considered changing the game itself. For example, baseball’s recent implementation of bigger bases, pitch clocks, bans on certain defensive alignments, and other rule changes have all proven beneficial to the game. It’s worth noting, however, that today’s changes do not entirely fit the historical context of baseball thirty years ago. Nonetheless, there were aspects of the game itself that could have been changed and agreed to by the players without violating their obligation to the fans. In this way, the league would have avoided the ethical dilemma it created by neither disclosing nor curtailing steroid use.

In summary, while baseball’s decision to defer a comprehensive drug policy did not violate codes of ethics between players and owners, it did violate their Kantian obligation to the fans. By not disclosing steroid use, the league misrepresented the game to the public upon whom they depend. Furthermore, though hindsight suggests that this was the correct decision, baseball couldn’t have known this was the case at the time. Therefore, while the outcomes of the league’s decisions can be fully justified on utilitarian principles, the correct course of action would have been to proactively establish a comprehensive drug policy and avoid the risks of a PED scandal.

References

BA. (n.d.). Steroid suspensions in Major League Baseball. Baseball Almanac.

https://www.baseball-almanac.com/legendary/steroids_baseball.shtml

Baber, H. (n.d.). The nature of morality and moral theories. University of San Diego.

https://home.sandiego.edu/~baber/gender/MoralTheories.html

BBR. (n.d.). Major league miscellaneous year-by-year averages and totals. Baseball Reference.

https://www.baseball-reference.com/leagues/majors/misc.shtml

Gendreau, M. S. (2015). Who? Moral Condemnation, PEDs, and Violating the Constraints of

Public Narrative. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 18(3), 515–528. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24478637

Michell, G. J. (2007). Report to the commissioner of baseball of an independent investigation

into the illegal use of steroids and other performance enhancing substances by players in Major League Baseball. Major League Baseball. https://files.mlb.com/mitchrpt.pdf 

Pantuosco, L. J. (2011). Does it pay to be unethical? The case of performance enhancing drugs in

MLB. The American Economist, 56(2), 58–68. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23240392

Strulik, H. (2012). Riding High: Success in Sports and the Rise of Doping Cultures. The

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 114(2), 539–574. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41679520

Rachels, J.R. S. (2022). The Elements of Moral Philosophy (10th ed.). McGraw-Hill Higher

Education (US). https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781264998692

Uberti, D. (2016). Baseball writers face moral dilemma in hall of fame vote. Columbia

Journalism Review. https://www.cjr.org/analysis/baseball_writers_annual_ritual_of.php

Weisbaum, W. (2010). McGwire apologizes to La Russa, Selig. ESPN.

https://www.espn.com/mlb/news/story?id=4816607

The Moral Case for Edward Snowden

Acts of espionage present curious ethical dilemmas. In the case of Edward Snowden, he acted because he believed his actions served the greater good, both to civil liberties and to the existence of the country. On the one hand, utilitarian morals certainly apply. Civil liberties form the foundation of this country and broadly benefit the lives of most Americans. On the other hand, Snowden makes subtle appeals to idealistic American values that appear to be deeply personal and subjective. His desire to help Iraqis escape tyranny and his disillusionment with American foreign policy (Winig, 2014, p. 3) capture this sentiment. However, it's not clear to what extent moral frameworks are equipped to judge actions when taken in defense of ideas. Morality is often talked about as it applies to our interactions with one-another, but seldom do we consider how the value of ideas and individuals stack up against each other. For example, do the ideas of civil liberties and unalienable rights hold value apart from their impact on people’s lives? At first, it seems as though they don’t. After all, Kant, Mill, and others attempted to project definitions of morality that imply universal truths, agnostic of cultural context, and they all fail on these same grounds. And yet, people are willing to die for their countries and the ideas that define them.

Such perspective casts Snowden’s actions and the national conversation that followed in a new light. At root was a conversation about the type of society we want to have and how willing we are to defend those values. However, it’s not obvious that this is a moral conversation. The fact that the NSA failed to disclose the true nature of the Patriot Act to congress (and by extension, the American public) suggests an ethically dubious footing (Winig, 2014, p. 1). And Obama’s subtle conflation of transparent policy with disclosing specific anti-terrorist activities is at best, intellectually dishonest (p. 9). Certainly, the members of the state establishment would defend their secrecy (or lie) on utilitarian grounds. Defending the country is, after all, defending the greater good. When defending that greater good transgresses into a personal quest for power, however, is not clear. And so, for this reason, bringing the public into the conversation is to check the power of an overly-intrusive government.

Yet for this to be a conversation about morals, we must agree that civil liberties and the qualities that make America what it is, hold value. Baber (n.d.) writes that morality is a system for determining right from wrong and ethics is the study of that system. I would propose, however, that ethics describe specific actions and morals govern the context of those actions. In that, the government’s failure to disclose their domestic surveillance program was unethical, even if its existence was morally justifiable. The NSA’s defense, therefore, could invoke utilitarian principles even while acknowledging a Kantian obligation to tell the truth. Snowden, on the other hand, would likely argue that not only was the failure to disclose unethical, but the program itself was immoral. Without civil liberties, there is no America. Therefore, actions that violate those norms cannot be done in service to the greater good.

Clearly, these conclusions rest in large part on the value one places on the premise of America. Snowden, for example, makes numerous references to liberties, turnkey tyranny, and the general good of the American people in his communications both before and after his disclosure (Winig., 2014), suggesting a strong belief in America. This moral subjectivism, or right and wrong as determined by the individual, rejects formal premises of morality (Baber, n.d.). Alternatively, Snowden could mount a utilitarian defense, however, his inability to know the outcome of his decisions prevents him from accurately honoring the greater good. His decisions, as was argued by General Dempsey, might have caused far more harm than benefit (Winig, 2014, p. 11) in which case he could only base his actions on subjectivism, even if he believed he was invoking utilitarian principles. Nonetheless, with all of this being said, Snowden’s decisions have proven beneficial in deeply subtle and important ways.

The moral worth of civil liberties may not be obvious but that does not mean they lack value. It may be that, like all moral frameworks, they have value simply because we say they do. Therefore, the why behind our sense of moral value isn’t so important. It’s whether we broadly agree that these ideas hold value that matters. In that, Snowden’s decision put the idea of America up for public vote. It provided Americans an opportunity to reaffirm that the legal and philosophical basis for western governance still hold moral worth. Moreover, the fact that as of 2016, over 56% of Americans aged 18-34 viewed Snowden favorably (Winig, 2016) suggests many young people hold similar values. More importantly, this shared acceptance of value allows us to draw firmer moral evaluations. Because Americans value our civil liberties, they must be considered in our evaluation of the greater good. The government’s failure to disclose the NSA’s spying program, therefore, jeopardized the idea of America and the value Americans place in it. Not only do the NSA’s actions fail on Kantian grounds, but they fail on utilitarian principles as well. Though Snowden couldn’t have known the utilitarian implications of his actions with certainty, we can still say he acted morally, even if from a subjective point of view.

In summary, the national conversation that followed the Snowden leaks was not simply about the legality of his actions, it put the idea of America up for debate. It also helped to establish the moral worth of the laws and civil liberties that govern society. In that, moral clarity can be established that finds while Snowden may have invoked subjective forms of right and wrong, he ultimately acted with morality.  

References

Baber, H.E. (n.d.). The nature of morality and moral theories. University of San Diego.

http://home.sandiego.edu/~baber/gender/MoralTheories.html

Winig, L. (2014). Hero or traitor? Edward Snowden and the NSA spying program. Harvard

University. https://case.hks.harvard.edu/hero-or-traitor-edward-snowden-and-the-nsa-spying-program/

Winig, L. (2016). Hero or traitor? Edward Snowden and the NSA spying program (sequel).

Harvard University. https://case.hks.harvard.edu/hero-or-traitor-edward-snowden-and-the-nsa-spying-program-sequel/

The Symbiosis of Domestic Issues and Foreign Affairs

For many young American’s, the war in Afghanistan has defined their country’s foreign policy. Yet for much of the last eighty years, intervention and globalization have been the status quo. From the Cold War to the War on Terror, the United States has been a global leader, defending western values and American capitalism. The fall of the Soviet Union, however, was followed by the rise of globalization, cheap labor, and the decline of American manufacturing. Between 2000 and 2010, Ohio alone lost over 600,000 manufacturing jobs to outsourcing and automation (Ahmed, 2018, p. 27), while the rise of the service and technology sectors left many blue-collar communities with little recourse. The subsequent loss of jobs and protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have helped to usher in a renewed focus on domestic priorities, however disentangling national concerns from world affairs is difficult if not impossible. This essay examines the interplay between domestic and foreign policy and argues that each cannot exist without the other.

Policy Analysis & Discussion

In an article published in Polity, David Lumsdaine (1996) examines the fusion of domestic and foreign affairs, noting that the norms of the former often influence the latter. For example, states with strong social welfare programs often have strong foreign aid programs. Similarly, protectionist, free-market, or centrally planned societies generally adopt similar international policies (pp. 301-305). In a market-driven representative democracy, like the United States, such domestic priorities may shift generationally or with each election cycle. During the Cold War, for example, foreign policy reflected anti-communist public sentiment and favored international intervention. In fact, not only did the duopoly of the Cold War drive the West’s security apparatus, but it also drove the rise of western manufacturing as American companies filled the industrial void left by the second world war (Ahmed, 2018).

That said, policymakers don’t always follow public opinion. For example, by the turn of the century, domestic issues were once again a national concern. Nonetheless, policymakers pursued a globalist agenda while framing those policies as promoting American jobs (Ahmed, 2018, pp. 11-13). Ironically, these policies decimated Midwest manufacturing and resulted in the aforementioned job losses. Twenty years later, domestic policies are once again a public priority. According to Gallup data, the number of Americans who say the country should take a major or leading role in world affairs has fallen by 15% (Jones, 2023), while Pew Research found that 51% of adults prefer greater attention be paid to domestic issues than on foreign policy (Silver, 2022). Taken together, these data suggest that Americans want U.S. involvement in world affairs, but not at the expense of domestic concerns.

The link between domestic and foreign policy isn’t always so clear, however. For example, Ukraine’s ability to defend its shipping lanes could directly impact national food prices (Berman et al, 2024). European grain exports and U.S. foreign aid, therefore, become domestic issues. America could spend money on Ukraine and prevent a spike in food prices, but it would have less money to spend on national priorities like renewable energy, immigration, crime, and infrastructure. Similarly, protectionist trade policies such as tariffs on Chinese exports also carry unintended consequences. Researchers Selmi et al (2020), studied the fallout of U.S. tariffs, and found that such protectionist policies have largely harmed American companies, noting that the technology, industrial, energy, and consumer sectors were particularly affected (pp. 284, 286, 288). Furthermore, China responded with its own set of tariffs, cutting its reliance on American technology, and favoring domestic suppliers. According to the Wall Street Journal, Cisco, Dell and Hewlett Packard have seen a dramatic reduction in sales, and Adobe, Citrix, and Salesforce have each closed or reduced the scale of their Chinese operations as a result (Lin, 2024). In short, separating international and domestic policy in a globalized economy is difficult. It’s important to consider, therefore, to what degree America can relinquish its status as a global leader and promoter of global trade.

Such concerns are no better illustrated than in the areas of agriculture and manufacturing. According to the EPA, agriculture contributed over $1 trillion to U.S. GPD and employed over 22 million workers in 2019 (EPA, 2023). China is one of the largest importers of American agricultural products, bringing in over $3.2 billion in soybeans alone in 2018. (Selmi et al, 2020, p. 290). At the same time, researchers Burke & Emerick (2016) note that while corn and soybeans are two of America’s most important crops, they are also some of the most vulnerable to climate change. Just one day in excess of corn’s optimal growing temperature can reduce end of year yields by half a percent (p. 108). Furthermore, a majority of American corn and soy is grown in areas benefiting from irrigation subsidies, benefits that Burke & Emerick theorize are unlikely to continue (p. 116). Agriculture, therefore, represents a confluence of domestic, international, and regional policies, bridging both industrial and climate-related interests.

Such interests have begun to impact domestic policy. For instance, while the United States buys roughly 80% of Mexico’s agricultural exports, domestic farmers have not had equal access to the NAFTA market. In response to growing national concerns, certain provisions were added to the USMCA to help American farmers compete in the regional economy (Runde et al, 2021, p. 6). Promoting more multilateral trade between North American countries will help protect American farmers should China go elsewhere for its agricultural needs. Nonetheless, there is no denying the threat to U.S. farmers posed by a trade war with China, decreased globalization, and competition from regional trading partners.

In some ways, the shift toward regional trade perfectly illustrates the tradeoffs between global and local priorities. For instance, since NAFTA was implemented, trade between the U.S. and the rest of North America has tripled. It’s added over $80 billion in GDP and an estimated 14 million jobs to the U.S. economy (Chatzky et al, 2020). Pulling back from China allowed policymakers to invest more regionally and domestically. At the same time, the rise of Chinese and Mexican manufacturing has led to opportunities to reshore some of the labor that was lost over the last twenty years. Institute for National Strategic Studies senior researcher T.X. Hammes (2016) writes that wage gains in Asian and Mexican manufacturing, combined with advancements in robotics, and 3D printing, have made the cost of reshoring more competitive with overseas production. In fact, Hammes believes the 3D printing revolution and the rise of robotics will fuel a proliferation of localized manufacturing (pp. 6-8). Nonetheless, Hammes and others recognize the increase in robotics and elimination of supply chains necessarily means the loss of jobs. While some jobs will undoubtedly be created, how robotics, AI, and advancements like 3D printing effect the labor market are critical policy issues going forward.

On the issue of climate change, regionalization, reshoring, and technological advancements all prove beneficial. As Hammes (2016) points out, shorter supply lines and more efficient production mean fewer greenhouse gas emissions, less waist, and a lower carbon footprint. In this the United States has an opportunity to not only address domestic manufacturing and climate-related concerns, but also emerge as a world leader in the green transition. This begins paradoxically with a reduced focus on world affairs and an increased capacity for domestic spending. The Inflation Reduction Act is one such piece of legislation, providing incentives for a variety of green investments from renewable energy to battery technology; and it’s expected to create over 1.3 million jobs by 2030 (Higgins, 2023). Legislation like the IRA or its predecessor, the Energy Independence Act, not only provides incentives for new technology, but creates opportunities for the manufacturing and fossil fuel economies.

Conclusion

Indeed, a wholly isolationist focus is unrealistic. As this discussion has shown, domestic and foreign priorities come with tradeoffs. Chinese tariffs spurred a renewed focus on regional relationships; aiding Ukraine takes funds away from domestic priorities like immigration and infrastructure; and confronting climate change requires a coordinated global effort, but depends on robust domestic policies. Conversely, increased involvement in European and Middle East affairs necessarily means less money for domestic priorities. In short, there is no domestic policy that is free of global implications. Each must be made with consideration of the other.

References

Ahmed, S. (Ed.). (2018). U.S. foreign policy for the middle class: Perspectives from Ohio. The Ohio

State University & Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/USForeignPolicy_Ohio_final.pdf

Chatzky, A., McBride, J., & Sergie, M.A. (2020). NAFTA and the USMCA: Weighing the impact of

North American trade. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/naftas-economic-impact#chapter-title-0-2

Jones, J.M. (2023). Fewer Americans want U.S. taking major role in world affairs. Gallup.

https://news.gallup.com/poll/471350/fewer-americans-taking-major-role-world-affairs.aspx

Lumsdaine, D. (1996). The intertwining of international and domestic politics. Polity, 29(2), 299-

306. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3235305

Lin, L. (2024). China intensifies push to ‘delete America’ from its technology. The Wall Street Journal.

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-technology-software-delete-america-2b8ea89f?mod=hp_lead_pos8

Hammes, T.X. (2016). Will technological convergence reverse globalization? Institute for National

Strategic Studies. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/media/news/article/834357/will-technological-convergence-reverse-globalization/

Higgins, T. (2023). The inflation reduction act: A year in review. Center for American Progress.

https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-inflation-reduction-act-a-year-in-review/

Runde, D., Sandin, L., & Parham, I. (2021). Opportunities for the U.S.-Mexico economic partnership

under the Biden and AMLO administrations. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep30081

Selmi, R., Errami, Y. & Wohar, M. (2020). What Trump’s China tariffs have cost U.S. companies?

Journal of Economic Integration, 35(2), 282-295. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26917205

Silver, L. (2022). Americans are divided over U.S. role globally and whether international engagement

can solve problems. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/06/10/americans-are-divided-over-u-s-role-globally-and-whether-international-engagement-can-solve-problems/

Norway’s Push for a Renewable Future

A little over 120 kilometers off the west coast of Norway sits the world’s largest aquatic windfarm. The project dubbed Hywind Tampen, is part of the country’s aggressive push into offshore wind and other renewable energy sources. According to the International Trade Administration (a U.S. agency), the Norwegians expect to have 1,500 turbines in operation, producing upwards of 30 GW in renewable energy by 2040 (ITA, 2024). Yet at the same time, a significant percentage of Norway’s GDP comes from fossil fuel extraction. Just 400 kilometers south of the Hywind Tampen project, some of the world’s largest oil and gas platforms occupy the North Sea. While Norway relies primarily on renewable energy at home, they are a major player in the international fossil fuel market. For example, Norwegian natural gas exports cover roughly 3% of global and 25% of European demand (NP, 2023). All told, fossil fuel extraction accounted for nearly a quarter of Norway’s GDP in 2023 (CNBC, 2024). This dependence on fossil fuels and Norway’s status as a green leader make the country an intriguing case study. More importantly, their success at widespread EV adoption, use of renewable energy, and reliance on fossil fuels to pay for it all, provide a template for the green transitions of other western economies.

