Policy Brief: Green Hydrogen and a Renewable Future

Nearly two decades of incentives and energy policies have spawned a remarkable duality in renewable energy. Solar accounts for just 3.9% of total U.S. electricity, yet California produced so much solar energy, the state essentially threw it away. This has prompted lawmakers to cut back on incentives and delay installations, but nationally there are few signs of solar abating (Osaka, 2024). In February of 2023, for example, the EIA estimated that over half of new U.S. electricity generating capacity would come from solar, compared to just 11% from wind and 14% from natural gas (Fasching & Ray, 2023). If solar proliferation continues, even modestly, this presents both infrastructure and policymaking challenges. Furthermore, the United States’ commitment to 100% carbon-free electricity by 2035 (WH, 2021), necessitates a massive investment in renewable energy. This is further supported by the IRA, IIJA, and FERC order 2222 which not only encourages distributed energy resources like rooftop solar, but requires utilities to integrate DER into the grid. Yet, as the California case shows, the intermittent nature of renewables lends such energy sources to extreme cycles of boom, bust, and waste.

The seasonal characteristics of renewables have made storage a critical component of the green ecosystem. In fact, while the storage conversation centers around lithium-ion solutions, the concept of batteries is broad and often far removed from chemical processes. Pumped hydro and thermal storage are two examples, however, as this paper argues, hydrogen presents an intriguing alternative that can be both green and renewable at scale. Moreover, hydrogen compliments the ancillary, short-term application of traditional batteries by providing robust seasonal energy for those months where little solar is available. In this, hydrogen does not compete with battery storage but instead fills a gap that would otherwise be covered by fossil fuels.

This paper explores the policies that advance hydrogen’s use as a grid-scale energy source in three capacities: a seasonal supplement to intermittent renewable energy, a store for excess renewable energy, and onsite industrial energy supply. The benefits of such applications are threefold. First, committing excess renewable energy to hydrogen production avoids waste as is currently happening in California. Second, as the mix of renewables grows, the impact of intermittent supply will become more apparent. Stored hydrogen provides both cheap and reliable energy to a wide range of customers and helps FERC meet its obligations in those areas. It also helps smooth supply dips, reduces risks to infrastructure and helps RTOs and ISOs ensure adequate, affordable supply to their regions. Finally, stored hydrogen, particularly in industrial capacities, helps reduce congestion by alleviating transmission loads during peak usage periods.

Background & Literature Review

The use of hydrogen is nothing new. In fact, heavy industries around the world produce large quantities of hydrogen for use in everything from fertilizers to steel. It is not, however, widely used as a source of electricity, and its application in this domain remains largely theoretical. That said, hydrogen possesses intriguing potential as a long-term supplement to intermittent renewables. Similarly, it has potential as an alternative power source to energy intensive industries like manufacturing and computing, and as a capacity management system that reduces congestion through DER.

To begin with, however, it’s important to acknowledge the limitations of hydrogen as an energy source. For example, Both Lambert (2007) and McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) write that hydrogen is not as energy efficient nor as cheap as traditional batteries. This is, in part, because traditional lithium-ion batteries store electricity while hydrogen fuel cells manufacture it. This process produces electricity, heat, and water instead of simply releasing electricity (DOE, n.d.). For this reason, hydrogen energy systems are not an ideal solution for intra-day applications. However, both Lambert (2007) and McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) believe it is cost-effective and environmentally favorable when deployed at scale over several months (for example, during winter). Energy efficiency also declines through the process of manufacturing and storage. Flux power (Flux, 2021) writes that hydrogen produced by electrolysis is only 30-40% efficient, while Bloom Energy (Bloom, 2023) was more optimistic, citing efficiencies as high as 60% in certain applications. Regardless, energy loss is a consideration. Furthermore, Edwards et al (2007) cite the “significant energy penalty” (p. 1050) associated with hydrogen storage, not to mention further losses incurred if the gas is used to make steam. Therefore, good policy must consider how hydrogen is to be used, its strengths, weaknesses, and appropriate applications.

Nonetheless, long-term storage is perhaps the most obvious grid-scale application of green hydrogen. Lambert (2020) and McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) each note the potential for hydrogen to be used as a seasonal load balancer, during periods when renewable sources aren’t as plentiful. This seasonal use compliments ancillary systems, like batteries and spinning reserves, by assuming a long-term, base-load role. Moreover, unlike lithium-ion batteries, hydrogen fuel cells do not need to be recharged so long as the supply of fuel remains constant (DOE, n.d.). Moving hydrogen, however, presents both incentives and disincentives for grid-scale applications. On the one hand, Edwards et al (2007) write that the current transportation system cannot be easily converted to carry hydrogen. Moreover, moving hydrogen at scale, they write, will require significant research and development. Lambert (2020), however, cites studies suggesting the existing natural gas infrastructure is indeed capable of handling pure hydrogen. Either way, it’s fair to assume that infrastructure investment will be required to bring hydrogen power to market in large quantities.

Alternatively, these risks can be mitigated by producing hydrogen onsite. In fact, onsite electricity production presents an intriguing opportunity for industry, regulators, and policymakers alike. For example, while residential customers number over 154 million, there are just 900,000 industrial consumers. Yet those customers draw over 25% of domestic electricity, the majority of which is bought from suppliers (Shively & Ferrare, 2019). In fact, according to the EIA (2023), just 15% of industrial electricity is produced onsite, with most of that coming by way of combined heat and power (CHP) generation. In that, there is an opportunity for green hydrogen. Edwards et al (2007) write that hydrogen-based CHP is up to 85% energy efficient, making it an intriguing replacement to natural gas. Such energy efficient solutions take on increased importance as the EIA expects total energy needs to more than double by 2050, with a majority of that being supplied by intermittent renewables (AEO, 2023).

The issue then becomes one of supplying power cheaply enough to economically manufacture hydrogen on-site. This could entail entering into exclusive power purchase agreements or standing up dedicated transmission lines to meet those needs. As with all aspects of the hydrogen solution, transmission is not without complications. Shively & Ferrare (2019) and Robertson & Palmer (2023) both express the difficulty in setting up new transmission lines, and RTOs face significant challenges bringing energy to customers when lines cross multiple jurisdictions. Nonetheless, onsite hydrogen production avoids transportation challenges while also absorbing excess energy from the grid. Perhaps most importantly, locally produced electricity reduces congestion by feeding it directly to the load.

Finally, it’s necessary to discuss some of the existing policies, their challenges and unintended consequences as they relate to hydrogen. To begin with, hydrogen production has many applications outside of electricity that compete for attention. For example, McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) note the challenge for policymakers lies in knowing where hydrogen fits in the green economy. Its power producing capabilities are one potential use, but it possesses a wide range of industrial applications that make knowing how it should be used more difficult.

Perhaps more crucial is green hydrogen’s dependence on cheap energy. Edwards et al (2007) write that though commercial hydrogen is 75% energy efficient, the cost of electrolysis is still several times higher than hydrocarbon-derived production (p. 1047). Over ten years later, the Department of Energy continues to cite the cost of electricity as the single biggest prohibitor to hydrogen production (Peterson et al, 2020 p. 13). Therefore, the success of hydrogen is directly coupled to policies that promote cheap energy. In that, the discussion has come full circle, returning to the dilemma faced by California lawmakers who have curtailed solar incentives due to an overabundance of supply. Rogers & Wisland (2014) summed up this problem rather succinctly, writing that DER integration is not a technical challenge, it is largely one of economics. Specifically, who pays for the cost of transmission when the flow of electricity is reversed (p. 4), or as was the case in California, when prices go negative.

On that note, federal policies have produced both benefits and drawbacks to DER, and by extension, green hydrogen. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act directs federal funds toward the research and development of clean hydrogen energy systems. It also directs research toward more efficient electrolysis and establishes clean hydrogen hubs for developing and promoting new technologies (Christensen et al, 2021). These policies along with a trend of energy decentralization, suggest that renewable energy will be cheaply available to green hydrogen producers over the long-term. On the other hand, serious concerns exist over supply chains and ongoing trade disputes with China, Southeast Asia, India, and others. Nikos et al (2021) write that tariffs put in place under the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 have increased the price of Chinese PV cells by upwards of 60%. The increased costs are one reason solar prices are higher in the United States than in most of the rest of the world (p. 16). Runde & Ramanujam (2020) similarly argue that the pandemic highlighted the United States’ overreliance on foreign supply chains, and suggest a need to reshore American manufacturing. In summary, federal and state policies aimed at the proliferation of DER necessitate supply chains capable of meeting that demand. Consequently, achieving grid-scale green hydrogen as mentioned by the IIJA, is likewise dependent upon international supply chains and trade policy.

Policy Options

As the preceding discussion has shown, green hydrogen offers a compelling solution to seasonal inconsistencies in renewable energy. It is, however, predicated on an abundance of cheap, renewable energy, making it directly dependent on DER and susceptible to international trade policies. Fortunately, it’s not necessary for policymakers to solve a grid-scale problem in one initiative. Much in the way today’s DER initiatives are predicated on over forty years of prior policy, hydrogen adoption can, and arguably should, be done incrementally.

As a starting point, policymakers can target specific industries. For example, Ohio might partner with heavy manufacturers while Arizona and Texas might choose to work with industrial computing. The goal of such programs would be to reduce congestion and enable growth by promoting onsite power production. Under such a program, industry partners could receive abatements, carbon credits, or property tax adjustments based on the percentage of power they generate onsite. Two roughly parallel models exist for this approach: PURPA’s avoided cost stipulation (Shively & Ferrare, 2019) and property tax breaks for homeowners who install DER (Rogers & Wisland, 2014). Such policies are effective in 45 states and carry broad public support. In either case, adapting these policies to industrial customers could incentivize onsite energy production and help meet EIA growth projections while reducing congestion.

It’s important to note that onsite power production doesn’t necessarily require grid-ready fuel cell technology. As was reported by the EIA (2023), most onsite power production comes from CHP processes. The extent to which hydrogen could replace natural gas is a critical point for R&D, however, hydrogen and natural gas blends are an alternative that could work with existing infrastructure. For example, tests have proven blends containing 5-10% hydrogen were compatible with existing technology, and Europe is testing concentrations as high as 20% (Lambert, 2020). Therefore, regulators could stipulate a hydrogen transition that mirrors ethanol additives in fuel, rewarding companies who produce or use green hydrogen in lieu of natural gas.

More importantly, excess energy must be both affordable and accessible. Congestion is one of the biggest risks to supply and often necessitates establishing new lines. Given the difficulties in building new transmission cited by Shively & Ferrare (2019) and Robertson & Palmer (2020), it’s important for RTOs to begin the planning process early. One policy approach could be to build on FERC order 2222 and require utilities to provide hydrogen producers with direct access to excess energy, provided that excess is derived from renewables and used to produce green hydrogen. In that, RTOs and utilities are compelled to build new transmission lines, while industrial consumers are rewarded for investing in green hydrogen DER. Furthermore, Villarreal (2020) advocates for adopting policies that compel utilities to invest in DER, noting that their multi-year planning processes benefit from the flexibility DER provides. Taking industrial demand off the grid reduces both technical and bureaucratic risk.

