In 2008, the orange haze of wildfire smoke filled the Puget Sound basin for the first time in recent memory. Within a few years, forest fires were reported on the west side of the Cascade Mountains and smoke infiltration into the urban area became an annual occurrence. The abnormally barren slopes of the Olympic Mountains and severity of summer drought suggested an apparent change in climate. Even the diminishing need to mow the lawn was peculiar. Though these are all anecdotal observations, they are examples of how individual experience shapes environmental sentiment. In fact, such observations can lead to fervent public support for environmental policies, but they can also lead to wide swings in sentiment, preferred solutions, and even whether a problem exists at all. This essay examines the interplay between public, state, federal, and special interests, and argues that while the various approaches to climate change are not mutually exclusive, public opinion is too irregular to drive policy. Instead, legislators ought to focus their efforts on incentivizing the private sector to adopt and create green technology.
In an essay published in Environmental Policy: New Directions for the Twenty-First Century, Drs. Christopher Borick and Erick Lachapelle write that, contrary to what one might expect, popular support for climate policies doesn’t necessarily correspond to legislative policy (Vig, et al., 2021, p. 63). Furthermore, public opinion on the environment itself is highly irregular. For example, in just a year and a half from April 2008 to October 2009, public belief that there was solid evidence for global warming fell from 71% to 57% (p. 64) and by 2011, the number of Americans who believed climate change was occurring had fallen to levels not seen since 1997. By 2017, however, climate change acceptance had once again risen to over 60% (p. 66). These examples illustrate how within only a decade, public sentiment toward the environment swung from popular support to minority issue and back again. These dramatic turns in public opinion are not indicative of climate science or environmental policies. They’re reflective of fickle public concern. As Drs. Borick and Lachapelle observed, the decline in sentiment toward global warming in 2009 directly corresponded to the Great Recession (p. 64). While not definitive, this is evidence that the salience of environmental issues is not as robust as the more immediate concerns of finances, home, and family. Therefore, it’s not hard to see how garnering political support, much less enacting law would be very difficult when public attitudes toward climate are so fluid. On the other hand, studies suggest that the environmental divide between rural and urban residents may be moderating. For example, in research conducted by University of Utah Professor, Mark Brunson (Brunson et al., n.d.), survey data found that while environmental attitudes between rural and urban dwellers differed, the difference wasn’t so extreme. These findings run opposed to the stereotypical divide between urban and rural views on climate. Yet achieving consistent public policy at national and even state levels remains difficult.
Not only is public attitude subject to change, but what to do about climate is equally as subjective. Is solar, wind, tidal, or geothermal the preferred renewable energy solution? Are lithium powered EVs, bikes, blimps, or scooters tomorrow’s method of transportation? Is rainwater harvesting ecologically responsible or taking resources out of the natural environment? Clearly, the variety and number of potential solutions to climate change make the job of legislating extremely difficult.
However, while public opinion on the environment is erratic, special interests provide some measure of focus. For example, timber companies might advocate for the renewable nature of forestry. Environmental interests might bring awareness to endangered species or agricultural concerns in Africa and Brazil. Regardless of the point of view, special interests provide staying power that can outlast public opinion. As Oregon State University Professor, Brent Steel (1996) writes, “It has been noted that disequilibrium in society or in a specific policy arena is often a stimulant to interest group formation and heightened group activity” (pp. 401-419).In other words, while the public at large might be undecided on renewable energy solutions, special interest groups exist to advocate for such concerns.
Furthermore, the disequilibrium referenced by Steel isn’t isolated to the realm of public opinion. Such inequality exists in financial and human resource capacity as well. These differences influence how various special interest groups from environmental NGOs to corporations interact with state and local governments. For example, environmentalist groups tend to focus on policy through litigation and activism (elite challenging), whereas corporations tend to focus on lobbying agencies and individual politicians (Steel, 1996).
This difference in approach can represent popular public opinion. For example, Steel (1996) writes that with a strong plurality of people identifying as environmentalists, there is incentive for both special interests and corporations to consider public opinion. Certainly, with the rise of social media, hashtags, and viral posts, the ability for a financially underpowered organization to make a difference in the national narrative has changed over the last two decades. These are all positive indicators for environmentalists, however special interests are not a cure-all for climate issues. Climate by definition is a global phenomenon and therefore macro in scale. NGOs and special interest groups, on the other hand, are often hyper focused on a single issue or a subset of issues. The scale of the problem and resulting efforts are therefore incongruent.