Policy and Literature Review

Along with rich natural gas deposits, Norway has some of the world’s most well-suited geography for producing renewable energy. For example, 98% of Norway’s electricity is provided by renewables with the overwhelming majority of that coming from hydroelectric dams (Ritchie et al, 2024). Interestingly, while electricity production in terms of TWH has increased steadily since 1970, green energy on a per capita basis has remained relatively flat over the same period (secs. 1-2). This is due in large part to the legacy of Norway’s reliance on hydroelectric power. While much of the world invested in coal and gas-powered plants, Norway built dams. Nonetheless, Norway’s overall GHG emissions have climbed steadily since 1970, peaking around 2004 before gradually declining over the last 20 years (EC, 2023). While this constitutes a surprise, it illustrates that a green economy is much larger than the electric grid and moratoriums on gas powered cars.

Figure 1 Norway's total GHG emissions by sector (EC, 2023).

For example, according to the European Commission (EC, 2023), the majority of Norway’s GHG emissions are from fossil fuel extraction. While global GHG emissions have doubled since 1970, Norway’s emissions related to the production of oil and gas have expanded by a factor of 30.

It's also worth contextualizing Norway’s performance against the United States. Surprisingly, America’s total GHG emissions on a per capita basis have remained relatively flat since 1970 (EC, 2023). CO2 emissions peaked between 2004 and 2007 before declining for much of the next 15 years. By the same measure, Norway’s CO2 emissions peaked around 2010 and have declined only modestly since. This is likely due to a much smaller population and a continued policy of maximizing fossil fuel exports.

Figure 2 Norway's total CO2 emissions by sector (EC, 2023).

Finally, while Norway’s specific policies will be discussed more in the next section, it’s helpful to review international trends in green policy adoption. Ohio State University dean of law, Lincoln Davies (2018) writes that green policies generally follow a three-phase arc, beginning with policy proliferation (at the federal and local level), then by a period of iteration and improvement, and finally a widespread redistribution of successful policies across other green initiatives (p. 315). Furthermore, Davies notes that policymakers are shifting toward market-based solutions rather than feed-in-tariffs and taxes. Such moves are a sign of a maturing green economy (pp. 316-317) and evident in Norway’s transition to a low emission society.

Policy Actions and Recommendations

Norway’s modern relationship with environmental policy began in 1991 when they became one of the first nations to adopt a carbon tax. Today, 85% of the country’s GHG emissions are covered either by EU or domestic CO2 policies (IEA, 2022, p. 10). Norway has been an active participant in the Paris Climate Agreement as well, adopting so-called NDCs or National Determined Contributions to reduce emissions to half of their 1990 levels by 2030. The NDC targets were given legal backing in 2017 by the Climate Change Act, and in 2021, the country introduced the Climate Action Plan, which sets emissions targets on all areas not covered by NDC or EU regulations (p. 10). Norway has also taken aggressive steps to push EV adoption, including setting goals to eliminate all new gas-powered car sales by 2025, waving EV VAT taxes, instituting exemptions on tolls, ferry passes, and parking, and offering free public charging for EV owners. (CNBC, 2024). These policies and the proliferation of electric vehicle manufacturers have resulted in a dramatic increase in EV adoption. For example, according to CNBC reporting, 82% of Norway’s new car sales were electric in 2023 (CNBC, 2024). The rise of EV’s has resulted in an almost 16% reduction in transportation-related CO2 emissions since 2014 (EC, 2023) and a 20% improvement in Oslo’s air quality, according to Sture Portvik, the city’s manager of electromobility (CNBC, 2024, 3.15).

Yet Norway’s electrification has carried unintended consequences and challenges. For example, increased EV adoption has resulted in a dramatic reduction in CO2 tax revenue. At the same time, an increase in EVs has led to increased traffic, wear and tear on the city’s infrastructure and less tax revenue to pay for repairs. In a nod to the policy arc outlined by Davies (2018), policymakers have begun phasing out EV incentives and redistributing the public tax burden more evenly across EV owners (CNBC, 2024). Nonetheless, for all of Norway’s efforts, their GHG emissions remain relatively high. Future policies must work to wean Norway’s economy off fossil fuel production. For example, CNBC (2024) reported that Norway intends to double its electricity output through wind power alone by 2040 (18.30). At the same time, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance has proposed implementing a resource rent on onshore wind power and reinvesting those funds in green technology (NMF, 2024). Another option is to gradually wind down fossil fuel exploration by limiting new permits. Under this model, Norway would exit the fossil fuel industry by 2050 (Statistics Norway, 2020). Such policies could be further paired with subsidies to help ease the industry’s transition to green energy.

Using policies to spur innovation, particularly in battery technology and agriculture is another option. Freyer Battery CEO Bergen Steen cites the American Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) as an example European policymakers could follow (CNBC, 2024, 11.00). The IRA has resulted in hundreds of billions of dollars in green tech investment from battery alternatives to better steel (Worland, 2023). Green technologies could also be applied to agriculture alongside taxes on corporate farms or moratoriums on industrial fertilizers.  In short, it is essential that future policies work to transition existing carbon-heavy industries to low emission technologies, while reducing the footprint of those systems through better batteries and more sustainable practices.

Conclusion

Limiting GHG emissions matters as the impact of pollutants carries global consequences. Norway’s example, even if local, provides at least one possible approach to limiting emissions. That said, it’s important to discuss why some countries fail to address climate concerns. One reason already covered here is geography. Few countries have Norway’s rivers or coastline and therefore don’t have access to hydro or wind alternatives. Another reason is a lack of national wealth. Green tech, while cheapening, is still costly. The infrastructure alone is not conducive to geopolitical instability, nor do developing nations have the resources to invest in such technologies. Domestic concerns play a role as well, from special interests in the oil and gas industries, to a lack of affordability. The rivers of the Pacific Northwest are a terrific source of renewable energy but garner resistance from environmental groups and the EPA. The diverse landscape of the United States similarly prohibits the widespread adoption of solar or wind. Finally, political will makes environmental change difficult. In Norway, there is a culture of shared utility around the use of public funds, and a track record of using that money for the public good. The United States, on the other hand, has no comprehensive energy policy (Kraft & Furlong, 2019), nor does such national trust exist. None of these reasons preclude the adoption of green technology, but they illustrate the complications associated with going green.

In summary, Norway is leading the world’s transition to a green, low emission society, but that transition is predicated on a continued reliance on fossil fuels. While this might seem hypocritical, it illustrates the complexities of going green in an advanced economy. More importantly, the Norwegian model illustrates that fossil fuels are part of the green solution, whether by funding green industries, or transitioning themselves to new technologies.

References

CNBC. (2024, February 17). How Norway built an EV utopia while the U.S. Is struggling to go electric

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The Sun Still Orbits the Earth in Utopia

Evening sun passed through the Parthenon, casting a two-dimensional lattice upon which Plato walked. The philosopher muttered quietly to himself, gesticulating in moments of thought that coalesced around the notion of an idyllic city state. His mentor and friend Socrates, was long dead, executed at the hands of a democratic mob, and it was now against his memory that Plato formed his ideas. The state was not simply a governing body, it was the cultivator of citizens, a parent, a mentor, and guardian. A state did not a great people make. A great state with great institutions made the citizenry. It was therefore with some irony that Plato extolled the higher virtues of human intellect and deplored anything that might pollute the mind. The people, it seemed, were agents of great intellectual potential, but could not be trusted with self-governance (Crawford, 2007). It’s unlikely that Plato included himself amongst those requiring a parental guardian, however. He, after all, was the author of the idea. If only everyone possessed his capacity for intellectual reflection, society might well enter the utopian bliss he sought to create. This inherent selfishness would be mirrored thousands of years later by Marxist revolutionaries like Stalin and Castro, who used such utopian ideas to propel themselves into positions of elite power. Indeed, neither Stalin nor Castro had any intention of condemning themselves to a life of dreary factory work. The revolution and utopia itself were about them. The legions of proletariat were simply useful idiots in a personal quest for power. This essay examines utopian concepts in politics, society, and social media, and explores the thesis that utopian thinking is inherently, perhaps unavoidably, self-serving, and narcissistic.

Much like its Marxist incarnation, utopias are dramatic asymmetries in power masked by curtains of egalitarianism. The Marxist manages to hide this fact in plain sight, notably excluding the elite in their blistering ripostes of capitalism and instead focusing their ire on the bourgeois. Plato was similarly partial to authoritarian governance. As Yves Charbit notes, “[T]he statement that Plato was concerned with ‘equality’ is debatable, and at the very least, should not be understood in the sense of democratic equality. For him, Sparta, not Athenian democracy, represented the most accomplished political model” (Charbit & Virmani, 2002, p. 211). Plato’s guardians, an elite cadre of intellectuals, skilled in logic and unpersuaded by passion were the center of an exclusive upper tier of society. Guardians were imagined to possess the virtues sought in an idyllic citizenry, most notably wisdom and reason. Only warriors were similarly esteemed, and both were privileged in the community (p. 223).  While Plato never explicitly identifies himself as a guardian or a warrior, these ideas are products of his inner dialogue and suggest that his ideal state reflects his self-image. Plato’s utopia, therefore, is his utopia. It not only reflects his values but demonstrates the requisite arrogance to presuppose his values on others. Plato presumes to know what is in everyone’s best interests and withholds the ability for citizens to make such decisions for themselves. In fact, such presuppositions are demonstrated in today’s politics, social movements, and popular culture. They manifest in populism, communism, and identity politics. At the center of these dynamics, however, whether group-based or individual, is an inherently self-centered motivation.

Utopia, exclusivity, power, and revolution are inseparable. Utopian concepts also employ universally simplistic thinking. Sadeq et al (2011) write that utopian thinkers portray the idyllic state as a living reality, enjoyed by all citizens. The end-state is so obvious, they write, that it is taken for granted and with little thought about how it would be implemented or maintained (pp. 131-132). In other words, utopia simply works and almost magically so. More’s vision of a feudal labor system where everyone works the fields (p. 138) captures this quite well. In More’s idyllic state, however, he fails to question the basic assumption that trade work holds equal value – or any value – to all people. Such a society might be quite dystopian for large numbers of people, yet this possibility doesn’t enter into More’s thinking. Therefore, much like Plato’s managed society, one must ask whose utopia More is describing. Has he based his imaginings on empirical research and collective study or is he simply articulating what would make him happy.

Similarly flawed thinking manifests in utopian concepts of power and hierarchy. For example, in a study of narcissism in right-wing populist movements, researchers Golec de Zavala & Keenan (2021) write that members of populist movements see themselves as exceptional and entitled to privileged treatment. They view themselves self-righteously as the only true representatives of national interests. Narcissistic populism, they write, is not about social justice and equality but rather, entitlement and privilege (pp. 2-3). This collective narcissism blends with individual perceptions of self, and personal status is often the underlying motivation for broader nationalist concerns (p. 2-4). In this way, the left and right wings share common ground. For example, Betty Glad (2002) writes that Stalin and Hitler both displayed grandiose yet insecure perceptions of self. Describing both as malignant narcissists, possessing superegos with insatiable appetites for personal glory. Stalin portrayed himself as the creator of a communist world order while Hitler envisioned himself the founder of a pure Germanic utopia, often comparing himself to Jesus (pp. 2, 5, 20). While each of Stalin, Hitler, Plato, and More sought to advance their vision of an ideal state, Hitler and Stalin wrapped their personal motivations in national political movements. It’s important, therefore, to consider whether individual narcissistic behavior manifests at the group level and how each might influence the other.

To begin with, utopias are collectives of sameness. This uniformity was captured quite well in the 2014 film The Giver (Noyce, 2014), which depicts a utopian society of egalitarian equality, surveillance, and tightly controlled social norms. Society is governed by a single matriarchal authoritarian (Meryl Streep), whose knowledge of life before utopia is debatable, but whose singular authority is not. In their paper on narcissism and political affiliation, Hatemi & Fazekas (2018) summarize such political narcissism, writing that political ideologies and attitudes are not just about how one should live, but demanding that all others live the same way. This arises from a definition of narcissism that is not simply being concerned with oneself but is an agglomeration of self, views of others, modes of thinking, and motivations that guide behavior and become part of individual identity (pp. 873-875). Golec de Zavala & Keenan (2021) arrived at a similar bidirectional conclusion, noting that collective narcissism merges group and personal identity, often compensating undermined self-importance with group affiliation (p. 4). In other words, narcissistic behavior not only manifests at the group and individual levels, but each interacts with the other.

Such interactions are evident in today’s social media landscape. Consider the microblogging site Tumblr, for instance. Andre Cavalcante (2019) likens the site to a “queer utopia” and users describe it as a “queer bubble” where one can lose themselves and fall into a black hole (pp. 1715-1716). Tumblr, like all utopian concepts, represents a type of safe space. One where conformity and lack of dissenting opinion are expected. For utopians, safe spaces are synonymous with ‘people like me’ which mirrors the uniformity of sameness expected in utopia. For example, Cavalcante writes that Tumblr is a vortex of similar thought and is nearly devoid of dissenting opinions (pp. 1727-1729). This sameness extends to the use of language as well. For example, users of Tumblr note that there is no need to defend concepts or words and that the site’s queer voice drowns out non-conforming views (p. 1727). This conformity and the loss of self suggests a merging of group and personal identity through common language, experience, and thought as summarized by Hatemi & Fazekas (2018).

Like spatial utopias, digital utopias possess revolutionary ideation. Cavalcante (2019) for instance, reviews prior research indicating that users of digital utopias are not merely content with behavioral and political change, but seek to bring about social revision as well (p. 1723). They carry an expectation of group accommodation. As one user put it, “people [on Tumblr] get it. And if they can, everyone else should” (p. 1725). This collective self-consciousness closely parallels the collective narcissism observed in right-wing populist movements by Golec de Zavala & Keenan (2021), noting that collective narcissists are driven by a belief that their group is unique, exceptional, entitled to privileged treatment, and insufficiently recognized by others (pp. 2-4). Furthermore, Hatemi & Fazekas (2018) write that with respect to identity politics, the demands for attention, benefits, and implied superiority arguably reflect the exhibitionist dimension of narcissism, that is, the expectation that greater attention be paid to one’s wishes, needs, opinions and values (pp. 874-875). Finally, the proclivity of some members to speak on behalf of the group, prefacing statements with ‘As a…’ followed by their identifiers, further suggests narcissistic self-importance (p. 876). More critically, such statements position the speaker at the center of the group and at the head of an impromptu hierarchy, drawing attention to themselves and away from the issue. The utopian thinking embodied in identity politics, therefore, represents the narcissistic traits observed in both Marxist and populist visions of the ideal.

The self-centered nature of utopian thinking can lead to xenophobic tendencies. For example, although Plato’s utopia allowed for contact with the outside world, he expressly sought to limit external interactions (Charbit & Virmani, 2002, p. 209). The sequestration of utopia, however, is common in spatial, cultural, and religious conceptions of society. Travis DeCook (2022) writes that the nature of utopia necessitates not only a separatist purity but an expulsion of all that threatens its order (p. 213). This intolerance is captured by today’s safe spaces, echo chambers, and xenophobic policies on both the right and left, from modern border policy in the United States to legislating cultural difference in Quebec as advocated by Charles Taylor (Gutmann, 1994). It’s represented in popular culture through films like Elysium (Blomkamp, 2013), where utopia is visible from Earth but separated by the vacuum of space. It’s captured in religious concepts where Heaven is separated from humanity both physically and temporally.

More interesting is what these attempts at utopia say about us. Charles Taylor’s essay on politics of difference offers one perspective. Writing on the notion of legislating difference through law, he says, “the goal of [such laws] is not to bring us back to an eventual ‘difference-blind’ social space but…to maintain and cherish distinctness, not just now but forever” (Gutmann, 1994, p. 40). Just as the literature cited by Cavalcante (2019) suggests, utopians are not satisfied with equal recognition and tolerance. There seems a clear desire for advanced social status and an equally clear disinterest in equal treatment. Taylor’s appeals to distinctness are actually a summons to group identity and sameness. In this respect, he seeks to elevate the in-group (French Quebeckers) over the out-group, non-French speaking Canadians.

It’s not surprising that an inherently self-centered paradigm would produce broadly corrosive pressure on society. Stalin and Hitler illustrate the far ends of such extremes, however utopian thinking fails such tests on theoretical grounds as well. As DeCook (2022) writes, More’s utopia utterly fails in its mission to form a better citizenry through state institutions by not only creating worse utopians, but also worse non-utopians. It is a fundamental contradiction, he says, that utopians claim to abhor the dimensions of money, violence, and greed, yet depend on those vices in others for their very survival (pp. 210-215). In this vein, it is debatable whether the utopias of Marxism, populist nationalism, or identity politics, have created better citizens. Certainly, the aspects of intolerance, cancel culture and doxing, are authoritarian and unbecoming of a morally higher ground. Charles Taylor’s (Gutmann, 1994) desire to preserve the French-Canadian culture through law bears similar reflection. It is undoubtedly the version of Quebec that he remembers, not that of someone else or of another time that defines his ideal state. In summary, it’s clear in the examples reviewed here that utopians are not simply satisfied with equal recognition under law and social norms, they are interested in the self-centered acquisition of status and power both for themselves and for their group.