Finally, ensuring abundant, cheap energy is essential to the success of clean hydrogen, however, as California has demonstrated, incentives lose effectiveness when excessive energy is produced. Nonetheless, for states lacking California’s solar boom, there are effective policies available. For example, Rogers & Wisland (2014) write that net metering and property tax breaks still hold value in most areas. Others, like Ünel & Zerbe (2022) argue that net metering fails to compensate DER owners for the full value of their investment. In that, homeowners should be paid for both the utility and environmental avoided costs (pp. 5-6). Alternatively, requiring utilities to invest in clean energy is another option. For example, as part of their renewable portfolio standard, New Jersey requires 35% of energy sold in state to come from renewables (NJ, n.d.). A final approach, not discussed in any of the literature reviewed here is to require solar on all new construction. This could reasonably be limited to areas conducive to solar generation, and is more appropriate for markets like California where incentives are no longer effective. As with all of these solutions, however, supply concerns exist for such large-scale production initiatives.

Policy Recommendation

Any policy must contain clear scope and success criteria. Therefore, the recommendation in this paper is to create abundant, cheap electricity through DER and provide that energy to industrial partners for the purpose of creating clean hydrogen. McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) advocate for a similar approach, noting the unpredictability of the residential market, appliance compatibility, and a host of other technical complications as reasons to avoid consumer-based solutions. Alternatively, industrial customers often exist in clusters with dedicated infrastructure, some of which is hydrogen compatible, or capable of supplying the power required to manufacture it onsite (pp. 5, 10, 20). Industrial customers are fewer but also have the most to gain from self-managed DER. Provided overhead is sufficiently reduced, supplementing their energy consumption with clean hydrogen may prove cost advantageous, particularly in those periods where renewables are unavailable. Achieving partial grid separation would also help insulate them from extreme price spikes that occur on an intra-day basis.

McWilliams & Bruegel (2021) write that finding an industrial partner willing to share some of the risk is essential to the technology’s success. In this, regulators have an opportunity to incentivize industrial cooperation by providing tax breaks, carbon credits, and direct access to cheap (or free) renewable energy. If opportunities do not already exist for the private sector to partner with the DOE, policymakers should consider expanding the IIJA to include such programs. Local governments could work with specific companies to install, upgrade, or test existing infrastructure for use with hydrogen CHP. The DOE’s EV-focused Workplace Charging Challenge is a good example of what such a policy could look like. The important point is that such policies produce real world infrastructure from which data can be collected.

Finally, amending FERC order 2222 to require RTOs to provide excess green energy directly to industrial customers is a great long-term strategy. There is unfortunately, likely no way around the difficulties of building new transmission lines, though to the extent possible, regulators can work to streamline the process. This policy provides transmission operators with a destination for their excess energy while also incentivizing industry to invest in DER. It’s worth noting that residential incentives are not recommended due to the uncertainty of green hydrogen’s compatibility. In that, it is important that policymakers limit scope as described and work with a handful of participants, perhaps by holding a lottery, where government agrees to share the capital costs associated with green hydrogen infrastructure. On a longer-term basis, regulators need to establish real targets, like those stated around emissions reductions. For example, converting 50% of onsite energy production to green hydrogen by 2050 is one goal. Having all industrial customers fully independent, sustainable, and renewable by 2060 is another objective. Either way, real world infrastructure and measurable definitions of success are critical.

Conclusion

Clean hydrogen presents a terrific opportunity to provide seasonal energy when solar and wind are not available. The risks of hydrogen, including infrastructure compatibility, DER dependence, and international policies, make its viability far from certain. Therefore, policymakers must consider options that are both targeted and carry well-defined measures of success. To that degree, a focus on industrial customers, infrastructure support, including direct access to cheap energy, and active federal partnerships are essential to the success of clean hydrogen.

References

AEO. (2023). Annual energy outlook AEO2023. U.S. Energy Information Administration.

https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/

Bloom. (2023). Hydrogen power generation and the significance of efficiency. Bloom Energy.

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Ünel, B., & Zerbe, A. (2022). The Role of Information in Distributed Energy Resource

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Christensen, E.L., Auslander, J.M., & Pilchen, Z.B. (2021). The bipartisan infrastructure

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Fasching, E. & Ray, S. (2023). More than half of new U.S. electric-generating capacity in 2023

will be solar. U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=55419

Flux. (2021). Hydrogen fuel cell efficiency. How does it compare to lithium-ion? Flux Power.

https://www.fluxpower.com/blog/hydrogen-fuel-cell-efficiency-how-does-it-compare-to-lithium-ion#:

Lambert, M. (2020). Hydrogen and decarbonisation of gas: false dawn or silver bullet? Oxford

Institute for Energy Studies. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep33923

McWilliams, B., & Zachmann, G. (2021). Navigating through hydrogen. Bruegel.

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NJ. (n.d.). Energy policy in New Jersey. Department of Environmental Protection.

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Tsafos, N., Carey, L., Nakano, J., & Ladislaw, S. (2021). Trade Tensions and Reliance on

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Shively & Ferrare. (2019). Understanding today’s electricity business. Enerdynamics.

Osaka, S. (2024). Rooftop solar panels are flooding California’s grid. That’s a problem. The

Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2024/04/22/california-solar-duck-curve-rooftop/

Peterson, D., Vickers, J., & DeSantis, D. (2020). DOE hydrogen and fuel cells program record.

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Robertson, M. & Palmer, K. (2023). Transmission 102: Building new transmission lines.

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Rogers, J., & Wisland, L. (2014). Solar Power on the Rise: The Technologies and Policies

behind a Booming Energy Sector. Union of Concerned Scientists. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep00012

Runde, D. F., & Ramanujam, S. R. (2020). Recovery with Resilience: Diversifying Supply

Chains to Reduce Risk in the Global Economy. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26011

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Internal Combustion Engines Role in the Climate Agenda

In 2012 a Connecticut-based startup, LiquidPiston, made waves when it announced plans to create an internal combustion engine with 50% efficiency. While the company intends their design for sub-100 horsepower applications (Wojdyla, 2012), LiquidPiston’s efforts are part of a much broader push to revolutionize ICE technology. These efforts in the face of environmental pressure and a surge in EV production, speak to the durability of the ICE. For example, The Wall Street Journal reports that while ICEs continue to dominate the US market, consumer demand for electric vehicles is stalling and sales of hybrids and high-efficiency ICEs are climbing (Ziegler, 2024). Yet questions over the efficacy of more efficient combustion engines remain, from carbon leakage and the rebound effect to those based on ideological principle. This essay examines the politics and media coverage surrounding fuel economy and the argument that better fuel efficiency is a valid means of reducing GHG emissions.

Regulating fuel economy is nothing new, though for people over the age of forty, the Clean Air Act of 1970 may seem like recent history. To begin with, the CAA mandated a 90% reduction in new vehicle emissions by 1975 (EPA, 2023). Then, following the oil embargo of the next few years, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, which required automakers to incrementally increase fuel efficiency over the coming decade (Nivola, 2009, p. 2). Throughout the 1980s and 90s, the EPA imposed regulation seeking to further limit the amount of carbon and nitrogen-based emissions. Yet despite these efforts, emissions and fuel economy per vehicle improved only modestly and, in fact, declined in the first decade of this century. This regression was largely due to poorly written policy that failed to foresee the rise of light-duty trucks and SUVs, both of which were excluded under existing efficiency regulations (pp. 2, 3). It wasn’t until the Obama administration that policy began to move the needle on fuel economy, aiming to double efficiency by 2025 (UCS, 2016). Nonetheless, the notion of addressing climate change through more efficient use of fossil fuels is seen by climate advocates as a temporary solution if not outright dismissed.

Admittedly, it’s easy to view EV resistance as the product of special interests and the status quo. However, a closer look at the issue suggests efficiency may have a role to play in environmental policy. To begin with the global economy is overwhelmingly reliant on fossil fuel energy. Even advanced economies, like Norway, with strong bases of renewable energy are dependent on fossil fuel exports as a major source of GDP. Furthermore, Santos et al (2021) write that over 60% of global electricity comes from burning fossil fuels and that EV emissions are simply transferred to the source (p. 4). Such carbon leakage has been noted by experts on either side of the efficiency discussion. For example, Karplus et al (2015) write that reduced fuel consumption resulting from greater fuel economy leads to lower prices which makes those fuels more attractive to other industries (p. 520). Gasoline that might have been burned in cars, for instance, is simply burned elsewhere.

Efficiency is not necessarily the panacea that proponents of greater fuel economy might suggest, however. Parry & Pizer (2007) write that increasing miles per gallon can actually increase fuel consumption by encouraging owners to drive more (p. 85). This so-called rebound effect was noted by Karplus et al (2015) and others as a drawback of ICE economy standards. Other scientific bodies such as the Union of Concerned Scientists take a much more optimistic stance, writing that if all the scheduled regulations are implemented, the United States could reduce its oil usage by 2.4 million barrels per day (UCS, 2016). Nonetheless, the propensity of hybrid owners to drive more is a significant argument against greater fuel economy. Finally, hybrids may not be as efficient as consumers believe. The Wall Street Journal ran an article overviewing the costs and advantages of owning a hybrid. They were quick to note that hybrid efficiency is greatest during short commutes or city driving but declines on the open highway (Ziegler, 2024). While this may not affect the majority of drivers, it is the inverse of what consumers have come to expect from traditional ICEs.

As might be expected, the issue of hybrids has drawn media and special interest attention. The Wall Street Journal article (Ziegler, 2024), for instance, was relatively apolitical in its evaluation of the hybrid solution, noting consumer familiarity and a lack of range anxiety as its advantages. On the other hand, CNN (2024) was somewhat critical of Toyota’s resistance to full EVs and continued reliance on hybrid technology. Karplus et al (2015) and Nivola (2009) were pragmatic while Santos et al (2021) were clearly partial to the fossil fuel industry. While it’s difficult to say whether special interests played a role in biasing the aforementioned media coverage, they certainly have a seat at the table. The EPA, for example, is America’s primary regulator of emissions and chiefly responsible for setting efficiency standards. The Union of Concerned Scientists, cited here, advises regulators and industry officials on potential outcomes of policy, while finally, prominent industry leaders Toyota (CNN, 2024), Nissan (Perkins, 2021), and Stellantis (Stafford, 2023) are embracing hybrid innovation. To the extent that oil industry concerns are present, they are secondary to economic and manufacturing efficiency. GM of Toyota North America, David Christ (CNN, 2024) sums up the argument by pointing out that for every EV battery that’s produced, the company could make six plug-in hybrids and ninety standard hybrids (1.45). Christ goes on to argue that green adoption should not be measured in terms of EVs sold, but in carbon remediated.

It's clear from the preceding discussion that promoting greater fuel economy is not without its disadvantages, however good policy begins with acknowledging the risks of rebounding and carbon leakage. The former can be addressed through carbon taxes and cap and trade programs as outlined by Parry & Pizer (2007) while the latter could be dissuaded through carbon border adjustments (carbon tariffs) as advocated by Kardish et al (2022). Most importantly, consumer preference will drive both market and policy decisions. A 2020 PEW survey (Tyson & Kennedy, 2020) found that a bipartisan majority of Americans believe the government should do more on climate and that over 70% favored tougher fuel economy standards. Researchers note that while partisan divides exist on the issues of carbon emissions, carbon taxes, and fuel economy, at least half of republicans favored environmentally-conscious policy in each case (p. 6). Such strong bipartisan support suggests a path forward for policymakers.

In summary, greater fuel economy has a part to play in the global effort to remediate carbon emissions, but it must be supported by policy that limits leakage and transference. It’s clear from the literature reviewed here that the issue of fuel efficiency is salient in the news, scholarly articles, and public opinion. Such broad interest provides an opportunity for policymakers to enforce regulations that benefit both consumers and the climate.

