In 2001 noted Political Scientist and Professor John Mearsheimer published his third book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Mearsheimer pays particular attention to states and their motivations in chapter 3, in which he defines the world as inherently anarchial, competitive, and one dominated by power, fear, and a quest for survival. This trinity of motivations manifests principally as military strength, aggression, and underhanded behavior which can only be offset by geographical factors or opposing strength (Mearsheimer, 2001). This essay examines a few of Mearsheimer’s positions and argues that contrary to a perpetual state of fear and threat of war, the world today is driven much more by economic motivations, interconnectivity, and mutual prosperity.
The decade following the end of World War II laid the groundwork for two markedly divergent paths of global order. In one was the rise of the Soviet Union, nuclear proliferation, and an omnipresent threat of atomic catastrophe. In the other, the late forties and fifties marked the beginning of globalization, openness, and increased economic freedom between countries. As Princeton Professor of Politics and International Affairs John Ikenberry (1996, pp. 79 - 80) points out, it was institutions like the United Nations and global trade agreements like GATT that, while widely used to enforce Soviet containment, provided the basic stability for Western States and democracies to engage in more free and open trade. It is, as Ikenberry says (p. 79), telling that while the Soviet Union collapsed more than thirty years ago, these Western agreements and trade are still flourishing today.
Mearsheimer (2001, pp. 63-64, 66) would argue that institutions like the UN, NATO, and trade agreements like GATT or the USMCA (formerly NAFTA) are at their root driven by competition and motivated by fear and a need for ever greater security. But why? Mearsheimer (p. 54) clearly states that his first assumption is that world order is anarchic. This to mean, as he puts it, there is no government of governments, no global authority presiding over world affairs. It is this anarchial environment that inspires competition and leads states to exist in perpetual fear.
On its face at the highest level, the world is anarchic. There is no government of governments and save for the goodwill of a Great Power, smaller states have little recourse. However, there are Great Powers and those Great Powers do come to the aid of weaker states. Currently we see this playing out in great force in the Ukraine war. More distantly, in the first Gulf War, the United States came to the aid of Kuwait. America also infamously backed the Taliban against the Soviets during their Afghan war. Great Power involvement in the affairs of weaker states is discretional to be sure but it’s not non-trivial. Furthermore, trade deals like the USMCA or the USJTA (United States Japan Trade Agreement) provide the structure and necessary rules that govern commerce between countries that both parties agree to. In short, whether a Great Power, an international trade deal, or non-governmental organizations like the IMF or the IAEA, there are resources available to weaker states. The world does not exist in a vacuum of authority as perhaps Mearsheimer suggests nor is it a free for all. Trade agreements and cooperatives between States like the UN provide a semblance of international law and order, not anarchy.
Mearsheimer (2001) concludes that survival is the core drive of every state and indeed it is hard to argue that any state would choose to not exist. However, Mearsheimer over-indexes on the prominence of survival in the policies of foreign affairs. For example, he writes, “[…] the only assumption in dealing with a specific motive that is common to all states says their principal objective is to survive” (p. 55). He furthers this point by proposing that American military might is the only reason Canada and Mexico do not attack their North American neighbor and that the Atlantic Ocean is the only thing keeping the Americans out of Europe (pp. 56, 60). These arguments ignore the mutually beneficial trade agreements between the U.S., Mexico, and Canada, as strong motivators for peace; and they ignore the fact that the United States has twice crossed the Atlantic to fight World Wars; and, after occupying large swaths of the European continent, decided to give it back. To be clear, survival can absolutely play a dominant role in foreign policy. The spread of Communism was a key motivator in America’s decision to get involved in Vietnam, for example (Office of the Historian, 1964). The Cold War and the resulting arms race were also direct manifestations of all the things Mearsheimer identifies in his arguments. The critique is that the motivators of fear and survival are highly selective to specific situations between actors. The foreign policy of Ukraine, for example, is no doubt highly indexed by fear and a struggle for survival, but this does not mean that a similar relationship exists between the countries of Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
Finally, if fear, survival and the threat of war govern foreign policy, we should see an increase in inter-state conflict, but in fact we see a long-term decline in wars between countries. According to the Peace Research Institute (2016), rates of war between countries have dramatically declined since the 1940s. In fact, not only have rates of inter-state conflicts decreased, they’re not a major contributor to overall world conflict:
(Gates et al., 2016, p. 2)
Over this same period, the world has become increasingly globalized and economically dependent. As American University professor Joshua Goldstein (2011) points out:
Not only is China a very long way from being able to go toe-to-toe with the United States [militarily]; it’s not clear why it would want to. A military conflict (particularly with its biggest customer and debtor) would impede China’s global trading posture and endanger its prosperity. (Wars will get worse in the future section, para. 4)
The same logic applies to the relationships codified in NAFTA and later the USMCA. In today’s world, economic prosperity motivates Great Powers while existential survival is the exception, not a constant. Consider, for example, that from the end of World War II until the early 1970s, world GDP and trade grew by 4.9% and 7% respectively per year. The fortunes of growth were universally felt from Europe to Asia, and of course, North America (WTO, 2014, p.48). It’s hard to imagine such a change in global prosperity not impacting priorities between states; and indeed, the decline in inter-state conflicts suggests this is the case.
In summary, the world does not exist in a state of total anarchy. Great Powers serve their best interests, but today those interests are principally governed by maintaining good economic ties with the rest of the world. An increase in trade, a decrease in inter-state conflicts, and the proliferation of international cooperatives all reflect a shift toward global interdependence. The more skin states have in the economic game, the more they have to lose through war. Survival is therefore less driven by an anarchial model of power and fear, and more incentivized through economic prosperity while playing within the rules.
References
Gates, S., Nygard, H.M., Strand, H. & Urdal, H. (2016). Trends in armed conflict, 1946-2014.
Peace Research institute Oslo. https://files.prio.org/publication_files/prio/Gates,%20Nyg%C3%A5rd,%20Strand,%20Urdal%20-%20Trends%20in%20Armed%20Conflict,%20Conflict%20Trends%201-2016.pdf
Goldstein, J. (2011, August 15). Think again: war. Foreign policy.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/15/think-again-war/
Ikenberry, J. (1996). The myth of post Cold-War chaos. Foreign Affairs, 75(3), 79-91.
Mearsheimer, J. (2001). Anarchy and the struggle for power. The tragedy of great power politics. (pp.
54-72). W.W. Norton & Company
Office of the Historian. (1964, March 16). 84. Memorandum from the secretary of defense
(McNamara) to the president. Office of the historian. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d84
World Trade Organization. (2014). World trade report 2014.
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/world_trade_report14_e.pdf