Any closing discussion must acknowledge certain limitations. To begin with, utopian thinking is not necessarily a group attribute. For example, Golec de Zavala & Keenan (2021) note that narcissism predicts nationalism, but nationalism does not predict narcissism (p. 4). A populist might simply agree with a political alignment but not for narcissistic reasons. Similarly, a Tumblr user is not a narcissistic utopian simply for engaging in an online community. In fact, many users cited by Cavalcante (2019) acknowledge the lack of diverse views on Tumblr as a problem. Cavalcante himself calls the limited range of opinion and the potential to inhabit an echo chamber the biggest risks to the Tumblr community (pp. 1727-1729). Finally, it bears special notice that observing narcissistic characteristics is not tantamount to making a clinical diagnosis of narcissism. The thesis of this paper is that utopian thinking is inherently narcissistic and self-serving, not that all utopians are narcissists. In that, the evidence seems strongly aligned with the hypothesis. The deeper question, however, is whether utopian thinking is unavoidably narcissistic and whether that’s all bad. South African scholar Sabelo J Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018) argues that the Cartesian subject (Descartes’ I think therefore I am) replaced God with self and positioned man at the center of the universe (p. 85). While Ndlovu-Gatsheni intended this birth of narcissistic thinking in the context of racism and identity politics, it can be extrapolated further as a universal point of reference for technocratic and atheistic utopian forms, like Marxism. In the absence of a higher power, the self becomes paramount. While this doesn’t wholly describe the paths to narcissistic utopias, after all, many western religions position humanity as the object of God’s attention, it offers some intriguing food for thought. Finally, it must be asked whether utopian thinking has any value or whether it represents a grave threat to society. Certainly, the losers in Stalin’s revolution would argue the latter. Indeed, collective narcissism can represent real dangers to democracy. On the other hand, majority rule can be slow if not impossible to change. Bringing about social revolutions like gay marriage, women’s and civil rights arguably require the hard leadership that only narcissists provide. Therefore, the presence of narcissistic traits in utopian thinking is likely both a feature and a bug. Not all thinkers are narcissists, yet to suppose our ideal state is the perfect state for all requires narcissistic qualities.

In summary, narcissism appears to play a strong role in utopian thinking. This manifests as a need for recognition at both the group and individual levels and persists across political affiliation. Narcissistic qualities are observable in the utopian concepts of Plato and Charles Taylor and in the digital and physical spaces. Finally, while being affiliated with a utopian community or movement does not make one a narcissist, it is clear that the sun still orbits the earth in utopia.

References

Blomkamp, N. (Director). (2013). Elysium [Film]. QED International, Kinberg Genre,

Alphacore.

Cavalcante, A. (2018). Tumbling into queer utopias and vortexes: Experiences of LGBTQ social

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Charbit, Y., & Virmani, A. (2002). The Platonic City: History and Utopia. Population (English

Edition, 2002-), 57(2), 207–235. https://doi.org/10.2307/3246608

Crawford, T. (Ed.). (2007). Plato. Tudor publishing company.

DeCook, T. (2022). The charming circle: identity in utopia, unethical practices, and Augustine’s

two cities. Moreana, 59(2), 208-219. DOI: 10.3366/more.2022.0126

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Golec de Zavala, A. & Keenan, O. (2020). Collective narcissism as a framework for

understanding populism. Journal of Theoretical Social Psychology, 5(2), 1-11. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/jts5.69

Gutmann, A. (1994). Multiculturalism. Princeton University Press

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Social Science, 7(9), 131-141. https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v7n9p131

Social Networking: A new species of media or a public health concern

In 1927 Philo Farnsworth demonstrated the first working version of the television. This device would revolutionize information in ways few could imagine. Media was no longer simply a newspaper, radio, or photograph. It was a talking box that magically combined all three domains into a visual and auditory experience. Certainly, television was transformative, and it would reign supreme for nearly 80 years until the advent of Facebook and social networking. Indeed, the rise of social media has dominated the information landscape in ways that dwarf the impact of television. The ubiquity of the internet and its constant presence in our lives represents something fundamentally different from all previous forms of media. It travels with us in ways that television and radio can’t approach. Its utility is embedded into everything from healthcare to navigation. Yet growing concerns exist about the consequences of social media, its role in our lives, and the potential for physical and psychological harm. This essay explores the case for social media addiction and whether today’s media represent not just the next evolution of communication, but a public health and safety concern.

The idea of media addiction is nothing new. In fact, scientists have been studying the effects of television on behavior since 1964 (Kubey & Csikszentmihalyi, 2004). And much like the conclusions of researchers studying TV, there is general agreement that social media addiction exists, but its definition, prevalence, and even its relationship to our behavior is less clear. For example, researchers at the University of Bergen note that the recency of social media and the lack of uniform data, make determining pervasiveness difficult if not impossible (Andreassen, 2015, pp. 175-176). Similar conclusions were drawn by Kuss & Griffiths (2017) and Reed & Reay (2015). In fact, in the literature reviewed here, there was broad agreement for both the presence of addiction and the need for further study. Concerns over data quality, self-selection, and biasing were also raised by Reed & Reay (2015), Lee (2015), and Tang et al (2017). The data aren’t wholly bad, however. Andreassen (2015) notes that while statistical support for pervasiveness is hard to come by, data suggesting that certain people are predisposed to social networking (social media) addiction do exist. Furthermore, data showing parallels between social media and chemical addiction were cited by Andreassen (p. 176) and Kuss & Griffiths (2017). The latter notes the growing body of evidence that social networking addiction causes symptoms typically associated with substance abuse, such as, mood modification, tolerance, withdrawal, relapse, and conflict (pp. 2, 6). Scientific American draws similar parallels between social media addiction and compulsive gambling, noting that both groups try and fail to stop, and become defensive about the behavior when questioned or prohibited from engaging in the activity (Kardaras, 2016, p. 67). Addiction, therefore, is broadly understood as prioritizing social networking to the detriment of other social activities, relationships, and one’s psychological health and well-being (Andreassen, 2015, p. 175). In other words, addicts display a continued preference for social media, even if such preferences are detrimental.

Nonetheless, defining specific boundaries remains difficult. How much social media does one need to consume before they’re considered an addict. Many social media users engage in normal overuse while maintaining healthy relationships in the real world (Andreassen, 2015, p. 176). Researchers Kuss & Griffiths (2017) generalize this observation more broadly, suggesting that heavy social network engagement might constitute a new normal (p. 5), and may not be problematic. One might imagine a similar observation being made of America’s crowded taverns during the industrial revolution. Were the bars and speakeasies of the 1920s and 30s breeding grounds for alcoholics or a new normal in industrialized America. Such anecdotal observations suggest that addiction, in general, may be difficult to pin down. Researchers may agree that problem behavior exists, but specifically when behavior becomes a problem is less clear.

The previous section has demonstrated that social media addiction has captured researcher’s attention. At the least there seems to be a broad suspicion that social media addiction is real, even if its cause and extent are not understood. In this it is important that the issue be taken seriously as addiction represents a conversion from the digital into the literal. The virtual in the physical. Though it may be unclear when normal use becomes an addiction, research indicates a strong connection between depression, anxiety, guilt, and other psychological issues with social media overuse. For example, Andreassen (2015) writes, social networking sites are used to replace feelings of guilt, anxiety, restlessness, helplessness, and to forget about personal problems (p. 176). Such coping behaviors can affect behavior in the real world. For example, neuroticism, defined as a tendency to experience anxiety, fear, and depression was positively related to private social networking use during working hours (p. 178). Furthermore, social network addicts were unable to separate from social media despite realizing its negative effects. The usage resulted in social withdrawal, insomnia, and other health problems (pp. 178-179). Marshall University researcher Keith Beard (2011) notes the common causes of internet addiction as depression, anxiety, social awkwardness, and a means of escape from domestic issues (p. 103). In fact, studies suggest that the relationship between our psychological state of mind and social media is bidirectional. That is, it can create and worsen pre-existing conditions (p. 102). The negative looping of social media is known to researchers as the Facebook effect. The more friends a person has on the platform, the higher the likelihood they’ll be depressed, and the more time a person spends on social networking, the more likely they are to become addicted (Kardaras, 2016, p. 69). These findings illustrate the complex relationship between social networking and mental health. A relationship exists but in which direction and to what degree remains unclear.

The consequences of social media addiction can manifest in other ways as well. For example, Scientific American cited research showing a link between compulsive texting and poor performance in school (Kardaras, 2016, pp. 67-68). Research conducted by Reed & Reay (2015), suggested that higher levels of internet use were negatively related to self-motivation, study habits, goal orientation, and control over learning. The authors are quick to note that their findings extend the conclusions of prior research, suggesting that excessive internet and social media use negatively impacts grades (pp. 719-720). A separate, non-representative study of African American students found the opposite, however. While 57% strongly agreed that social media and texting were a distraction during lecture, their GPA was not affected (Lee, 2015, pp. 54-55). Amongst the literature reviewed here, however, the aforementioned research was an outlier.

Beyond school, addiction to social networking impacts work and career. Several studies cited by Andreassen (2015) corroborated these findings, concluding that the use of social networks during working hours negatively impacted performance, and in some cases, resulted in termination (p. 180). More generally, researchers find that multitasking is strongly correlated with excessive smartphone and Facebook use (Lee, 2015, p. 54), suggesting that the urge to engage online regularly diverts attention away from the real world. Nonetheless, while addiction to social media can result in negative outcomes, the long-term consequences may take years to play out. Poor academic performance, for example, might lead to declining job or graduate school opportunities. Poor performance at work, particularly if it leads to termination, can result in increased stress, anxiety, and depression, as well as stunted professional growth. Therefore, it’s important to understand the contributing factors of addiction, who’s at risk, and what, if any trends can be determined.

While the limitations of existing research have been noted, many academics recognize the importance of standardizing scales, definitions, and conducting cross-cultural studies. One such study was conducted by Tang et al (2017) which looked at social media addiction amongst young adults in China, Singapore, and the United States. The numbers were eye-catching. For example, 43% of students reported at least one internet-related addiction. Females were significantly more likely to cite social networking addiction and males more likely to cite gaming addiction as problems (p. 676). It’s worth noting however, that gender biases were far less conclusive in other, U.S. based studies. Tang et al add that cultural factors are a significant contributor to addiction. For example, U.S. rates of self-identified social networking addiction amongst males and females were identical, 26.2%. And online gaming addiction was almost wholly an American phenomenon (pp. 676-677). The increased likelihood of female addiction to social media is likely skewed by Chinese data, where, researchers theorize, China’s one child policy and academic pressure lead Chinese children to seek connections through social media that are unavailable at home (pp. 679-680). Like other studies, Tang et al found that depressive symptoms are a leading indicator of addiction; however, they add that being an only child increases the risk of being depressed. It is not surprising, therefore, that Chinese students spent roughly 10 hours per week on social networking compared to about 6.5 for Americans (pp. 678-679). These data further suggest a connection between anxiety, depression, and addiction but point to cultural factors as a potential driver of behavior.

Further studies suggest similar trends amongst adolescents and college-aged adults. For example, Reed & Reay (2015) found that problematic internet usage was much higher in college students than in the general population (p. 720). Nonetheless, these data were acknowledged as exploratory by researchers. Equally in question are the causes of addiction. As discussed, psychological factors such as anxiety and depression may lead to and result from addiction. However, whether addictive tendencies are the product of our environment or biology is contested. Dingel et al (2015) researched the coverage of addiction in academic literature. While the study found consistent interest in environmental factors (such as cultural norms, parenting, and domestic violence), biological drivers dominated the conversation (p. 475). They note that the notion of an addiction gene crowded out alternative theories and treatments (p. 476). Still, researchers including Dingel et al, recognize that environmental and biological factors are not mutually exclusive, and may in fact be complementary (p. 475). Therefore, based on the literature reviewed here, it is likely that some combination of environmental, pre-existing, and biological factors is at play. For example, researchers acknowledge that social media addicts may have other addictions (Andreassen, 2015, p. 178). Scientific American cited studies indicating that 20% of teens, who were engaged in hyper-texting, were twice as likely to have tried alcohol and 41% more likely to have tried illegal drugs. While not synonymous with addiction, researchers note that such tendencies could indicate compulsive behavior (Kardaras, 2016, p. 68).

Finally, the role of technology and the object of addiction are equally contested. For example, is a social media addict addicted to their phone, the applications, or the psychological reward of social approval. In a 1994 Playboy interview, Marshall McLuhan (1994) argued that the delivery method mattered more than the content of the message, commenting that “most people…are blissfully ignorant of what the media do to them; unaware that because of their pervasive effects on man, it is the medium itself that is the message, not the content” (para. 10). McLuhan’s comments strike a different tone when we consider that 90% of Americans have a smartphone (Bortin, 2023), and over 3 billion people worldwide have a Facebook account (Dixon, 2024). In fact, so attached are we to our mobile phones that researchers developed the term nomophobia to describe the fear of being without one’s device (Kuss & Griffiths, 2017, pp. 8-9). The notion of smartphone addiction, nonetheless, remains contested. For example, Kuss & Griffiths argue that the object of addiction isn’t the technology but other people’s confirmation (pp. 6-9). In this way, social media hijacks our need for novelty, or neophilia, while producing interactions that are less satisfying than real world encounters (Kardaras, 2016, pp. 67-68). In reality, our relationship with social media is not exclusively defined by the device or how we use it. Instead, it is both the omnipresence of our mobile phones and the continuous access to social media that differentiates the internet age from all others.

As demonstrated, the idea that social media addiction exists is broadly suspected, however, much remains undefined. For example, anxiety and depression are surely connected, but to what degree and in which direction is under discussion. Furthermore, are we sure that what we’re observing is addictive behavior and not a new social norm. The research shows, after all, that hyper use is predominant among today’s college-aged students, not their parents’ generation. Yet, at the same time, research also suggests that social media invokes biological desires for human connection and confirmation, even if failing to deliver those basic needs. Furthermore, the near ubiquitous presence of mobile phones coupled with the expanding footprint of social networks like Facebook and increasingly, TikTok, make social media available in ways early television producers could never imagine. Indeed, the era of being able to leave the news at home has long since passed. In this regard, social media, mobile phones, social networks, and the internet are fundamentally different than all previous forms of media. In an essay for Harvard International Journal, Neil Postman (2004) wrote that in solving the problem of information scarcity, we’ve created a new problem of information saturation (p. 4). In fact, we may have created a public health crisis. According to the World Health Organization, more people are reporting mental health issues today than in the 1980s and depression is now the leading global cause of disability (Kardaras, 2016, p. 66). The Chinese have recently declared social media addiction a public health risk (Tang et al., 2017, p. 678) while similar concerns are an active point of research at the National Institute of Health. Such actions lend support to the notion that social media are not simply the next evolution of media. They are fundamentally different, having fused biological and psychological factors with unprecedented accessibility to create a new form of media. Yet the lack of empirical data, uniform scales of measure, and most importantly, pervasiveness, fall short of the requirements to support a public health crisis. Therefore, while it is true that social media are fundamentally different from all prior forms of media, declaring their overuse a public health issue is not supported by the research. Better data are required.

In summary, there is general consensus that social media addiction exists, but its pervasiveness and drivers are not fully understood. However, the ongoing evolution of addiction research should not dissuade policymakers from recognizing the risks of social media overuse, and it does not change the assessment that today’s media represents something distinctly different from all prior media. Nonetheless, until better data are made available, it is too early to declare social media addiction a public health concern.

References:

Andreassen, C.S. (2015). Online social network site addiction: A comprehensive review. Current

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Beard, K.W. (2011). Internet addiction in children and adolescents. In H.O. Price (Ed.), Internet

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social networking among young adults in China, Singapore, and the United States. Asia Pacific Journal of Public Health, 29(8), 673-682. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1010539517739558

Texas: A Look Back at the Lonestar State’s Approach to Covid

On March 4th, 2020, the Texas Department of State Health Services reported the state’s first case of covid in Fort Bend County, just outside of Houston. What followed mirrored much of the national response to a fast-moving pandemic. Through a series of executive orders, Governor Greg Abbott issued lockdowns, suspended schools, set hospital capacity and mask mandates, and imposed quarantines on all interstate travelers. Within weeks, however, the state had begun reopening, and by March of the following year, all covid restrictions had been lifted. This essay examines Texas’ response to the covid-19 pandemic, the policy decisions, major actors, and outcomes for one of the nation’s most populous states.