References

CNN. (2024). Toyota sells only two electric vehicles. Executive insists they’re not

holding back. CNN Business. https://www.cnn.com/videos/business/2024/04/11/toyota-executive-electric-vehicles-hybrids-cprog-gr-orig.cnn

EPA. (2023). Timeline of major accomplishments in transportation, air pollution, and

climate change. United States Environmental Protection Agency. https://www.epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-and-climate-change/timeline-major-accomplishments-transportation-air

Kardish, C., Ye, J., Keohane, N. (2022). Carbon border adjustments: Considerations for

policymakers. Center for Clkmate and Energy Solutions. https://www.c2es.org/document/carbon-border-adjustments-considerations-for-policymakers/

Karplus, V., Kishimoto, P.N., & Paltsev, S. (2015). The global energy, CO2 emissions,

and economic impact of vehicle economy standards. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 49(4), 517-538. https://www.jstor.org/stable/jtranseconpoli.49.4.0517

Nivola, P.S. (2009). The long and winding road: Automotive fuel economy and American

politics. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0225_cafe_nivola.pdf

Parry, I.W.H. & Pizer, W.A. (2007). Emissions trading versus C02 taxes versus

standards. Resources for the future. https://www.rff.org/publications/issue-briefs/emissions-trading-versus-co2-taxes-versus-standards/

Perkins, C. (2021). Nissan says it’s working on an engine with 50-percent thermal

efficiency. Road and Track. https://www.roadandtrack.com/news/a35646974/nissan-50-percent-thermal-efficiency/

Santos, N.D.S.A., Roso, V.R., Malaquias, A.C.T., & Baêta, J.G.C. (2021). Internal

combustion engines and biofuels: Examining why this robust combination should not be ignored for future sustainable transportation. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 148, 147-148. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2021.111292

Stafford, E. (2023). 2025 Ram 1500 Ramcharger avoids the range anxiety of EV trucks.

Car and Driver. https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a45734742/2025-ram-1500-ramcharger-revealed/

Tyson, A., & Kennedy, B. (2020). Two-Thirds of Americans Think Government Should

Do More on Climate: Bipartisan backing for carbon capture tax credits, extensive tree-planting efforts. Pew Research Center. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep57745

UCS. (2016). Fuel Economy and Emissions Standards for

Cars and Trucks, Model Years 2017 to 2025: A critical step to reducing oil use and global warming emissions. Union of Concerned Scientists. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17278

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Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/lifestyle/cars/hybrid-car-is-it-worth-it-69adc329?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1

Texas: A Look Back at the Lonestar State’s Approach to Covid

On March 4th, 2020, the Texas Department of State Health Services reported the state’s first case of covid in Fort Bend County, just outside of Houston. What followed mirrored much of the national response to a fast-moving pandemic. Through a series of executive orders, Governor Greg Abbott issued lockdowns, suspended schools, set hospital capacity and mask mandates, and imposed quarantines on all interstate travelers. Within weeks, however, the state had begun reopening, and by March of the following year, all covid restrictions had been lifted. This essay examines Texas’ response to the covid-19 pandemic, the policy decisions, major actors, and outcomes for one of the nation’s most populous states.

Policy and Literature Review

Within ten days of the Fort Bend covid case, Governor Abbott invoked the Texas Disaster Act of 1975 and declared a state of disaster. The Act’s provisions suspended many of the checks and balances inherent in state and local governance, and enabled the governor to enact sweeping policy decisions (OTG, 2020). Over the course of the pandemic, Governor Abbott would issue over two dozen executive orders, enforcing everything from social distancing to inmate visitation restrictions. In fact, in March 2020 alone, the governor would legislate limits on gatherings, order full lockdowns of non-essential services, and issue mandatory quarantines for all travelers. The state also issued daily reporting requirements and expanded hospital bed capacity to accommodate a surge in cases. Mask mandates, however, would not be issued until July 2020 under executive order 29 (OTG, n.d.).

While Texas may have garnered a reputation for covid obstinance, their early policy decisions, including mask-mandates, were in-line with most other states. California, for example, implemented mask mandates in June 2020, just two weeks ahead of Texas. To the extent that controversy exists, it most likely stems from Texas’ decision to prioritize economic concerns ahead of perceived health risks. Yet Texas’ policies didn’t produce radically adverse results. For example, by the end of March 2020, Texas was averaging 370 new covid cases per day, or 0.0125 cases per 1,000 people. By the same measure, the national rate of infection stood at 0.04 cases per 1,000 people. By the time Texas reopened in March 2021, that average had increased to 0.12 cases (per 1,000) per day but still below the national average of 0.17 cases per 1,000 people per day (Google, 2022). In other words, Texas’ initial rate of infection was one third that of the broader United States and remained below the national average even after opening early. This is not necessarily due to policy, however. While Texas’ restrictions were not that different than most other states, Texas’ population is younger and significantly less dense then harder hit areas like New York. Texas also implemented an aggressive vaccination drive, vaccinating over 1 million people by mid-January 2021 (OTG, 2021). These factors at least partly explain why Texas outperformed national rates of infection, even while being home to large at-risk populations.

Policy Actions

Although Texas would become the first state to deliver over 1 million covid vaccinations, the state’s efforts were not without criticism. The Texas Tribune, for example, noted that vaccine distribution centers were most often located in the hospitals and pharmacies of white affluent neighborhoods, and raised concerns that vaccination wouldn’t be available to the state’s Black, Hispanic, and other at-risk populations (Garnham & Cai, 2021). Such concern for minority infections was echoed by the Texas Health and Human Services Commission. A 2021 report, for example, noted that Black, poor, and socioeconomically disadvantaged neighborhoods had fewer hospitals, physicians, and pharmacies per 100,000 people, than other neighborhoods (DSHS, 2021, p. 7). In a follow up study conducted the next year, the Commission found that Blacks and Hispanics were most likely to get covid and added that Hispanic ethnicity was the strongest leading indicator of covid mortality across groups (DSHSa, 2022, p. 4). Such vulnerabilities were evident in their reliance on social welfare programs as well. For example, throughout the pandemic, Black and Hispanic enrollment in the state Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, was higher than all other demographics (pp. 43-47). Yet the state’s vaccination efforts produced effective results and, at least partly, refute concerns stated in the media.

While Texas enlisted the National Guard to assist with testing in the early months of the pandemic (Wallace, 2020), the Department of Health and Human Services was the primary agency responsible for coordinating vaccination efforts. In fact, the DSHS was arguably the principle policy actor throughout the pandemic, second only to the governor’s office. Administration of the vaccine, however, was predominately conducted by private entities (hospitals, pharmacies, etc). The state DSHS authorized vaccinators and worked with other agencies, such as the Division for Emergency Management and the Texas Education Agency to distribute vaccines and raise public awareness. Concerns over low vaccination rates amongst at-risk communities led officials to begin holding “pop up vaccine events” in Wal-Mart parking lots and other retail locations. The purpose of the events, according to the DSHS, was to increase vaccination coverage among at-risk adults as well as drive vaccine education (DSHSb, 2021). In addition, the Texas DSHS stopped requiring proof of underlying health conditions, which had previously prevented undocumented immigrants from receiving vaccines (Chen & Jameel, 2021). The combination of robust supply, mobile vaccination sites, and decreased scrutiny resulted in broad coverage for some of Texas’ most at-risk communities. By July 2022, 68% of Hispanics reported being vaccinated, while 55% of Whites and 49% of Blacks had received at least one shot (Ndugga et al., 2022). As of 2024, only 0.054 per 1,000 Texans are hospitalized with covid compared to a national rate of 0.065 per 1,000 people (CDC, 2024). These numbers suggest Texas has maintained national parity despite a drive to reopen quickly and perceived vaccine hesitancy.

When evaluating Texas’ response to the covid pandemic, it’s important to recognize the relationship between economic, health, and social priorities. Academics Michael Kraft and Scott Furlong note that prolonged economic hardships and unemployment not only impact families, but also governments, tax revenue, and agency’s ability to provide social services (Kraft & Furlong, 2019, p. 210). This was apparent both in Governor Abbott’s decision to reopen as quickly as possible, but also in the state’s decision to extend SNAP, TANF, and Medicaid benefits throughout the pandemic. While federal assistance was available to all states, local funding was still required for each of the aforementioned programs. Such policies illustrate the balance lawmakers must strike between economic and social priorities. Economic collapse would have disproportionately impacted Black and Hispanic communities, who were more dependent on the continuation of SNAP and TANF than other groups.

As mentioned, KFF data (Ndugga et al., 2022) indicate a majority of Whites and Hispanics have been vaccinated. The Black community remained behind as of 2022 data, however. One policy approach Texas might consider is conducting outreach through members of the African American medical community. That is, work with Black doctors to engage the black community. It may also prove beneficial to offer incentives for developing pharmacies and other facilities in at-risk neighborhoods. That said, gathering quality requirements is perhaps the most important action the state could take. Texas should begin by asking Black communities about vaccine hesitancy and whether such approaches as those suggested above are relevant.

More broadly, the state could consider expanding its Medicare and Medicaid coverage. Together these programs represent some of the most at-risk individuals, from the elderly to the disabled, yet coverage quality remains an issue. Rand Corporation (Rand, n.d.) cites the fee-for-service model, common throughout the U.S. as incentivizing quantity over quality of service. In addition, such structures and the bottomless supply of cash associated with the federal government, leads to overbilling and fraud (Kraft & Furlong, 2019). One potential solution identified by Rand (n.d.), however, is the use of Accountable Care Organizations to help ensure a proper balance of quality and quantity of care. Such ACOs are proliferating across the United States and could help provide better care for Texans with at-risk conditions or long-covid.

Conclusion

In summary, Texas’ initial handling of the covid-19 pandemic was not that dissimilar from other states. Whie their push to reopen was more aggressive than other regions, it required a careful balance between economic, social, and public health concerns. In the end, Texas’ rate of infection and hospitalization were in line with national averages, suggesting that their decisions were not significantly riskier than more conservative approaches.

References

CDC. (2024). Trends in United States COVID-19 hospitalizations, deaths, emergency

department (ED) visits, and test positivity by geographic area. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#trends_currenthospitalizations_select_00

Chen, C. & Jameel, M. (2021). False barriers: The things should not prevent you from

getting a COVID vaccine. ProPublica. https://www.propublica.org/article/false-barriers-these-things-should-not-prevent-you-from-getting-a-covid-vaccine

DSHSa. (2021). Impact of COVID-19 on vulnerable populations in Texas. Texas Health

and Human Services Commission. https://www.hhs.texas.gov/sites/default/files/documents/services/health/coronavirus-covid-19/impact-covid-19-vulnerable-populations-texas.pdf

DSHSb. (2021). DSHS launches new round of pop up vaccine events. Texas Health and

Human Services. https://www.dshs.texas.gov/news-alerts/dshs-launches-new-round-pop-up-vaccine-events

DSHS. (2022). Impact of COVID-19 on vulnerable populations in Texas: Phase 2 report.