In a sense the environmental movement and, to a degree, public opinion are anarchial. That is, there’s no central authority that determines which environmental pursuits are worthwhile and which are not. Policy is still subject to whatever is popular at the moment. However, the anarchial nature of environmental priorities provides an opportunity for both states and the federal government to issue guidance. In some senses, state-level engagement offers an attractive alternative to more distant federal governance. State-level approaches theoretically are closer to home and resonate more with public officials and their constituents. States can also lead by example or build coalitions on climate issues. On the other hand, states have no shortage of bureaucracy or special interests. The latter presents both competitive and potentially ethical issues for environmentalists seeking to enact legislative change.
University of Michigan Professor Barry Rabe (Vig, et al., 2021) writes extensively on climate policies and the trend toward increased state autonomy on climate issues. While there are benefits to the increased localization of climate policy, increased state autonomy comes at the cost of reduced federal funding (p. 37). That said, the federated approach to climate could be an ideal model for western democracies. The federal government sets goals and the states determine how to achieve them. However, there are two fundamental challenges to this approach. First, senators and representatives are elected for six- and two-year terms, respectively. This makes establishing lasting policy difficult as the system is engineered to elect officials who represent the most current public concerns. Second, climate policy is written by state and national officials whose campaigns are often financed by corporations. Asking lawmakers to regulate an industry that may have helped them get elected is a fundamental conflict of interests.
That said, Congress and state governments can be stout environmental allies. As Carleton College Professor of Science, Technology, and Society, Norman Vig writes, President Reagan faced stiff congressional resistance to his deregulatory climate agenda in the early 1980s. Ironically, the backlash against Reagan’s policies strengthened existing environmental regulations such as the Clean Water Act (Vig, et al., 2021, p. 91). Congress also retains budgetary and confirmation powers that can be used to check adversarial climate agendas. In this sense, the bureaucracy or, status quo, works to protect environmental policy.
Nonetheless, the same short-term risks to the climate agenda exist in Congress as do at the state and local levels. Indeed, the cyclical nature of Western government is what makes democracy work. Yet it is precisely what makes dramatic and committed environmental change extremely difficult. Ironically, the answer for Western governments and environmentalists may be to embrace private industry. Such an embrace is not without precedent. Consider, for example, that following the Civil War, the federal government financed the transcontinental railroad. During the Great Depression, FDR’s New Deal financed a boom in new construction. The United States even subsidized oil companies to incentivize domestic production during World War II. That said, the United States’ track record on green energy subsidies is less consistent. In a paper published by the Center for Strategic International Studies, researchers Jack Caporal and William Reinsch (2021) found that green subsidies declined by 59% from 2010 and 2019 (p.6). Though such subsidies have increased over recent years they remain well below 2010 levels. Nonetheless, according to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (Fasching, 2022), electricity generation from renewable sources has increased steadily over the same period. These data suggest private sector commitment to renewable energy and should incentivize further government assistance.
Finally, in a market economy, competition, innovation, and incentives work to transform and erect new sectors. Instead of viewing industry as an adversary, subsidies seek to leverage capitalism as a resource in the climate agenda. Furthermore, while still vulnerable to the same democratic risks cited above, subsidies leverage the human capacity to innovate and create a new status quo.
In summary, public support for environmental policies is inconsistent and, while special interests provide some focus to environmental issues, they are still driven by public concerns. To this extent the political systems of Western democracies are beholden to public opinion and market conditions. This makes widespread legislative change more difficult. Instead, governments ought to leverage their economies to create new sectors that not only challenge the status quo but result in lasting climate change.
References
Brunson, M., Shindler, B., Steel, B. (n.d.). Rural versus urban differences in natural resource
management.
Caporal, J. & Reinsch, W. (2021). Toward a climate-driven trade agenda. Center for Strategic and
International Studies. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep28809.4
Steel, B., Pierce, J. C., & Lovrich, N. P. (1996). Resources and strategies of interest groups and
industry representatives involved in federal forest policy. The Social Science Journal (Fort Collins), 33(4), 401–419. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0362-3319(96)90014-2
Fasching, E. (2022). In the first half of 2022, 24% of U.S. electricity generation came from renewable
sources. U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=53779
Vig, N. J., Kraft, M. E., & Rabe, B. G. (2021). Environmental Policy: New Directions for the Twenty-
First Century (11th ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc. (US). https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781544378039