Policy and Literature Review

Within ten days of the Fort Bend covid case, Governor Abbott invoked the Texas Disaster Act of 1975 and declared a state of disaster. The Act’s provisions suspended many of the checks and balances inherent in state and local governance, and enabled the governor to enact sweeping policy decisions (OTG, 2020). Over the course of the pandemic, Governor Abbott would issue over two dozen executive orders, enforcing everything from social distancing to inmate visitation restrictions. In fact, in March 2020 alone, the governor would legislate limits on gatherings, order full lockdowns of non-essential services, and issue mandatory quarantines for all travelers. The state also issued daily reporting requirements and expanded hospital bed capacity to accommodate a surge in cases. Mask mandates, however, would not be issued until July 2020 under executive order 29 (OTG, n.d.).

While Texas may have garnered a reputation for covid obstinance, their early policy decisions, including mask-mandates, were in-line with most other states. California, for example, implemented mask mandates in June 2020, just two weeks ahead of Texas. To the extent that controversy exists, it most likely stems from Texas’ decision to prioritize economic concerns ahead of perceived health risks. Yet Texas’ policies didn’t produce radically adverse results. For example, by the end of March 2020, Texas was averaging 370 new covid cases per day, or 0.0125 cases per 1,000 people. By the same measure, the national rate of infection stood at 0.04 cases per 1,000 people. By the time Texas reopened in March 2021, that average had increased to 0.12 cases (per 1,000) per day but still below the national average of 0.17 cases per 1,000 people per day (Google, 2022). In other words, Texas’ initial rate of infection was one third that of the broader United States and remained below the national average even after opening early. This is not necessarily due to policy, however. While Texas’ restrictions were not that different than most other states, Texas’ population is younger and significantly less dense then harder hit areas like New York. Texas also implemented an aggressive vaccination drive, vaccinating over 1 million people by mid-January 2021 (OTG, 2021). These factors at least partly explain why Texas outperformed national rates of infection, even while being home to large at-risk populations.

Policy Actions

Although Texas would become the first state to deliver over 1 million covid vaccinations, the state’s efforts were not without criticism. The Texas Tribune, for example, noted that vaccine distribution centers were most often located in the hospitals and pharmacies of white affluent neighborhoods, and raised concerns that vaccination wouldn’t be available to the state’s Black, Hispanic, and other at-risk populations (Garnham & Cai, 2021). Such concern for minority infections was echoed by the Texas Health and Human Services Commission. A 2021 report, for example, noted that Black, poor, and socioeconomically disadvantaged neighborhoods had fewer hospitals, physicians, and pharmacies per 100,000 people, than other neighborhoods (DSHS, 2021, p. 7). In a follow up study conducted the next year, the Commission found that Blacks and Hispanics were most likely to get covid and added that Hispanic ethnicity was the strongest leading indicator of covid mortality across groups (DSHSa, 2022, p. 4). Such vulnerabilities were evident in their reliance on social welfare programs as well. For example, throughout the pandemic, Black and Hispanic enrollment in the state Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, was higher than all other demographics (pp. 43-47). Yet the state’s vaccination efforts produced effective results and, at least partly, refute concerns stated in the media.

While Texas enlisted the National Guard to assist with testing in the early months of the pandemic (Wallace, 2020), the Department of Health and Human Services was the primary agency responsible for coordinating vaccination efforts. In fact, the DSHS was arguably the principle policy actor throughout the pandemic, second only to the governor’s office. Administration of the vaccine, however, was predominately conducted by private entities (hospitals, pharmacies, etc). The state DSHS authorized vaccinators and worked with other agencies, such as the Division for Emergency Management and the Texas Education Agency to distribute vaccines and raise public awareness. Concerns over low vaccination rates amongst at-risk communities led officials to begin holding “pop up vaccine events” in Wal-Mart parking lots and other retail locations. The purpose of the events, according to the DSHS, was to increase vaccination coverage among at-risk adults as well as drive vaccine education (DSHSb, 2021). In addition, the Texas DSHS stopped requiring proof of underlying health conditions, which had previously prevented undocumented immigrants from receiving vaccines (Chen & Jameel, 2021). The combination of robust supply, mobile vaccination sites, and decreased scrutiny resulted in broad coverage for some of Texas’ most at-risk communities. By July 2022, 68% of Hispanics reported being vaccinated, while 55% of Whites and 49% of Blacks had received at least one shot (Ndugga et al., 2022). As of 2024, only 0.054 per 1,000 Texans are hospitalized with covid compared to a national rate of 0.065 per 1,000 people (CDC, 2024). These numbers suggest Texas has maintained national parity despite a drive to reopen quickly and perceived vaccine hesitancy.

When evaluating Texas’ response to the covid pandemic, it’s important to recognize the relationship between economic, health, and social priorities. Academics Michael Kraft and Scott Furlong note that prolonged economic hardships and unemployment not only impact families, but also governments, tax revenue, and agency’s ability to provide social services (Kraft & Furlong, 2019, p. 210). This was apparent both in Governor Abbott’s decision to reopen as quickly as possible, but also in the state’s decision to extend SNAP, TANF, and Medicaid benefits throughout the pandemic. While federal assistance was available to all states, local funding was still required for each of the aforementioned programs. Such policies illustrate the balance lawmakers must strike between economic and social priorities. Economic collapse would have disproportionately impacted Black and Hispanic communities, who were more dependent on the continuation of SNAP and TANF than other groups.

As mentioned, KFF data (Ndugga et al., 2022) indicate a majority of Whites and Hispanics have been vaccinated. The Black community remained behind as of 2022 data, however. One policy approach Texas might consider is conducting outreach through members of the African American medical community. That is, work with Black doctors to engage the black community. It may also prove beneficial to offer incentives for developing pharmacies and other facilities in at-risk neighborhoods. That said, gathering quality requirements is perhaps the most important action the state could take. Texas should begin by asking Black communities about vaccine hesitancy and whether such approaches as those suggested above are relevant.

More broadly, the state could consider expanding its Medicare and Medicaid coverage. Together these programs represent some of the most at-risk individuals, from the elderly to the disabled, yet coverage quality remains an issue. Rand Corporation (Rand, n.d.) cites the fee-for-service model, common throughout the U.S. as incentivizing quantity over quality of service. In addition, such structures and the bottomless supply of cash associated with the federal government, leads to overbilling and fraud (Kraft & Furlong, 2019). One potential solution identified by Rand (n.d.), however, is the use of Accountable Care Organizations to help ensure a proper balance of quality and quantity of care. Such ACOs are proliferating across the United States and could help provide better care for Texans with at-risk conditions or long-covid.

Conclusion

In summary, Texas’ initial handling of the covid-19 pandemic was not that dissimilar from other states. Whie their push to reopen was more aggressive than other regions, it required a careful balance between economic, social, and public health concerns. In the end, Texas’ rate of infection and hospitalization were in line with national averages, suggesting that their decisions were not significantly riskier than more conservative approaches.

References

CDC. (2024). Trends in United States COVID-19 hospitalizations, deaths, emergency

department (ED) visits, and test positivity by geographic area. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#trends_currenthospitalizations_select_00

Chen, C. & Jameel, M. (2021). False barriers: The things should not prevent you from

getting a COVID vaccine. ProPublica. https://www.propublica.org/article/false-barriers-these-things-should-not-prevent-you-from-getting-a-covid-vaccine

DSHSa. (2021). Impact of COVID-19 on vulnerable populations in Texas. Texas Health

and Human Services Commission. https://www.hhs.texas.gov/sites/default/files/documents/services/health/coronavirus-covid-19/impact-covid-19-vulnerable-populations-texas.pdf

DSHSb. (2021). DSHS launches new round of pop up vaccine events. Texas Health and

Human Services. https://www.dshs.texas.gov/news-alerts/dshs-launches-new-round-pop-up-vaccine-events

DSHS. (2022). Impact of COVID-19 on vulnerable populations in Texas: Phase 2 report.

Texas Health and Human Services Commission. https://www.hhs.texas.gov/sites/default/files/documents/covid-19-impact-on-vulnerable-populations-in-texas-dec-2022.pdf

Garnham, J.P. & Cai, M. (2021). Advocates worry vaccines will be out of reach for Black

and Hispanic neighborhoods devastated by COVID-19. The Texas Tribune. https://www.texastribune.org/2021/01/09/texas-coronavirus-vaccine-racial-inequality/

Ndugga, N., Hill, L., Artiga, S., & Haldar, S. (2022). Latest data on COVID-19

vaccinations by race/ethnicity. KFF. https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/latest-data-on-covid-19-vaccinations-by-race-ethnicity/

Google. (2022). COVID-19 open data repository. Google Health.

https://health.google.com/covid-19/open-data/

Kraft, M. E., & Furlong, S. R. (2019). Public Policy: Politics, Analysis, and Alternatives

(7th ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc. https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781544374598

OTG. (n.d.). Coronavirus executive orders, funding and waiver. Office of the Texas

Governor. https://gov.texas.gov/coronavirus-executive-orders

OTG. (2020). Governor Abbott declares state of disaster in Texas due COVID-19. Office

of the Texas Governor. https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-declares-state-of-disaster-in-texas-due-to-covid-19

OTG. (2021). Texas first state to administer 1 million COVID-19 vaccines. Office of the

Texas Governor. https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/texas-first-state-to-administer-1-million-covid-19-vaccines

Rand (n.d.). Paying for care: In depth. Rand Corporation.

https://www.rand.org/health-care/key-topics/paying-for-care/in-depth.html

Wallace, J. (2020). National Guard to help with mobile testing. The Houston Chronical.

https://web.archive.org/web/20200403011029/https:/www.houstonchronicle.com/news/article/Gov-Greg-Abbott-deploys-Texas-National-Guard-to-15162555.php

A Proactive Approach to Homelessness

In late September 2021 a fire broke out in the middle of a homeless camp in Seattle’s Ballard neighborhood. Two months later, firefighters responded to another blaze in the same location. The fires, crime, and unsanitary conditions occupying a public park sparked concerns from neighborhood watch groups, homeless activists, and politicians about the rise of homelessness across much of western Washington. Calls for action ultimately led to the park’s temporary closure; however, homelessness continues to be an issue in many of the surrounding areas. The Ballard Commons is one example of the challenge faced by policymakers tasked with resolving the region’s homeless crisis, but also mirrors the issues faced by other states. This essay attempts to answer the underlying causes of homelessness and identify the most effective policy for reducing Washington’s unhoused population.

According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 50% of the nation’s homeless are found in just four states: California, New York, Florida, and Washington (De Sousa et al, 2022, p. 16). Furthermore, the Washington Department of Health (WDOH, 2018) reported that while rates of homelessness broadly declined from 2005 to 2013, Washington’s homeless population increased for much of the next five years (p. 191). Unsurprisingly, the continued prevalence of homelessness and incidents such as those mentioned in the Ballard Commons, have resulted in a great deal of public concern. In a 2023 survey, the Washington Department of Commerce (WDOC, 2023) reported that housing costs and homelessness were the most important issues facing lawmakers, with each capturing 40% of the vote respectively. Nonetheless, setting policy has not been without controversy for the Governor, the state legislature, nor the Department of Commerce who is principally responsible for enacting policy.  

Homelessness is a contentious issue in part because it is both highly visible and poorly understood. Are homeless people lazy, drug-addicted, criminals. Or are they victims of systemic issues beyond their control. In fact, it’s a combination of all of the above. As sociologist Talmadge Wrigt (2000) says, homelessness is not one dimensional. It’s a combination of mental health, substance abuse, and structural factors (p. 30). Other studies echo such conclusions. For example, researchers Lee et al (2010) cite studies suggesting mental illness affects 30%-40% of all homeless people, and that those people are more likely to abuse substances (p. 506). They add, however, that rates of homelessness are highest where affordable housing is at its lowest (p. 509). Similar conclusions were drawn by a 2023 California survey that found 32% of all people surveyed had entered homelessness from a stable living situation. Of those, 58% cited lost income as the primary cause of their becoming homeless, and 63% cited domestic violence, overcrowding, or other conflicts as contributing to their circumstance (Kushel & Moore, 2023, pp.33-40). Such findings suggest that mental illness, substance abuse, and housing are core components of homelessness, but to view them as strictly causal would be incorrect. Instead, the research indicates that homelessness can result from one or a combination of multiple factors.

Any discussion of how to treat homelessness must include a review of existing policies. For example, Washington’s Rapid Capital Acquisition Program uses state funds to purchase hotels and apartment buildings for use as affordable housing (OFM, 2024 p. 17). Similarly, the 1811 Eastlake Housing First Program provides housing to homeless individuals with serious mental and alcohol abuse issues (Larimer et al, 2009 p. 1350). California’s Senate Bill 1380 restricts landlord’s ability to screen applicants based on poor credit, sobriety, or criminal convictions, and requires landlords to accept referrals directly from shelters, street outreach, and other programs (CA.gov, 2016). Subsidies are another approach. Oregon’s Health Authority State Rental Assistance program, for example, offers $500 monthly allowances for qualified recipients (Shroder & Matuga, 2018, p. 58). Additionally, Portland’s Tax Increment Financing program funds affordable housing projects around the Portland metro area (PHB, 2022, pp. 2-3). Alternatively, some states seek to focus on the highest risk individuals. For example, in 2022, New Hampshire launched their Critical Time Intervention program which focuses on reintegrating individuals discharged from psychiatric institutions (DHHS.NH.gov, 2022). Finally, Florida takes a more individualized approach as outlined by their Rapid Rehousing Initiative. Under this plan, local representatives focus on the specific needs of the individual with the goal of transitioning them out of state-sponsored housing as quickly as possible (FL.us, 2023). As this brief review of the literature shows, approaches to homelessness are varied, but all focus on housing as a primary means of addressing both costs, addiction, and stability.

 Housing programs are not only popular among states, but they can also produce real financial incentives. For example, Washington’s 1811 Eastlake program was reported to have been 53% more cost effective than incarceration or inaction (Larimer et al, 2009 pp. 1353-1354). Nonetheless, such approaches are not without drawbacks. The asymmetrical distribution of homelessness around urban centers raises questions over who should pay for a relatively localized problem. Furthermore, affordable housing projects, such as Washington’s Rapid Capital Acquisition program might be broadly supported but rejected by individual communities. Political Scientists Simon et al (2019) refer to such public resistance as NIMBY movements or, not in my backyard. People may support affordable housing, for example, but only so long as it’s not built near them. Still, academics suggest that middle, upper and affordable housing are not mutually exclusive. For example, Talmadge Wright (2000) suggests that such mixed housing could be built without compromising the quality of life for all involved (p. 40). Whatever the approach, affordable housing is among the most popular policies enacted by lawmakers across multiple states.

Other options include raising state (and federal) minimum wages. Washington state, for example, instituted a $16 per hour minimum wage as of 2024, over twice the federal minimum wage of $7.25. While such measures provide real benefit to the workers, they draw strong criticism from businesses, who argue that raising the cost of employment will force them to layoff workers. Such debates are described, in part, by political systems theory. Under such a paradigm an issue’s social, economic, and cultural context shape policy, specifically when confronting public opinion and interest group pressure (Kraft & Furlong, 2019 p. 81). As demonstrated, the minimum wage agenda experienced both supporting and opposing pressure from public and special interests.

Finally, criminalization or forced relocation are policies that have received strong criticism from activist groups such as the Washington Low Income Housing Alliance (WLHA, n.d.), who argue such programs disrupt the sole source stability homeless people have. However, such policies can enjoy public support from communities who simply want a problem dealt with. In fact, the more attention the public pays to a particular problem, the more difficult it will be for special interest groups to influence the outcome (Dur & De Bièvre, 2007, p. 7). This can be challenging for advocacy groups who face mounting public concern over a highly visible problem.  Furthermore, defining success can be difficult. Harvard lecturer Matt Andrews (2022) notes that achieving success involves much more than reaching in-program goals (p. 2). While such views may seem to reduce accountability, consider whether relocation without shelter addresses the underlying issues of housing affordability, substance abuse, and mental health. The goals of such programs might be obtained, but the broader social concern is unresolved. Similarly, affordable housing may provide a long-term solution without addressing the immediate concerns of the public. It is essential, therefore, that policies include both housing, wage, health, and public considerations.

In summary, homelessness is a broadly structural and personal issue. Economic drivers such as the cost of housing, low wages, and unemployment are all issues Washington can address through better policy, however public considerations must be taken into account. As the data show, a coherent strategy of moving people out of public parks and into affordable housing is more cost effective than incarceration or inaction. At the same time, such programs must ensure adequate support for individuals suffering from substance abuse and mental illness, with the goal of enabling them to live productive lives.  

References

Andrews, M. (2022). What is public policy success, especially in development. CID

Faculty Working Paper Series 2022.415, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/37373278

CA.gov. (2016). SB-1380 homeless coordinating and financing council (2015-2016).