Texas Health and Human Services Commission. https://www.hhs.texas.gov/sites/default/files/documents/covid-19-impact-on-vulnerable-populations-in-texas-dec-2022.pdf

Garnham, J.P. & Cai, M. (2021). Advocates worry vaccines will be out of reach for Black

and Hispanic neighborhoods devastated by COVID-19. The Texas Tribune. https://www.texastribune.org/2021/01/09/texas-coronavirus-vaccine-racial-inequality/

Ndugga, N., Hill, L., Artiga, S., & Haldar, S. (2022). Latest data on COVID-19

vaccinations by race/ethnicity. KFF. https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/latest-data-on-covid-19-vaccinations-by-race-ethnicity/

Google. (2022). COVID-19 open data repository. Google Health.

https://health.google.com/covid-19/open-data/

Kraft, M. E., & Furlong, S. R. (2019). Public Policy: Politics, Analysis, and Alternatives

(7th ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc. https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781544374598

OTG. (n.d.). Coronavirus executive orders, funding and waiver. Office of the Texas

Governor. https://gov.texas.gov/coronavirus-executive-orders

OTG. (2020). Governor Abbott declares state of disaster in Texas due COVID-19. Office

of the Texas Governor. https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-declares-state-of-disaster-in-texas-due-to-covid-19

OTG. (2021). Texas first state to administer 1 million COVID-19 vaccines. Office of the

Texas Governor. https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/texas-first-state-to-administer-1-million-covid-19-vaccines

Rand (n.d.). Paying for care: In depth. Rand Corporation.

https://www.rand.org/health-care/key-topics/paying-for-care/in-depth.html

Wallace, J. (2020). National Guard to help with mobile testing. The Houston Chronical.

https://web.archive.org/web/20200403011029/https:/www.houstonchronicle.com/news/article/Gov-Greg-Abbott-deploys-Texas-National-Guard-to-15162555.php

A Proactive Approach to Homelessness

In late September 2021 a fire broke out in the middle of a homeless camp in Seattle’s Ballard neighborhood. Two months later, firefighters responded to another blaze in the same location. The fires, crime, and unsanitary conditions occupying a public park sparked concerns from neighborhood watch groups, homeless activists, and politicians about the rise of homelessness across much of western Washington. Calls for action ultimately led to the park’s temporary closure; however, homelessness continues to be an issue in many of the surrounding areas. The Ballard Commons is one example of the challenge faced by policymakers tasked with resolving the region’s homeless crisis, but also mirrors the issues faced by other states. This essay attempts to answer the underlying causes of homelessness and identify the most effective policy for reducing Washington’s unhoused population.

According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 50% of the nation’s homeless are found in just four states: California, New York, Florida, and Washington (De Sousa et al, 2022, p. 16). Furthermore, the Washington Department of Health (WDOH, 2018) reported that while rates of homelessness broadly declined from 2005 to 2013, Washington’s homeless population increased for much of the next five years (p. 191). Unsurprisingly, the continued prevalence of homelessness and incidents such as those mentioned in the Ballard Commons, have resulted in a great deal of public concern. In a 2023 survey, the Washington Department of Commerce (WDOC, 2023) reported that housing costs and homelessness were the most important issues facing lawmakers, with each capturing 40% of the vote respectively. Nonetheless, setting policy has not been without controversy for the Governor, the state legislature, nor the Department of Commerce who is principally responsible for enacting policy.  

Homelessness is a contentious issue in part because it is both highly visible and poorly understood. Are homeless people lazy, drug-addicted, criminals. Or are they victims of systemic issues beyond their control. In fact, it’s a combination of all of the above. As sociologist Talmadge Wrigt (2000) says, homelessness is not one dimensional. It’s a combination of mental health, substance abuse, and structural factors (p. 30). Other studies echo such conclusions. For example, researchers Lee et al (2010) cite studies suggesting mental illness affects 30%-40% of all homeless people, and that those people are more likely to abuse substances (p. 506). They add, however, that rates of homelessness are highest where affordable housing is at its lowest (p. 509). Similar conclusions were drawn by a 2023 California survey that found 32% of all people surveyed had entered homelessness from a stable living situation. Of those, 58% cited lost income as the primary cause of their becoming homeless, and 63% cited domestic violence, overcrowding, or other conflicts as contributing to their circumstance (Kushel & Moore, 2023, pp.33-40). Such findings suggest that mental illness, substance abuse, and housing are core components of homelessness, but to view them as strictly causal would be incorrect. Instead, the research indicates that homelessness can result from one or a combination of multiple factors.

Any discussion of how to treat homelessness must include a review of existing policies. For example, Washington’s Rapid Capital Acquisition Program uses state funds to purchase hotels and apartment buildings for use as affordable housing (OFM, 2024 p. 17). Similarly, the 1811 Eastlake Housing First Program provides housing to homeless individuals with serious mental and alcohol abuse issues (Larimer et al, 2009 p. 1350). California’s Senate Bill 1380 restricts landlord’s ability to screen applicants based on poor credit, sobriety, or criminal convictions, and requires landlords to accept referrals directly from shelters, street outreach, and other programs (CA.gov, 2016). Subsidies are another approach. Oregon’s Health Authority State Rental Assistance program, for example, offers $500 monthly allowances for qualified recipients (Shroder & Matuga, 2018, p. 58). Additionally, Portland’s Tax Increment Financing program funds affordable housing projects around the Portland metro area (PHB, 2022, pp. 2-3). Alternatively, some states seek to focus on the highest risk individuals. For example, in 2022, New Hampshire launched their Critical Time Intervention program which focuses on reintegrating individuals discharged from psychiatric institutions (DHHS.NH.gov, 2022). Finally, Florida takes a more individualized approach as outlined by their Rapid Rehousing Initiative. Under this plan, local representatives focus on the specific needs of the individual with the goal of transitioning them out of state-sponsored housing as quickly as possible (FL.us, 2023). As this brief review of the literature shows, approaches to homelessness are varied, but all focus on housing as a primary means of addressing both costs, addiction, and stability.

 Housing programs are not only popular among states, but they can also produce real financial incentives. For example, Washington’s 1811 Eastlake program was reported to have been 53% more cost effective than incarceration or inaction (Larimer et al, 2009 pp. 1353-1354). Nonetheless, such approaches are not without drawbacks. The asymmetrical distribution of homelessness around urban centers raises questions over who should pay for a relatively localized problem. Furthermore, affordable housing projects, such as Washington’s Rapid Capital Acquisition program might be broadly supported but rejected by individual communities. Political Scientists Simon et al (2019) refer to such public resistance as NIMBY movements or, not in my backyard. People may support affordable housing, for example, but only so long as it’s not built near them. Still, academics suggest that middle, upper and affordable housing are not mutually exclusive. For example, Talmadge Wright (2000) suggests that such mixed housing could be built without compromising the quality of life for all involved (p. 40). Whatever the approach, affordable housing is among the most popular policies enacted by lawmakers across multiple states.

Other options include raising state (and federal) minimum wages. Washington state, for example, instituted a $16 per hour minimum wage as of 2024, over twice the federal minimum wage of $7.25. While such measures provide real benefit to the workers, they draw strong criticism from businesses, who argue that raising the cost of employment will force them to layoff workers. Such debates are described, in part, by political systems theory. Under such a paradigm an issue’s social, economic, and cultural context shape policy, specifically when confronting public opinion and interest group pressure (Kraft & Furlong, 2019 p. 81). As demonstrated, the minimum wage agenda experienced both supporting and opposing pressure from public and special interests.

Finally, criminalization or forced relocation are policies that have received strong criticism from activist groups such as the Washington Low Income Housing Alliance (WLHA, n.d.), who argue such programs disrupt the sole source stability homeless people have. However, such policies can enjoy public support from communities who simply want a problem dealt with. In fact, the more attention the public pays to a particular problem, the more difficult it will be for special interest groups to influence the outcome (Dur & De Bièvre, 2007, p. 7). This can be challenging for advocacy groups who face mounting public concern over a highly visible problem.  Furthermore, defining success can be difficult. Harvard lecturer Matt Andrews (2022) notes that achieving success involves much more than reaching in-program goals (p. 2). While such views may seem to reduce accountability, consider whether relocation without shelter addresses the underlying issues of housing affordability, substance abuse, and mental health. The goals of such programs might be obtained, but the broader social concern is unresolved. Similarly, affordable housing may provide a long-term solution without addressing the immediate concerns of the public. It is essential, therefore, that policies include both housing, wage, health, and public considerations.

In summary, homelessness is a broadly structural and personal issue. Economic drivers such as the cost of housing, low wages, and unemployment are all issues Washington can address through better policy, however public considerations must be taken into account. As the data show, a coherent strategy of moving people out of public parks and into affordable housing is more cost effective than incarceration or inaction. At the same time, such programs must ensure adequate support for individuals suffering from substance abuse and mental illness, with the goal of enabling them to live productive lives.  

References

Andrews, M. (2022). What is public policy success, especially in development. CID

Faculty Working Paper Series 2022.415, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/37373278

CA.gov. (2016). SB-1380 homeless coordinating and financing council (2015-2016).

California Legislative Information. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB1380

DHHS.NH.gov. (2022). NH DHHS launches new community-oriented program to

support people after psychiatric hospitalization. New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services. https://www.dhhs.nh.gov/news-and-media/nh-dhhs-launches-new-community-oriented-program-support-people-after-psychiatric

De Sousa, T., Andrichik, A., Cuellar, M., Marson, J., Prestera, E., & Rush, K. (2022). The

2022 Annual homelessness assessment report (AHAR) to Congress. The U.S. Department of Housing

and Urban Development. https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/2022-AHAR-Part-1.pdf

Dur, A.& de Bièvre. (2007). The question of interest group influence. Journal of Public

Policy, 27(1), 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X07000591

FL.us. (2023). The 2023 Florida statutes (including special session C). Online Sunshine.

http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0420/Sections/0420.6265.html

Kraft, M. E., & Furlong, S. R. (2019). Public Policy: Politics, Analysis, and Alternatives

(7th ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc. https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781544374598

Kushel, M. & Moore, T. (2023). Toward a new understanding: The California statewide

study of people experiencing homelessness. University of California San Francisco. https://homelessness.ucsf.edu/sites/default/files/2023-06/CASPEH_Report_62023.pdf

Larimer, M. E., Malone, D. K., Garner, M. D., Atkins, D.C., Burlingham, B., Lonczak,

H.S., Tanzer, K., Ginzler, J., Clifasefi, S.L., Hobson, W.G., & Marlatt, G.A. (2009). Health care and public service use and costs before and after provision of housing for chronically homeless persons with severe alcohol problems. American Medical Association, 301(13). 1349-1357. https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/183666

Lee, B., Tyler, K., & Wright, J.D. (2010). The new homelessness revisited. Annual

Review of Sociology, 36, 501-521. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25735089

OFM. (2024). Proposed 2023-25: Budget and policy highlights. Office of Financial

Management. https://ofm.wa.gov/sites/default/files/public/budget/statebudget/highlights/budget23/04-Homeless_Housing_.pdf

PHB. (2022). Portland housing bureau’s 2022 metro bond + TIF opportunity solicitation.

Portland Housing Bureau. https://www.portland.gov/phb/documents/metro-bond-tif-opportunity-solicitation-m-bos-fall-2022/download

Shroder, M. D. & Matuga, M. P. (Eds.). (2018). The housing-health connection.

Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research, 20(2). https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/cityscpe/vol20num2/Cityscape-July_2018.pdf

Simon, C.A., Steel, B.S., Lovrich, N.P. (2019). State and local government and politics.

Oregon State University. https://open.oregonstate.education/government/

WDOC. (2023). State survey: Most people say housing is #1 issue. Washington State

Department of Commerce. https://www.commerce.wa.gov/news/state-survey-most-people-say-housing-is-1-issue/

WDOH. (2018). Washington State Health Assessment. Washington State Department of

Health. https://doh.wa.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/Documents/1000/2018SHA_FullReport.pdf

WLHA. (n.d.). Toolkit to combat the criminalization of homelessness. Washington Low

Income Housing Alliance. https://www.wliha.org/sites/default/files/toolkit.pdf

Wright, T. (2000). Resisting homelessness: Global, national, and local solutions.