California Legislative Information. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB1380

DHHS.NH.gov. (2022). NH DHHS launches new community-oriented program to

support people after psychiatric hospitalization. New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services. https://www.dhhs.nh.gov/news-and-media/nh-dhhs-launches-new-community-oriented-program-support-people-after-psychiatric

De Sousa, T., Andrichik, A., Cuellar, M., Marson, J., Prestera, E., & Rush, K. (2022). The

2022 Annual homelessness assessment report (AHAR) to Congress. The U.S. Department of Housing

and Urban Development. https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/2022-AHAR-Part-1.pdf

Dur, A.& de Bièvre. (2007). The question of interest group influence. Journal of Public

Policy, 27(1), 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X07000591

FL.us. (2023). The 2023 Florida statutes (including special session C). Online Sunshine.

http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0420/Sections/0420.6265.html

Kraft, M. E., & Furlong, S. R. (2019). Public Policy: Politics, Analysis, and Alternatives

(7th ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc. https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781544374598

Kushel, M. & Moore, T. (2023). Toward a new understanding: The California statewide

study of people experiencing homelessness. University of California San Francisco. https://homelessness.ucsf.edu/sites/default/files/2023-06/CASPEH_Report_62023.pdf

Larimer, M. E., Malone, D. K., Garner, M. D., Atkins, D.C., Burlingham, B., Lonczak,

H.S., Tanzer, K., Ginzler, J., Clifasefi, S.L., Hobson, W.G., & Marlatt, G.A. (2009). Health care and public service use and costs before and after provision of housing for chronically homeless persons with severe alcohol problems. American Medical Association, 301(13). 1349-1357. https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/183666

Lee, B., Tyler, K., & Wright, J.D. (2010). The new homelessness revisited. Annual

Review of Sociology, 36, 501-521. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25735089

OFM. (2024). Proposed 2023-25: Budget and policy highlights. Office of Financial

Management. https://ofm.wa.gov/sites/default/files/public/budget/statebudget/highlights/budget23/04-Homeless_Housing_.pdf

PHB. (2022). Portland housing bureau’s 2022 metro bond + TIF opportunity solicitation.

Portland Housing Bureau. https://www.portland.gov/phb/documents/metro-bond-tif-opportunity-solicitation-m-bos-fall-2022/download

Shroder, M. D. & Matuga, M. P. (Eds.). (2018). The housing-health connection.

Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research, 20(2). https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/cityscpe/vol20num2/Cityscape-July_2018.pdf

Simon, C.A., Steel, B.S., Lovrich, N.P. (2019). State and local government and politics.

Oregon State University. https://open.oregonstate.education/government/

WDOC. (2023). State survey: Most people say housing is #1 issue. Washington State

Department of Commerce. https://www.commerce.wa.gov/news/state-survey-most-people-say-housing-is-1-issue/

WDOH. (2018). Washington State Health Assessment. Washington State Department of

Health. https://doh.wa.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/Documents/1000/2018SHA_FullReport.pdf

WLHA. (n.d.). Toolkit to combat the criminalization of homelessness. Washington Low

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Contemporary Sociology, 29(1), 27-43. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2654929  

Avoiding A Return to History

In 2015 a tiny Seattle startup created waves when it announced that all employees would make at least $70,000 per year. Gravity Payments then CEO Dan Price declared that he was cutting his own salary to the new self-imposed minimum. The move garnered national attention from the Seattle Times to the Wall Street Journal, with supporters calling Price a visionary and critics labelling him a Socialist. In fact, both rather missed the point. Whether conscious or not, wage inequality has become salient enough in the American consciousness, that it’s begun manifesting in voluntary corporate policy. Gravity Payments action and the attention it drew are both leading indicators of a deeper problem. America’s social gradient between rich and poor is out of balance, resulting in unhealthy wage disparities and limited social mobility. More importantly, such leading indicators presage more serious declines in our social fabric, trust in government, and open the door for dangerous ideologies.

Differences in outcome are a feature of the capitalist system. This is, at least partly, predicated on preferencing individual freedom over collective stability. Individual failure is allowed to ensure the possibility of individual success. In a society where sufficient numbers of citizens succeed, the overall community (the collective whole) benefits. Plato recognized this relationship in Republic, though emphasized the opposite hierarchy, stating that a wise state begets wise citizens (Charbit, 2002 p. 222). In fact, the relationship is not so binary. A society cannot rise above its citizenry, and a citizenry – at large – will have a difficult time rising above existing social norms. Polarization, income inequality, and affordable housing are all examples of broad social trends that individuals might overcome, but where achieving radical social change is difficult. Gravity Payments decision to dramatically increase its minimum wage, for example, did not spawn a wave of similar movements across the industry, nor does one person choosing to overcome their partisan polarization result in a dramatic sea change. Yet societies do change, and dramatic transformations do exist. The rise of fascism in Germany and Italy, are such examples, as is the multi-century evolution of the American colonies into the United States. The countries of China, Japan, and Vietnam have also undergone radical changes in government and social norms since the turn of the 20th century.

It bears contemplation then that all nations have an inevitable end, including the United States. There will one day, no longer be a thing called America. This need not necessitate a dystopian depression, merely an acknowledgement that history deals from a deck of very limited cards. Each hand has a shelf-life and there is constant pressure to wipe the board clean and deal another round. There is also a propensity, perhaps inevitability, that history will deal a hand previously favored. Utopian concepts, for example, have existed throughout human history and continue to surface in the modern day. Marxism is its most recent conception, but the principles of Marxism are not themselves new. Plato was highly suspicious of democracy, private property, and decadence. In so far as establishing the ideal city, he saw the individual as entirely subservient to the state (Futre Pinheiro, 2006 p. 158). The welfare of the collective, in Plato’s mind, was paramount. The great philosopher John Locke also advocated for strict social controls amongst the American colonies, going so far as to express a need for tithingmen and draconian norms such as neighbors reporting each other’s transgressions (Hsueh, 2008). Both Locke and Plato, and for that matter, Karl Marx, wrapped these totalitarian ideas in a vision of utopia. A perfect society of uniformity, contentedness, and intellectual exploration. It is what makes such ideas so dangerous but precisely what makes them so appealing, particularly in times of great division.

In fact, utopian and totalitarian tendencies manifest throughout the American free world. Homeowners Associations are one such example. These islands of perfection are devoid of individualism, ruled by a vaguely democratic but wholly totalitarian body, where neighbors report neighbors, and the collective can strip owners of their properties. Consider further the East Wind Community, a child of the hippy commune established in 1974 (Mariani, 2020) and which continues to operate in a wholly Marxist manner today. There, food and labor are equally distributed amongst its 72 residents and a minimalist approach is taken to technology (para. 3). More insidiously, our online communities exhibit utopian tendencies through closed (private) groups, closely guarded both algorithmically, administratively, and through strictly enforced social norms. All of these examples suggest that utopian, collectivist, and tribal tendencies are tightly intertwined and very present in western society. It is paramount, therefore, that these tendencies be acknowledged and understood by liberal governments. The attention garnered by Gravity Payments is not so notable because of what it is, but because it is at all. Totalitarian tendencies are corralled only (and then not always), by prosperous societies. When such inequalities exist, utopian ideas gain broad appeal, and they provide a vehicle for totalitarian ideology to spread. In that, Gravity Payments is not an example of Socialism run amok; it is an early warning sign that social inequality is dangerously out of balance.

In summary, history is bound to repeat itself. The utopian concepts of antiquity are just as present today as they were in the time of Plato. Modern inclinations toward totalitarianism are no less benign because they exist in the 21st century, or because they’re wrapped in visions of bliss. They are dangerous because they carry broad appeal when capitalism fails to maintain adequate social balance. It is necessary, therefore, that western governments ensure social mobility to avoid a return to history.

References

Charbit, Y., & Virmani, A. (2002). The Platonic City: History and Utopia. Population, 57(2),

207–235. https://doi.org/10.2307/3246608

Marinari, M. (2020). The new generation of self-created utopias. The New York Times.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/16/t-magazine/intentional-communities.html

Pinheiro, M. P. F. (2006). Utopia and Utopias: a Study on a Literary Genre in Antiquity. In S. N.

Byrne, E. P. Cueva, & J. Alvares (Eds.), Authors, Authority, and Interpreters in the Ancient Novel:

Essays in Honor of Gareth L. Schmeling (Vol. 5, pp. 147–171). Barkhuis. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt13wwxhm.12

The Legacy of Media

As the Berlin wall fell in early November 1989, the demise of communism was heralded across the western world. It was a triumph of democratic principles globally, while hailed a Republican victory in the United States. Images of Germans demolishing one of the most iconic emblems of communism transmitted around the world. It was a landmark moment in modern politics and a pivotal moment in the German national narrative. It is with little surprise, therefore, that few people gave much thought as a newly syndicated radio show joined the chorus of voices heralding this historic moment. From his New York studio, Rush Limbaugh echoed many of the bipartisan sentiments of the time, and his subsequent rise to prominence is due, at least in part, to the fall of communism. It is ironic, however, that Limbaugh, a conservative commentator, would usher in an era of media that would erode the social capital that forms the basis of civil society. More importantly, social media have been left to carry on and refine the legacy of traditional media, through the power of science and algorithms.

In 2023 Fox News had nearly $15 billion in annual revenue (Statista, 2024).  Like many of their rivals, the network relies on a bevy of primetime commentators to attract viewers. And much to the chagrin of their rivals, Fox has continued to lead both CNN and MSNBC in nightly ratings, even as viewership has broadly declined for all networks. Despite the declining ratings, however, the networks have been slow to die. This is partly due to the durability of partisan media. Years prior, Rush Limbaugh proved that such an opinion-based, partisan format could be successful. For conservative networks, like Fox, his syndication proved that a national appetite for such programming existed. Traditional delivery like that of Larry King was suddenly bland by comparison. The subsequent rise of conservative commentary forced the major news networks to respond with a similar, commentary-led format.

The rapid evolution of television, fueled by the competition for viewers was brought about by the onset of for-profit newscasting. Fox News wasn’t the evening news, nor was it just commentary. It was also entertainment. And it lowered the level of critical engagement required by providing the viewer with a ready-made opinion. It was, to paraphrase Rush Limbaugh’s snarky review of his own show, not just the news, but what to think about it (C-Span, 2020). Ironically, this was precisely the criticism levied at Limbaugh throughout his rise. His show wasn’t news in the traditional sense. He was, as he put it, simply responding to the mainstream media (60 Minutes, 2020). This would become the format of dozens of hosts, from Bill O’Reilly and Sean Hannity to Don Lemon. Evening news was replaced by panels of guests with opposing opinions, often talking over one another in chaotic two-minute clashes before breaking. All the while revenues continued to climb, and the networks continued their partisan drift.

Thirty-five years after the rise of Rush Limbaugh, the consequences of partisan broadcasting are at least partially clear. The declining trust Americans place in the media has been widely reported as has the overall decline in ratings. More troubling, partisan media whether in the news or social media, have made Americans less trusting of one another and perhaps less trusting of our institutions. Havard Professor Robert Putnam (1995) describes such trust as social capital. In Putnam’s assessment, social capital has broadly declined with the rise of television. The partisan formula popularized by Rush Limbaugh was adopted by the nightly news and, eventually, reproduced algorithmically by social media. In other words, the media have changed, but the partisan formula remains the same.

Consider, for example, our growing ability to self-segregate through social media. Conservative and liberal groups isolate from one another while Facebook and Youtube algorithms ensure the divide is never crossed. As legacy media erodes and social media continues to grow, the entry point to group participation becomes increasingly important. In the 1980s, for example, groups might have been organized around parent-teacher associations, churches, or YMCAs. While some homogeneity should be expected based on the characteristics of the community, the group was still more or less random. Putnam’s (1995) study, however, shows a dramatic decline in social capital over the last 80 years, suggesting that fewer people are engaged in traditional group activities. Furthermore, physical places are no longer the genesis of group formation. Social media and the internet have replaced churches and community centers. And while the former are welcome to all, the latter are guarded by algorithms and administrators. Group formation, if it were to happen in the physical world, would likely be predicated on our digital affiliations. The polarization of media, therefore, affects not only our perceptions of the world, but our physical interactions within it.

The point of this argument is not to pin the demise of social capital on Rush Limbaugh. The proliferation of partisan commentary is only one aspect of a for-profit, entertainment driven news industry, whose legacy extends beyond cable television to social media and the physical world. Instead, it’s important to realize that polarization is occurring and likely occurring to each of us. It takes relatively little examination to point out the wayward drift in others, but a great deal of self-reflection to recognize it in ourselves. As American critic, Howard Rheingold said, “Unless a great many people learn the basics of online crap detection…I fear for the future of the internet as a useful source of credible news, medical research, financial information, educational resources, scholarly and scientific research” (Hobbs & McGee, 2014, p. 57). In other words, it’s incumbent upon each of us to consume the world in a responsible way.

In summary, the success of partisan national media provided the basis for continued partisan divide in social media. This divide extends not only to the information we consume, but the company we keep. While the decline in social capital is in part due to polarization, its remedy lies in our collective ability to recognize how media manipulates our perceptions and work to undo polarization in ourselves.

References

C-Span. (2020). User clip: Limbaugh tells you what to think. [Video]. C-Span.

https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4853284/user-clip-limbaugh-tells

Hobbs, R. & McGee, S. (2014). Teaching about propaganda: An examination of the historical

roots of media literacy. Journal of Media Literacy Education, 6(2), 56-67. www.jmle.org

Putnam, R. D. (1995). Tuning in, tuning out: The strange disappearance of social capital in

America. PS: Political Science and Politics, 28(4), 664–683. https://doi.org/10.2307/420517   

Statista (2024). Revenue of Fox Corporation in the fiscal years 2017 to 2023. Statista.

https://www.statista.com/statistics/1270363/fox-corporation-revenue/

60 Minutes. (2020, February 5th). Rush Limbaugh: The 1991 60 minutes interview. [Video].

YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=017VvbOOQLo

Welfare Through Empowerment

The ideas of the internet, fiber optics, Amazon and the billionaires they would create were inconceivable to America’s founders. One wonders how the United States constitution might look or whether it would exist at all, had the members of the Constitutional Convention better understood the future. Certainly, western liberalism has produced the greatest economic, political, and military power the world has known. Yet within this system of unbelievable wealth lie vast disparities in circumstances. Indeed, the disparity between rich and poor gave rise to Marxism, Vladimir Lenin, and the Soviet Union. Contemporary western liberals have argued the merits of capitalism from its most radical libertarian extremes to various degrees of welfare state. This essay examines the arguments of the late Northeastern University professor Stephen Nathanson (1998), whose approach, while flawed and at times misleading, arrives at a meritorious conclusion: Social safety nets are the moral obligation of any society that can afford to provide them. Furthermore, this essay argues that understanding the flaws of Dr. Nathanson’s arguments helps advance a more successful version of his ideas.

Welfare State and Nation Building have an improbable commonality. Each is widely despised by various factions of the American demos. In a subjective sense, they share another common thread: Nation building might better describe a government’s obligation to the citizenry and the country it oversees, than the best interpretations of the welfare state. Governments ought to look at social welfare as categorically similar to national defense or infrastructure spending. Investing in, arguably the country’s greatest asset, its people, is not only a morally just cause but also an operationally just expense. In his book, Economic Justice Dr. Nathanson (1998) argues the advantages of such a comprehensive welfare state over the extremes of Socialism and Libertarian Capitalism. However, while he draws some worthwhile conclusions, his reasoning is flawed.

To begin with, Dr. Nathanson (1998) fails to acknowledge the middleclass. He builds his argument on a binary view of extreme wealth and extreme poverty; and, while poverty, in part, drives the need for social safety nets, he leads the reader to the false conclusion that only the conditions of wealth and poverty exist, while overstating privilege and unjust reward. This view obfuscates the much broader problem of shrinking class mobility, and it ignores a critical measure of success in addressing social stability. Instead, Dr. Nathanson uses inheritance as both a means to illustrate the advantages of the rich, and as an example of unjust or undeserved wealth (pp. 57, 64 – 65). However, even a high-level review of the data shows this reasoning to be flawed. For example, according to the Federal Reserve, the average inheritance received by American beneficiaries in 2019, was just $49,200 (Bricker et al., 2020). Even ignoring that this number is inflated by the top 1%, this is still far short of the windfall required to attend college or to retire. Furthermore, according to data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average age at which inheritance is received is 50 – 60 years old (Wolff & Gittleman, 2011 p. 3). Certainly, far too late to advantage someone at the start of life. Finally, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, over 87% of households earning less than $25,000 a year, used economic stimulus to meet household expenses (Perez-Lopez & Bee, 2020). Even if these households received an average inheritance, that money would likely be spent on basic needs, not college tuition or buying a home. The issue is that Dr. Nathanson is logically conflating inheritance with purchasing power. For example, even if inheritance were made illegal, the families of rich children would still be able to afford the tuitions of elite schools, housing costs, and medical care. Furthermore, by committing this logical indiscretion, Dr. Nathanson overvalues the importance of wealth while simultaneously missing the point of wealth stagnation.

As the data show, simply providing money to the poor won’t result in life-changing circumstances. It is the sustained ability to earn more and change social status that matters. Yet, American’s ability to change classes has dramatically declined over the last fifty years. According to the World Economic Forum (Lu, 2020), middleclass wages are stagnating and the percentage of people who earn more than their parents is plummeting. While 62% of aggregate income went to the middleclass in 1970, by 2018, that number was just 43%. Over the same period, the upper class saw their income increase from 28% to 48%, while lower class income fell by just 1%. In other words, the incomes of the poorest Americans have remained relatively unchanged over the last fifty years while the ability to change income status, for most Americans, has diminished. Class mobility and wage stagnation are somewhat different problems than the issues raised by Dr. Nathanson, but their potential solutions are similar.

In fact, one of Dr. Nathanson’s (1998) more intriguing ideas is the notion of a social inheritance, which would be held in trust until some future date (p. 125). He entertains other ideas as well, hinting at concepts of minimum wage or universal basic income (UBI). While these ideas are attractive, they face significant hurdles in practice and in theory. While the inflationary impacts of minimum wage are muted by the fact that only a subset of workers benefit from a wage increase, a trust or UBI would theoretically be available to everyone. Former presidential candidate Andrew Yang (2020) advocated for a universal basic income that would be available to all Americans regardless of earnings. The issue with UBI and to a lesser extent with minimum wage, is that when everyone has the same basic income, the value of that money decreases. The cost of goods whether bread or apartments increases as a result. In essence, inflation will define UBI as the new poverty level. This doesn’t mean that the idea of social inheritance should be written off, but the inflationary consequences need to be thoroughly understood.

Alternatively, western countries ought to focus on enabling outcomes. As Dr. Nathanson (1998) says, “A comprehensive welfare state could operate in different ways. It could provide specific resources such as food, housing, health care, and education” (p. 106). Indeed, such solutions are not without precedent. For example, according to the European Commission, in 2020 Germany spent over $430 billion euros or 12.8% of gross domestic product on healthcare. Over the same period, France reported total national healthcare costs of 12.2% of GDP (Eurostat, 2022). According to the World Bank (2022), Germany and France spent 4.7% and 5.5% of GDP on education in 2020 respectively. Such programs could manifest in the United States, for instance, as an extension of public education to include college and graduate school. Doing so would enable career development while freeing students of crippling debt. Public transportation is another program with near universal benefits. The United States should commit to building the infrastructure to connect communities to one another and ensure access to services like education. Finally, dissociating health insurance from employment is critical. A person who wishes to advance their status by going back to school, should not have to worry about health coverage while pursuing a career that will likely increase their productivity. In short, these programs should not focus on income status specifically, but on universal access to the tools required to build a more productive citizenry.

Dr. Nathanson correctly concludes that nations who can afford social safety nets, have a moral obligation to provide them. However, he incorrectly defines the problem by ignoring the middleclass and the issue of class mobility. In fact, social safety nets are vital to the people who need them, but they should be focused on promoting wage and opportunity growth for all people, not dependence on a discretionary system.

 References

Bricker, J., Goodman, S., Moore, K.B., & Volz, A.H. (2020). Wealth and income concentration in the

SCF: 1989-2019. The Federal Reserve. https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/wealth-and-income-concentration-in-the-scf-20200928.html

Eurostat. (2022). Healthcare expenditure statistics. Eurostat: Statistics explained.

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Healthcare_expenditure_statistics#Healthcare_expenditure

Lu, M. (2020). Is the American dream over? Here’s what the data says. World Economic Forum.

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/09/social-mobility-upwards-decline-usa-us-america-economics/

Nathanson, S. (1998). Economic Justice. Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Perez-Lopez, D., & Bee, C.A. (2020). Majority who received stimulus payments spending most of it on

household expenses. The United States Census Bureau. https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2020/06/how-are-americans-using-their-stimulus-payments.html

The World Bank. (2022). Government expenditures on education, total (% of GDP).

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS

Wolf, E.N., & Gittleman, M. (2011). Inheritances and the distribution of wealth Or whatever

happened to the great inheritance boom? Bureau of Labor Statistics. https://www.bls.gov/osmr/research-papers/2011/pdf/ec110030.pdf

Yang, A. (2020). The freedom dividend, defined. Yang 2020.

https://2020.yang2020.com/what-is-freedom-dividend-faq/

Industry and Lasting Climate Change

In 2008, the orange haze of wildfire smoke filled the Puget Sound basin for the first time in recent memory. Within a few years, forest fires were reported on the west side of the Cascade Mountains and smoke infiltration into the urban area became an annual occurrence. The abnormally barren slopes of the Olympic Mountains and severity of summer drought suggested an apparent change in climate. Even the diminishing need to mow the lawn was peculiar. Though these are all anecdotal observations, they are examples of how individual experience shapes environmental sentiment. In fact, such observations can lead to fervent public support for environmental policies, but they can also lead to wide swings in sentiment, preferred solutions, and even whether a problem exists at all. This essay examines the interplay between public, state, federal, and special interests, and argues that while the various approaches to climate change are not mutually exclusive, public opinion is too irregular to drive policy. Instead, legislators ought to focus their efforts on incentivizing the private sector to adopt and create green technology.

In an essay published in Environmental Policy: New Directions for the Twenty-First Century, Drs. Christopher Borick and Erick Lachapelle write that, contrary to what one might expect, popular support for climate policies doesn’t necessarily correspond to legislative policy (Vig, et al., 2021, p. 63). Furthermore, public opinion on the environment itself is highly irregular. For example, in just a year and a half from April 2008 to October 2009, public belief that there was solid evidence for global warming fell from 71% to 57% (p. 64) and by 2011, the number of Americans who believed climate change was occurring had fallen to levels not seen since 1997. By 2017, however, climate change acceptance had once again risen to over 60% (p. 66). These examples illustrate how within only a decade, public sentiment toward the environment swung from popular support to minority issue and back again. These dramatic turns in public opinion are not indicative of climate science or environmental policies. They’re reflective of fickle public concern. As Drs. Borick and Lachapelle observed, the decline in sentiment toward global warming in 2009 directly corresponded to the Great Recession (p. 64). While not definitive, this is evidence that the salience of environmental issues is not as robust as the more immediate concerns of finances, home, and family. Therefore, it’s not hard to see how garnering political support, much less enacting law would be very difficult when public attitudes toward climate are so fluid. On the other hand, studies suggest that the environmental divide between rural and urban residents may be moderating. For example, in research conducted by University of Utah Professor, Mark Brunson (Brunson et al., n.d.), survey data found that while environmental attitudes between rural and urban dwellers differed, the difference wasn’t so extreme. These findings run opposed to the stereotypical divide between urban and rural views on climate. Yet achieving consistent public policy at national and even state levels remains difficult.

Not only is public attitude subject to change, but what to do about climate is equally as subjective. Is solar, wind, tidal, or geothermal the preferred renewable energy solution? Are lithium powered EVs, bikes, blimps, or scooters tomorrow’s method of transportation? Is rainwater harvesting ecologically responsible or taking resources out of the natural environment? Clearly, the variety and number of potential solutions to climate change make the job of legislating extremely difficult.

However, while public opinion on the environment is erratic, special interests provide some measure of focus. For example, timber companies might advocate for the renewable nature of forestry. Environmental interests might bring awareness to endangered species or agricultural concerns in Africa and Brazil. Regardless of the point of view, special interests provide staying power that can outlast public opinion. As Oregon State University Professor, Brent Steel (1996) writes, “It has been noted that disequilibrium in society or in a specific policy arena is often a stimulant to interest group formation and heightened group activity” (pp. 401-419).In other words, while the public at large might be undecided on renewable energy solutions, special interest groups exist to advocate for such concerns.

Furthermore, the disequilibrium referenced by Steel isn’t isolated to the realm of public opinion. Such inequality exists in financial and human resource capacity as well. These differences influence how various special interest groups from environmental NGOs to corporations interact with state and local governments. For example, environmentalist groups tend to focus on policy through litigation and activism (elite challenging), whereas corporations tend to focus on lobbying agencies and individual politicians (Steel, 1996).

This difference in approach can represent popular public opinion. For example, Steel (1996) writes that with a strong plurality of people identifying as environmentalists, there is incentive for both special interests and corporations to consider public opinion. Certainly, with the rise of social media, hashtags, and viral posts, the ability for a financially underpowered organization to make a difference in the national narrative has changed over the last two decades. These are all positive indicators for environmentalists, however special interests are not a cure-all for climate issues. Climate by definition is a global phenomenon and therefore macro in scale. NGOs and special interest groups, on the other hand, are often hyper focused on a single issue or a subset of issues. The scale of the problem and resulting efforts are therefore incongruent.

In a sense the environmental movement and, to a degree, public opinion are anarchial. That is, there’s no central authority that determines which environmental pursuits are worthwhile and which are not. Policy is still subject to whatever is popular at the moment. However, the anarchial nature of environmental priorities provides an opportunity for both states and the federal government to issue guidance. In some senses, state-level engagement offers an attractive alternative to more distant federal governance. State-level approaches theoretically are closer to home and resonate more with public officials and their constituents. States can also lead by example or build coalitions on climate issues. On the other hand, states have no shortage of bureaucracy or special interests. The latter presents both competitive and potentially ethical issues for environmentalists seeking to enact legislative change.

University of Michigan Professor Barry Rabe (Vig, et al., 2021) writes extensively on climate policies and the trend toward increased state autonomy on climate issues. While there are benefits to the increased localization of climate policy, increased state autonomy comes at the cost of reduced federal funding (p. 37). That said, the federated approach to climate could be an ideal model for western democracies. The federal government sets goals and the states determine how to achieve them. However, there are two fundamental challenges to this approach. First, senators and representatives are elected for six- and two-year terms, respectively. This makes establishing lasting policy difficult as the system is engineered to elect officials who represent the most current public concerns. Second, climate policy is written by state and national officials whose campaigns are often financed by corporations. Asking lawmakers to regulate an industry that may have helped them get elected is a fundamental conflict of interests.

That said, Congress and state governments can be stout environmental allies. As Carleton College Professor of Science, Technology, and Society, Norman Vig writes, President Reagan faced stiff congressional resistance to his deregulatory climate agenda in the early 1980s. Ironically, the backlash against Reagan’s policies strengthened existing environmental regulations such as the Clean Water Act (Vig, et al., 2021, p. 91). Congress also retains budgetary and confirmation powers that can be used to check adversarial climate agendas. In this sense, the bureaucracy or, status quo, works to protect environmental policy.

Nonetheless, the same short-term risks to the climate agenda exist in Congress as do at the state and local levels. Indeed, the cyclical nature of Western government is what makes democracy work. Yet it is precisely what makes dramatic and committed environmental change extremely difficult. Ironically, the answer for Western governments and environmentalists may be to embrace private industry. Such an embrace is not without precedent. Consider, for example, that following the Civil War, the federal government financed the transcontinental railroad. During the Great Depression, FDR’s New Deal financed a boom in new construction. The United States even subsidized oil companies to incentivize domestic production during World War II. That said, the United States’ track record on green energy subsidies is less consistent. In a paper published by the Center for Strategic International Studies, researchers Jack Caporal and William Reinsch (2021) found that green subsidies declined by 59% from 2010 and 2019 (p.6). Though such subsidies have increased over recent years they remain well below 2010 levels. Nonetheless, according to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (Fasching, 2022), electricity generation from renewable sources has increased steadily over the same period. These data suggest private sector commitment to renewable energy and should incentivize further government assistance.

Finally, in a market economy, competition, innovation, and incentives work to transform and erect new sectors. Instead of viewing industry as an adversary, subsidies seek to leverage capitalism as a resource in the climate agenda. Furthermore, while still vulnerable to the same democratic risks cited above, subsidies leverage the human capacity to innovate and create a new status quo.

In summary, public support for environmental policies is inconsistent and, while special interests provide some focus to environmental issues, they are still driven by public concerns. To this extent the political systems of Western democracies are beholden to public opinion and market conditions. This makes widespread legislative change more difficult. Instead, governments ought to leverage their economies to create new sectors that not only challenge the status quo but result in lasting climate change.

References

Brunson, M., Shindler, B., Steel, B. (n.d.). Rural versus urban differences in natural resource

management.

Caporal, J. & Reinsch, W. (2021). Toward a climate-driven trade agenda. Center for Strategic and

International Studies. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep28809.4

Steel, B., Pierce, J. C., & Lovrich, N. P. (1996). Resources and strategies of interest groups and

industry representatives involved in federal forest policy. The Social Science Journal (Fort Collins), 33(4), 401–419. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0362-3319(96)90014-2

Fasching, E. (2022). In the first half of 2022, 24% of U.S. electricity generation came from renewable

sources. U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=53779

Vig, N. J., Kraft, M. E., & Rabe, B. G. (2021). Environmental Policy: New Directions for the Twenty-

First Century (11th ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc. (US). https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781544378039

The Tools of Conservation

As the first American settlers expanded west into the frontier, they were met with a seemingly infinite abundance of resources. From gold and timber to bison and beavers, the New World supplied industries with a bounty of raw materials. There was, as former ambassador to the WTO Michael Punke says, a myth of inexhaustibility about the American west (Burns, 2023, 1:41.00). The prairies, forests, and mountains were so vast, that it was inconceivable to most Americans that those resources could ever be depleted. This was no more apparent than in our management of the American Buffalo. What began as herds in the tens of millions were hunted nearly to extinction. Historian Dan Flores calls it a destruction of animal life without precedent in human history (1:44.00). Yet the same society that nearly wiped out the bison acted to save them from extinction. It is with similar irony that many of America’s early conservationists were hunters, foresters, and other people whose lives depended on a fruitful and sustainable land. This paper explores America’s approach to natural resource management, the role of government, and the tools employed to ensure sustainable policies.

Natural resource management begins at home. It is perhaps one of the easiest points of entry for the public to engage in good environmental stewardship, however it remains one of the most contentious issues in contemporary politics. Drs. William Lowry and John Freemuth write that public lands and national parks are widely supported by the public at both the state and federal levels; however, what to do with those lands remains politically contested (Vig et al., 2021, p. 209). At the same time, from 2005 to 2017, national park visitation increased by over 20% (p. 212), suggesting that Americans value the environment and resources within it. The public’s role in natural resource management is therefore divided. On the one hand, American’s value having access to those resources. On the other, conservation has become entangled with political affiliation and partisan points of view.

While partisan politics have slowed environmental progress in recent decades, Congress has passed conservationist legislation with bipartisan support. The Endangered Species Act is one such example. In fact, from 1980 – 2020, spending on conservation and land management increased by 27% (Vig et al., 2021, p. 19). National parks have expanded greatly over the last two centuries as well, broadly due to congressional action. However partisan politics remain active within the conservation debate. For example, University of Wisconsin Professor of Political Science, Michael Kraft writes, Republicans have consistently favored industrial interests, particularly since the mid-1990s (p. 112), representing a shift away from the bipartisan collaboration of the prior two decades. The partisan shift has also prevented reform to existing regulations, like the aforementioned Endangered Species Act and the Superfund program (pp. 128, 129). In short, Congress is the primary federal entity capable of passing laws that protect natural resources, however party politics can impede progress.

The fact that Congress has been able to achieve any movement on environmental issues is somewhat remarkable given the lack of jurisdiction granted by the constitution. However, Political Scientist Kimberly Smith writes, that while the constitution doesn’t provide Congress with explicit authority over natural resources, Article IV has been broadly interpreted by the courts as giving Congress such jurisdiction (Vig et al., 2021, p. 146). This interpretation grants extraordinary power to Congress as the legislature controls Federal funding to the agencies charged with managing natural resources. Critically however, the President appoints the heads of these agencies, which often carry partisan motivations. The nominations of Presidents Reagen and Trump to the EPA are good examples of such appointments (pp. 91, 100). Therefore, while the courts have granted Congress the authority to manage America’s resources, the agencies in charge of executing that management are largely directed by the President.

On the one hand, the size of the United States supports a direct regulation, command-and-control approach like that discussed above. On the other hand, the diversity of environments, population centers, local economies, and industrial concerns make such an approach unrealistic. However, central planning has nonetheless resulted in successful policies. The Antiquities and Resource Conservation Acts are good examples of such regulations. The former protects natural and manmade artifacts and has been used to expand America’s national parks (National Parks Service, 2023). The latter helps to protect waterways and other natural resources from contamination (Vig et al. 2021, p. 375). Federal agencies such as the National Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and National Park Service combine to manage forests, access to natural resources, and protect wild spaces. While agencies’ agendas can fluctuate with different presidencies, their centralized nature allows for broad application of regulations. Driving consistency across the American continent would be difficult if such objectives were left entirely to individual states. That said, centralized planning is not without drawbacks.

To begin with, the ecological diversity of the United States makes a one-size-fits-all approach impractical. This has led to policy friction between federal and state authorities. For example, natural resources like fossil fuels are often subject to federal and state guidelines (Vig et al. 2019, p 208). Local industries can influence state policies in ways that conflict with Federal objectives. For instance, partisan politics played a role in the GOPs pursuit of privatization for large swaths of federal land, as lawmakers from those states sought to represent local interests (p. 208). That said, while partisan politics have hindered progress over the last two decades, they’ve opened the door for an era of collaboration.

Drs. Chris Ansell and Alison Gash of Berkley define collaborative governance as the process of bringing various environmental interests together with the goal of fostering collaborative decision making (Ansell & Gash, 2007, p 543). This approach theoretically results in a more informed solution by involving opposing interests such as conservation groups and timber companies. The Colorado river is one such example of collaborative management, where state and federal agencies, Native American tribes, and agricultural interests are working together to share the river’s resources (Kenny, n.d., pp. 71-76). These are certainly positive indicators for a collaborative approach; however, Drs. Ansell and Gash point out that participation can be court ordered or mandated by other authorities. Hence, the incentives and good faith efforts of the participants are paramount (Ansell & Gash, 2007, p. 552).