Contemporary Sociology, 29(1), 27-43. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2654929  

The Legacy of Media

As the Berlin wall fell in early November 1989, the demise of communism was heralded across the western world. It was a triumph of democratic principles globally, while hailed a Republican victory in the United States. Images of Germans demolishing one of the most iconic emblems of communism transmitted around the world. It was a landmark moment in modern politics and a pivotal moment in the German national narrative. It is with little surprise, therefore, that few people gave much thought as a newly syndicated radio show joined the chorus of voices heralding this historic moment. From his New York studio, Rush Limbaugh echoed many of the bipartisan sentiments of the time, and his subsequent rise to prominence is due, at least in part, to the fall of communism. It is ironic, however, that Limbaugh, a conservative commentator, would usher in an era of media that would erode the social capital that forms the basis of civil society. More importantly, social media have been left to carry on and refine the legacy of traditional media, through the power of science and algorithms.

In 2023 Fox News had nearly $15 billion in annual revenue (Statista, 2024).  Like many of their rivals, the network relies on a bevy of primetime commentators to attract viewers. And much to the chagrin of their rivals, Fox has continued to lead both CNN and MSNBC in nightly ratings, even as viewership has broadly declined for all networks. Despite the declining ratings, however, the networks have been slow to die. This is partly due to the durability of partisan media. Years prior, Rush Limbaugh proved that such an opinion-based, partisan format could be successful. For conservative networks, like Fox, his syndication proved that a national appetite for such programming existed. Traditional delivery like that of Larry King was suddenly bland by comparison. The subsequent rise of conservative commentary forced the major news networks to respond with a similar, commentary-led format.

The rapid evolution of television, fueled by the competition for viewers was brought about by the onset of for-profit newscasting. Fox News wasn’t the evening news, nor was it just commentary. It was also entertainment. And it lowered the level of critical engagement required by providing the viewer with a ready-made opinion. It was, to paraphrase Rush Limbaugh’s snarky review of his own show, not just the news, but what to think about it (C-Span, 2020). Ironically, this was precisely the criticism levied at Limbaugh throughout his rise. His show wasn’t news in the traditional sense. He was, as he put it, simply responding to the mainstream media (60 Minutes, 2020). This would become the format of dozens of hosts, from Bill O’Reilly and Sean Hannity to Don Lemon. Evening news was replaced by panels of guests with opposing opinions, often talking over one another in chaotic two-minute clashes before breaking. All the while revenues continued to climb, and the networks continued their partisan drift.

Thirty-five years after the rise of Rush Limbaugh, the consequences of partisan broadcasting are at least partially clear. The declining trust Americans place in the media has been widely reported as has the overall decline in ratings. More troubling, partisan media whether in the news or social media, have made Americans less trusting of one another and perhaps less trusting of our institutions. Havard Professor Robert Putnam (1995) describes such trust as social capital. In Putnam’s assessment, social capital has broadly declined with the rise of television. The partisan formula popularized by Rush Limbaugh was adopted by the nightly news and, eventually, reproduced algorithmically by social media. In other words, the media have changed, but the partisan formula remains the same.

Consider, for example, our growing ability to self-segregate through social media. Conservative and liberal groups isolate from one another while Facebook and Youtube algorithms ensure the divide is never crossed. As legacy media erodes and social media continues to grow, the entry point to group participation becomes increasingly important. In the 1980s, for example, groups might have been organized around parent-teacher associations, churches, or YMCAs. While some homogeneity should be expected based on the characteristics of the community, the group was still more or less random. Putnam’s (1995) study, however, shows a dramatic decline in social capital over the last 80 years, suggesting that fewer people are engaged in traditional group activities. Furthermore, physical places are no longer the genesis of group formation. Social media and the internet have replaced churches and community centers. And while the former are welcome to all, the latter are guarded by algorithms and administrators. Group formation, if it were to happen in the physical world, would likely be predicated on our digital affiliations. The polarization of media, therefore, affects not only our perceptions of the world, but our physical interactions within it.

The point of this argument is not to pin the demise of social capital on Rush Limbaugh. The proliferation of partisan commentary is only one aspect of a for-profit, entertainment driven news industry, whose legacy extends beyond cable television to social media and the physical world. Instead, it’s important to realize that polarization is occurring and likely occurring to each of us. It takes relatively little examination to point out the wayward drift in others, but a great deal of self-reflection to recognize it in ourselves. As American critic, Howard Rheingold said, “Unless a great many people learn the basics of online crap detection…I fear for the future of the internet as a useful source of credible news, medical research, financial information, educational resources, scholarly and scientific research” (Hobbs & McGee, 2014, p. 57). In other words, it’s incumbent upon each of us to consume the world in a responsible way.

In summary, the success of partisan national media provided the basis for continued partisan divide in social media. This divide extends not only to the information we consume, but the company we keep. While the decline in social capital is in part due to polarization, its remedy lies in our collective ability to recognize how media manipulates our perceptions and work to undo polarization in ourselves.

References

C-Span. (2020). User clip: Limbaugh tells you what to think. [Video]. C-Span.

https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4853284/user-clip-limbaugh-tells

Hobbs, R. & McGee, S. (2014). Teaching about propaganda: An examination of the historical

roots of media literacy. Journal of Media Literacy Education, 6(2), 56-67. www.jmle.org

Putnam, R. D. (1995). Tuning in, tuning out: The strange disappearance of social capital in

America. PS: Political Science and Politics, 28(4), 664–683. https://doi.org/10.2307/420517   

Statista (2024). Revenue of Fox Corporation in the fiscal years 2017 to 2023. Statista.

https://www.statista.com/statistics/1270363/fox-corporation-revenue/

60 Minutes. (2020, February 5th). Rush Limbaugh: The 1991 60 minutes interview. [Video].

YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=017VvbOOQLo

Industry and Lasting Climate Change

In 2008, the orange haze of wildfire smoke filled the Puget Sound basin for the first time in recent memory. Within a few years, forest fires were reported on the west side of the Cascade Mountains and smoke infiltration into the urban area became an annual occurrence. The abnormally barren slopes of the Olympic Mountains and severity of summer drought suggested an apparent change in climate. Even the diminishing need to mow the lawn was peculiar. Though these are all anecdotal observations, they are examples of how individual experience shapes environmental sentiment. In fact, such observations can lead to fervent public support for environmental policies, but they can also lead to wide swings in sentiment, preferred solutions, and even whether a problem exists at all. This essay examines the interplay between public, state, federal, and special interests, and argues that while the various approaches to climate change are not mutually exclusive, public opinion is too irregular to drive policy. Instead, legislators ought to focus their efforts on incentivizing the private sector to adopt and create green technology.

In an essay published in Environmental Policy: New Directions for the Twenty-First Century, Drs. Christopher Borick and Erick Lachapelle write that, contrary to what one might expect, popular support for climate policies doesn’t necessarily correspond to legislative policy (Vig, et al., 2021, p. 63). Furthermore, public opinion on the environment itself is highly irregular. For example, in just a year and a half from April 2008 to October 2009, public belief that there was solid evidence for global warming fell from 71% to 57% (p. 64) and by 2011, the number of Americans who believed climate change was occurring had fallen to levels not seen since 1997. By 2017, however, climate change acceptance had once again risen to over 60% (p. 66). These examples illustrate how within only a decade, public sentiment toward the environment swung from popular support to minority issue and back again. These dramatic turns in public opinion are not indicative of climate science or environmental policies. They’re reflective of fickle public concern. As Drs. Borick and Lachapelle observed, the decline in sentiment toward global warming in 2009 directly corresponded to the Great Recession (p. 64). While not definitive, this is evidence that the salience of environmental issues is not as robust as the more immediate concerns of finances, home, and family. Therefore, it’s not hard to see how garnering political support, much less enacting law would be very difficult when public attitudes toward climate are so fluid. On the other hand, studies suggest that the environmental divide between rural and urban residents may be moderating. For example, in research conducted by University of Utah Professor, Mark Brunson (Brunson et al., n.d.), survey data found that while environmental attitudes between rural and urban dwellers differed, the difference wasn’t so extreme. These findings run opposed to the stereotypical divide between urban and rural views on climate. Yet achieving consistent public policy at national and even state levels remains difficult.

Not only is public attitude subject to change, but what to do about climate is equally as subjective. Is solar, wind, tidal, or geothermal the preferred renewable energy solution? Are lithium powered EVs, bikes, blimps, or scooters tomorrow’s method of transportation? Is rainwater harvesting ecologically responsible or taking resources out of the natural environment? Clearly, the variety and number of potential solutions to climate change make the job of legislating extremely difficult.

However, while public opinion on the environment is erratic, special interests provide some measure of focus. For example, timber companies might advocate for the renewable nature of forestry. Environmental interests might bring awareness to endangered species or agricultural concerns in Africa and Brazil. Regardless of the point of view, special interests provide staying power that can outlast public opinion. As Oregon State University Professor, Brent Steel (1996) writes, “It has been noted that disequilibrium in society or in a specific policy arena is often a stimulant to interest group formation and heightened group activity” (pp. 401-419).In other words, while the public at large might be undecided on renewable energy solutions, special interest groups exist to advocate for such concerns.

Furthermore, the disequilibrium referenced by Steel isn’t isolated to the realm of public opinion. Such inequality exists in financial and human resource capacity as well. These differences influence how various special interest groups from environmental NGOs to corporations interact with state and local governments. For example, environmentalist groups tend to focus on policy through litigation and activism (elite challenging), whereas corporations tend to focus on lobbying agencies and individual politicians (Steel, 1996).

This difference in approach can represent popular public opinion. For example, Steel (1996) writes that with a strong plurality of people identifying as environmentalists, there is incentive for both special interests and corporations to consider public opinion. Certainly, with the rise of social media, hashtags, and viral posts, the ability for a financially underpowered organization to make a difference in the national narrative has changed over the last two decades. These are all positive indicators for environmentalists, however special interests are not a cure-all for climate issues. Climate by definition is a global phenomenon and therefore macro in scale. NGOs and special interest groups, on the other hand, are often hyper focused on a single issue or a subset of issues. The scale of the problem and resulting efforts are therefore incongruent.

In a sense the environmental movement and, to a degree, public opinion are anarchial. That is, there’s no central authority that determines which environmental pursuits are worthwhile and which are not. Policy is still subject to whatever is popular at the moment. However, the anarchial nature of environmental priorities provides an opportunity for both states and the federal government to issue guidance. In some senses, state-level engagement offers an attractive alternative to more distant federal governance. State-level approaches theoretically are closer to home and resonate more with public officials and their constituents. States can also lead by example or build coalitions on climate issues. On the other hand, states have no shortage of bureaucracy or special interests. The latter presents both competitive and potentially ethical issues for environmentalists seeking to enact legislative change.

University of Michigan Professor Barry Rabe (Vig, et al., 2021) writes extensively on climate policies and the trend toward increased state autonomy on climate issues. While there are benefits to the increased localization of climate policy, increased state autonomy comes at the cost of reduced federal funding (p. 37). That said, the federated approach to climate could be an ideal model for western democracies. The federal government sets goals and the states determine how to achieve them. However, there are two fundamental challenges to this approach. First, senators and representatives are elected for six- and two-year terms, respectively. This makes establishing lasting policy difficult as the system is engineered to elect officials who represent the most current public concerns. Second, climate policy is written by state and national officials whose campaigns are often financed by corporations. Asking lawmakers to regulate an industry that may have helped them get elected is a fundamental conflict of interests.