While efforts to manage the Colorado river are an example of collaborative governance, they are a better case study in sustainability planning. Rivers, forests, and fisheries are all examples of what academics refer to as common pool resources (Ostrom et al., 1999, p 278). In such cases, quotas or shares are assigned to private interests as a way of managing the overall resource (p. 279). In the case of water rights, those interests can also be public entities. Ideally managing common pool resources takes on a self-sustaining, industry-led capacity. That is, the various interests monitor their usage of natural resources in a responsible way, free of direct regulation. Drs. Ostrom et al, write however that such normalization is not always effective and typically regulatory oversight is required. Nonetheless, collective cooperation can be established, and flourish provided self-interested parties are not dominant (p. 279).

Finally, science-based decision-making can play a strong role in each of the above approaches to resource management, however whether it does is largely up to the special interests involved. How we manage natural resources is inherently a scientific question, whether it be how we extract oil from shale or the effects of overfishing on various aquatic species, science is simply the involvement of data. Though this can mean a scientifically led approach to policy, it does not necessarily mean so. In fact, most scientists prefer to not take a dominant role in setting policy (Steel et al., 2004 p. 5). The role of science should be to advise policymakers on the likely outcomes of various decisions and allow legislators to determine the best course of action. That said, science is not impervious to special interests. The issues of global warming, leaded gasoline, and tobacco are all examples where industrial interests funded science that supported a continuation of the status quo. For this reason, the profit motive has largely stifled market solutions to conservation.

The American buffalo is perhaps the best example of just how destructive market forces can be toward natural resources. America’s salmon and king crab fisheries are also examples of how free market priorities forced regulatory intervention. However, policy makers and markets do not have to be at odds. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development advises governments to treat resource efficiency as economic policy, and proactively engage with international supply chains to reduce duplicity and waste. The OECD also advocates for reducing investment barriers to environmental goods and services (OECD, 2018 p. 21). Such collaborative policies ought to reduce hostilities and produce better long-term solutions. More importantly, there are incentives for companies to act in the interest of conservation. First, conservation ensures not only the sustainability of the resource, but that of the dependent economies as well. Second, there is broad public support for conservationist policies from both rural and urban populations (Brunson et al., 2009 pp. 6-7). Furthermore, the increased power of urban centers, consumer spending, and social media provide powerful incentives for companies to act in sustainable ways. This could be Weyerhaeuser publicizing its land management and reforesting practices, or the efforts of mineral extraction companies to restore depleted mines. There are opportunities for market forces to change behavior as research by Ostrom et al (1999). showed, however these changes must be incentivized by the market. In other words, consumers must choose where they spend their money and reward those companies who embrace sustainable practices.

In summary, natural resource management invokes federal and state agencies, special interests, and a mix of central and collaborative planning. Market forces are largely kept out of the conversation except where consumers reward sustainable practices. Managing our natural resources, therefore, requires a mix of all the major players, from federal and state agencies to private interests and consumers alike.

References

Ansell, C. & Gash, A. (2007). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. The Journal of Public

Administration Research and Theory.

Brunson, M., Shindler, B., & Steel, B. (2009). Rural versus urban differences in natural resource

management. Oregon State University.

Burns, K. (Director). (2023). The American Buffalo [Film]. Florentine Films.

https://www.pbs.org/kenburns/the-american-buffalo/

Kenny, D. (n.d.). The environmental politics and policy of western public lands (pp. 71-79). Oregon

State University.

National Park Service. (2023). Antiquities act of 1906.

https://www.nps.gov/subjects/archeology/antiquities-act.htm

OECD. (2018). Global material resources outlook to 2060. Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development. https://www.oecd.org/environment/waste/highlights-global-material-resources-outlook-to-2060.pdf

Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C.B., Norgaard, R.B., & Policansky, D. (1999). Revisiting the

commons: Local lessons, global challenges. Science, 284, 278-282.

Steel, B., List, P., Lach, D., & Shindler, B. (2004). The role of scientists in the environmental policy

process: A case study from the American west. Environmental Science and Policy, 7, 1-13.

Vig, N. J., Kraft, M. E., & Rabe, B. G. (2021). Environmental Policy: New Directions for the Twenty-

First Century (11th ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc. (US). https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781544378039

Afghanistan: A Microfinancing Opportunity

A quick internet search of 1960s Afghanistan reveals a society that is unrecognizable today. Sixty years ago, Afghanistan was flourishing. Women and men intermingled, and girls attended coeducation schools. Then, following a series of coups, the Soviet invasion and the American-backed Taliban, Afghanistan fell under strict Islamic rule. A dramatic reduction in personal freedoms, access to education, food, and healthcare followed, while extreme poverty and religious rule have resulted in broad social exclusion, hunger, and a lack of basic needs. These issues are difficult to solve, and Afghanistan lacks much of the necessary infrastructure to deliver services at scale, however marginal improvements in living conditions are possible. This essay examines various local approaches to relieving poverty while remaining clear of systemic challenges such as infrastructure and governance.

Background

Landlocked and sharing long borders with Pakistan and Iran, Afghanistan sits in Central Asia, about 200 miles from the Arabian Sea. The region contains modest reserves of petroleum, natural gas, and mineral deposits. Traditional exports include low volume production of textiles, food products, and a variety of goods from furniture to shoes (CIA, 2023). The most widely publicized export under the Taliban’s first ascent to power was opium, however the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported that as of 2023, poppy production (as measured by land under cultivation) had declined by 95%, primarily due to a self-imposed ban on poppy farming (UNODC, 2023).

Poverty continues to define the Afghan way of life, however. According to the Multi-dimensional Poverty Index, Afghanistan’s 55% poverty rate in 2016 was the highest in the world (UNDP, 2023, p. 6). The country’s HDI score was similarly grim, ranking Afghanistan 180th out of 191 (UNDP, 2021, p. 274). Furthermore, according to the UN’s news agency, 95% of Afghans aren’t getting enough to eat (United Nations, 2022). In other words, there aren’t a diversity of options for Afghans facing extreme poverty and starvation.

Poor governance has plagued the country as well, with allegations of corruption widely reported during the West’s occupation of Afghanistan, and equally well documented oppression under the current Taliban regime. Further complicating matters is the Taliban’s isolation from the global community. This isolation, rampant poverty, and the freezing of over $7 billion in national assets by the United States, has left acting prime minister Mohammad Hassan Akhund with little to govern.

Despite its economic challenges, however, Afghanistan remains a fascinating case study. Consider that in just the last sixty years, the country has seen monarchial, theocratic, and democratic rule. It has twice been occupied by superpowers, endured decades of war, and though bordered by much stronger neighbors, it has continued to exist. The fact that a people can endure so much hardship and persist, is cause for optimism that a better future is possible.

Development Issues

Poverty is the single biggest development issues facing Afghanistan today. The effects of such conditions are varied, from hunger and bad health to hopelessness and lawlessness. More importantly, however, is the exclusion that comes with it. Academics Janet Gornick & Natascia Boeri define social exclusion as the absence of opportunity to make the most of one’s life (Gornick & Boeri, 2016). While this has several applications in Afghanistan, it is most visible in the Taliban’s treatment of women, who are forbidden from travelling, going to school, and holding most jobs. This constitutes a remarkable sequestration of the country’s productive population. Yet the restrictions on Afghan women are more than economic. As Gornick & Boeri write, social exclusion is both material and social (pp. 223, 224). Women are not only prevented from working, but they are also almost entirely cut off from society. This has a compounding effect on the economic mobility of families, whose working age women may be willing but not allowed to contribute.

One cannot talk about Afghanistan without talking about religion. The concepts of social exclusion and religious rule may seem academic; however, they help contextualize the relationship between development issues and their consequences. For example, religion impacts local government’s ability to treat the symptoms of poverty, such as hunger and disease. As research consultant Rick James writes, faith can be both a powerful and flammable agent for change (James, 2011, p. 110). Mixing religious views with the Taliban may be more risk than any Faith-based Organization (FBO) wishes to take on, for example. The resulting lack of aid compounds the short and long-term effects of hunger including lower IQs, impaired health, and malnourished children (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, p. 31). Furthermore, hunger and poverty exist in a negatively symbiotic relationship, where each feeds the other. Malnourished children are less productive, less intelligent adults, who are less capable of lifting their country out of poverty.

Policy Options

While mixing religion and relief carries risks, engaging with Muslim faith-based organizations to provide relief is nonetheless an intriguing approach. As Erica Bornstein (2002) of Berkely writes, people of faith have a long history of providing agricultural, education, and self-help assistance in places state-sponsored actors were unwilling to go (p. 5). Rick James (2011) adds that the communities that are the most in need are often communities of faith themselves, as is the case in Afghanistan. In other words, there’s a sense of common ground between recipient and giver.

As mentioned, conflicts over religious points of view may compound the effects of poverty. However, the risks aren’t all due to the Taliban. For example, the religious values associated with FBOs can interfere with the delivery of relief, as was demonstrated during the early days of the HIV epidemic (Clarke et al, 2011, p. 6). In another example, Erica Bornstein writes that World Vision sees economic transformation, morality, and redemption as intertwined (Bornstein, 2002, p. 9). Such a conflation of relief, faith, and morality offers all sorts of risks if the local community accepts the aid but rejects the faith. Nonetheless, FBOs whether Afghani or other, working locally with individual communities is worth exploring.

Promoting better healthcare locally is another option that should not radically compromise Taliban principles, nor should it require complex investment and infrastructure planning. For example, Banerjee & Duflo (2011) talk extensively about the effectiveness of mosquito nets at reducing rates of malaria, or a few drops of chlorine at preventing water-borne illnesses. Another benefit to prioritizing better healthcare is that it can be done through partnership with faith-based organizations. Essentially, an FBO who is permitted to operate inside Afghanistan for one purpose could deliver medical supplies as well. Finally, as an example of what basic disease prevention can do, research cited by Banerjee & Duflo indicates that children who grew up malaria free, earned up to 50% more throughout their adult lives than children who got the disease (p. 45). In other words, for the cost of a mosquito net or a few drops of chlorine, developing nations like Afghanistan can have more productive and better off adults.

Finally, microfinance is the most intriguing option Afghanistan could pursue. While poverty might seem counterintuitive to the notion of lending, microfinance is specifically designed to work in impoverished communities. For example, it has helped hundreds of locals start or grow businesses in places like India and Southeast Asia (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). Furthermore, loans do not have to constitute thousands of dollars. Grameen Bank, a microfinancier based in Bangladesh, for example, offers annual $450 maximum lines of credit for first time borrowers (Grameen Bank, 2023).

That said, while it’s easy to overplay the snowball effect of microfinance, there are limits to its ability to lift communities out of poverty. First, recipients of microfinancing are overwhelmingly poor and remain poor after having paid back their loans (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). Second, ensuring repayment is difficult and requires dedication on the part of the lender (p. 167). These are not reasons to avoid microfinance, however the commitment to the borrower and the limits of microfinance must be recognized.

Policy Recommendation

Afghanistan presents a number of challenges that could be addressed through better policy and governance. However, it’s important to keep in mind the likelihood that any such policy would be considered. Poverty is presumably something the Taliban government care about but lack the infrastructure to address. An alternative to massive development projects, however, is to lean on wealthier Afghans (perhaps government officials themselves), to act as lenders and financiers of microcredit.

The benefit of microfinance is that it provides individual families with opportunities to start small businesses that generate modest profits. Those profits can be used to buy other essentials, like food, medicine, clothing, or another loan. While other solutions like FBO assistance or medical aid are needed, microfinance provides the potential to meet those needs by cultivating micro-economic activity. In other words, generate incomes at an extremely local level that can be used to afford basic needs. That said, the scale of these operations should not be overexaggerated. One of the microfinance success stories cited by Banerjee & Duflo (2011), for example, was that of an Indian woman who began collecting and sorting trash by hand, then by cart, and eventually buying garbage from her neighbors. While a worthy success story, the results were still very local and should not be conflated with the outcomes of venture capital. The woman in the story remained poor and continued sorting garbage by hand. Credit allowed the woman to lift her family out of extreme poverty into a less dire, but still poor circumstance. It did not afford her a middleclass lifestyle.

Probably the more intriguing benefit of microfinance is that it could be administered by the Taliban, on a village-by-village basis. As discussed in the policy options section, servicing loans is a significant source of overhead for microfinanciers, however the Taliban’s near-ubiquitous control of government and civil services, as well as being one of the few sources of money in the country, make them a curious option. Furthermore, Pashtunwali which promotes a code of honor and shame (Glatzer, 2002), is widely understood by most Afghans, and could be a platform to establish trust that borrowed money will be repaid. Said differently, there is a cultural basis by which accountability can be presumed and enforced as a form of social insurance.

Finally, implementing microfinance is not without risks. First, sourcing the money to lend is a challenge. In the examples cited by Banerjee & Duflo (2011), the host countries where microfinance was taking place all had existing economies, whether in India or Southeast Asia. Afghanistan has virtually no economy by comparison. This challenge is not easily surmounted except through wealthy Afghans deciding to lend. Second, the wealthiest Afghans may be Taliban officials. As mentioned, the Taliban may be well positioned to operate microfinance schemes, however, their reputation for fear and brutality might preclude anyone from borrowing. This could be mitigated however by lending to Afghans in more conservative parts of the country. Upon establishing trust, they could branch out into more urban, comparatively liberal parts of Afghanistan. Finally, microfinance has limited upside, however, Afghanistan’s aforementioned 55% poverty rate suggests that even small increases in income can make a worthwhile difference.

Conclusion

Afghanistan is a troubled but formidable country. Its people face widespread poverty, starvation, and an oppressive religious regime. Yet there is opportunity for small scale, local efforts to produce meaningful change in the lives of individual families through microfinance. Unlike other policy approaches, microfinance enables entrepreneurial expression, generates income for families, and allows those who find success to buy food, medicine and other essential supplies. Most importantly, microfinance begins to break down the barriers of social exclusion by focusing on enablement through lending.

References

Banerjee, A. V. & Duflo, E. (2011). Poor Economics: A radical rethinking of the way to fight global

poverty. PublicAffairs.

Bornstein, E. (2002). Developing faith: Theologies of economic development in Zimbabwe. Journal

of religion in Africa, 32(1), 4-31. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1581670

CIA. (2023). The world factbook. CIA.gov.

https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/afghanistan/

Clarke, M. Charnley, S. & Lumbers, J. (2011). Churches, mosques, and condoms: Understanding

successful HIV and AIDS interventions by faith-based organizations. Development in practice, 21(1), 3-17. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23048380

Gornick, J.C. & Boeri, N. (2016). Gender and poverty. In D. Brady & L.M. Burton (Eds), The

Oxford handbook of the social science of poverty. (pp. 221-246).

Grameen Bank. (2023). Loan product details. Grameen Bank.

https://grameenbank.org.bd/loan/basic-loan-

James, R. (2011). Handle with care: Engaging with faith-based organizations in development.

Development in practice, 21(1), 109-117. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23048388

UNDP. (2023). 2023 global multidimensional poverty index (MPI). United Nations Development

Programme. https://hdr.undp.org/content/2023-global-multidimensional-poverty-index-mpi#/indicies/MPI

UNDP. (2022). Human development report 2021-22. United Nations Development Programme.

https://hdr.undp.org/content/human-development-report-2021-22

UNODC. (2023). Afghanistan opium survey 2023. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2023.pdf

UN News. (2022). Afghanistan: Food insecurity and malnutrition threaten ‘an entire generation’.

United Nations. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113982#

Environmental Policy: No Easy Solutions

In 2020 Gallup released a poll announcing that environmental issues were once again a salient force in the minds of most Americans. Survey results indicated that as many respondents expressed support for environmental issues as did for the economy (PEW, 2020). While these results seem to bode well for environmental issues, they embody the broader challenge faced by policy makers and special interests. Public support for environmental issues ebbs and flows. It is fickle, transient, and often subject to more pressing social needs. It is therefore difficult to create effective legislation, tackle long-term issues like climate change, and reevaluate existing law, when the public’s focus is so fluid. This paper explores how these, and other challenges impact the areas of western rivers, mining on public lands, rangelands, and forest management.

When it comes to the impacts of climate change, water might be second only to rising temperatures. Yet, unlike temperatures, water is a resource that must be divided, shared, and conserved across a wide range of special interests from local municipalities to agricultural and industrial concerns. This is the primary focus of western river management and these concerns are currently playing out with the Colorado and Klamath rivers. At root is a competition for limited water supply between rural and urban interests. However, the issue is more complex. As Doug Kenny (n.d.) writes in his essay, The Changing Fate of Western Rivers, water levels at Lake Mead have consistently dropped for most of the last 20 years (p. 74). More troubling is that there is a growing body of evidence that suggests these trends are not drought related, but part of a broader aridification of the region (p. 75).

Nonetheless, legislative reform remains elusive in large part due to the array of competing priorities over water resources. For example, the National Park Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service each have interests in the Colorado river. The Karuk and Yurok tribes are principal partners in the demolition of three dams along the lower Klamath river (Greenson, 2022), and consumers have an interest in maintaining robust fisheries. As this example illustrates, environmental concerns are complex and often involve multiple special interests, from private to public, federal and state.