That said, Congress and state governments can be stout environmental allies. As Carleton College Professor of Science, Technology, and Society, Norman Vig writes, President Reagan faced stiff congressional resistance to his deregulatory climate agenda in the early 1980s. Ironically, the backlash against Reagan’s policies strengthened existing environmental regulations such as the Clean Water Act (Vig, et al., 2021, p. 91). Congress also retains budgetary and confirmation powers that can be used to check adversarial climate agendas. In this sense, the bureaucracy or, status quo, works to protect environmental policy.

Nonetheless, the same short-term risks to the climate agenda exist in Congress as do at the state and local levels. Indeed, the cyclical nature of Western government is what makes democracy work. Yet it is precisely what makes dramatic and committed environmental change extremely difficult. Ironically, the answer for Western governments and environmentalists may be to embrace private industry. Such an embrace is not without precedent. Consider, for example, that following the Civil War, the federal government financed the transcontinental railroad. During the Great Depression, FDR’s New Deal financed a boom in new construction. The United States even subsidized oil companies to incentivize domestic production during World War II. That said, the United States’ track record on green energy subsidies is less consistent. In a paper published by the Center for Strategic International Studies, researchers Jack Caporal and William Reinsch (2021) found that green subsidies declined by 59% from 2010 and 2019 (p.6). Though such subsidies have increased over recent years they remain well below 2010 levels. Nonetheless, according to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (Fasching, 2022), electricity generation from renewable sources has increased steadily over the same period. These data suggest private sector commitment to renewable energy and should incentivize further government assistance.

Finally, in a market economy, competition, innovation, and incentives work to transform and erect new sectors. Instead of viewing industry as an adversary, subsidies seek to leverage capitalism as a resource in the climate agenda. Furthermore, while still vulnerable to the same democratic risks cited above, subsidies leverage the human capacity to innovate and create a new status quo.

In summary, public support for environmental policies is inconsistent and, while special interests provide some focus to environmental issues, they are still driven by public concerns. To this extent the political systems of Western democracies are beholden to public opinion and market conditions. This makes widespread legislative change more difficult. Instead, governments ought to leverage their economies to create new sectors that not only challenge the status quo but result in lasting climate change.

References

Brunson, M., Shindler, B., Steel, B. (n.d.). Rural versus urban differences in natural resource

management.

Caporal, J. & Reinsch, W. (2021). Toward a climate-driven trade agenda. Center for Strategic and

International Studies. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep28809.4

Steel, B., Pierce, J. C., & Lovrich, N. P. (1996). Resources and strategies of interest groups and

industry representatives involved in federal forest policy. The Social Science Journal (Fort Collins), 33(4), 401–419. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0362-3319(96)90014-2

Fasching, E. (2022). In the first half of 2022, 24% of U.S. electricity generation came from renewable

sources. U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=53779

Vig, N. J., Kraft, M. E., & Rabe, B. G. (2021). Environmental Policy: New Directions for the Twenty-

First Century (11th ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc. (US). https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781544378039

The Tools of Conservation

As the first American settlers expanded west into the frontier, they were met with a seemingly infinite abundance of resources. From gold and timber to bison and beavers, the New World supplied industries with a bounty of raw materials. There was, as former ambassador to the WTO Michael Punke says, a myth of inexhaustibility about the American west (Burns, 2023, 1:41.00). The prairies, forests, and mountains were so vast, that it was inconceivable to most Americans that those resources could ever be depleted. This was no more apparent than in our management of the American Buffalo. What began as herds in the tens of millions were hunted nearly to extinction. Historian Dan Flores calls it a destruction of animal life without precedent in human history (1:44.00). Yet the same society that nearly wiped out the bison acted to save them from extinction. It is with similar irony that many of America’s early conservationists were hunters, foresters, and other people whose lives depended on a fruitful and sustainable land. This paper explores America’s approach to natural resource management, the role of government, and the tools employed to ensure sustainable policies.

Natural resource management begins at home. It is perhaps one of the easiest points of entry for the public to engage in good environmental stewardship, however it remains one of the most contentious issues in contemporary politics. Drs. William Lowry and John Freemuth write that public lands and national parks are widely supported by the public at both the state and federal levels; however, what to do with those lands remains politically contested (Vig et al., 2021, p. 209). At the same time, from 2005 to 2017, national park visitation increased by over 20% (p. 212), suggesting that Americans value the environment and resources within it. The public’s role in natural resource management is therefore divided. On the one hand, American’s value having access to those resources. On the other, conservation has become entangled with political affiliation and partisan points of view.

While partisan politics have slowed environmental progress in recent decades, Congress has passed conservationist legislation with bipartisan support. The Endangered Species Act is one such example. In fact, from 1980 – 2020, spending on conservation and land management increased by 27% (Vig et al., 2021, p. 19). National parks have expanded greatly over the last two centuries as well, broadly due to congressional action. However partisan politics remain active within the conservation debate. For example, University of Wisconsin Professor of Political Science, Michael Kraft writes, Republicans have consistently favored industrial interests, particularly since the mid-1990s (p. 112), representing a shift away from the bipartisan collaboration of the prior two decades. The partisan shift has also prevented reform to existing regulations, like the aforementioned Endangered Species Act and the Superfund program (pp. 128, 129). In short, Congress is the primary federal entity capable of passing laws that protect natural resources, however party politics can impede progress.

The fact that Congress has been able to achieve any movement on environmental issues is somewhat remarkable given the lack of jurisdiction granted by the constitution. However, Political Scientist Kimberly Smith writes, that while the constitution doesn’t provide Congress with explicit authority over natural resources, Article IV has been broadly interpreted by the courts as giving Congress such jurisdiction (Vig et al., 2021, p. 146). This interpretation grants extraordinary power to Congress as the legislature controls Federal funding to the agencies charged with managing natural resources. Critically however, the President appoints the heads of these agencies, which often carry partisan motivations. The nominations of Presidents Reagen and Trump to the EPA are good examples of such appointments (pp. 91, 100). Therefore, while the courts have granted Congress the authority to manage America’s resources, the agencies in charge of executing that management are largely directed by the President.

On the one hand, the size of the United States supports a direct regulation, command-and-control approach like that discussed above. On the other hand, the diversity of environments, population centers, local economies, and industrial concerns make such an approach unrealistic. However, central planning has nonetheless resulted in successful policies. The Antiquities and Resource Conservation Acts are good examples of such regulations. The former protects natural and manmade artifacts and has been used to expand America’s national parks (National Parks Service, 2023). The latter helps to protect waterways and other natural resources from contamination (Vig et al. 2021, p. 375). Federal agencies such as the National Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and National Park Service combine to manage forests, access to natural resources, and protect wild spaces. While agencies’ agendas can fluctuate with different presidencies, their centralized nature allows for broad application of regulations. Driving consistency across the American continent would be difficult if such objectives were left entirely to individual states. That said, centralized planning is not without drawbacks.

To begin with, the ecological diversity of the United States makes a one-size-fits-all approach impractical. This has led to policy friction between federal and state authorities. For example, natural resources like fossil fuels are often subject to federal and state guidelines (Vig et al. 2019, p 208). Local industries can influence state policies in ways that conflict with Federal objectives. For instance, partisan politics played a role in the GOPs pursuit of privatization for large swaths of federal land, as lawmakers from those states sought to represent local interests (p. 208). That said, while partisan politics have hindered progress over the last two decades, they’ve opened the door for an era of collaboration.

Drs. Chris Ansell and Alison Gash of Berkley define collaborative governance as the process of bringing various environmental interests together with the goal of fostering collaborative decision making (Ansell & Gash, 2007, p 543). This approach theoretically results in a more informed solution by involving opposing interests such as conservation groups and timber companies. The Colorado river is one such example of collaborative management, where state and federal agencies, Native American tribes, and agricultural interests are working together to share the river’s resources (Kenny, n.d., pp. 71-76). These are certainly positive indicators for a collaborative approach; however, Drs. Ansell and Gash point out that participation can be court ordered or mandated by other authorities. Hence, the incentives and good faith efforts of the participants are paramount (Ansell & Gash, 2007, p. 552).

While efforts to manage the Colorado river are an example of collaborative governance, they are a better case study in sustainability planning. Rivers, forests, and fisheries are all examples of what academics refer to as common pool resources (Ostrom et al., 1999, p 278). In such cases, quotas or shares are assigned to private interests as a way of managing the overall resource (p. 279). In the case of water rights, those interests can also be public entities. Ideally managing common pool resources takes on a self-sustaining, industry-led capacity. That is, the various interests monitor their usage of natural resources in a responsible way, free of direct regulation. Drs. Ostrom et al, write however that such normalization is not always effective and typically regulatory oversight is required. Nonetheless, collective cooperation can be established, and flourish provided self-interested parties are not dominant (p. 279).

Finally, science-based decision-making can play a strong role in each of the above approaches to resource management, however whether it does is largely up to the special interests involved. How we manage natural resources is inherently a scientific question, whether it be how we extract oil from shale or the effects of overfishing on various aquatic species, science is simply the involvement of data. Though this can mean a scientifically led approach to policy, it does not necessarily mean so. In fact, most scientists prefer to not take a dominant role in setting policy (Steel et al., 2004 p. 5). The role of science should be to advise policymakers on the likely outcomes of various decisions and allow legislators to determine the best course of action. That said, science is not impervious to special interests. The issues of global warming, leaded gasoline, and tobacco are all examples where industrial interests funded science that supported a continuation of the status quo. For this reason, the profit motive has largely stifled market solutions to conservation.

The American buffalo is perhaps the best example of just how destructive market forces can be toward natural resources. America’s salmon and king crab fisheries are also examples of how free market priorities forced regulatory intervention. However, policy makers and markets do not have to be at odds. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development advises governments to treat resource efficiency as economic policy, and proactively engage with international supply chains to reduce duplicity and waste. The OECD also advocates for reducing investment barriers to environmental goods and services (OECD, 2018 p. 21). Such collaborative policies ought to reduce hostilities and produce better long-term solutions. More importantly, there are incentives for companies to act in the interest of conservation. First, conservation ensures not only the sustainability of the resource, but that of the dependent economies as well. Second, there is broad public support for conservationist policies from both rural and urban populations (Brunson et al., 2009 pp. 6-7). Furthermore, the increased power of urban centers, consumer spending, and social media provide powerful incentives for companies to act in sustainable ways. This could be Weyerhaeuser publicizing its land management and reforesting practices, or the efforts of mineral extraction companies to restore depleted mines. There are opportunities for market forces to change behavior as research by Ostrom et al (1999). showed, however these changes must be incentivized by the market. In other words, consumers must choose where they spend their money and reward those companies who embrace sustainable practices.

In summary, natural resource management invokes federal and state agencies, special interests, and a mix of central and collaborative planning. Market forces are largely kept out of the conversation except where consumers reward sustainable practices. Managing our natural resources, therefore, requires a mix of all the major players, from federal and state agencies to private interests and consumers alike.

References

Ansell, C. & Gash, A. (2007). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. The Journal of Public

Administration Research and Theory.

Brunson, M., Shindler, B., & Steel, B. (2009). Rural versus urban differences in natural resource

management. Oregon State University.

Burns, K. (Director). (2023). The American Buffalo [Film]. Florentine Films.

https://www.pbs.org/kenburns/the-american-buffalo/

Kenny, D. (n.d.). The environmental politics and policy of western public lands (pp. 71-79). Oregon

State University.

National Park Service. (2023). Antiquities act of 1906.

https://www.nps.gov/subjects/archeology/antiquities-act.htm

OECD. (2018). Global material resources outlook to 2060. Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development. https://www.oecd.org/environment/waste/highlights-global-material-resources-outlook-to-2060.pdf

Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C.B., Norgaard, R.B., & Policansky, D. (1999). Revisiting the

commons: Local lessons, global challenges. Science, 284, 278-282.

Steel, B., List, P., Lach, D., & Shindler, B. (2004). The role of scientists in the environmental policy

process: A case study from the American west. Environmental Science and Policy, 7, 1-13.

Vig, N. J., Kraft, M. E., & Rabe, B. G. (2021). Environmental Policy: New Directions for the Twenty-

First Century (11th ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc. (US). https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781544378039

Environmental Policy: No Easy Solutions

In 2020 Gallup released a poll announcing that environmental issues were once again a salient force in the minds of most Americans. Survey results indicated that as many respondents expressed support for environmental issues as did for the economy (PEW, 2020). While these results seem to bode well for environmental issues, they embody the broader challenge faced by policy makers and special interests. Public support for environmental issues ebbs and flows. It is fickle, transient, and often subject to more pressing social needs. It is therefore difficult to create effective legislation, tackle long-term issues like climate change, and reevaluate existing law, when the public’s focus is so fluid. This paper explores how these, and other challenges impact the areas of western rivers, mining on public lands, rangelands, and forest management.

When it comes to the impacts of climate change, water might be second only to rising temperatures. Yet, unlike temperatures, water is a resource that must be divided, shared, and conserved across a wide range of special interests from local municipalities to agricultural and industrial concerns. This is the primary focus of western river management and these concerns are currently playing out with the Colorado and Klamath rivers. At root is a competition for limited water supply between rural and urban interests. However, the issue is more complex. As Doug Kenny (n.d.) writes in his essay, The Changing Fate of Western Rivers, water levels at Lake Mead have consistently dropped for most of the last 20 years (p. 74). More troubling is that there is a growing body of evidence that suggests these trends are not drought related, but part of a broader aridification of the region (p. 75).

Nonetheless, legislative reform remains elusive in large part due to the array of competing priorities over water resources. For example, the National Park Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service each have interests in the Colorado river. The Karuk and Yurok tribes are principal partners in the demolition of three dams along the lower Klamath river (Greenson, 2022), and consumers have an interest in maintaining robust fisheries. As this example illustrates, environmental concerns are complex and often involve multiple special interests, from private to public, federal and state.

Similar competition between state, federal, tribal, and environmental concerns is evident in the issue of mining on public lands. Federal agencies administer approximately 350 million acres of public land which holds an abundance of natural resources with real economic value from timber and rivers to minerals and natural gas (Giordano, n.d.). What to do with these lands, who has access to them, and even their intrinsic value is all part of the public land debate. Furthermore, while the Bureau of Land Management is the largest administer of public land by acres, a number of federal agencies might exercise concerns over the same geography. For example, the Fish and Wildlife Service is predominantly concerned with animal species which may involve BLM land. Ultimately, political interests often determine how public land is used though these interests are often short-term and transient in nature.

Finally, rangelands and forest management share many philosophical concerns with western rivers and public land use. Much like the prior two issues, the model for how rangelands and forests are managed is rooted in 19th century politics, and much like the challenges faced by the BLM, the NFS must choose whether to open its land to resource extraction. As with the other agencies, decisions of the National Forest Service can carry adverse impacts to the domains of other agencies.

Beyond economic and legislative pressures, however, the NFS faces a unique challenge from wildfires (Toman, n.d.). While the threat of forest fires is not solely the domain of forestry, the impact of fires on forests is particularly strong. Forestry and wildfire management therefore represent a unique combination of concerns from timber, water, and air quality, to economic, urban, and wildlife management. As with all of the aforementioned issue areas, public policy, public will, and special interests represent the greatest challenges faced by federal agencies as they seek to manage our natural resources.

A common thread throughout public land policy, western river, forest, and rangeland management is their shared ancestry in 19th century politics. More generally, the policies associated with each are deeply influenced by expansionist priorities. For example, the Reclamation Act of 1902 recognized that water development was necessary to support western settlement and would form the basis for the Colorado River Compact of 1922 (Kenney, n.d. pp. 71, 72). Similarly, the Mining Act of 1872 was created, in part, to manage the flood of mining claims registered on federal lands (Giordano, n.d., p. 159). Finally, the Land ordinance of 1785 was an early version of federal land management policy, and a precursor to the Taylor Grazing act of 1934. In fact, in their essay, Western Rebellion, Drs. Simon et al, write, “the values of political actors during this period were largely shaped by a desire to significantly increase the size and influence of the United States” (Simon et al, n.d., p. 183). A sentiment embodied by not only the geographical expansion of the physical United States, but also its economic and political power as well. Furthermore, this mindset was accompanied by a belief that western resources were nearly infinite. As Eric Toman writes in his essay on fire management, there was a myth of superabundance about western resources. It was, as many thought, impossible to ever use them up (Toman, n.d. p. 59). Such dated policy is ill-equipped to handle the modern challenges of climate change and water scarcity. The Colorado River Compact, for example, was written following one of the wettest seasons on record (Kenney, n.d., p. 72). Updating this legislation to effectively manage resources in an era of diminishing supply not only involves political action, but also public will. Such action is an area of common ground between water, land, forest and rangeland management, however broad reform remains elusive.

In some cases, legislators might be slow to act because of competing special interests. In other cases, they simply may not identify with the issue. For example, the highly visual reduction of water in Lake Mead carries with it a sense of urgency, whereas the environmental implications of mining on public lands do not. For one thing, mining on public lands is not nearly as relatable as running out of water. In this regard, public land use represents another of the issues facing environmental concerns: public will. For many Americans, western states are distant places with distant concerns. Giordano’s (n.d.) essay, Mining on Federal Land, describes an inherent east-west divide over America’s natural resources. On the one hand, he says, Easterners seek to maximize the economic value of the west, while Westerners want to preserve the land for public enjoyment (p. 160). This cultural divide is certainly not exclusive to mining on public lands, but it serves to highlight how public perception is shaped by regional cultural priorities.

Mining on federal lands also engages the federal government in ways rangeland and water management do not. Giordano (n.d.) writes that the Mining Act of 1872 has numerous flaws. Among them, low environmental protection and minimal lack of developmental oversight (p. 162). While these may be relatively intuitive, Giordano adds that the Act lacks any sort of royalty program (p. 161), implying a private sector obligation where the federal government is paid dues like any other landowner. This is certainly a curious if not unprecedented theory of public and private sector relations, and it’s hard to imagine a similar relationship dictating access to fresh water.

If water and mining operations illustrate either end of public interest, rangeland and forest management are probably in the middle. Authors Simon et al (n.d.) write in their essay, Western Rebellion that ranching and land use policies are one of the preeminent examples of how policy creates constituencies (p. 185). This might suggest that ranching was a primarily western concern, however, at the time of the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, nearly half of all U.S. Senators represented states with grazing lands (p. 185). Furthermore, rangeland and forestry are increasingly salient issues with the rise of forest fires and widespread regional air quality issues.

Much like the images of Lake Mead, a thick covering of wildfire smoke is difficult to ignore. On the one hand, such a clear manifestation of a climate issue ought to result in easy public policy and united public opinion. However, as Toman (n.d.) writes, there is no easy approach. A strict policy of containment has led to an increase in fires and fire intensity; yet letting the fires burn as the NFS’s current hybrid approach dictates, results in vast amounts of smoke. The wildfire issue, better than any other, captures how public opinion and legislative options can run diametrically opposed. The public demands a solution, but no solution is consequence-free.

Finally, special interests are likely to remain a significant force in environmental policy. Mining and timber companies want access to public lands, power companies want access to hydroelectric opportunities, and American Indian tribes seek to restore native habitats. Perhaps most relevant of all, agricultural interests require access to water, bringing the issues of food and water into direct competition. Yet recent developments in the Klamath river basin have proven that such competing interests are not mutually exclusive. In an example of successful collaborative management, Indian tribes, federal and state agencies, agricultural concerns, and industry worked together to remove three dams and restore the natural habitats of various sites along the Klamath river (Grable, 2023). The Colorado River, while still unresolved, is another example of collaborative management in progress. That said, collaborative management is not a one size fits all approach. For example, land management and resource extraction are very much the domain of presidential priorities and therefore take on a command-and-control quality, versus the more inclusive approach of collaborative management.

In summary, public opinion, public policy, and special interests will continue to be the major challenges to environmental policy over the coming years. Furthermore, while collaborative management has produced promising results in the domains of water management, this does not preclude the need for long-term legislative change. As demonstrated by the issues of mining, wildfire smoke, and water levels in Lake Mead, legislative change is difficult, even when facing dire circumstances. Ultimately, the path forward will require compromise and a combination of collaborative and command and control solutions.  

References

Grable, J. (2023). With on down, Klamath dam removal proceeds on schedule. Oregon Public

Broadcasting. https://www.opb.org/article/2023/07/16/klamath-dam-removal-copco-2/.

Greenson, T. (2022). Tribes decry Klamath water proposal. North Coast Journal.

https://www.northcoastjournal.com/NewsBlog/archives/2022/12/16/tribes-decry-klamath-water-proposal.

Giordano, P.C. (n.d.). Mining on federal land (pp. 158-170). Oregon State University.

Kenny, D. (n.d.). The environmental politics and policy of western public lands (pp. 71-79). Oregon

State University.

PEW Research Center. (2020). As economic concerns recede, environmental protection rises on the

public’s policy agenda. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/02/13/as-economic-concerns-recede-environmental-protection-rises-on-the-publics-policy-agenda/.

Simon, C.A., Wolters, E.A., & Steel, B.S. (n.d.). Western rebellion (pp. 183-193). Oregon State

University.

Toman, E. Wildland fire policy and climate change (pp. 53-70). Oregon State University.

Vig, N. J., Kraft, M. E., & Rabe, B. G. (2021). Environmental Policy: New Directions for the

Twenty-First Century (11th ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc. (US). https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781544378039

America: A Multi-Century Revolution

Popular history would argue that the American revolution was based on taxes and parliamentary representation. However, this is not a complete story. Revolution wasn’t a singular event at a fixed point in time, nor was it limited to a handful of decades. Revolution was a long-running movement spanning multiple centuries with millions of participants, each committing a personal act of freedom. With every decision to leave their homelands, Europeans were, in a very real sense, declaring independence. This essay examines the roots of American’s desire for freedom and argues that what is commonly thought of the start of revolution was really the final act. Independence had already been declared centuries earlier and only culminated as a war fought against the British empire.

Centuries before the Sugar Act, the Stamp Act, and the Townsend Acts, and long before the Quebec Act, European settlers waited to board ships bound for the New World. This act of leaving their homeland likely bore special significance to them. It was, after all, no small risk to cross the Atlantic Ocean for a continent populated by a people who neither spoke their language nor shared their customs. There was the basic matter of leaving what was a familiar if not broken system under European rule and heading for a new land replete with danger. Likely very few Europeans imagined that by walking away, they were declaring independence from their homelands. But this was in fact what they were doing.