Similar competition between state, federal, tribal, and environmental concerns is evident in the issue of mining on public lands. Federal agencies administer approximately 350 million acres of public land which holds an abundance of natural resources with real economic value from timber and rivers to minerals and natural gas (Giordano, n.d.). What to do with these lands, who has access to them, and even their intrinsic value is all part of the public land debate. Furthermore, while the Bureau of Land Management is the largest administer of public land by acres, a number of federal agencies might exercise concerns over the same geography. For example, the Fish and Wildlife Service is predominantly concerned with animal species which may involve BLM land. Ultimately, political interests often determine how public land is used though these interests are often short-term and transient in nature.

Finally, rangelands and forest management share many philosophical concerns with western rivers and public land use. Much like the prior two issues, the model for how rangelands and forests are managed is rooted in 19th century politics, and much like the challenges faced by the BLM, the NFS must choose whether to open its land to resource extraction. As with the other agencies, decisions of the National Forest Service can carry adverse impacts to the domains of other agencies.

Beyond economic and legislative pressures, however, the NFS faces a unique challenge from wildfires (Toman, n.d.). While the threat of forest fires is not solely the domain of forestry, the impact of fires on forests is particularly strong. Forestry and wildfire management therefore represent a unique combination of concerns from timber, water, and air quality, to economic, urban, and wildlife management. As with all of the aforementioned issue areas, public policy, public will, and special interests represent the greatest challenges faced by federal agencies as they seek to manage our natural resources.

A common thread throughout public land policy, western river, forest, and rangeland management is their shared ancestry in 19th century politics. More generally, the policies associated with each are deeply influenced by expansionist priorities. For example, the Reclamation Act of 1902 recognized that water development was necessary to support western settlement and would form the basis for the Colorado River Compact of 1922 (Kenney, n.d. pp. 71, 72). Similarly, the Mining Act of 1872 was created, in part, to manage the flood of mining claims registered on federal lands (Giordano, n.d., p. 159). Finally, the Land ordinance of 1785 was an early version of federal land management policy, and a precursor to the Taylor Grazing act of 1934. In fact, in their essay, Western Rebellion, Drs. Simon et al, write, “the values of political actors during this period were largely shaped by a desire to significantly increase the size and influence of the United States” (Simon et al, n.d., p. 183). A sentiment embodied by not only the geographical expansion of the physical United States, but also its economic and political power as well. Furthermore, this mindset was accompanied by a belief that western resources were nearly infinite. As Eric Toman writes in his essay on fire management, there was a myth of superabundance about western resources. It was, as many thought, impossible to ever use them up (Toman, n.d. p. 59). Such dated policy is ill-equipped to handle the modern challenges of climate change and water scarcity. The Colorado River Compact, for example, was written following one of the wettest seasons on record (Kenney, n.d., p. 72). Updating this legislation to effectively manage resources in an era of diminishing supply not only involves political action, but also public will. Such action is an area of common ground between water, land, forest and rangeland management, however broad reform remains elusive.

In some cases, legislators might be slow to act because of competing special interests. In other cases, they simply may not identify with the issue. For example, the highly visual reduction of water in Lake Mead carries with it a sense of urgency, whereas the environmental implications of mining on public lands do not. For one thing, mining on public lands is not nearly as relatable as running out of water. In this regard, public land use represents another of the issues facing environmental concerns: public will. For many Americans, western states are distant places with distant concerns. Giordano’s (n.d.) essay, Mining on Federal Land, describes an inherent east-west divide over America’s natural resources. On the one hand, he says, Easterners seek to maximize the economic value of the west, while Westerners want to preserve the land for public enjoyment (p. 160). This cultural divide is certainly not exclusive to mining on public lands, but it serves to highlight how public perception is shaped by regional cultural priorities.

Mining on federal lands also engages the federal government in ways rangeland and water management do not. Giordano (n.d.) writes that the Mining Act of 1872 has numerous flaws. Among them, low environmental protection and minimal lack of developmental oversight (p. 162). While these may be relatively intuitive, Giordano adds that the Act lacks any sort of royalty program (p. 161), implying a private sector obligation where the federal government is paid dues like any other landowner. This is certainly a curious if not unprecedented theory of public and private sector relations, and it’s hard to imagine a similar relationship dictating access to fresh water.

If water and mining operations illustrate either end of public interest, rangeland and forest management are probably in the middle. Authors Simon et al (n.d.) write in their essay, Western Rebellion that ranching and land use policies are one of the preeminent examples of how policy creates constituencies (p. 185). This might suggest that ranching was a primarily western concern, however, at the time of the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, nearly half of all U.S. Senators represented states with grazing lands (p. 185). Furthermore, rangeland and forestry are increasingly salient issues with the rise of forest fires and widespread regional air quality issues.

Much like the images of Lake Mead, a thick covering of wildfire smoke is difficult to ignore. On the one hand, such a clear manifestation of a climate issue ought to result in easy public policy and united public opinion. However, as Toman (n.d.) writes, there is no easy approach. A strict policy of containment has led to an increase in fires and fire intensity; yet letting the fires burn as the NFS’s current hybrid approach dictates, results in vast amounts of smoke. The wildfire issue, better than any other, captures how public opinion and legislative options can run diametrically opposed. The public demands a solution, but no solution is consequence-free.

Finally, special interests are likely to remain a significant force in environmental policy. Mining and timber companies want access to public lands, power companies want access to hydroelectric opportunities, and American Indian tribes seek to restore native habitats. Perhaps most relevant of all, agricultural interests require access to water, bringing the issues of food and water into direct competition. Yet recent developments in the Klamath river basin have proven that such competing interests are not mutually exclusive. In an example of successful collaborative management, Indian tribes, federal and state agencies, agricultural concerns, and industry worked together to remove three dams and restore the natural habitats of various sites along the Klamath river (Grable, 2023). The Colorado River, while still unresolved, is another example of collaborative management in progress. That said, collaborative management is not a one size fits all approach. For example, land management and resource extraction are very much the domain of presidential priorities and therefore take on a command-and-control quality, versus the more inclusive approach of collaborative management.

In summary, public opinion, public policy, and special interests will continue to be the major challenges to environmental policy over the coming years. Furthermore, while collaborative management has produced promising results in the domains of water management, this does not preclude the need for long-term legislative change. As demonstrated by the issues of mining, wildfire smoke, and water levels in Lake Mead, legislative change is difficult, even when facing dire circumstances. Ultimately, the path forward will require compromise and a combination of collaborative and command and control solutions.  

References

Grable, J. (2023). With on down, Klamath dam removal proceeds on schedule. Oregon Public

Broadcasting. https://www.opb.org/article/2023/07/16/klamath-dam-removal-copco-2/.

Greenson, T. (2022). Tribes decry Klamath water proposal. North Coast Journal.

https://www.northcoastjournal.com/NewsBlog/archives/2022/12/16/tribes-decry-klamath-water-proposal.

Giordano, P.C. (n.d.). Mining on federal land (pp. 158-170). Oregon State University.

Kenny, D. (n.d.). The environmental politics and policy of western public lands (pp. 71-79). Oregon

State University.

PEW Research Center. (2020). As economic concerns recede, environmental protection rises on the

public’s policy agenda. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/02/13/as-economic-concerns-recede-environmental-protection-rises-on-the-publics-policy-agenda/.

Simon, C.A., Wolters, E.A., & Steel, B.S. (n.d.). Western rebellion (pp. 183-193). Oregon State

University.

Toman, E. Wildland fire policy and climate change (pp. 53-70). Oregon State University.

Vig, N. J., Kraft, M. E., & Rabe, B. G. (2021). Environmental Policy: New Directions for the

Twenty-First Century (11th ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc. (US). https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781544378039

Eritrea: The Unrealized Potential of one of Africa’s Poorest Nations

In 1993 a relatively tiny sliver of land bordering the Red Sea, won its independence from Ethiopia. By many measures the modest country of Eritrea, should be one of Africa’s richest nations. Its strategic position on one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, abundant natural resources, and central access to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the U.A.E. suggest that with moderately successful governance, this coastal state could be one of the region’s most prominent success stories. Instead, a combination of poor management, lack of fiscal transparency, stagnating growth and ongoing emigration have left Eritrea behind many of their developing peers. This paper examines the challenges facing Eritrea’s development, and argues that while a focus on FDI, economic diversification, and emigration are critical to its success, true reform begins with increased transparency.

Background

Eritrea is located on the horn of Africa, bordered by the Red Sea to the north, Sudan to the west, and Ethiopia and Djibouti to the south. The country is mineral-rich, with large reserves of copper, zinc, silver and gold. Its long coastline boasts a powerful fishery, and its strategic location provides ready access to the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. Yet for all these innate advantages, Eritrea remains not only among the world’s poorest nations, but near the bottom of their peer group (Kaplan, 2016). This combination of factors, their tremendous potential coupled with an inability to get out of their own way, makes Eritrea an intriguing case study.

The 2018 human development index ranked Eritrea 179th out of 189 countries in terms of total development, a fact representative of the country’s poor governance, lack of social spending, and non-existent participation in the global economy (United Nations Development Programme, 2018). However, this is only the best estimate based on the available data. Eritrea’s absence from both the MPI and Gini indexes, for example, illustrate a much broader issue with transparency and disclosure.

Though their lack of transparency and low HDI scores are powerful indicators of poor governance, Eritrea’s history has notable bright spots. To begin with, their separation from Ethiopia was both peaceful and democratic. Though a border dispute and twenty years of war would later follow, a stable peace was reached in 2018 and the two countries appear to be regional allies. On the other hand, Eritrea’s democratic aspirations seemed to have died at nearly the moment they were born. Their president, Isaias Afwerki has held office since 1993 and the country has yet to hold a single democratic presidential election.

Development Issues

While Eritrea supposedly has democratic intentions, it has failed to demonstrate liberal reform. Seth Kaplan, of Johns Hopkins University, writes that the anti-business ideology of government officials has resulted in an underdeveloped private sector, a lack of skilled labor, and a weak judicial system (Kaplan, 2016, p. 13). These are all broad symptoms of what economists like Paul Collier (2007) refer to as the bad governance development trap. Furthermore, Eritrea remains self-reliant and protectionist. These policies have resulted in stagnant growth and economic isolation. In 2014, for example, FDI per capita was among the lowest in Africa while imports were far from where they should be (Kaplan, 2016,pp. 7, 10). Strict, isolationist policies limit growth and discourage investment, while other opportunities, such as economic diversification, are lost.

These economic challenges are further complicated by Eritrea’s resource-rich geography. Collier calls this the natural resource curse and writes that developing nations with large natural resource booms often end up poorer than when they started (Collier, 2007, p. 23). Deakin University professor Damien Kingsbury echoes this sentiment, writing that income from natural resources should provide capital for investment and development, however it more often leads to corruption and violence (Kingsbury, 2019 p. 97). While it’s not fair to say that Eritrea has fallen victim to the natural resource curse, its preference to open mineral extraction to FDI, as it did with the Bisha Mine in lieu of other opportunities (Kaplan, 2016), bears watching. In other words, if Eritrea’s poor governance continues to preference natural resource development, the historical odds are not conducive to a prosperous long-term future. While the concepts of traps might seem academic and theoretical, they provide real value. Not only do they help frame the country’s economic and political landscape, but they also help define problems and frame solutions.

Policy Options

Despite its economic and social development concerns, Eritrea has options. The first of these is to increase financial transparency. While this should be technically straightforward, rooting out corruption is not so simple. It is impossible for foreign agencies to ensure zero corruption without internal cooperation. The simple case of identifying dishonesty was illustrated by Kingsbury (2019), who cited examples of Indonesian officials who questioned how agencies would know when one hundred miles of road were asked for, but only twenty were needed (p. 88). Transparency requires local action, either on the part of public officials or the public themselves. Collier (2007) cites an example in Uganda where one banking official decided to alert local media every time the central government released public education funding. The resulting public scrutiny incentivized officials to address corruption, and as a result, the amount of money reaching schools increased from 20% to 90% of allocation (p. 67). Transparency carries obvious risks, however. Death threats, political unrest, public shame, and removal from office are a few. That said, transparency followed by immediate action, such as the sustained delivery of funding to schools or hospitals, should mitigate the risk.

Given the amount of emigration that has occurred over the past two decades, Eritrea would likely need to revisit their position on staunch self-reliance and accept foreign technical assistance. International aid could also be used to build out infrastructure, roads, the electrical grid, and schools. Aid could also help existing infrastructure. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has allocated over $6 million in technical assistance to help fight African Swine Fever in Latin America (U.S. Department of State, 2023). It’s difficult to imagine a developing country with poor education having the intellectual capacity, much less the budget to protect their existing infrastructure from such risks.

Eritrea could also consider increasing imports, particularly those that support existing businesses or develop infrastructure. Free trade carries risks, however, as was demonstrated in Cameroon where cheap onion imports devastated local farmers. However, non-competitive imports or flexible tariffs are options the government could consider (Achtnich, 2018). Ultimately, engaging with the world economy and protecting local interests are not mutually exclusive, but do require careful planning.

Alternatively, Eritrea could take steps to encourage more foreign direct investment by improving transparency and disclosure. That said, there are no silver bullets. As Kingsbury (2019) writes, FDI often involves a foreign company extracting resources and amassing offshore profits that provide little benefit to the local economy (p. 71). FDI is also subject to market conditions and competition from more attractive opportunities abroad. The IMF reported, for example, that recent trends in FDI show a clear preference for geopolitical alignment and reduced risks (Ahn et al., 2023). The recent pullback from China and Taiwan are examples of how quickly FDI can change directions. That said, these risks don’t preclude FDI but they are important policy considerations.

Finally, economic diversification is another area of opportunity. Kingsbury (2019) cites the explosive growth of China, Japan, India, and Brazil as examples of countries who became factories for the West, though he cautions that such approaches don’t always work and carry unintended consequences (p. 66). Another risk of service diversification is that services are inherently dependent upon the health of one’s customers. Much of the Middle East and Africa’s futures, for example, lie in their ability to diversify away from fossil fuels. Regardless, similar opportunities exist for Eritrea to serve its wealthier regional neighbors, just as Brazil and India served the West.

Policy Recommendations

Long-term success for Eritrea can be summarized in three objectives: encourage foreign direct investment, stop the flow of emigration, and incentivize the diaspora to return home. These goals contribute to the sustained success of Eritrea by diversifying the economy, growing GDP, increasing tax revenue, and retaining Eritrea’s human intellect; however, none of these objectives can be met without first increasing transparency.

Transparency might be a footnote in other developing countries, however in Eritrea, a lack of disclosure is a fundamental and well recognized problem. This is evident in such basic terms as its absence from the MPI and Gini indexes, as well as its poor international perception (Kaplan, 2016). In fact, Eritrea’s reputation and lack of access earned it a near last place finish on the World Bank’s assessment of government effectiveness (p. 13). It’s difficult to argue for increased foreign investment, international aid, and economic diversification, when the country’s government can’t be trusted.

Transparency carries both international and domestic goals. For example, domestic transparency includes publishing government finances in local papers. It may also include a degree of freedom of the press to print such data without narrative. Conversely, recipients should publish what they received versus what the government supposedly allocated. Third party regional audits would be another option. As the Uganda case cited by Collier (2007) showed, such disclosure not only reduces corruption, but it increases public trust. Furthermore, transparency helps effectively distribute aid by directing it to where it’s needed most.

Internationally, transparency can make the difference between development and remaining in the bottom billion. Kingsbury (2019) points to Botswana as a country that has greatly improved its anti-corruption controls particularly around natural resource extraction (p. 77). Such controls encourage foreign investment and aid by reducing ambiguity and risk. Open contracts and bidding are one example of such transparency. More importantly, the financial incentives that come with disclosure result in increased tax revenue. This is money the government can use to reinvest in infrastructure, education, economic development, and to pay the salaries of employees.

Certainly, transparency carries risks, particularly for the government officials charged with reforming. However, public outrage, unrest, death threats and violence can be mitigated by open public dialogue and immediate transparent action. If Eritrean officials are skeptical of these reforms, the increased national wealth and personal prestige that come with a healthy and diversified economy ought to provide reasonable motivation.   

Conclusion

Eritrea’s natural resources and geography place it in a strong position to succeed, however, its insular self-reliance and economic isolation have resulted in a stagnant economy, lack of opportunity, and rampant emigration. These issues are exacerbated by a lack of transparency that discourages foreign investment and international aid. These factors make it highly unlikely that Eritrea will be able to self-arrest and climb out poverty without decisive reform. It is critical therefore that Eritrea commit to a policy of transparency, at home and abroad. From these reforms can flow increased economic prosperity, social spending, and national wealth.

References

Achtnich, T. [DW Documentary]. (2018, June 6). The deceptive promise of free trade. [Video].

YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DnW9ZQtI1_E

Ahn, J., Habib, A., Malacrino, D., & Presbitero, A.F. (2023). Fragmenting foreign direct investment

hits emerging economies hardest. The International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/04/05/fragmenting-foreign-direct-investment-hits-emerging-economies-hardest

Collier, P. (2007). The Bottom Billion: Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about

it. Oxford University Press Academic US. https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9780199740949

Kaplan, S. (2016). Eritrea’s economy. Atlantic Council. http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep03690.7

Kingsbury, D. (2019). Politics in Developing Countries. Taylor & Francis.

https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781351583145

U.S. Department of State. (2023). Foreign Assistance. https://www.foreignassistance.gov