For many settlers, the New World represented opportunity. There they could develop a trade, own land, practice religion, and accumulate wealth (Foner, 2011 pp. 6-7). It was, in many respects, the basis of what we take for granted today: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In other words, the things many of them felt they had no access to in Europe. Fleeing their homelands meant an escape from the European class system, Papal authority, and an unfair and often brutal legal system. It represented a future that simply did not exist outside of the New World.

To put a value on these motivations, consider the risks the average European was taking. Arriving safely in the New World was no guarantee. Hurricanes, pirates, violence, and ship-born disease were just a few of the ways to die before ever catching sight of America. Once arrived upon North American shores, death in the form of disease, Native Americans, and other settlers was possible, if not likely. It was with no small amount of risk that these early settlers departed their homelands. The arduous journey they faced was not unlike that of so many other immigrants who seek American opportunities today. The fact that these settlers braved the dangers ahead speaks to how little future they saw for themselves at home. French settler, Michel-Guillaume Jean de Crèvecoeur (1782), sums up this sentiment well:

To what purpose should [American settlers] ask one another what countrymen they are? Alas, two thirds of them had no country. Can a wretch who wanders about, who works and starves, whose life is a continual scene of sore affliction or pinching penury can that man call England or any other kingdom his country? (p. 3)

Here Crèvecoeur declares that the average settler had no bond to Europe. So little future was offered back home that these settlers readily adopted an American identity. Leaving, for these settlers, was a quiet act of revolution.

By the time the Sugar Act passed into law, the American colonies were full of European immigrants and native-born Anglo-Americans, many of whom came from nothing and bore little allegiance to their parent countries. These same settlers who had fought for English interests only a year before in the French and Indian War, were now being asked to carry its financial burden as well. The Quebec Act of 1774 which ceded territory to the French likely carried additional bite as those colonists who had fought for England watched the monarchy give away large swaths of land. These events carry much more significance when viewed against the backdrop of a population who had fundamentally declared their independence four centuries prior. They’d been asked to die in wars and pay the costs of an empire many of them felt no allegiance to. Taxes weren’t the reason, but they may well have been the cause of the American Revolution.

In summary, immigration to the New World represents a breakup of sorts between the settler and his country. This divorcing of the old life was itself an act of independence and self-determination. It was an indictment of the European system and an embrace of the potential for something better. It was a quiet revolution that involved no armies or wars. It was simply conceived by the act of walking away. What followed nearly three centuries later was nothing more than a formality. Revolution had been building for hundreds of years prior.

References:

Crèvecoeur, M.G. J. (1782). “What is an American?” Letter III of letters from an American farmer.

https://americainclass.org/sources/makingrevolution/independence/text6/crevecoeuramerican.pdf

Foner, E. (2011). Give me liberty: An American history. W.W. Norton & Company

Federalism: Echoes of Plato’s Paternal Guardian

When the framers of America’s constitution came together on a chilly November afternoon, likely very few expected the Articles of Confederation to be ratified quickly. In fact, it would be over two years before this early attempt at a governing framework would be codified. This wasn’t exactly a problem with the articles, but it was certainly a manifestation of another problem. The early attempts at federal governance required total agreement from all states. A paralyzed and powerless central government was a problem the framers and federalists both sought to resolve. Indeed, very little of the United States government requires unanimity to operate today, and it’d be easy to package the federalist movement as a rebuttal to the Articles of Confederation; but reality speaks to a much deeper philosophical debate. The Federalist Papers weren’t just about a strong central government, they advocated for the rule of law, a guardian state that ran afoul of America’s identity and confronted the values of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Two thousand years before American colonists declared their independence, Plato wrestled with the ideas of moral autonomy and the paternal state. He had only recently watched his mentor Socrates put to death at the hands of democratic lynch men, and he now questioned the merits of mob rule. Undoubtedly the events surrounding Socrates’ execution greatly influenced his mistrust of the general citizenry, and his belief in absolute obedience to the law. In Crito, Plato goes so far as to declare that the citizen is indebted to the state. “[S]ince you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by [the state] can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave” (Crawford, 2007 p. 30), he says. So sacred was the law, and by extension, the state, that Plato declared them our paternal guardians. In his mind, the public was not to be trusted. It was after all a panel of citizens who had convicted Socrates to die. The law, by contrast, was emotionally agnostic and in theory, state guardians could be taught to protect it. Plato had no way of knowing that his principles of guardianship would persist for millennia to come, and one day work their way into the founding documents of the world’s greatest empire.

Centuries later, the Federalist papers sought to address certain deficiencies in the Articles of Confederation. Among them, entangled federal and state powers and a weak central government. This implied that a strong central government was needed but that boundaries needed to be set. At first pass these objectives may seem at odds with one another. However, as historian Gary Wills summarizes it,

Neither [Hamilton nor Madison] wanted to see the states absorbed into a national government, but neither thought it was likely. It seemed [unlikely] that a central authority could or would want to descend to enforcement of local laws. (Wills, 1982 p. xv)

Separation of powers was essential to the Federalist system and both Hamilton and Madison recognized that the federal government couldn’t do everything. Nevertheless, Americans were wary of the formation of a strong central government. Not only would this have seemed like a return to British rule, but the very presence of a central government implied authority and the rule of law. More importantly, it required that the citizen cede a little of their personal autonomy to the state. These demands were not entirely unwarranted, however. North America was, after all, far from settled. There were still active Indian, French, Spanish, and English interests in the region, and domestic instability in the recently failed Shay’s rebellion (Krutz, 2021). Certainly, a strong central government could play a useful role in international and domestic affairs yet, empowering a central government carried a scent of Plato’s paternal guardian and such sentiments were decidedly not American. It’s not clear how many common Americans would have actively connected resistance of central governance to Plato’s guardian state, but these aspects certainly would have played with America’s founders. After all, “Madison did not believe in the equality of the branches of government, but in legislative supremacy” (Wills, 1982 p. xxii). In other words, the rule of law. Despite reservations that a central government could metastasize into tyranny, the debate pressed on. A central government was necessary, the federalists argued, but to what degree.

Ultimately a strong separation of federal and state powers such as that protected by the tenth amendment, carried the day. The federalist papers served their purpose, and the constitution was ratified. However, for those who were wary of Madison’s view, their fears would have been codified with the formation of the Supreme Court. It was, in many respects, a final nod to Plato’s guardian state. The court was assigned to protect the Constitution and ruled by a panel of judges who could not be removed. States retained much of their autonomy but guardianship, it seemed, would forever have a role in American government.

It’s easy to view the federalist papers as a logical rebuttal to the Articles of Confederation; and, in many respects, this is a fair assessment. The notion of a strong central government, after all, is academic in hindsight. Yet for the time, the ideas of central governance would have seemed overbearing and paternalistic. Indeed, the debate over how much federal government is necessary continues to this day. The persistence of this dialogue speaks to more than the structure of government; it speaks to a debate between personal autonomy and the guardian state. A debate that reaches back to the time of Plato.

References

Crawford, T. (Ed). (2007). Six great dialogues. Dover Publications, Inc.

Krutz, G. (2021). American government (3rd ed.). Rice University.

https://openstax.org/details/books/american-government-3e

Wills, G. (1982). The federalist papers. Bantam Classic.

The Inalienable Rugged American

As Charles Ingalls drove his family west across the frozen Mississippi river, he had no idea that his daughter’s stories would be immortalized as classic American history. Though they were only one family out of tens of thousands to push into America’s heartland, they existed at a time of pivotal transition from homesteading to mass industrialization. Yet despite the dramatic changes in where and how people lived, the fundamental aspects of America remained unchanged. This essay explores who and what Americans are, the threads that stitch our society together, and how the earliest aspects of our culture continue to shape who we are today.

As a furniture builder I have some appreciation for the industrious capability of the early settlers. That is to say, I can only sense the great chasm that exists between twenty-first century woodworking, and raising a family, fending off Indians, and building a homestead. It’s remarkable to consider that for Charles Ingalls, felling trees and building a cabin with no recourse except what he could provide for himself, was simply part of the task of being a man. Yet tens of thousands of settlers chose the dangers and unpredictability of the frontier, over the relative stability of settled lands.

It is this choice, in fact, that makes America what it is. The United States represents a type of natural selection that began with the earliest settlers and continues with modern immigration today. Consider, for example, the type of person who decides to push westward across the Appalachian Mountains, with only a wagon, axe, and his wits to see him through. Today those same people contend with deserts, rivers, and human trafficking while in search of something better. The fact is, most people, whether then or now, will avoid the frontier. For most, even an uncomfortable life is preferable to the possibility of dying. It is no wonder then that America is a collection of inwardly directed, self-reliant, anti-intellectual individuals, who lack pretense and are suspicious of those who harbor it. From necessity more than intelligence, the frontier selected for the bootstrap American while rejecting all aspects of class and European hauteur. “Here there are no aristocratical families,” writes French American Michel-Guillaume Jean De Crèvecoeur. “[N]o courts, no kings, no bishops…The rich and the poor are not so far removed from each other as they are in Europe.” He continues, “The rich stay in Europe; it is only the middling and the poor that emigrate.” (Crèvecoeur, 1782).

In this sense, America disposed its people of class by virtue of geography, while simultaneously instilling a great value for self-reliance and inner-direction. This inner-direction as Sociologist David Riesman (1963) wrote, is defined as an increase in personal mobility, accumulation of wealth, expansion, exploration, and colonization (p. 14). Riesman goes on to say, “the source of direction for the individual is ‘inner’ in the sense that it is implanted early in life by the elders and directed toward generalized by nonetheless inescapably destined goals” (p. 15). In other words, the modern traits of American exceptionalism are engrained in us by prior generations and ultimately those forged by the frontier. In this way, the traits of the most adventurous settlers echo through modern American society.

The frontier, therefore, dispelled all notions of intellectualism by rejecting whatever debate might have been associated with the luxury of the upper class. As Crèvecoeur pointed out, these were not the people to make the journey in the first place, but had they crossed the Atlantic Ocean en masse, they would have found little utility for European intellectualism in the frontier. Indeed, America’s anti-intellectualism, cultivated by the harsh reality of the wilderness, persisted well into the twentieth century. Historian Richard Hofstadter (1966) cites President Eisenhower, who defined an intellectual as, “a man who takes more words than are necessary to tell more than he knows” (p. 10). This sentiment illustrates the collision between academia and American independence. Ironically, Eisenhower, a West Point grad and hard-nosed Texan, embodied this dichotomy himself. Yet, like Riesman’s inner-direction, America’s anti-intellectualism is born of a frontier where a man’s wits, not his social status, were often the difference between life and death. This environment cultivated a distaste for the superfluous as much as it fueled America’s expansion and industrial might. As the frontier of America’s wilderness diminished, we turned our attention, with no less rugged individualism, to the frontiers of industry and the world.

In summary, Americans are, in a very literal sense, a product of our environment, formed both by our geography and the generations who raised us. America’s culture is not homogeneous in a sense that binds us together in groups, but instead we our bound to one another as individuals. Though modern technology has radically changed how Americans live, there is still no escaping the individualism and self-reliance of our ancestors.

References

Crèvecoeur, M.G. J. (1782). “What is an American?” Letter III of letters from an American farmer.

https://americainclass.org/sources/makingrevolution/independence/text6/crevecoeuramerican.pdf

Hofstadter, R. (1966). Anti-intellectualism in American life. Vintage Books.

Riesman, D., Glazer, N., & Denney, R. (1963). The lonely crowd: A study of the changing American

character. Yale University Press.